The Minority’s Groping: Further Light on Khaisan and Udai*

NAKAMI, TATSUO
Institute for the Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa

The Mongol declaration of independence was not an outcome of the Chinese Revolution in 1911 against the Manchu government. Certainly, the Mongols declared its independence concurrently with the outbreak of the Chinese Revolution. However, the latter did no more than accelerating it. Mongol independence was basically the result of their own nationalistic movements for ages. The declaration of independence and the formation of the Bogdo Khan regime, were aimed at creating a “Great Mongolian State” including not only Outer but also Inner Mongolia. The Bogdo Khan government was thus joined by many Inner Mongols who occupied important positions in it. Among them, Khaisan from Kharachin, Councillor of Home Affairs, and Udai (Otai) from Khorchin, Vice-Minister of Military Affairs, were the most distinguished. I have already written an article on these two men entitled “Khaisan and Udai: Two Inner Mongols under the Bogdo Khan Regime”, *The Tōyō Gakuhō*, Vol. 57, Nos. 1–2 (January, 1976).11

---

* This article is the revised paper read at 5th East Asian Altaistic Conference on December 31, 1979. I wish most earnestly to thank Professor Hidehiro Okada, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, for his valuable criticism and advice, and Professor Paul M. Thompson, University of London, for his kind efforts in improving my English.

I also would like to express my thanks to the former Director Wang Yu-chung and the staff of the Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica in Taipei for their generous assistance when I visited the Institute. A research grant from the Japan Association for Asian Political and Economic Studies enabled me to research at the Institute.


Since the publication of my article, the several works relating to this subject have been published. They are as follows:


How did the Inner Mongols under the Bogdo Khan regime act at that time when Russia, aiming at the formation of Autonomous Outer Mongolia, was putting strong pressure upon the Bogdo Khan government? Until now, this question has been largely ignored even by the scholars in the Mongolian People's Republic. In this paper, using mainly the foreign archival documents at the Institute of Modern History of Academia Sinica, and the papers of George Ernest Morrison at the Mitchell Library, I would like to answer that question by focussing on Khasian and Udai.


T'ien Chih-hê 田 志和, "Sha-ē yü Mēng-ku Wu-t'ai tê p'an-luan” [沙俄與蒙古烏泰的叛亂], Chi-tin shin-ta hsieh-pao 『吉林師大學報』, 1978, No. 3 pp. 36–43.


3) Chung-hua min-kuo wai-chiao tang-an, Chung-tê tang, Wai-Mēng-ku lei 中華民國外交檔案中俄檔外蒙古類 [unpublished documents on Sino-Russian relations concerning Outer Mongolia].

Only file that are cited in this article are listed:
K'u-lun tu-li an 庫倫獨立案, 16 Vols. [Abbreviation: KTA]
Vol. 1–15: Ch'ao-tang 諧檔 (copies), File number D-5-1 (Pei-tzu 北字 no. 2320).
Vol. 16 : Yüan-tang 原檔 (original), File number D-5-2 (pei-tzu 2321).
Ch'ai-kê-t'u hui-i ch'ao-tang 極克図會議谐檔, 8 Vols, Ch'ao-tang, File number D-6-2 (Pei-tzu no. 2326). [Abbreviation: CHC].

4) In regard to George Ernest Morrison, see
G. E. Morrison was the political adviser to the government of the Republic of China since August 2, 1912. After Morrison's death in 1920, his papers were given in trust to the Mitchell Library in Sydney, Australia. The papers are now catalogued and opened to the public in that Library. (File no. ML MSS. 312) See Guide to the Papers of George Ernest Morrison in the Mitchell Library, Sydney (Sydney: Library Council of New South
Khaisan was born in Qadalang Ulaγan Παγγα of the Kharachin Right Banner of Čoγu Čiγuγu in 1862/63. After a varied career in China proper and Manchuria, Khaisan led a Mongol uprising against the Chinese immigrants into his land. Such uprisings often occurred in Inner Mongolia in the late Ch'ing. Although Khaisan struck a blow against the Chinese, he was obliged to flee to Harbin for safety. There, he worked as the editor of the first newspaper in Mongolian, the Mongγul-un sonin biγig, published by the Chinese Eastern Railways Company. This newspaper is highly esteemed by the scholars in the Mongolian People's Republic for its great influence on the Mongol movement for independence. It seems that leaving Harbin Khaisan set foot in Urga for the first time in 1907, and joined in the movement toward independence led by Khandadorji and Cherengchimed. By this time, Khaisan had arrived at the conclusion that the Mongols had to liberate themselves from Chinese domination and form an independent state of their own. According to Gustaf J. Ramstedt, who had met Khaisan in 1909,

"He [Khaisan] spoke of all the tribulations which oppressed the Mongols'"

Wales, 1977, ii+229 p.
A part of the papers was edited and published by Lo Hui-Min.
While this article was being printed, I had an opportunity to research the papers at the Mitchell Library. Fortunately, I could add some materials I had found there, which were not printed in Correspondence in this article.


In regard to Ch'en Lu's book, see


9) Gustaf John Ramstedt (1873–1950), the well-known Finnish Altaist who was at this time researching in Mongolia.
minds. Out of 88 princes about 40 were clear about the political situation, said Khaisan-gun. He had visited them all. Some of them were seized by fright and realized the coming danger, while others were so ignorant and addicted to drunkenness that a visit to them was wasted."\(^{10}\)

The political strain in Mongolia reached a climax especially in Urga with the arrival of the new Amban Sandowa 三多 (March 11, 1910), to whom the enforcement of "the new policy toward Outer Mongolia" had been entrusted. The principal aims of that policy were to develop Mongolia, to interrupt Russian expansion, and to absorb the overpopulation of China proper into Mongolia, and so. However, from the point of view of the Mongols, the new policy represented a critical threat to their ecological environment.\(^{11}\) In July, 1911, secret meetings were held in Urga by the princes and lamas. All of the participants recognized that Mongolia was faced with a crisis, but it seems that there was no consensus at first on the future status of Mongolia. Among them, Khaisan together with Cherengchimed, took the most radical position.\(^{12}\) Finally the conclusion was reached that they should send a delegation to Russia to ask for her support. Khaisan represented Inner Mongolia in this delegation.\(^{13}\)

On September 13, 1911, the Ch'ing government abandoned "the new policy toward Mongolia" because of strong pressures from Russia.\(^{14}\) However, on October 10, the Chinese Revolution broke out in China proper. Mongolian princes and lamas, making use of the disorders in China proper, declared the Mongolian independence and established the Bogdo Khan government on December 1. In that government, Khaisan took the post of Counsellor of Home Affairs\(^{15}\) under Cherengchimed. In the early days of the Bogdo Khan regime,

---


12) In 1915, Cherengdorji*, remembering the independence of 1911, told Ch'en Lu** "if Khaisan hadn't come to Urga, Outer Mongolia would not have been able to gain its independence." See Ch'en Lu: *op. cit.*, p. 109.

* The Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs at this time, and afterwards the first Prime Minister of the Mongolia People's Republic.

** the Chinese High Commissioner in Urga.

13) Khaisan and Cherengchimed often wrote letters to their old friend, Polish philologue, Kotovits on this trip. In those letters, their desire for the nation's independence was vividly manifested. See B. Котовичийн хувийн архиваас олдсон Монголын түүхэнд холбогдох зарим бичиг, (Ulan-Batur, 1972).

After the formation of the Bogdo Khan regime, it sent delegations to Russia in 1912–13 and 1913–14. Every time the Inner Mongols joined in a mission. In the delegation of 1913–14 Udai was vice-representative.


Cherengchimed, surrounded by many distinguished Inner Mongols, held the most influential position in that government.\(^{16}\) Khaisan was playing the part of the leader of these Inner Mongols. Cherengchimed was a radical nationalist, and it was his strongly-held desire to make Bogdo's Mongolia completely independent.\(^{17}\) It seems that Khaisan wielded considerable influence through his close connection with Cherengchimed.\(^{18}\) The Bogdo Khan regime's foreign documents were written mainly by him.\(^{19}\) Theodor Alfred Rustad\(^ {20}\) met Khaisan in Urga in 1911–12, and wrote about him as follows:

“He [Khaisan] would have Mongolia absolutely independent. We used to have discussions on the subject. He was not for the Russians, on the contrary he was very suspicious of them and watched their movement very carefully. He said he know that there existed a party in Russia that wanted to make the Desert of Gobi the frontier between China and Russia. Russia only wanted North Mongolia together under one government. He said he knew the Russians were against the Southern Mongols joining the North, because it would interfere with their plan. He however was working to get the whole of Mongolia together. He is a real patriot, nothing mean about him. He has got his ideal and is working for it... Hai-Shun-Gung further told me that if no nation outside of Russia would recognize their independence, he would then go to the Hague conference\(^ {21}\) and try to get the sympathy of the Powers. Hai-Shun-Gung is the only man of the new Mongol government that really does anything. The rest of them just drink and let things go as they best can, and leaves everything to Hai-Shung-Gung. He takes no salary and spends his own money. He wants

---


\(^{17}\) Наявнамжил, Г.: *Өөрөө бичээчийн үгүүлэл*. (Ulan-Batur, 1956), pp. 188–189. Although Cherengchimed was a lama priest of high rank, he showed a marked trend toward secularism.

\(^{18}\) Ibid., p. 189.


However, according to Prof. Paul Hyer, Prof. S. Jagchid’s revised opinion is that those documents were mainly written not by Khaisan, but by Sodnam. I thank Prof. P. Hyer for this communication.

\(^{20}\) T. A. Rustad, a Norwegian in the employ of the British and American Tabacco Company, operating in Mongolia. See *Correspondence, II*, p. 47, note 1.

\(^{21}\) Khaisan had said the same meaning to a Russian in 1910. See Григорьевич, С.С.: *Дальневосточная политика империалистических держав в 1906–1917 гг.*, (Tomsk, 1965), p. 392.
the Mongols to be treaded like human beings that is all he works for he says. He is sincere all right, but I am afraid the Russians will get the best of him in the long run."

The last paragraph of Rustad’s letter, showed his far-sightedness, and accurately foretold Khaisan’s subsequent activities:

“I [Rustad] believe that if Hai-Shun-Gung could be explained the situation properly, he would rather go together with China than risk to be annexed by Russia, sooner or later.”

Within the Bogdo Khan regime, there was a counterforce opposing Cherengchimed. It was the pro-Russian group led by the Outer Mongolian princes. The discordance between Cherengchimed and that group gradually became clearer. Namnangsüürgün’s appointment as Prime-Minister in July, 1912, marked the success of that group’s efforts to bring about a decline in the influence of Cherengchimed.

Udai was born in Khorchin’s Ḫasar-tu Banner of Ḫirim Ėjuultan in 1859/60. At first he was a lama but in 1884 he renounced the cloth to become a feudal lord on his brother’s death. However, the human relations surrounding him were complicated, and the financial situation of his Banner was at its worst. Being heavily in debt on his sif, Udai accepted loans from Russian agencies in Manchuria. From 1901 onward, he leaned toward Russia politically. Russia intended to use Udai as a tool for expanding her influence into Inner Mongolia. However, this partnership did not last long, because Russia found that Udai had become unreliable. Having also built up a large indebtedness to the Ch‘ing government, he had gradually come under Chinese influence. Sometime later, Udai came into touch with the Mongol independence

22) Correspondence, II, No. 554, from T. A. Rustad, Chinwangtso, Chili, 5 November 1912, pp. 51-52.


24) In my earlier article, about Udai’s name, I had quoted Owen Lattimore’s the Mongols of Manchuria (1st published in 1934; reprinted by New York: Howard Fertig, 1969) as follows: “the Chinese transcription of his [Udai’s] name is Wu-t’ai [五台], and in fact he was probably named after the Wu-t’ai Shan [五台山], a group of five holy mountains in northern Shansi province, which is an important center of Mongol pilgrimages.” (p. 119.) However, when I tried to reconfirm this with Professor O. Lattimore at the Third International Congress of Mongologists (Ulan-Batur, August 1976), he retracted the statement for the reason that Wu-t’ai is inconsistent with Udai.

25) Udai was 25 years old in 1884. See Hsü Shih-ch’ıang 徐世昌: Tung-san-sheng chéng-lüeh (東三省政略), (Shanghai, 1911), Vol. 2, p. 10.
movement through *Siregetü blam-a bökü bayan* (his brother?), who was always his political ally and who had a great influence on him.26) According to the Russian documents, Siregetü blam-a visited St. Petersburg in the spring of 1910 to ask for Russian support for the struggle against the Ch'ing.27) At that time, Russia, stressing that this struggle should be materially independent, promised to give them only moral support.

Just as Udai was at the nadir of his fortunes and was planning to return to politics, the Chinese Revolution and the Mongol declaration of independence occurred. In August, 1912, Udai together with Rashimingchur of Khorchin, responding to the persuasion of the Bogdo Khan regime to unify the Outer and Inner Mongolia, rose in arms. However, his rebellion was suppressed by a strong Chinese army and he, together with many Mongols, fled to Urga. What did his rebellion mean? It is certain that the declaration of independence in Urga deeply impressed the people of Inner Mongolia. In fact, 35 out of Inner Mongolia’s 49 Banners wanted to join Independent Mongolia. However, in reality, most of them were too prudent or irresolute to attempt joining the Bogdo Khan regime.28) Udai’s uprising was the first as well as the biggest among those that broke out at that time. Udai was appointed Vice-Minister of Military Affairs in the Bogdo Khan regime, when he arrived in Urga.

In November, 1912, Bogdo’s Mongolia was successful in establishing tentative diplomatic relations with Russia by concluding an agreement, in spite of the fact that Russia had been aiming at the formation of Autonomous Outer Mongolia since the Mongol declaration of independence.29) As I have already mentioned, Bogdo’s Mongolia aimed to be a completely independent state uniting all of the Mongols. Therefore, after the signature of the Russo-Mongolian Agreement, she launched an offensive to obtain diplomatic recognition from the Imperialist Powers.30) However, Russia strongly opposed Mongolia making contacts with the Imperialist Powers, considering the international relations in East and Inner Asia. Struggling against growing Russian pressures, Cherengchimed searched for Japanese support. In February, 1913, he went to Hailar, and asked the Japanese consul-general in Harbin to arrange

trip to Japan for him. The Japanese consul-general in deference to the non-involvement policy toward Outer Mongolia which was expressed in the Russo-Japanese Entente of 1912, warned Cherengchimed against arousing Russian suspicion. In the end, Cherengchimed was obliged to abandon his trip because of strong Russian pressure, and returned in anger to Urga. The Inner Mongols in Outer Mongolia were greatly shocked by this failure, because they knew that not only Russia but even Japan was against the Inner Mongolia uniting with the Outer Mongolia. On March 24, 1913, Henry G. C. Perry-Ayscough\(^{31}\) supposed that Udai would “in the next few days tender his allegiance to the Republican government.” According to Perry-Ayscough, “the question of Mongolia is assuming a slightly better complexion.”\(^{32}\)

However, Udai was planning just the opposite behavior to the one Perry-Ayscough had expected. Immediately after the signing of the Russo-Mongolian Agreement, the military invasion of Inner Mongolia was being encouraged, mainly by the Inner Mongols in Outer Mongolia headed by Udai. Khaisan and the famous hero from Barga named Damdinsüürün, approved of this plan.\(^{33}\) After Cherengchimed’s fall from power, of which decisive factor was his failure to visit Japan, the majority of the Bogdo Khan regime or Outer Mongolian princes began to attach primary importance to Outer Mongolia. Opposing them, the Inner Mongols in Outer Mongolia aimed at building up the effective administration of the Bogdo Khan regime over Inner Mongolia for the purpose of realizing their wish: the formation of the “Great Mongolian State” including Inner Mongolia. The military invasion began in January, 1913, and among the commanders of the Bogdo Khan army were of course Khaisan and Udai.\(^{34}\) In the first six months in 1913, the Bogdo Khan army prevailed over the Chinese army. However, after that, the Bogdo Khan army was worried by the lack of weapons. Moreover, the invasion was faced with Russian strong objection. In the end, the Bogdo Khan’s force was obliged to withdraw from Inner Mongolia in December, 1913.\(^{35}\)

While military invasion was being undertaken, just the opposite activity was being attempted at the same time. According to Morrison, it seems that

---

\(^{30}\) Nakami Tatsuo, “Bogudo Hán seiken no taigai kōshō doryoku . . .”, pp. 1–58.

\(^{31}\) Henry George Charles Perry-Ayscough, British employee of the Chinese Post Office, a District Deputy Postmaster. The co-author of *With the Russians in Mongolia* (op. cit.).

\(^{32}\) *Correspondence, II*, No. 585, to D. D. Braham, Peking, 11 April 1913, pp. 121–122.


\(^{34}\) Пунцагноров, Ц.: *op. cit.*, p. 60.

\(^{35}\) “Письмо чрезвычайного Монгольского посланника, председателя совета министров Монголии министру и. д. Сазонову от 16(3) декабря 1913 г.”, “Царская Россия и Монголия в 1913–1914 гг.”, *Красный архив*, Vol. 6 (37), 1929, pp. 37–38.

\(^{36}\) *Correspondence, II*, No. 631, to Ts'ai T'ing-kan, Peking, 25 July 1913, p. 203.
Mongol emissaries often came and went between Urga and Peking from the beginning of 1913. In his memorandum dated of July 25, 1913, Morrison wrote as follows:

"In the beginning of this year Mongol emissaries from Urga proposed certain conditions, by agreement with which a number of Mongols and their families and following in Urga would return to China. Conditions proposed were easy of acceptance. They referred mainly to the prevention of the cultivation of Mongol lands by Chinese unless with Mongol consent, to the retention by Mongols of their ranks, to the re-building of the Palace and their buildings of Wu tai [Udai] and the restoration of his rank, to a question of Mongols having their own officials, and to a question of expenses. Virtually the condition had for their object the guarantee of the protection of their lives and property.

The return of these Mongols to China—and every day the number of them is increasing—will have one highly important result. The world will see that Mongols, whom the Russians represented as being clamorous for Russian protection from Chinese oppression, are anxious to escape from that protection and return to their kinsmen. The return will falsify Russian misrepresentations.”

It seems that the wirepuller behind these emissaries was Khaisan, who had kept secret contact with Prince Gungsunghorbu of Kharachin and Frans August Larson (in Chinese, Lan Li-hsun 藪理諫). Gungsunghorbu was the most important figure in Inner Mongolia and when the Bogdo Government was organized, he pledged allegiance to the Bogdo Khan, but after that, thinking over the situation of Inner Mongolia calmly, switched to the side of China. It is certain that even after this turnabout he remained in making contact with many men in Urga, including Khaisan. It is also know that Larson, a Mongol sympathizer, was, at this time the adviser to the Bureau of Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs. According to a Chinese document dated April 1, 1913, Khaisan, as he

Frans A. Larson (b.1870), a Swedish missionary and curio dealer, formerly agent of British and Foreign Bible Society in Mongolia, where he lived for many years and travelled widely. He had many Mongol friends in not only Inner but also Outer Mongolia. He was famous in his book, Larson: Duke of Mongolia (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1950). I could identify Larson with Lan Li-hsun, as I found his name cards, which were printed in English and Chinese, in the Papers of G. E. Morrison, ML MSS. 312/204 (Mongolia, 1914–1919), p. 379.
went to Harbin secretly, was found out by the Russian authorities and was obliged to return to Urga.\textsuperscript{40} Khaisian was prohibited from leaving Urga by the Bogdo Khan government. After these secret contacts, Khaisian sent his eldest son, Hai Yung-pu 海永溥 /or Hai Yung-chêng 海永盛 in a different document\textsuperscript{41}/to Peking.\textsuperscript{42}

On September 26, 1913, just as the Bogdo Khan army’s campaign was at a standstill, Morrison wrote to Ts'ai T'ing-kan 蔡廷幹 as follows:

> "Today I had a visit from another Mongol, an intelligent young man with an excellent knowledge of Chinese who is a Secretary in the Home Office in Urga. He only left Urga on 11th of September and has come round to Peking via Siberia. He is the eldest son of the Hai San Kung, who is the leader of the pro-Chinese Party in Urga. Important information has been brought back by him but he has to act with extreme caution for fear that the knowledge that he has returned to China and that his father is anxious to return may induce the Russians to impose difficulties upon his father. He asks that certain treatment should be accorded to him. To make quite clear what he requires he has written out in Chinese the proposals which he desires to bring before the notice of the High Authorities. In a separate sheet\textsuperscript{43} enclosed in this letter I roughly mention what he has done and some information that he has brought. No doubt you would be so kind as to see that it is brought before the notice of the President, because it seems very important that the Mongol Government in Urga should be weakened as quickly as possible by the secession of many of its followers."\textsuperscript{44}

How did Morrison evaluate this behavior of Khaisian? On October 21, 1913, Morrison wrote to Hsiung Hsi-ling 熊希齡 concerning Khaisian as follows:

> "There are still remaining in Urga various high Authorities who would like to return to China. Among those the most friendly to China is the Hai San Kung and it is about him that I now write. He is still in Urga..."

\textsuperscript{40} KTA, Vol. 8, 1 April 1913, ti-tzu no. 3041, [叡國務院圖一件].
\textsuperscript{41} CHC, Vol. 1, 13 March 1914, [叡蒙藏局圖一件].
\textsuperscript{42} KTA, Vol. 15, 4 December 1913, [叡國務院圖回蒙藏事務局是一件].
\textsuperscript{43} Larson was appointed the adviser on Morrison’s recommendation. In spite of this appointment, he remained to be “a friend for Mongols”. He was very concerned about future status of Mongolia, especially Inner Mongolia. See Nakami Tatsuo, “Bogdo Hán seiken no taigai kôshô doryoku...”; pp. 45–47.
\textsuperscript{44} Correspondence, II. No. 646, to Ts'ai T'ing-kan, Peking, 26 September 1913, p. 219.
It is very important that Hai San Kung should return to Peking but to induce him to return he would require to know how he was to be received. His friend the Bintu Wang, who showed marked friendliness to China, was killed in Urga. The son of the Hai San Kung returned to Peking on the 23rd of September. He is a trustworthy and intelligent man and if Your Excellency could find time to see him and Mr. Larson together, I think you would find it of great interest.\(^{45}\)

The formation of *Autonomous Outer* (not *Independent*) Mongolia was proclaimed by the Russo-Chinese declaration of November, 1913. The Inner Mongols in Outer Mongolia found themselves in a very difficult situation. At the same time, Khaisan’s secret negotiations were disclosed by the Bogdo Khan’s authorities and Khaisan and his family were all arrested on October 14, 1913.\(^{46}\) According to Khaisan himself, “it is hard to fathom the Russians’ real intention [toward Mongolia],” and “Russia, befooling Outer Mongolia, invaded our lands and plundered our rights and interests. I [Khaisan] protested against their unreasonable behavior. So, I earned their ill-will.” Khandadorji, Foreign Minister of the Bogdo Khan government and a leader of the pro-Russian group, and the Russian consul in Urga who had hated him, “enticed Rashimingchur to sue me [Khaisan] for my colluding with the Republican government.” In this way, he was arrested, and “too ill-treated for words.”\(^{47}\)

Hai Yung-pu in Peking, was very anxious about his father, and wrote a letter to the Bureau of Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs on December 4, 1913. In that letter, he asked to the Chinese authorities’ help to obtain the release of his father. The Chinese government, recognizing that Khaisan was arrested by the Bogdo Khan regime because of his pro-Chinese attitude, decided to comply with Hai Yung-pu’s request. China expected Russia to pressure the Bogdo Khan government into releasing Khaisan.\(^{48}\) The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs appealed to Russia for such mediation on December 5, 1913. When the Chinese Minister to Russia, Liu Ching-jen 劉錦人 met G. A. Kozakov\(^{49}\) on December 17, Kozakov indicated that Russia had no reason to do so. However, he said that Russia would advise the Bogdo Khan regime to release Khaisan, if China granted an amnesty to Udai, who had been on the side of the Bogdo Khan regime.\(^{50}\) In the result, Khaisan was released on the ground of insufficient evidence and his illness.\(^{51}\) After his release, Khaisan sometimes

---

\(^{45}\) *Correspondence, II*, No. 656, to Hsiung Hsi-ling, Peking, 21 October 1913, p. 230.

\(^{46}\) KTA, Vol. 15, 4 December 1913, [収國務院中俄蒙藏事務局電一件].

\(^{47}\) CHC, Vol. 1, 13 March 1914, [収蒙藏事務局電一件].

\(^{48}\) KTA, Vol. 15, 5 December 1913, shu-tzu no. 244, [發駐俄劉公使電一件].

\(^{49}\) Г. А. КОЗАКОВ, the Chief of the Far Eastern Section, Russian Foreign Office.

\(^{50}\) KTA, Vol. 15, 7 December 1913, [發駐俄劉公使電一件].; Vol. 15, 9 December 1914, wang-tzu no. 852, [發國務院總理電一件].

\(^{51}\) CHC, Vol. 1, 13 March 1914, [収蒙藏局電一件].
sent letters to the Chinese government, in which some suggestions were made.\textsuperscript{52)\textsuperscript{52}} However, The Chinese government decided that all of the problems concerning Mongolia should be solved officially at the conference which was scheduled to be opened in Kiakhta between Mongolia, Russia, and China. So, from the Chinese point of view, Khaisan's suggestions even if partially salutary were felt to be a potential obstacle at the conference.\textsuperscript{53)\textsuperscript{53}} Moreover, Russia, upset at Khaisan's behavior, supposed that he had acted at China's instigation. Finally, after destroying these negotiations, Russia protested to the Chinese government, demanding that it prevent Larson and Gungsunborbu from intervening in Mongol affairs.\textsuperscript{54)\textsuperscript{54}} Larson especially provoked the antipathy of Russia.\textsuperscript{55)\textsuperscript{55}}

Udai never abandoned his hope for the formation of a “Great Mongolian State”. He visited St. Petersburg together with the Prime Minister Namnang-süsür in December, 1913. Udai at that time spoke out his mind to his friend, Vadmaev,\textsuperscript{56)\textsuperscript{56}} who sent the following letter to the Russian Tsar:

“Udaiwan—the same man who during the Russo-Japanese war was consistently on the side of the Russians—has just visited me. Under all situations unfavourable to Russia, he helped Russians as far as it was within his ability and possibility.

The Chinese and Japanese did not like him and last year avenged him. His principality was completely destroyed and he fled with a thousand families definitively ruined. Khotukhhta accepted him.

Udaiwan, being as Vice-Minister of Justice\textsuperscript{57)\textsuperscript{57}} in Urga, arrived together

\textsuperscript{52)} One of his suggestions, for example, was that Urga should be turned into an international settlement. CHC, Vol. 2, 12 October 1914, [取政事堂交呈一件，附件鐵石所擬規復外蒙秩序條陳稿呈]。

\textsuperscript{53)} CHC, Vol. 1, 14 March 1914, [發蒙古事務處際一件]。

However, Khaisan was still highly esteemed by Morrison. Morrison, in his memorandum “to secure permanent peace in Inner Mongolia”, wrote as follows:

"Administration: The old methods employed under the Manchu dynasty are not suited to present conditions in Mongolia. What is needed is a Council of the Mongols themselves held in Mongolia, say, north Kกลาง which should include all the head Princes of Inner Mongolia, such as Abugar Ta Wang, Durbet Wang etc. Among them also should be included Hái San Kung, at present in Urga, who has great organising ability and knowledge of both Mongols and Chinese. He has proved himself throughout the recent crisis a loyal subject of the Chinese Republic. His son could take his place till he arrived."

See the Enclosure to the Letter No. 678: “Memorandum Regarding Mongolia, 3 December 1913”, Correspondence, II, p. 266.

\textsuperscript{54)} CHC, Vol. 1, 7 March 1914, [公府秘書堂際一件]。

\textsuperscript{55)} CHC, Vol. 1, 24 March 1914, [取政事堂奏附俄參贊柯里索福君問答紀要一件]。

\textsuperscript{56)} П. А. Вадмаев, the famous Kalmyk lama in St. Petersburg.

\textsuperscript{57)} Correctly, he was Vice-Minister of Military Affairs, but he is sometimes referred to as Vice-Minister of Justice in the literature. See for example, ۦ H. М. А. У. М. М. У. М., II, p. 528.
with Sayin-noyau Khan [Namnangsüürüüng], and had the happiness to be presented to Your Majesty in Livadia.

They are extremely depressed by their position and it is only out of respect for Your Majesty that they do not complain of the fact that no attention is paid to them.

However, to myself it is clear that they are dissatisfied with their mission, because the Ministry of Foreign Affairs till now has not replied to their written appeal including various kinds of requests." 58)

From June, 1914, the conference on the Mongolian problem was held in Kiakhta between Mongolia, Russia, and China. Udai sat as a member of the Mongol delegation at this conference. The problem of Inner Mongols in Outer Mongolia was of course taken up as a subject for discussion at the conference. 59) As a result, the Chinese government granted amnesties all the Inner Mongols in Outer Mongolia. After the Kiakhta Agreement of 1915 or the formation of Autonomous Outer Mongolia, the Inner Mongols including Khaisan and Udai went home with their hope broken. 60) However, both Khaisan and Udai were received warmly by the Chinese government: Khaisan for his contribution to China's restoration of power in Inner Mongolia, and Udai as a symbol of the Inner Mongols to whom China granted amnesties. Udai was not only restored to all his titles and rights, but appointed the councillor to the Bureau of Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs in the government of China at an annual salary of 12,000 liang. 61) Moreover, the Chinese local authorities lent him a helping hand to return to his homeland. 62) Khaisan received immunity from responsibility for his torture of the Chinese in Mongolia. 63) His title was restored and $5,000 was given from the Ministry of Finance on order of Yuán Shih-k'ai in Peking. 64)

In comparison with Udai, Khaisan's behavior sounds to be contradictory. He was certainly a radical nationalist in the early days of the Bogdo Khan regime. However, after that, he changed his attitude in the opposite direction. I believe that two aspects of his behavior must have been integrated in his interior. He became primarily concerned about the future status of Inner

58) "Письмо Доктора Бадмаева Николаю Романову от 5 января 1914 г. / 23 декабря 1913 г. /", "Царская Россия и Монголия", pp. 48–49.
60) E. H. M. A. У'-чин мунуух, II, pp. 528–529.
63) In regard to Khaisan's torture of the Chinese in Mongolia, see KTA, Vol. 5, 20 January 1913, ti-tzu no. 643, [取國務院函一件].
64) "Монголия", Вестник Азии, No. 37, Part 1, (1916), p. 126.
Mongolia, in proportion as the majority of the Bogdo Khan regime or Outer Mongolian princes attached much importance to Outer Mongolia especially after the fall of Cherengchimed. This Khaisan's change of attitude might be connected with his character. Khaisan was described not only as a very intelligent but also as a shrewd fellow by all the writers including the Outer Mongols,65) This character is said to be common to the Kharachin.66) It is natural that the minority among the big powers should have such a character. Udai was a single-minded man who could not look ahead into the future. The Mongols was the minority in the world the Imperialist Powers dominated. At the same time, the Inner Mongols under the Bogdo Khan regime was also the minority in Outer Mongolia. It seems that Khaisan and Udai's behaviors show both extremes of the typical patterns of the Inner Mongols in Outer Mongolia who, having a big vision of forming the "Great Mongolian State", had to experience frustrations.

65) НАСАНИМЖИЛ, Г.: op. cit., p. 189.