The Preparatory Committee for Implementation of Sharia (KPPSI): An Islamic Resurgence in South Sulawesi

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1. Introduction
Throughout the history of modern Indonesia, the demand for formal enforcement of the Islamic Syariah laws has been the mainstay of the muslims’ struggle since the birth of the state. The Jakarta Charter provides an evidence that the implementation of the Syariah has to involve the state. As attempts to ratify the Charter have never been successful, the demand has resurfaced each time there is an opportunity. During the rule of the authoritarian New Order regime, the voice demanding the implementation of the Syariah was largely unheard of, but it does not mean that the aspiration had died down. After the fall of the New Order, political parties with Islam affiliation, such as Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP / Union for Development Party), and Partai Bulan Bintang (PBB / Star and Moon Party), took a strong stance in the annual meeting of the People’s Assembly (MPR), which debated the amendment of the Constitution and repeated the demand that the omitted seven words in the Jakarta Charter were reinstated.

If we look closely, we can observe an ambiguity in the role of religion (Islam) in the state. On the one hand, the citizens demonstrate a high level of religiosity while the governing power has been unwilling to let Indonesia turn into an Islamic state. On the other hand, the push from the religiosity seems to have prevented them from turning Indonesia into a completely secular state. Within this context, we can see a number of state policies that are accommodative towards the interests of the citizens in practicing the Sharia.

For the sake of examples, we could list the passing of Law No. 1 on Marriage
in 1974, Law of Religious Court in 1989, Law on National Education in 1989, Compilation of Islamic Laws of 1991, Ministerial-level Joint Decree on Amil Zakat, Wakaf and Sadaqah in 1990. The entire body of regulations demonstrates the state’s willingness to accommodate the demands for and the interests in the implementation of the Sharia. Therefore, it was understandable that the Minister for Religion Munawir Sadzali said, just before the 1992 General Election, that the interests of the Muslims were already fulfilled by the state just at the time when no Islamic party existed in Indonesia.

Nevertheless, the state’s flexibility toward the interests in and the implementation of the Sharia was considered by some as insufficient as far as their aspiration was concerned. In general we can say that the Muslims’ aspiration concerning the role of religion in the state can be classified along three lines. First, as religion is an individual phenomenon, it concerns the relationship between a human being and the Al-Khalik (the Creator) and therefore it can be established and known only by the two parties. Consequently, it does not have to be included in the governance and the state has no right to interfere with a person’s religion because it is a private matter. Those who subscribe to this stance are mostly those who can be called religion-neutral nationalists. In the Javanese culture, the group of people is known as “Orang Abangan.”

Second, the implementation of the Sharia covers a certain segment that requires state intervention. Therefore, in certain issues the state has no choice but to interfere in the implementation of the Sharia. For the majority of the people, the Sharia implementation has permeated into their culture. Those who hold this belief are the santris (clerics), who do not actually believe that the establishment of an Islamic state is mandatory.

Third is the belief that Islam is both a religion and state (din wa daulah). The supporters believe that Islam is a perfect religion that not only regulate the people’s ibadah (ultimate worship to God) but also worldly power—which, in its application, renders the state non-existence. They believe that, to practice Islamic religion equals to establishing an Islamic state. In other words, establishing an
Islamic state is part of the enforcement of the Sharia. Believers of this doctrine are the santris who, influenced by certain teachings and political views, consider that Islam should be the basis for all dimensions of life in the world, including, in this case, the formation of the state.

If Indonesia, with its Pancasila (Five Fundamental Principles) had been able to bring prosperity and justice to its people and to create a system that prevents its government administrators from committing improper conducts, the last line of the aspiration might not have had room to grow in the country. Unfortunately, the reality has been that, since Indonesia won its independence in 1945 the state has had no power to obligate its people to strictly follow the teachings of their respective religion. This has resulted in rampant collusion, corruption and nepotism in addition to a host of other decadent conducts by the administrators as well as many of the common people.

All of these problems have strengthened—at least for those who have fought for this cause—the legitimacy for demanding a formal enforcement of Sharia in the state. As on the national level the aspiration to have the Sharia formally implemented no longer received any support, then in the present era of decentralization and regional autonomy certain regions—from the provincial to the regency and municipal levels—a new opportunity emerges for the aspiration to implement Sharia. South Sulawesi is one of the provinces where such an aspiration has flourished in the era of regional autonomy. The province has formally implemented the Sharia throughout its administrative region as the manifestation of the powerful Islamic culture there.

2. The Muslims Community of South Sulawesi

The existence of strong Muslims community in South Sulawesi first appeared at the end of the 16th century. At the time, Makassar had developed into a maritime town where its large port became the transit place for international traders. These were Muslim traders, including those from Gujarat, Arab and Persia. Despite the signs that the Muslims community already existed in the area, there
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has been no indication that a conversion of a large scale ever took place there except after Islam entered the power structure.

Since the King of Gowa and Tallo announced their conversion into Islam in 1605, the communities in this region almost at once changed their religion into Islam following their kings. Ibn Khaldun’s theory, which states that the religion of the people follows the religion of their king turned out to be the case in South Sulawesi. There have been a number of pockets that have never participated in the conversion. One of the reasons is the strong influence of local leaders who have stayed in their religion. Another reason may be that the pockets are geographically difficult to access by the Islamic preaching. Such a phenomenon can be observed in a lot of places where Islam is a majority religion.

Similar to what the Javanese had, in South Sulawesi the people also had their own “Wali Songo” (Nine Saints of Islam). These were charismatic figures that spread religious teachings both through culture and structure. Datuk Tallua (in the Makassarese language) or Datuk Tellue (in Bugis), which means three Datuks, were Islam preachers from the land of Minangkabau. They were recognized by the people from South Sulawesi as the first Islamic missionaries who spread Islam in the Bugis-Makassar. They were Datuk ri Bandang, who was actively teaching Islam in the eastern part of South Sulawesi, Datuk Patimang in the western part and Datuk ri Tiro in the southern part.

The three Datuks approached the elite in the Makassar kingdom and were responsible for the entry of the King, his family and his noblemen into Islam. What was more, one year later, the King of Gowa, who had changed his name into Sultan Alauddin, issued a decree, a political decision that declared Islam as the religion of his kingdom. The Sharia was implemented across the kingdom. The political decision had a very powerful effect on the acceleration of Islamization process.

In addition to the use of the structure, Islamization also took place through the cultural means. The teachings of Islam were included in the existing customs and traditions. The Sharia was made part of the pangadereng (in the Bugis
custom) or pangadakang (in the Makassarese custom), which was some kind of pakem (standard rules of tradition) that provided the guidance for living in a state, a community and a culture in this region.

In the pre-Islam tradition, there were four pillars for the establishment of a community, a state and a culture. These were ade (customary tradition that brought order and corrected the populace), rapang (which provided a strong foundation for the kingdom), wari’ (deliberation that strengthened the familial and state relationship) and bicara (the laws that prevented unlawful actions). After the arrival of Islam, the Sharia was added to the pangadereng, making the total number of pillars five. In Datuk ri Bandang’s manifesto it was stated that customs should never contradict the Sharia. If the custom was unable to solve a problem, they should refer to the Sharia, and vice versa.¹

Through the two routes, the structure and the culture, Islam quickly permeated the soul of the local community and culture. The aculturation and enculturation of Islam into the Bugis and Makassarese traditional cultures happened so intensely that they identified themselves with Islam. Therefore, to the Bugis and Makassarese, it was out of place if someone from this ethnic group was not a follower of Islam. Such a person would be considered a deviation from the pangadereng. Because the pangadereng defined the identity, any Bugis or Makassarese that was not a Muslim would not be recognized as belonging to their group. Rather, he would be treated as an outsider.²

The arrival of the Westerners, started by the Portuguese and followed by the Dutch—both were holders of Christianity and both were hegemonic and colonialists, drove the growth of the communal and cultural identity of the populace. This resulted not only in a stronger position of Islam as the religion of the kingdom and its people but also in the local people’s fanatism toward their religion. Therefore, in this respect, the Islamhood of the Bugis and Makassarese has been deeper compared with the Islamhood of the other communities in Sulawesi. The Bugis and Makassarese were highly fanatic to Islam. In the towns and villages, we have witnessed spontaneous social behavior that demonstrates how deep their
fanatizm toward Islam.

The Bugis and Makassarese are very sensitive and can be quickly offended by anyone who insults Islam or the Muslims, regardless of whether they themselves do not consistently practice the five Islamic principles such as shalat and fasting. Islam has become part of their siri, a self-respect that must not be belittled by anybody. In the 1950s and 1960s, their fanatism was evident in the tenacity of the Darul Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia (DI/TII) revolt in South Sulawesi, which was led by Abdul Qahar Muzakkar. The movement of DI/TII in South Sulawesi was the longest lasting local struggle compared with the DI/TII movements in Java and Aceh.

In the 20th century, when nationalism began to emerge through the update of the commitment to Islam and its community, as indicated by the births of the modern Islamic organizations such as Syarikat Islam, Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), the same sense of nationalism was also felt among the Muslims of the South Sulawesi. Therefore, just like what happened in Java, there was a competition—if not a conflict—in South Sulawesi between the so-called modernist Muslims and the traditionalist Muslims.

Although the two coexist, we could say that the modernists are relatively more influential. Unlike the modernists in Java, the modernists in South Sulawesi extend its influence through the pesantren (Islamic boarding schools) especially during the country’s struggle for independence and during the New Order era. A list of important pesantren in South Sulawesi may include Daru Da’wah wal Irasyad (DDI) in Pare-Pare, As’adiyah in Sengkang (Wajo), Ikatan Masjid dan Mushalla Indonesia Muttahidah (IMMIM) in Makassar, as well as the ones that appeared later such as Pesantren Hidayatullah. All of them have had a very strong influence on the Islamhood and religiosity of the Bugis and Makassar peoples.

The Alauddin State Islam Institute (IAIN) was founded in 1965. It has produced a number of intellectual clerics whose views had a widespread influence on the Muslims in this region. Universitas Muslimin Indonesia (UMI) is the largest and oldest private university in South Sulawesi. Founded in June of 1945, it is
known for its critical thinking and perceptiveness toward deviant social phenomena that do not conform with the Islamic aspiration. Another major Islamic university is Universitas Muhammadiyah, which has been running since 1962 and has campuses in several regencies in South Sulawesi. Universitas Islam Makassar, which was founded recently, now has a permanent campus in a strategic location in the eastern part of Makassar. All these Islamic universities, along with UMI and IAIN, have lately been serving as the guards of the formal implementation of the Sharia in South Sulawesi.

3. Formalization of the Sharia: A Political Context

The formalization of the Sharia enforcement as a political agenda in South Sulawesi was not a novel phenomenon. Despite the fact that Darul Islam/Negara Islam Indonesia (DI/NII) led by Abdul Qahar Muzakkar was diagonally opposed to the legitimate government of the Republic of Indonesia, the concept that Qahar Muzakkar’s NII aspired to was clearly an aspiration to have a formal enforcement of the Sharia in the running of the state. In the concept of a state as Qahar Muzakkar was fighting for, it was stated that “The foundation of the Indonesia must absolutely be Islam and the belief in God for every ethnic group of the Indonesian nation based on their individual religion.”

The NII, according to Qahar Muzakkar’s concept, could not be fully implemented in the government that he had no full control of. Nonetheless, it represented an ideal that was supported by a majority of Muslims in the South Sulawesi region. While it was true that not every Muslim in this region was supporting Qahar Muzakkar’s DI/NII, their reluctance was not caused by a rejection against the ideology but, instead, by their disapproval of the recruitment method and the way the movement was trying to spread its influence. The recruitments of new members were conducted by means of powerful persuasion, threats and terrors. This was the reason why not every Muslim in South Sulawesi liked the movement.

After Qahar Muzakkar’s movement was defeated, the Indonesian govern-
ment was able to suppress the aspiration to establish the Sharia. It was undeniable that the over 50% votes won by Masyumi Party and 15% votes won by NU in the first ever general election in 1955 clearly demonstrated the degree of the influence of Islamic politics in this region.

Although Masyumi and NU never stated exactly their wishes to form an Islamic state and government, Masyumi’s victory sociologically showed the South Sulawesi populace’s close ties to Islam. Under the militaristic New Order government, the Islamic politics could be suppressed to its weakest point. This is understandable, as the military was still traumatized by Qahar Muzakkar’s Islam-based armed insurgency.

At the same time, the New Order government’s party, Golongan Karya (Golkar), was able to easily exert its influence in this region, turning South Sulawesi from a basis of support for Islamic political parties into a leading supporter of Golkar. The influence of Golkar is so strong in this region that, even in the post New Order era, Golkar still enjoys a lot of support.

The strong support for Golkar in the 1999 general election could be explained if we take into account B. J. Habibie’s background. He was the first Indonesian president who came from the Bugis land and he was backed by Golkar. During those days, Habibie was seen as a symbol of leadership of Islam. He was the chairman of *Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia* (ICMI, or “Indonesian Association of Muslim Scholars”), responsible for turning the parliament and the cabinet into “Green” at the end of the New Order period. Green here represented Islam.

Habibie’s success in taking Islam aspiration into the mainstream solidified his position in the mind of many Muslims. However, while he was expected to lead the state in the reform era, he did not manage to gain the support of Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (MPR, or “People’s Consultative Assembly”). His accountability address was rejected by the MPR, and it wiped out his opportunity for getting reelected as president. This disappointed the Bugis and Makassarese, and they expressed their dissatisfaction through spontaneous rioting in various
places in the region. In response to Habibie’s loss, there were even voices that urged the region to separate itself from the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia.

The discontent with the central government grew along with Habibie’s failure to secure his presidency. In the meantime, several Islamic figures in South Sulawesi made an attempt to revitalize an old idea, which was to formalize the Sharia. Some of the local Islamic figures attended and spoke in the First Mujahidin Congress, which was held in Yogyakarta in August 2000. The Congress’s goal was to “unify the vision and mission of the Mujahidins in establishing the Sharia.”⁵ Among the South Sulawesi figures who were present at the congress was Abdurrahman Basalamah. He was the rector of UMI and an economist. He was then appointed chairman of the Majelis Iqtishadiyah (Economic Council) of Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI, or “Indonesian Council of Mujahidins”). The other figures were Aswar Hasan, who became a member of Majelis Siyasah Syari’ah; Agus Dwikarna, who was appointed Secretary of Majelis Tanfidziyah, and Yunus Tekeng, who served as a member in the formulation team in one of the commissions in the congress.⁶

We have no convincing evidence that the Mujahidin Congress in Yogyakarta had any organizeric relationship with the Congress of Indonesian Muslims in Makassar, although many of the MMI figures were also there during the Makassar congress. This congress ran from 19th to 21st of October 2000. Among the MII figures who were present in the congress were Abubakar Ba’asyir, Habib Husin Alhabsi, Irfan Suryahadi Awas and A. M. Fatwa. Fatwa, who had Bugis blood, was a politician from Jakarta. He also attended the Mujahidin Congress in Yogyakarta earlier.

The leading figures of the Congress of Indonesian Muslims were those who were also present in the Majelis Mujahidin Congress in Yogyakarta. The Makassar congress is also said to have a genealogical relationship with the informal meeting of four Islamic figures from South Sulawesi, which took place prior to the Mujahidin Congress in Yogyakarta. The four leaders were Prof. Dr. Abdur-
rahman Basalamah, Prof. Dr. Mattulada—who was a professor in anthropology
and history at Universitas Hasanuddin (UNHAS), Prof Dr. Achmad Ali—who was
a professor in Law at UNHAS, and Abdul Hadi bin Haji Awang—who was a Min-
ister from Malaysia’s Terengganu State. Abdul Hadi was the second rank leader
in the *Parti Islam SeMalaysia* (PAS, or “Pan Malaysian Islamic Party”), which was
a leading opposition party during Prime Minister Mahatir Muhammad’s govern-
ment.

The informal meeting took place in Hotel Berlian, Makassar, on 28 May
2000, a couple of months before the Mujahidin Congress in Yogyakarta. There
was no information as to what was discussed in the meeting of the four leaders.
It was unclear whether the meeting was the precursor of the Congress of Indo-
nesian Muslims. One thing was certain, however, was that two of those who par-
ticipated in the meeting at Hotel Berlian—Abdul Hadi bin Haji Awang from Ma-
laysia and Prof. Mattulada—were absent in the Congress of Indonesian Muslims.
Prof. Mattulada passed away before the Congress was held.

### 4. The Formation of KPPSI

The Congress of Indonesian Muslims lasted three days from 19th to 21st October 2000. Started with a *tabligh akbar* in Masjid Markaz Isami, the pride of the
South Sulawesi Muslims, the congress was opened by Abdurrahman Basalamah.
The event took place in the *Sudiang Asrama Haji* (Pilgrim Transit Dormitory) in
the eastern part of the city of Makassar. According to the press, the number of
congress participants was estimated to be 750, consisting of delegates from the
regencies as well as activists from various Islamic organizations such as *Himpunan
Mahasiswa Islam* (HMI, or Association of Muslim Students), ICMI, Muhammadi-
yah and NU.

The congress was tightly guarded by around 300 youths from *Laskar Jundullah* (God’s Soldiers). They created a fearsome image. *Laskar Jundullah* is a para-
military organization with no affiliation with any major Islamic mass organiza-
tion, and neither was it born for the purpose of safeguarding the congress. This
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organization was created in Solo in 1999, along with some branches outside of Solo. The leader of *Laskar Jundullah* was Muhammad Agung Abdullah Hamid SE, a young businessman from South Sulawesi. Subsequently, he was replaced by Agus Dwikarna, a youth figure from the region who was arrested and jailed in Manila, the Philippines, in 2002.

From its name, we can tell that *Laskar Jundullah* was formed to guard the enforcement of Sharia. The tight guard by the Laskar Jundullah imparted a stern impression—not only to the congress but also to the enforcement of the Sharia. Quasin Mattar, one of the members of the Komite Persiapan Penegakan Syariat Islam (KPPSI, or the Preparatory Committee for the Implementation of the Islamic Sharia), criticized the congress as spreading a sense of fear. In *Fajar* daily, 31 October 2000, he wrote, “I was frightened by the group of Islamic Sharia Enforcers.”

The Congress of Muslims Community featured a number of papers on the application of the Sharia presented by Muslim figures. It was concluded with a Makassar Declaration. In essence, the declaration stated that the Muslims in South Sulawesi were ready for the enforcement of the Sharia. The congress also formed the Preparatory Committee for the Implementation of the Islamic Sharia (KPPSI) and appointed Abdul Aziz Qahar Muzakkar as the *tanfidziyah* chairman. He was the leader of Pesantren Hidayatullah, a major Islamic boarding school with branches in various places across the country. He was also the son of the late Qahar Muzakkar, the leader of South Sulawesi DI/NII. The text of the declaration was read by the steering committee’s chairman Drs. Aswar Hasan, and was presented to the Chairman of the South Sulawesi’s Council by the eldest participant, H. Muhammad Amire, who was a delegate from the Luwu Regency. The congress was officially closed by the Speaker of South Sulawesi’s Council, H. Amir Syam.

The election of Ir. Abdul Aziz Qahar Muzakkar as KPPSI’s *tanfidziyah* chairman raised a question. Was KPPSI in fact a rebirth of Qahar Muzakkar’s movement? Historically, it made sense, because KPPSI was not the first movement
aimed at establishing the Sharia. It was continuing the movement led by Qahar Muzakkar.

In his days, Qahar Muzakkar and his group were fighting for the establishment of the Sharia, and today KPPSI also fought for the same cause. The only thing that differed was the way the objective was fought for. While in the past they resorted to unconstitutional means, this time a constitutional way was chosen. Yet, Abdul Aziz Qahar Muzakkar dismissed the view that KPPSI was a reincarnation of the Qahar Muzakkar’s movement. “Our goal is only to bring about a more civilized, more peaceful and more prosperous life, and this can only be achieved through the implementation of the Shania,” he said.\(^\text{12}\)

KPPSI was welcomed by a lot of parties such as Islamic mass organizations, Muhammadiyah and NU. It was also welcomed by the South Sulawesi’s Council and the local administration. The South Sulawesi Council Speaker H. M. Amin Syam pledged his full support for the implementation of the Sharia in his province. During the visit from the congress representatives, he said he “could understand and was ready to support the noble aspiration.” However, whether the Council as an institution could accept it or not remained a question.\(^\text{13}\) The chairman of the \textit{Amanat Umat} Fraction in the South Sulawesi Council had a firmer stance and “was ready to push the aspiration of applying the Sharia at the Council in the future.”

South Sulawesi’s Second Deputy Governor, H. Masnawi AS., also announced his support for the enforcement of the Sharia in the province. “If the majority of the populace wants it, then the government will also support it.”\(^\text{14}\) How the Sharia should be established, including whether a \textit{Peraturan Daerah} (Perda, or “Local Regulation”) would be necessary, was a decision that had to be jointly made by the government and the legislative body. For him, the most important issue was to that the Muslims had to apply the Sharia with consistency. Once the Muslims were able to live by the Sharia, it would be easier for the government to enforce the law. All the government would have to do was to codify what was already being practiced. “The enforcement of the Sharia was not supposed to be viewed
from its negative side alone, such as the punishment for adulterers or thieves. It must be appreciated based on its positive side as well. For instance, with the enforcement of the Sharia, the Muslims will be deterred from any activity prohibited by their religion.”

South Sulawesi’s governor at that time, H.Z.B. Palaguna, also supported the establishment of the Sharia. He said that “the application of the Sharia is very important today. There are a lot of things that must be implemented from the Sharia. Practicing the five pillars of Islam will have positive influence on the advancement of the Muslims as a whole. What is also important is the practice of the pillars and the principles of Islam.”

As for the formalization of the Sharia implementation in the framework of regional autonomy such as what we have in Aceh, Palaguna took a careful stance. He said that in South Sulawesi it would be difficult to replicate such autonomy. “We are in a state that is based on Pancasila. Indonesia is not a state based on one religion. Although the majority of the people in South Sulawesi are Muslims, we have to accept the diversity that exists in Indonesia—including in South Sulawesi. Therefore inter-religion harmony must be maintained—also as ukhuwah Islamiyah (Islamic Brotherhood) among religious people.”

5. KPPSI and the Government
One year after the formation of KPPSI in the Congress of South Sulawesi’s Muslims in October 2001, the committee organized the second congress in November 2001. The goals of the second congress were to confirm their position, to seek constitutional route to the implementation of the Sharia, to build an argumentation that would be acceptable to autonomy specifically for South Sulawesi, and to expand the membership as well as its composition and its ideological orientation.

The organizing committee was expanded and included important officials and almost all South Sulawesi’s figures both on the regional and national levels. They consisted of, among others, the governor of South Sulawesi, the Council
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speaker, head of the regional office for Ministry of Religion, the mayor of Makassar, Sulawesi’s VVIP figures such as Jusuf Kalla, Andi Sose, M. Aksa Mahmud and Tamsil Linrung. The chairman of South Sulawesi’s Majelis Ulama Indonesia (Indonesian Ulema Council), the chairman of South Sulawesi’s Muhammadiyah, the chairman of South Sulawesi’s NU, the coordinator of South Sulawesi’s ICMI who was also the first deputy rector of Hasanuddin University, plus most of the rectors of local and colleges were listed as the steering council.  

The large number of local figures involved in the committees of the Second Congress of South Sulawesi Muslims Community, both in the steering and organizing committees, gave an impression that this congress—which was also the work of KPPSI—was supported by all elements of the South Sulawesi’s Muslims community with no opposition. In the congress an effort was made to give as many elements of the community as possible the opportunity to speak out. Vice President Hamzah Haz was scheduled to officially open the congress. Unfortunately, he was late for no clear reason and he spoke on behalf of himself as an individual. Jusuf Kalla, one of the local figures, and A. M. Fatwa also made their speeches in their respective capacity as individuals. With the inclusion of “government people” and “people from the central government,” it became apparent that the ideological orientation of the Second Congress of South Sulawesi’s Muslims Community did take national interest into consideration.

The desire to formalize the Sharia across South Sulawesi, which started as an initiative of the Muslim community through the formation of KPPSI, had evolved into a movement that involved the local government and the council. It was not surprising that KPPSI’s objectives eventually became the agenda of the local government. To realize the aspiration, the Provincial Government of South Sulawesi, through Gubernatorial Decree No. 389/VI/2001, which was updated with Gubernatorial Decree No. 601/X/2001, formed the Assessment Team for the Sharia’s Implementation in the South Sulawesi Province. The team had three main tasks, namely,

1. To organize a closed seminar with the objective of designing research
and poll;
2. To conduct an opinion poll, and
3. To conduct a comparative study abroad, in this case in Malaysia. The reason is that the country—specifically some of its States, were considered to have fully implemented the Sharia.

The related agenda of the South Sulawesi Provincial Government was carried out as a proof of the government’s seriousness in responding to the aspiration of its populace, the majority of whom were Muslims. A study was conducted by teams that were formed in the regencies and mayoralties with a total number of 24. The task was to find out as accurately as possible to what extent the communities in these localities would like to have the Sharia formally implemented. The scientific study was expected to be able to gauge the communities’ aspiration. In other word, it was supposed to determine whether the demand for formal implementation of the Sharia truly represented the South Sulawesi’s people and not just a claim that was made by their leaders.

The research was conducted using the survey method in every regency and mayors. The samples included executive officials (including the regents and the mayors), members of the legislative bodies, religious leaders, public figures as well as the people on the street. The results of the study showed that the idea of formally enforcing the Sharia obtained support from the majority of the South Sulawesi population.19

The research conclusion also stated, among others, that the South Sulawesi people still had varied notions of the Sharia. There was still no standard understanding of the religious law. Therefore it was mandatory to first work out a uniform concept agreed on by all parties in South Sulawesi in the development of the Sharia concept for application in this region. Such a common ground was necessary to prevent disputes between existing groups, which could cause instability in the general community.

Despite the varied notions of the Sharia—some segments of the populace even had very little understanding of it, in general the community responded
positively to the discourse on the implementation of the Sharia for the Muslims in South Sulawesi. The majority of the population of South Sulawesi are Muslims, and they conceded that, as Muslims, they should heed the Sharia and they had already so although perhaps still partially. 

From the results of the study it was possible to assume that it was a prerequisite that everyone had to have clear understanding of the Sharia concept before it was imposed. It was also importan that the understanding should not vary from one person to another. Apparently there was no effort in this study to dig deeper into the appropriate system to be implemented and the kind of system that was preferred by the people of South Sulawesi to ensure that the Sharia could be enforced despite the fact that the people still had limited knowledge of this concept. Is it not true that a certain degree of ignorance of the law is common phenomenon in every community, and it should never be taken as a reason to hamper the establishment of the law. Once a law is made effective, every citizen is under the obligation to obey it, although he may not understand it fully. This study did not come up with a recommendation on how the system should created to prevent the varied understanding of the Sharia would not become a stumbling block in its enforcement.

The comparative study to Malaysia, which had become an agenda of the Provincial Government, was carried out by a number of intellectuals from the campuses as well as council members. A visit was made to the State of Terengganu, a state where the PAS ruled and the Sharia was already formally applied. In this state, Hadi Awang, which we had mentioned earlier as one of the four influential figures in the informal meeting at Hotel Berlian, was serving as the Chief Minister. He was also the No. 1 person in PAS, Malaysia, the strongest Islamic political party there known for their fundamentalist position and opposition to UMNO-supported Mahathir Mohammad’s government.

The conclusion of the study, as reported by Prof. Dr. Abdurrahim Yunus, was that the state was economically prosperous, psychologically conducive and legally orderly due to the formal enforcement of the Sharia. In the state, the gov-
ernment was entitled to impose the Sharia and monitor its implementation. In Indonesia, the state is based on Pancasila, but the application of the Sharia is the state’s responsibility. Therefore, while Indonesia has the principle that reaffirms the belief in the one and only God, corruption and immoral activities seem to be tolerated everywhere and the law is not enforced. Consequently, the people do not enjoy prosperity and live in constant restlessness. In short, Indonesians can only enjoy very little of what God has blessed them with because they have rejected the introduction of the Sharia. The contrast between the two states served to amplify the belief of the study team that the Sharia was absolutely the only way if the people were to have a larger share of the blessings and live prosperously.

6. Demand for Special Autonomy and the Basis for Its Argumentation

The target that KPPSI wished to achieve was a special autonomy for the Province of South Sulawesi that would allow it to introduce the Sharia. The aspiration was not without any argumentation, both historical and political. The Steering Committee of the Second Congress of the South Sulawesi Muslim Communities had outlined the argumentation. In the Second Congress, after some editorial revisions, no substantial changes were made to the draft. The following points represent the path of logics that they used to get to the premise that underscored the need to apply the Sharia in a formal way in the mold of the special autonomy right for South Sulawesi:

A. Historical Foundation:

1. The Sharia has been in effect in South Sulawesi since the 17th century. However, the enforcement of the Sharia was abolished by the Dutch colonial VOC as they arrived in South Sulawesi. The Sharia has not been reinstated during the Republic era until today.

2. The basic tenet of the national movements, which were marked by the emergence of Islam-based organization, such as Sarekat Islam, Muhammadiyah and NU—all of which position the Sharia as an ideal that has
to be realized, received positive response. The Muslim communities in
general belonged to one of these organizational movements.

3. Abdul Qahar Muzakkar, one of the prominent Independence fighters
from South Sulawesi, had waged a jihad in reestablishing the Sharia by
rejecting the deletion of the seven words in the Jakarta Charter and by
fighting against the communist influence in South Sulawesi in the early
1950s.

4. In the Reform Era, new movements and revitalized efforts have emerged
to reestablish the Sharia in South Sulawesi, which is considered an order
from Allah SWT with the *Wajib* (“Mandatory”) nature. The movements
and efforts also serve the fulfillment of the responsibility toward and the
desire to maintain the integrity of the Unitary State of Republic of Indo-
nesia (NKRI).

**B. Political Foundation:**

1. All political fractions represented in the Council of the Province of
South Sulawesi have pledged their full support for the application of the
Sharia. These political forces include FPG (Golkar), FPP (P3), FPDI-P
(PDI-P), FKK (Kesatuan Kebangsaan), FAU (Amanat Umat) and F-TNI/
Polri.

2. The South Sulawesi Council, as the highest legislative authority in the
province, has declared its support. Furthermore, the members of parlia-
ment in Jakarta that represent South Sulawesi or come from the area
have formed a working group to formulate and fight for the aspiration.

3. The development model in the Province of South Sulawesi, which is
based on the religion, is in conformity with the implementation of the
Sharia.

4. The South Sulawesi populace, particularly the Bugis, Makassar and Man-
dar ethnic groups, have long been known as parts of the Indonesian na-
tion with a very strong adherence to the teaching of Islam, just like other
provinces in the country such as Aceh, West Sumatra, South Kalimantan,
West Nusa Tenggara and Banten. In fact, South Sulawesi has been known as the “Terrace of Madinah.”

5. The South Sulawesi populace is fully aware that in the reform era of today the time has come to adopt the Sharia as an alternative. They feel that the system that was put in place to manage the state has been unsatisfactory and has failed to provide peace and prosperity. A solution has to be found to replace it as soon as possible.

6. The powerful aspiration of the people in South Sulawesi has to be favorably responded to by the government as it constitutes an effort to foster and maintain NKRI, especially if such an aspiration is applied peacefully and constitutionally. Otherwise, there is a possibility that the voices that call for separatism will grow stronger like snowballs, and in the long term these will be difficult to suppress.

7. The granting of special autonomy by introducing the Sharia is the most appropriate solution and will at the same time serve a binding force that keeps the nation together. It will be an effort to broaden the horizon of the South Sulawesi people in advancing the nation, specifically as it relates to the province.

It is interesting to note here that a figure in the national history who had in the past been categorized a rebel against the sovereign NKRI was given a very respectable position as a fighter for the Sharia in South Sulawesi. He was Abdul Qahhar Muzakkar, the leader of DI’NII in the region. According to the local Muslims, his rebellion was not a treason. It was a firm conviction against the deletion of the seven words from the Jakarta Charter and the dominance of Communism in the central government. The seven words omitted from the Jakarta Charter would have served as the foundation for a formal establishment of the Sharia in the communal and state life of an independent Indonesia. In addition, the Second Congress also mentioned a historical event in 1957 that demonstrated the strong desire of the South Sulawesi people to treat Islam as the underlying principle for the building the state life in this region. It was said that from 7
to 11 December 1957 the King of Gowa, who was supported by the top brass of the army KDMSSST and the Military Governor SST held a Congress for the Development of Muslims Community in Malino. The sole goal of the congress was to establish the Sharia in a formal manner in the land of South Sulawesi. Therefore, the Congress of Muslims Community that was underway must be viewed as a continuation of the previous struggle that had yet to accomplish its purpose. The congress also admitted that the local people’s knowledge of Islam was still rather limited. However, the congress was of the opinion that the condition should not create an obstacle to the enforcement of the Sharia.

7. KPPSI’s Understanding of Implementation of the Sharia

It was rather surprising that, although the implementation of the Sharia was the main cause that KPPSI was fighting for, the committee itself did not seem to have any formula, scenario and concept for the formal application of the Sharia in South Sulawesi. Nor did it make any attempt in this regard. The thought leaders and supporters of KPPSI only focused on a very simple question: “Is it necessary to establish the Sharia?”

This very simple question seemed to be a powerful weapon, because it left every Muslim with no choice of proper answer but “yes.” And this positive answer was used to gain as much support as possible both from the bureaucrats, the legislatures and the Muslims community in general. The fact is, there is a crucial issue in every effort to formalize the Sharia in Indonesia, namely, the relationship between religion and the state.

This issue has been a classic topic of discussion, and AM Fatwa, a South Sulawesi figure who was jailed repeatedly during the New Order period because of his struggle for the establishment of the Shari, reminded the congress right from the congress opening that they should no longer mention the seven words in the Jakarta Charter and the Presidential Decree. “There is no impediment to any religion in this country to practice the precepts. The aspiration of the people to apply the Sharia must not be blocked. The majority must never unlaw-
fully impose their ideas on the minority. On the other hand, the minority must not hinder the desire of the majority. In the meantime, there is a wish among a number of groups to reinstate the spirit of the seven words in the Jakarta Charter and the Presidential Decree of 5 July 1959, it should not be renewed. What is the most important today is to develop a new concept that is aligned with existing laws and regulations.23

Meanwhile, Palaguna, South Sulawesi’s governor, also gave his support to the implementation of the Sharia, but the substance of the support was different from what KPPSI was pushing for. He said: “The implementation of the Sharia is very important in South Sulawesi. A lot of things need to be applied in the Sharia, such as the Rukun Islam that brings positive effects on the development of Islam in general. Today, many of the Muslims fail to fulfill the Rukun Islam and Rukun Iman properly. Today, what is important is to put the two principles into practice.”24

Within KPPSI itself there were conflicting views of the model for the implementation of the Sharia. Qasim Mathar, one of KPPSI’s leading figures, is an intellectual from the IAIN and he was against the formalization of the Sharia. Unfortunately, there is no publicly accessible record of the discussion between Mathar and other figures who demanded the formalization of the Sharia. Nevertheless, it does not mean that no discussion ever took place. In several seminars at the IAIN and other locations, the papers hinted that there were the two major views as to how the Sharia was to be implemented.

To discuss the theme without getting away from the two schools of thought would be a repetitious and uninnovative activity. Every Muslim supported the enforcement of the Sharia, but when it comes down to the way it should be implemented, we can see two different opinions. We can call them the substantive and the formalistic schools of thought. The first exerted that the implementation of the Sharia did not have to be formalized in the form of regulations and laws. It also did not require the establishment of an Islamic state where Al Qur’an and Sunnah served as the constitution. What was important was that the substance
of the teaching, the soul and the values of Islam were practiced by every citizen and the government. The Formalistic school of thought, on the other hand, was of the opinion that more than just values would be needed. Islam and the Sharia had to be formalized in positive legal framework and embodied in an Islamic institution. According to this school of thought, Islam was a religion that was kafah, complete and din wa daulah. Therefore, the Muslims were not only under an obligation to form an Islamic state and apply the entire precepts in their day-to-day life in the community and in the state but were also not allowed to heed other ideological teachings and laws—let alone practice them in their life.

Central figures in KPPSI, such as Hamka Haq, Jalaluddin Rahman, Harifuddin Cawidu and Qasim Mathar, were moderate-minded intellectual leaders because they had clear understanding of the arguments made by both schools of thought. Speaking on behalf of their institutions, the leaders of the two largest Islamic organizations, Muhammadiyah and NU, did not support the formalization of the Sharia although they fully supported KPPSI. They were supportive of the substance instead of the form, and their position was that the Sharia must be enforced.

If the discussions continued to focus on the same issue, we can say that there was no need to have KPPSI. To conduct a seminar or a workshop seems to have its own implication. The series of seminars following the Second Congress tended to be directed to academic debates, while workshops would be a better choice in finding a model for the implementation of the Sharia. It is possible that this was related to the speech given by Jusuf Kalla, a leading figure in South Sulawesi, in the opening session of the Second Congress held by KPPSI. He said, among other things, that the effort to formalize the requirement to practice the ibadah in regional regulations, especially the shalat (prayers), would not only create uneasiness among the Muslims but could indirectly belittle God, who has instructed the standard practice of the shalat and related sanctions.

According to Harifuddin, Jusuf Kalla had the opinion that “the Sharia has been properly and peacefully practiced for a long time in South Sulawesi. There
are several immoral activities that have not been entirely abolished, such as gambling, prostitution and alcohol consumption. However, the last type of munkaroh (immoral activities) did not require us to demand the implementation of the Sharia through a special autonomy. The people of South Sulawesi will be able to live under a better and more peaceful condition if the current condition is maintained. It will be different if we enforce new regulations that may cause conflicts among the community.”

As can be expected, the statement by Jusuf Kalla in the opening of the Second Congress of the Muslims Community held by KPPS and was upbeat in the struggle for the implementation of the Sharia in South Sulawesi caused disappointment in certain fundamentalist and radical components of the community that wanted a formal enforcement of the Sharia. In this regard, it was possible that the bomb that exploded during the Second Congress was tied to the weak position held by Jusuf Kalla. The bomb was set off in the location where Jusuf Kalla’s business operated. The case has not been solved in court until today. The fact is that, after the Second Congress, KPPSI has lost its power. The special autonomy bill that KPPSI has worked out has by now disappeared into the back burner. Will KPPSI stop here, or will it continue to fight for a special autonomy right? There is no definitive answer. A number of KPPSI at the regency and mayoralty levels have fought for the issuance of the local regulation with Sharia content, but most of them have been frustrated as the local regulation cannot be properly enforced.

8. Response from Non-Muslims

A surprising finding of the interviews with KPPSI’s supporters was that the implementation of the Sharia in South Sulawesi through a special autonomy status was endorsed by all of the people in the province, including those who followed other religions. Despite the surprising nature, the finding was understandable as the number of non-Muslim population was very small. In addition, they believe that, if the Muslims live strictly by the Sharia, the condition will improve and
they all will be able to share a better, more orderly and more prosperous life together because of the overwhelming proportion of the Muslim population there. However, the finding of a survey conducted by Christian priests in Makassar a few weeks after the Makassar Declaration at the end of First Congress painted a different picture from what KPPSI’s supporters that we interviewed for this research.  

Briefly, the response of the Christians to KPPSI can be divided into three groups. The first group (22.2%) believed that it was too early to respond to KPPSI’s aspiration. KPPSI had to be invited to provide more comprehensive information as to its short-term and long-term purposes and objectives. The Christians should not be provoked by the declaration at the end of the congress, because the 2,500 congress participants did not necessarily represent the views of millions of Muslims in South Sulawesi. Still, in the democratic world of today, everyone is free to express his opinion, and every aspiration put forward by individuals as well as groups of people must be respected and wisely responded to.

The second group (26.3%) stated that, if the implementation of the Sharia was truly intended to improve the life of the people and the state, which was in a dire condition lately, then the Christians should give their support. If the Muslims had to enforce the Sharia, then the Christians would have to strictly follow the rules of Christianity to ensure that both could participate in enhancing the life of the people, the state and the nation.

The third group (52.6%) expressed their objection to the plan of implementation of the Sharia across South Sulawesi. The main reason that they had was that Indonesia was founded on the Pancasila foundation. Therefore, there is no room for other principle foundation other than Pancasila. If there was ever another fundamental principle in addition to Pancasila to be adopted by the state, they were worried that the integrity of the state would be in jeopardy. Some elements in this group said while Indonesia was based on Pancasila, which guarantees the people the freedom to practice the religion of their choice, the Christians were still subjected to unfair treatment. The situation might get worse
if the state were based on the Sharia. As an example, they cited the period of the Qahar Muzakar’s movement. The movement based their activities on the Sharia, and the Christians experienced a lot of terrible suffering.

However, some of the people in the group believed that, if they Muslims were earnestly committed to applying the Sharia, it would have to be deliberated based on mutual trust. If followers of other religions had to live separately, the separation should take place in peace.

9. Conclusion

KPPSI was a phenomenon that was trying to revitalize the effort to enforce the Sharia in a formal way in South Sulawesi. Two historical justifications existed. First, the Sharia was already in force during the periods of the Islamic kingdoms in South Sulawesi between the 17th and the 19th centuries. The enforcement of the Sharia was halted when the Dutch arrived. Since the 19th century, the Dutch influence grew in power. After the Independence of the Republic of Indonesia there were efforts to reestablish the Sharia through the DI/NII movement. The DI/NII was defeated before the goal was successfully accomplished.

In the eyes of some of the South Sulawesi people, DI/NII’s leader Abdul Qahar Muzakkar was a Muslim freedom fighter who waged a jihad in reestablishing the Sharia in the post-Independence era as a rejection to the omission of the seven words in the Jakarta Charter and as an effort to block communist influence in South Sulawesi.

In the Reform Era we see renewed efforts to reinstate the Sharia in South Sulawesi in a more elegant and democratic manner. KPPSI has suggested to the Parliament that a bill should be drawn to grant a special autonomy status to South Sulawesi, allowing the province to formally enforce the Sharia like what has been given to Nangroe Aceh Darussalam.

The founding of KPPSI in South Sulawesi in the Reform Era was driven by three interrelated momentum. First, in the Reform Era we have a democratic government that allows the people to express their political aspiration freely and
safely, free from the fear of getting accused as being against Pancasila. Secondly, the democratic Reform Era a policy of decentralization has been put into effect and regional autonomy allows the provinces as well as the levels below manage their administration based on the aspiration of the local populace. Thirdly, the failure of Habibie, a leader figure from South Sulawesi who was also a symbol of Islam, in defending his presidency after his accountability speech as the head of state was rejected by the general meeting of the MPR. Ironically, the MPR itself was the result of the general election that he instructed in 1999. The establishment of KPPSI can be perceived as a reaction to the deep disappointment of the people in South Sulawesi due to the MPR’s decision to have Habibie step down from being the president.

Although it seems that almost all Muslims communities in South Sulawesi were in support of KPPSI, the organization’s attempt in recommending to the Parliament a bill of special autonomy status for the Province has been unsuccessful. Three factors have been responsible for the failure. First, some of the formal leaders in South Sulawesi such as the governor did not provide their full support. Their support was more rhetorical in nature, and it was different from what KPPSI wanted. Secondly, a number of national leaders with South Sulawesi background, such as Habibie, Jusuf Kalla and A. M. Fatwa, also failed to provide any political support. As leaders on the national level, it seems that they have given priority to the interest of the nation instead of the interests of the province where they have come from. Thirdly, KPPSI did not a clear understanding of the implementation of the Sharia. The Muslim scholars have not come to an agreement on the concept of Sharia implementation. Furthermore, there is also disagreement among supporters of KPPSI as to the meaning of the concept of the “Sharia implementation.”

While KPPSI’s main program was not fully achieved and a special autonomy law was still absent, some of KPPSI branches in the regencies have succeeded in pushing the local government and the council to draw local regulation (Perda) aimed at implementing the Sharia. Almost all the regencies now have a local
regulation that handles community problem of alcoholic drinks. Part of the community views it as an enforcement of the Sharia. However, KPPSI is still not entirely happy with the application of the local regulation. The Bulukumba Regency is considered the most successful in this respect, as it already has local regulations on zakat (alms giving). Many of the other regencies are looking at Bulukumba as a model.

Notes

1 A discussion on Islamization in South Sulawesi through the two routes can be read in Mattulada “Islam di Sulawesi Selatan” (Islam in South Sulawesi) in Taufik Abdullah (ed.) Agama dan Perubahan Sosial (Religion and Social Changes) Rajawali, Jakarta, 1983, pp. 214–273.
2 Ibid., p. 235.
3 See Abdul Qahhar Muzakkar, Konsep Nilai Demokrasi Indonesia, Penerbit Hasanuddin, without year, p. 77.
4 Interview with Dr. Abdul Rachiem Yunus on 30 May 2003.
5 Irfan Suryahadi Awas, Risalah Kongres I Mujahidin dan Penegakan Syari’at Islam, Yogjakarta, Wihdah Press 2001.
7 Ibid., p. 4.
8 Fajar, 23rd October 2000.
9 Ibid., p. 5.
10 Ibid., p. 5.
12 Fajar, 22 October 2000.
13 Fajar, 24 October 2000.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
16 Fajar, 27 October 2000.
17 Ibid.
18 Burhaman Djonedding and Dias Pradadimara, op-cit., p. 6.

21 Interview with Prof. Dr. Abdul Rahim Yunus, Makassar, 15 May 2003.

22 Conclusion of the Meeting of the Steering Committee for the Second Congress of the South Sulawesi Muslims Community regarding the Historical and Political Foundations for the Pursuit of Special Autonomy for the Implementation of the Sharia in the South Sulawesi Province. (MS) (27 October 2001)

23 See *Fajar* daily, 20 October 2000.

24 See *Fajar* daily, 27 October 2000.


26 *Ibid*.