First Contact between Ya‘qūb Beg and the Qing
The Diplomatic Correspondence of 1871*

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The collection of the National Palace Museum in Taipei includes a Turkic letter sent to the Qing Dynasty in early 1871 by Ya‘qūb Beg (1820?–77), who established a political regime over the oasis cities of Xinjiang in the late 19th century. Here we introduce this Turkic document and consider the activities and intentions of Ya‘qūb Beg at that time. The aim of this paper is to reveal new facts about contacts between Ya‘qūb Beg and the Qing Dynasty.

In 1870, Ya‘qūb Beg went on an expedition to Turfan and Urumchi and extended his territory to the east. During this campaign, Ya‘qūb Beg released and returned the Qing officials captured in Turfan and Urumchi by the Tungans and sent this letter to the Qing. The letter carefully explains how his conquest and rule of Xinjiang were legitimate; his actions were rationalized as the will of God and thus beyond human intellect. From the letter, we appreciate Ya‘qūb Beg’s desire to have the Qing acknowledge that his rule was an accomplished fact.

The Qing authorities in Hami immediately replied with the “Letter of Admonition,” in which clearly states that Xinjiang was part of the Qing’s “dynastic territory.” At the same time, the authorities began to explore possibilities for cooperation not only with the local Chinese militias, but also with the Tungans for defense against Ya‘qūb Beg.

Ya‘qūb Beg had left Turfan for the west before the “Letter of Admonition” arrived. It can be surmised that the relationship with Russia deeply influenced this action. As a result, the first contacts made between Ya‘qūb Beg and the Qing in early 1871 were stillborn. However, keeping in mind the content of the 1877 negotiations in London, it is noteworthy that both Ya‘qūb Beg and the Qing insisted on their legitimacy to rule Xinjiang on the basis of each other’s logic.

Keywords: Ya‘qūb Beg, Xinjiang, Tungan, Qing Dynasty, National Palace Museum

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Introduction

The Qing’s century-long rule in Xinjiang (Chinese Central Asia, Eastern Turkistan) was temporarily upset in 1864, in the 3rd year of the Tongzhi reign (dates such as this will be expressed below in the form TZ 3), because of a large-scale rebellion by its Muslim inhabitants. During the rebellion, Ya’qūb Beg (1820–77), a military commander from the Khoqand Khanate, appeared in Kashgar. After suppressing disunited rebel parties, Ya’qūb Beg established a political regime over the oasis cities around the Tarim Basin, which lasted from 1867 to 1877. The period of the Ya’qūb Beg regime up until the Qing’s re-conquest and the establishment of Xinjiang Province in 1884 (Guangxu/GX 10) is an important turning point in this region’s history.

In his domains, Ya’qūb Beg intended to carry out governance in accordance with Islamic shari’a law. At the same time, the government entered into diplomatic relationships with Russia, British India, and the Ottoman Empire, the processes of which have been clarified by past studies.1 However, our knowledge of the relationship with the Qing Dynasty, which lay to the east of the domains and had formerly ruled there, is limited to their negotiations during the advance of the Qing army in 1877.2 In these circumstances, the suggestion of A. Khodjaev based on Qing records deserves close attention: immediately after the first expedition to Urumchi in 1870, Ya’qūb Beg sent a letter to the Qing. Khodjaev explains that although the original letter does not exist, Ya’qūb Beg used the opportunity to open negotiations with the Qing and gain official recognition of the existence of his state.3

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1) For example, Kim 2004: 138–58.
2) In 1877, the negotiations between Ya’qūb Beg and the Qing proceeded through the mediation of the British government in London (Hsü 1964).
3) Ходжаев 1979: 54.
The collection of the National Palace Museum (NPM) in Taipei includes three documents written in Arabic-script Turki (i.e. Chaghhatay) from the Qing period. In March 2011, we examined the document (JZ, 107186) at NPM and decided that it was the original letter from Ya’qūb Beg to the Tongzhi Emperor (r. 1861–75), which was believed to be lost. At present, this document is the only existing letter from Ya’qūb Beg officially addressed to the Qing. In addition, the Qing responses to Ya’qūb Beg are also archived at NPM. Together, these sources reveal new facts about the contact between Ya’qūb Beg and the Qing in early 1871.

This study introduces the Turkic document and considers the activities and intentions of Ya’qūb Beg when he sent it to the Qing. Moreover, we study the Qing’s reactions after receiving it and show gaps in perception between the two sides regarding the situation. The aim of this paper is to shed light on a previously unknown phase of contact between the Ya’qūb Beg regime and the Qing Dynasty.

1. Historical Background

1.1. The Muslim Rebellion and the Ya’qūb Beg Regime

In Xinjiang, under the rule of the Qing, after the first revolt in Kucha in 1864 the rebellion expanded to the oases around the Tarim Basin. The growth of the rebellion led to the establishment of Muslim governments in the oases, ultimately leading to the loss of Qing rule over the region. The rebellious government of Kucha under the leadership of Rāshidin Khwāja, who took the initiative in the Kucha rebellion, attempted to extend the sphere of influence by organizing and sending armies east and west from Kucha. In Kashgar, Šiddīq Beg, a leader of the Qirghiz, tried to seize power in the district, but failed to receive support from the oasis inhabitants. In response, he asked the Khoqand Khanate to send a khwāja of the Makhdūmzādas, who had religious authority over the people of the Kashgar oasis. ‘Ālim Qul, a political strongman in the khanate, dispatched to Kashgar Buzurg Khān Tōrā, a son of Jahāngīr Khwāja who invaded Qing territory, fought against the Qing authorities, and succeeded in maintaining power in the Kashgar district for a few years in the 1820s before he was suppressed. Ya’qūb Beg was appointed by ‘Ālim Qul to the post of Commander of the Troops that accompanied Buzurg Khān.

After they arrived in Kashgar, Ya’qūb Beg acquired the districts around Kashgar through energetic military activities and assumed power by excluding Buzurg Khān. Thereafter, he occupied Yarkand and Khotan and then conquered Aqsu and Kucha, which at that time were under the rule of the rebels, and completely overthrew Rāshidin’s authority. Ya’qūb Beg then succeeded in establishing his political regime over the wide territory of Altı-shahr on the western side of the oases region in the Tarim Basin. Subsequently, in 1870 (TZ 9), he conquered Turfan, an oasis on the eastern side of the Tarim Basin and Urumchi in the

4) The other two documents are letters that, in 1848, the Khoqand envoy ‘Abd al-Ghafor presented to the hākim beg and the Qing administrator (Ma. amban) of Kashgar (Tang 1985; Onuma, Shinmen, and Kawahara 2012).
north of the Tianshan Mountains, both of which were under the rule of the rebellious Tungans (Ch. Hui min 回民 or Han hui 漢回). Having conquered this area, he governed a wide territory that included a major part of Xinjiang that had been under the rule of the Qing Dynasty prior to the Muslim rebellion. At the same time, Ya‘qūb Beg actively constructed a social infrastructure for effective administration over the whole territory of his regime. In particular, he made efforts to rebuild or repair some important Islamic religious institutions such as mosques and mausoleums of Islamic saints, and to improve and maintain traffic routes and facilities.

Ya‘qūb Beg established diplomatic relationships with Russia, British India, and the Ottoman Empire. Meanwhile, the Qing government, which had fallen into crisis at the loss of Xinjiang, approved a proposal by General Zuo Zongtang 左宗棠 to recover Xinjiang, and dispatched an army under Zuo’s command. In spring 1877, after the capture of Turfan by the Qing forces, Ya‘qūb Beg died at Korla from a stroke. The Qing army advanced west and finally occupied Kashgar in December 1877. After recovering Xinjiang, the Qing government newly established the province of Xinjiang in 1884 to reorganize the region’s administrative system.

1.2. Circumstances before and after the Production of the Document

Considering the political progression of Ya‘qūb Beg’s regime, it is clear that the JZ, 107186 document was sent to the Qing immediately after Ya‘qūb Beg made the expedition to Turfan and Urumchi and succeeded in bringing these districts under his control. With regard to the situation before and after the document was dispatched, particularly the circumstances of Ya‘qūb Beg’s conquest of Turfan and Urumchi, we can find detailed descriptions in Mullā Mūsá Sayrāmî’s Tāriḵ-i ʿamniya (TA), one of the major historical works that describe the incidents during the period of the Muslim rebellions in the second half of the 19th century; its revised and enlarged edition Tāriḵ-i ḫamidi (TH/J, TH/Ā); and Tāriḵ-i ᵰihārī (TS), which scholars believe was written at the dictation of ‘Abd Allâh Pānšad who was among the influential generals under Ya‘qūb Beg’s command. There is also testimony from Mei Zhenqing 梅振清, who was sent by the Qing government to investigate the internal conditions of Turfan and Urumchi under the rule of the Tungans, and who was captured and imprisoned at Turfan by the Tungans. His testimony records, in detail, important incidents in the Turfan and Urumchi districts at that time and it is through this source that we can shed new light on the historical situation.

After he occupied Kucha in 1867, Ya‘qūb Beg advanced to Korla where he negotiated with the Tungans in Turfan about the border of their territories, the result of which fixed the boundary at Ushaq-tal between them.6) He then returned to Kashgar after he established a customs house at Korla and set up a qaraḵul-khāna, or guard post, at Ushaq-tal.7)
Meanwhile, Tuo Delin 愛得璘 (or Tuo Ming 愛明), Suo Huanzhang 索煥章, and Ma Zhong 马仲 (or 马忠) led the occupation of Turfan and Urumchi. The Qing authorities barely retained control of Hami (Qumul) and Barköl. At the beginning of 1869, the Qing dispatched the Brigade Commander (Ch. youji 遊擊), Mei Zhenqing, with the Special Delegates (Ch. weiyuan 委員) of Hami, Wurentai 烏仁泰 and Chaifu 白福, to examine circumstances in Turfan and Urumchi. After arriving in Turfan, although Mei Zhenqing stayed there, Wurentai and Chaifu left for Urumchi, following Tuo Delin’s indications. The Qing officers were captured, divided into two parties, and kept separately in custody in Turfan and Urumchi.\(^7\)

Ya’qūb Beg did not take noticeable military action for a while after conquering Kashgar. However, in spring 1870, the Tungan army advanced from Turfan to Korla; the army stationed at Ushaq-tal and Korla could not oppose them and fled west. The Tungans attacked Kucha and stayed there for nine days to plunder the city, and then retreated toward Turfan.\(^8\) According to the recollection of Mei Zhenqing, it is during the period from March 2 to March 31, 1870 that the Tungans invaded Ya’qūb Beg’s territory, and they left Kucha to return to Turfan ten days after they attacked the city.\(^9\) The descriptions of TS relate that it was on the 1\(^{st}\) day of the month of ‘Id Qurbān in 1286 AH (March 4, 1870) that the news of the Tungans’ pillaging of Kucha reached Ya’qūb Beg.\(^10\)

In response, Ya’qūb Beg set out east from Kashgar on March 11, 1870, and arrived in Aqsu. Receiving the news that the Tungans had withdrawn toward Turfan, he ordered the construction of a grand orda, or official residence, at the city of Aqsu. The army, in command of Ya’qūb Beg himself, left Aqsu and advanced east for Turfan by way of Kucha and Korla.\(^11\) Arriving in the Turfan Basin, Ya’qūb Beg’s army, the vanguard of which was under the command of the two generals, ‘Umar Quil and 'Abd Allāh,\(^12\) occupied Toqsun in the

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7) An Ahong (阿訇 < Pe. Akhund) of the Jahriya from Shaanxi originally. In June 1864, when the Qing army of Urumchi went to Kucha to suppress the Muslim rebels and Urumchi was left poorly defended, Tuo Delin organized an uprising with Suo Huanzhang and killed the Provincial Military Commander (Ch. tidu 提督), Yebuchungga 楚布沖額 and the Commander-in-chief (Ch. dutong 都統), Pingrui 平瑞. Then he called himself the “Muslim King” (Ch. Qingzhen wangguo 清真国) in 1865.

8) Originally he was the Assistant Regional Commander (Ch. canjiang 参将) of the Green Standard (Ch. liying 参营) in Urumchi. After joining the uprising with Tuo Delin and coming to power, he called himself the da yuanshui 大元帥, or “Great Marshal.”

9) One of the leaders of the Tungan rebels in Urumchi.

10) Details unclear. However, he was probably one of the Muslim heads because he is described as “Chaifu Beg” in the JZ, 107189: f. 2.

11) JZ, 107187: ff. 2–3, TZ 10. 2. 24 [1871.4.13], the memorial of Wenlin; SGXHF, 242: 15a–b, TZ 10. 4. 15 [1871.6.2]; SGXHF, 245: 10a, TZ 10. 5. 24 [1871.7.11]. According to the Qing records, besides this three persons, Zhuang Qiying 張義慶, Chen Zhaoiku 陳兆魁 (in Turfan), and Ma Decheng 马得成 (in Urumchi) were taken into Tungan custody.


13) JZ, 107187: f. 3.

14) TS: 67b.


16) The author of TS.
western edge of the basin. When they advanced to Turfan,\(^{17}\) they fought and gained a victory against the Tungan troops deployed from Turfan. Subsequently, the Tungan reinforcements that were dispatched from Urumchi by Dâwûd Khalîfa (i.e. Tuo Delin), a leader of the Tungans, arrived in Turfan, and with the Tungan troops from Turfan attempted to carry out a pincer attack on Ya’qûb Beg’s army, which ultimately defeated the Tungans.\(^{18}\)

According to Mei Zhenqing, who was in Turfan City at the time, the Tungan army of Turfan was led by Suo Huanzhan and Ma Zhong. In the period from May 30 to June 8, 1870, Ma Tai arrived with the troops from Urumchi and, in collaboration with Ma Zhong, engaged in intense battles with Ya’qûb Beg’s army for twenty days; in these battles, Ma Tai was wounded by a spear. After being unsuccessful in the attack on June 23, 1870, Ma Tai finally fled to Urumchi.\(^{19}\) From the fact that ‘Abd Allah was also injured,\(^{20}\) we can deduce that both sides fought fiercely.

Ya’qûb Beg built fortresses and continued to besiege Turfan City, battling against the Tungan sorties. He also occupied the dependent towns of Turfan City such as Qara-khoja and Lukchun. From August 1870, the Tungans sought peace and Ma Zhong visited Ya’qûb Beg’s military camp; however, they could not reach an agreement. On the night of September 22, the Tungans made a fierce attack on their enemy, but were defeated; from that point on, they were under fire day and night for one month. Jâmadâr Dâdhwâh who had once led the artillery of the Khoqand Khanate\(^{21}\) and was the artillery commander of Ya’qûb Beg’s army, commanded this attack.

The siege of Turfan City lasted for six months.\(^{22}\) In the end, the Tungans surrendered. On November 1, 1870, Ma Zhong met Ya’qûb Beg again and accepted the condition that all the Tungans should leave the city within a week. Su Huanzhang died of an illness less than two days after leaving the city.\(^{23}\) Ya’qûb Beg did the Tungan leaders a favor and appointed Ḥâkim Khân Tûrâ to the post of ḥâkim of Turfan. At that time, Xu Xuegong, who was an influential leader of the local Chinese militia (Ch. tuanlian 团練) based at Nanshan 南山 between Urumchi and Yulduz, visited Turfan with his followers to submit to Ya’qûb Beg and presented offerings of food and livestock.\(^{24}\)

According to TS, on the 10\(^{th}\) day of the month of Ramadan in 1287 AH (December 4, 1870), Ya’qûb Beg had his troops depart from Turfan for Urumchi under the command of General ‘Abd Allâh, and then set out for Urumchi himself.\(^{25}\) After subduing Dawânch (Ch.

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17) According to Mei Zhenqing, from May 1 to 29, 1870, Ya’qûb Beg broke through the defense of Toqsun and arrived in Turfan (JZ, 107187: f. 3).
19) JZ, 107187: ff. 3–4.
20) TS: 73b.
22) Although TH and TA write that the siege continued for nine months (TH/J: 89b; TH/A: 445; TA: 201), it seems reasonable to suppose that the actual period was a half year.
23) JZ, 107187: f. 5.
25) TS: 81a. According to TH, it was on the 14\(^{th}\) day of the month of Rajab of 1287 AH (October 10, 1870) that Ya’qûb Beg departed from Turfan for Urumchi, so there is a difference of
Dabancheng (達阪城), an important strategic pass in the Tianshan Mountains, Ya’qūb Beg’s army fought a fierce battle with the Tungan army, which made a sortie from Urumchi, and finally gained victory over the Tungans. Although his army launched an attack on the gate of the city of Urumchi, he later ordered a temporary cease-fire. Dawūd Khalifa informed Ya’qūb Beg that he wanted to surrender and provided Ya’qūb Beg with tribute, and Ya’qūb Beg accepted his proposal. However, the Qing sources describe that Ma Tai, who surrendered to Ya’qūb Beg, was taken away to the Nanlu 南路, or the region to the south of the Tianshan Mountains.

After the occupation of Urumchi, Ya’qūb Beg appointed Ma Zhong, a leader of the Tungans in Turfan, to the post of da yanshay (Ch. da yуanshuai 大元帥) of Urumchi. At the same time, Ya’qūb Beg told Ma Zhong to furnish Xu Xuegong with provisions as well as do a favor for Xu Xuegong who called on Ya’qūb Beg to pay his respects. According to TS, it is said that the Khıtiyas (i.e. the Chinese local militia under the command of Xu Xuegong) accepted the payment of jüya or a per capita tax levied on non-Muslim people, and returned to their stronghold, after Ya’qūb Beg urged them to cooperate with the Tungans.

TH writes that after his three-month stay in Urumchi, Ya’qūb Beg returned to Turfan, where he stayed for about two months and punished some of the Tungans. According to the Qing source, Ya’qūb Beg returned to Turfan on February 2, 1871, and forced some Tungan women and men to migrate to the Nanlu. TS points out that he showed honor to Hakim Khān, hakim of Turfan, and celebrated ‘Id al-Adha, or the Festival of Sacrifice (February 20, 1871), while he was staying in Turfan.

During this expedition, Ya’qūb Beg knew that Qing officers had been caught in Turfan and Urumchi. According to Mei Zhenqing, sometime between February 19 and 28, 1871, Ya’qūb Beg’s “head entrusted with managing matters” (Ch. guanshi toumu 管事頭目) by the name of Yusu Han 玉蘇罕 (Yūsuf Khān?), visited him to give notice that he was permit-
Zhenqing departed from Turfan, and then the letter from Ya’qūb Beg—the Turkic document (JZ, 107186) precisely, reached him in Lukchun.37 With the letter, Mei Zhenqing returned to Hami on March 12 after two years’ absence.30 Wurentai and Chaifu, who were in Urumchi, were also released and arrived in Hami on March 27.39

In response to the letter from Ya’qūb Beg, the Agent (Ch. banshi dachen 辦事大臣) of Hami, Wenlin (文麟, ?–1876),40 drew up the “Letter of Admonition” (Ch. yute 諫帖) to Ya’qūb Beg and dispatched Bai Shitai 白世泰 with it on March 28, 1871. However, before Bai Shitai reached Turfan, Ya’qūb Beg had already left for the Nanlu. Although Bai Shitai waited in Putaogou 葡萄溝 near Turfan City, the “Letter of Admonition” never passed into Ya’qūb Beg’s hands.41 Given that it took Mei Zhengqing eleven days to go from Turfan to Hami, Bai Shitai might have arrived around April 8, 1871 if he had advanced toward Turfan. Therefore, we can conclude that Ya’qūb Beg had left Turfan before then.

Ya’qūb Beg moved from Turfan to Qara-shahr.42 After he took measures at Qara-shahr to subordinate the Torghut nomads, one of four major tribes of the Oyirad, he returned to Aqsu on June 8, 187143 and stayed at the newly built orda.44 At this time, news reached Ya’qūb Beg that Chinese troops under the leadership of Xu Xuegong had raided Urumchi, killed Ma Zhong, and plundered the city before leaving.45 Ya’qūb Beg dispatched an army under the command of Ḥakim Khān Törä and other officials toward Urumchi, which officially launched the second Urumchi campaign.

2. Text and Translation of the Document

2.1. Text in Arabic scripts

(1) بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

(2) بحرين اقليمي بليليب ايگدارليق فيلادر غان خاقان جينغ،

(3) بليليندرادور غان اوچور. بيز مسلمانلانيني اووع كتوب لاريمديك تاریخ حسابيمدیه

Urumchi was named Yusuf Beg Yasawul Bashi, who conveyed to Ya’qūb Beg the first report that the Qing army had reached Gucheng 古城 (TH/Ä: 482); however, it is unclear whether or not we can consider the two as one and the same person.

37) JZ, 107187: f. 6. 38) JZ, 107187: f. 2; JZ, 107189: f. 1; SGXHF, 242: 14b–15a. 39) JZ, 107190: f. 1; SGXHF, 242: 17b–18a. 40) The Manchu Bannerman belonging the Plain Blue Banner, who was at this position in 1865–76. 41) SGXHF, 253: 12a, TZ 10. 9. 29 [1871.11.11]. For the Letter of Admonition, see 4. 2. 42) Kim Hodong argues that this happened in the period from March 21 to April 20, 1871 (Kim 2004: 96). 43) Kim 2004: 96. 44) TH/J: 92b; TH/Ä: 459. 45) According to TH, it is said that Xu Xuegong felt seriously dissatisfied because the supremacy in the Urumchi district was entrusted to the Tungans by Ya’qūb Beg and he could not get provisions that had been promised, although he had served Ya’qūb Beg. As mentioned later, the countermeasures the Qing government took against Ya’qūb Beg’s extension of power included the attempt to win over the local militia under the leadership of Xu.
2.2. Transcription

(1) Bismi ‘l-lähî ’r-raḥmâni ’r-raḥîm
(2) Bâjin iqilimini bilip igâdarîq qiladurghan Khâqân-i Chingha,
(3) bilindürâdurghan uchur. Biz musulmânînlarni ulugh kitâbilirmizdâki ta’rîkh hisâbîmizda
(4) bir ming ikki yüz sâksân bir, Khâqân hisâbida uchûnci yildâ Nañâdîn Kâshgharnî
(5) Farrâj yerlikli oghrî Siddiq buzup iqâlîp andûh ishlînî qîlghan ekân. Bizlînî Khôqand
wilâyati-
(6) ni khâni buyrûp Kâshgharga kelip ulugh khudâni amr-farmâni birlân u yîlerârgha
(7) îgâ bolup turghanimizda, bu taraf Khotan Aqsu Ush Kuchar qâtârîq yêrlîrîmu
(8) fuqrâralari birla qolûmînda amânlîk tafîf tînc kongül awqât qîlîp yûrûp
(9) edî. Toqquzunxî yildâ Țurfan Khamyûza ichidâkî ghalaba chiqarîp yurt buzghan ânsiz
(10)Tûngânlar “Nañlûgha baramîz.” dep kôngî buzulîp Kucharghacha barghanida,
cherîk âtlandurup Țurfangha kelip
(11)Turfanni taskhîr qîlîp mundâkî yamanlînlarni adabini berip Ürûmchighamû barîp
hammasini
(12) tâbi’ qîlîp, bu aradânî andûh Tûngânlar khudâ ta’âlânî iltifâtî bilä täza jazâsînî kördî.

(46) In principle, the transcription system used for the Arabic-script is that adopted in Komatsu,
Umemura, Uyama, Obiya, and Horikawa 2005: 592.
(13) Munda ichkärüdän qoqiq Tüngärnlärni qolida tutulup qulghan manşabdärler bar ekän.
(14) Aldurup qoqiq baqturup edük. Ürümchidin yanip kelip bu utschen manşabdärni
(15) “Yakhirshi saqayiq qulghan ekän. Mundäki ötkän gäp-sözlärni
(16) yetkürüp salamätlikimizni bildürüp äsanlik sorasun.” dep
(17) yandurduk. Khäqan bolsa dawlati qalin. Musulmânlar bolsa khudäwand-i karim
(18) zamün u äsmänni yaratıp äfarida qulghan khudâdin bölük pusht-
(19) panâhi yoq. Hali bolsa munka ishlarimu ulugh khudâni iltifati birlä
(20) bolup turadur. Kirgänlärmu yetip kirip ma’tüm qilur, bildürür.

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muhr 1284
Muhammad Ya’qûb

2.3. Translation and commentary

[recto]

In the name of God, Most Gracious, Most Merciful.

To the Khâqân of Chîn[47] who is ruling and is in possession of the state of Bâjin (i.e. Beijin),
[I send] a letter to let you know [the matter as below]. According to our calendar in the
great book of us Muslims (i.e. Qur’an) in the year of 1281, and according to the calendar of
the Khâqân in the 5th year [of the Tongzhi reign], a robber [by the name of] Siddîq[48] from
Farrâj broke into Kashgar in the Nanlu region, occupied the city, and did disgusting things.
As the khân of the Khoqand district ordered us,[49] we came to Kashgar. When on the basis
of the order and instruction of God we came into possession of those places, other places
in this direction, such as Khotan, Aqsu, Ush, and Kucha, along with their inhabitants also
found peace in our hands and could live without fear. In the 9th year [of the Tongzhi reign],
the restless Tungans in Turfan and Khomyuza (i.e. Urumchi)[50] who had gained victory
[over the Qing authorities] and disturbed the districts, hatched the evil plot to go to the
Nanlu. When they went to Kucha, [our] army set out [to advance toward the east], came to
and conquered Turfan, and inflicted punishment on the bad people (i.e. Tungans) in this
place (i.e. Turfan). [After that] we also went to Urumchi and subjugated the whole of
the district. [As a result,] the disgusting Tungans around these districts were newly punished

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47) “Khâqân of Chîn” means the Emperor of the Qing dynasty (the Tongzhi Emperor at that time).
In most of the historical works written in the 19th century, such as the Addendum to the Turkic
translation of Tarihi-i Rashidi and TA, the Emperors of the Qing are generally referred to as
“Khâqân-i Chîn” (Shinmen 1994b; Shinmen 2009a: 119).
48) This “Siddîq” can be identified as Siddîq Beg. It is said that he was a hâkim of Farrâj (Farrâj/
Farrâch) in the period under the Qing rule (Ta’qûb Begdın ilgârî Kâshqarni alghan Siddîq Begning
dâstân tadhkirası 1a; Hamada 1982: 75).
49) Actually, ‘Alim Qul, a powerful leader of the Khoqand Khanate at that time who competed
with Khudâyâr Khân, dispatched Buzurg Khân and Ya’qûb Beg to Kashgar (Beisembiev 2003:
69–70).
50) KhMYWZH in the text can be probably given in Roman transcription as “Khomyuza,” which
may be a corruption of the word “Hongmiaozi” 红庙子. “Hongmiaozi” is another name for
Urumchi, given in Chinese (Shinmen 2009b: 189).
by the favor of God—may He be exalted. At this place, there were [Qing] officials who had come out from the interior [of China],\(^{51}\) were captured by the Tungans, and detained in custody. We took [them] out [from imprisonment] and took care of them. [When] we came back [to Turfan] from Urumchi, we allowed these three officials\(^{52}\) to return [to Qing territory], thinking that they were well enough and that we would like to let them report to you what had happened here, to inform you that we were well and to have them inquire after [the Khāqān’s] health. While the state of the Khāqān is profound, there is no existence but the great God, God who created and composed the universe, on whom we Muslims rely. Regarding [the situation] at present,\(^{53}\) such matters could be achieved only with the favor of the great God. Those who enter into [Qing territory] (i.e. the three Qing officials) will explain and account for [the circumstances], when they arrive [at the office of the Qing government].

[verso]

(seal) 1284 (year)\(^{54}\)
Muḥammad Yaʿqūb

3. The Characteristics of the Document and the Yaʿqūb Beg’s Intentions

3.1. Format of the Document

This document consists of one sheet of paper, 260 mm wide and 440 mm long. The text of the document is written in black ink in twenty lines on the front, and there is a seal stamped in black ink in the lower right hand corner on the reverse. The text of the document is written in the Turkic language of Central Asia.

We know from the translation that the document is undated. As mentioned below, the addressee is the Khāqān of Chin, while the sender can be assumed to be the same man as

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51) “Ichkāri” originally means “interior” or “inside,” but in the text can be thought to mean the interior of China. Actually, the Qing officials were sent from Hami.

52) It is difficult to determine whether the “three officers” refers to Mei Zhenqing, Zhuang Yiqing, and Chen Zhaokui in Turfan or to Mei Zhenqing, and Wurentai and Chaifu in Urumchi. Although Mei Zhenqing asked Yusu Han, “Why don’t you allow the three of us (including Mei Zhenqing) to go back together?”, he did not say who the other two persons were (JZ, 107187: f. 6). As a result, Zhuang Yiqing and Chen Zhaokui were not released, but Mei Zhenqing departed with six of the followers before Wurentai and Chaifu arrived in Turfan.

53) This part of the text is difficult to make out; we believe it can be rendered as HLY: hele (Jarring 1964: 118), and it can be given a translation of “at present.” Although the original form of HLY in Persian should be hāle/hālī, the word in modern Uzbek that corresponds to it is not holi but hali, so the spelling HLY in Arabic scripts that lacks alef after H is not so strange in Central Asia. According to Onuma’s research, in the text of the document presented in 1801 to the Qing government by Iskandar Wang, the Turfan junwang 郡王 (Commandery Prince) who held the post of hākim beg of Kashgar at that time, there are a few examples of the same word with the same spelling (Onuma 2010: 187, 191, 208).

54) May 5, 1867–April 23, 1868.
the person whose name is shown on the seal on the reverse, even though the name does not appear on the front of the document.

3.2. The contents of the document

Regarding the sender of the document, the name on the seal is Muḥammad Yaʾqūb, which corresponds to Yaʾqūb Beg’s real name. Because no title is added to the name, it is possible that it is from another man who had the same name. However, considering that the Qing archives concerning the document clearly describe that it was the letter from paxia, which in the Qing sources from that time always means Yaʾqūb Beg,55 there can be doubt that the name of Muḥammad Yaʾqūb on the seal is none other than that of Yaʾqūb Beg, and thus it is he who sent the letter.

With regard to the character of the Turkic language used in the document, in some sentences, the suffix “-ni” for the genitive case is used instead of the suffix “-ning.” There are ample examples of such a form in Turkic literature written in the Ferghana region at that time.56 It is not necessarily appropriate to conclude that because of the existence of such phenomena the writer of the document had come from the Ferghana region, because there are examples in some of the local documents in the Kashgar district. However, it is difficult to argue that the existence of such an expression in the document decreases the possibility that the writer of the document was from the Khoqand Khanate.

On the other hand, with regard to place or region names in the document, we can find some peculiarities. The name of KhMYWZH, which originated in the Chinese name of Urumchi, Hongmiaozi, is used when Urumchi is first referred to. When it refers to the oases region around the Tarim Basin, the Turkic term such as Altı-shahr does not appear, but the name of Nanlu derived from Chinese name Nanlu is adopted. The usage of the Chinese version of the place or region names suggests that a local person who had knowledge of Chinese could have had a part in writing the document. It could also be argued that the Chinese names of the place and region were adopted intentionally so that it would be easier for the Qing Emperor or officials—the readers of the document—to understand its contents correctly.

We can divide the contents of the document into eight parts.

55) In the literature in the Turkic language of Central Asia at that period, the word pādshāh that originated in the Persian language, was often used to mean king. It can be supposed that paxia in the Qing sources is derived from the transliterated form of “pāshā” into Chinese, which formed because the “d” fell off from pādshāh. However, as far as we know, in the literature in Turki or Persian written by local authors or Yaʾqūb Beg’s subordinates, Yaʾqūb Beg is not called pādshāh, but called Yaʾqūb Beg, Yaʾqūb qoshbegi, the name that added the title given by the Khoqand Khanate, Atalıq Ghāzi that was the title given by himself after he established his regime, or Janāb-i ḍīl or His Excellency. In contrast, the Qing sources in many cases call him paxia, but it is difficult to clarify the reason why this naming was adopted.

56) We can hardly find such an expression in the 19th-century historical narratives in Turki written in Xinjiang. In contrast, for example, in Janāb-i Badawlatni hikayatları, a historical work written by a man named Aḥmad Quli from Andijan under the command of Yaʾqūb Beg, such an expression appears quite frequently.
i. Basmala
ii. addressee: the Khāqān of Chīn (i.e. the Qing Emperor)
iii. the arrival in Kashgar and capture of the district
iv. the rule of the oases of Altı-shahr
v. the military operations against the Tungans in Turfan and Urumchi, and seizing of the districts
vi. the release and care of the Qing officials who had been confined by the Tungans, and returning them
vii. the declaration of Ya’qūb Beg’s standpoint towards the Khāqān of Chīn
viii. [verso] seal of the sender

We examine the eight parts of the text as below:

i. In the name of God, Most Gracious, Most Merciful.

This indicates that the writer of the document is a Muslim.

ii. To the Khāqān of Chīn who is ruling and is in possession of the state of Bājīn (i.e. Beijing)

It is clear that the addressee is the Qing Emperor (the Tongzhi Emperor at that time).

iii. According to our calendar in the great book of us Muslims (i.e. Qur‘ān) in the year of 1281, and according to the calendar of the Khāqān in the 3rd year [of the Tongzhi reign], a robber [by the name of] Siddiq from Farrāj broke into Kashgar in the Nanlu region, occupied the city, and did disgusting things. As the khan of the Khoqand district ordered us, we came to Kashgar. When on the basis of the order and instruction of God we were in possession of those places,

In this part of the text, we see that they were dispatched to Kashgar by the Khoqand khan to restore public safety in the district and that they got possession of the district because the Kashgar district was thrown into a tragic situation by the evil deeds of Siddiq Beg, although the text does not literally refer to the cause and effect relationship between the evil deeds of Siddiq and their arrival in Kashgar. As is generally known, Siddiq Beg, who aimed at taking the leadership of the Kashgar rebellion, asked ‘Alīm Qul, a strong person of the khanate at that time, to send a khwāja of the Makhdūmsādas. Buzurg Khān was dispatched by ‘Alīm Qul to Kashgar. Ya’qūb Beg accompanied him, and they removed Siddiq Beg and took power in Kashgar—this is the state of affairs. The text does not touch on the fact that they were sent to Kashgar in response to Siddiq’s request. The description of the course of events is not untrue, but it has a kind of bias, probably in order to insist on the appropriateness of their arrival at and occupation of Kashgar by pointing out that their
activities were conducted as countermeasures by the Khoqand Khanate against the injustice of the rebel leader’s actions.

iv. other places in this direction, such as Khotan, Aqsu, Ush, and Kucha, along with their inhabitants also found peace in our hands and could live without fear.

In this sentence, the fact that oases were in stable condition under their rule is very briefly mentioned, not describing how they conquered these areas by overthrowing the rebellious powers in the Khotan and Kucha districts. It appears to express tacitly the appropriateness of the *fait accompli* that these areas were under their rule at that time.

v. In the 9th year [of the Tongzhi reign], the restless Tungans in Turfan and Khomyuza (i.e. Urumchi), who had gained victory [over the Qing authorities] and disturbed the districts, hatched the evil plot to go to the Nanlu. When they went to Kucha, [our] army mounted horses [to advance toward the east], came to and conquered Turfan, and inflicted punishment on the bad people (i.e. Tungans) in this place (i.e. Turfan). [After that] we also went to Urumchi and subjugated the whole of the district. [As a result,] the disgusting Tungans around these districts were newly punished by the favor of God—may He be exalted.

This part, in which the process of their conquest of Turfan and Urumchi is mentioned, is based upon the outline of the facts. It regards the Tungans as bad fellows and justifies their occupation of Turfan and Urumchi as actions to punish the wicked Tungans.

To sum up, it can be assumed that the parts of the text from iii to v, in which the outline of the process of Ya’qūb Beg’s conquest and rule is briefly but systematically explained, was described in order to insist on the appropriateness of the conquest and subjugation of Turfan and Urumchi in the most recent period and of his rule over the whole territory, including the Turfan and Urumchi districts.

vi. At this place, there were [Qing] officials who had come out from the interior [of China], were captured by the Tungans, and detained in custody. We took [them] out [from imprisonment] and took care of them. [When] we came back [to Turfan] from Urumchi, we made these three officials return [to the Qing territory], thinking that they were well enough and that we would like to let them report to you what had happened here, to inform you that we were well and to let them inquire after [the Khāqān’s] health.

At the same time, the document clearly expresses Ya’qūb Beg’s friendly attitude in protecting the Qing officials and sending them back safely to the Qing territory, which he did. It can be thought that this part of the text indicates Ya’qūb Beg’s intention to let the Qing know that he, needless to say, had no hostile feelings toward the Qing, had no wish to set
foot in territory over which the Qing effectively controlled under the present circumstances, and desired a cordial and stable relationship with the Qing on the condition that Ya'qūb Beg continued to be able to govern his existing territory.

vii. While the state of the Khāqān is profound, there is no existence but the great God, God who created and composed the universe, on whom we Muslims rely. Regarding [the situation] at present, such matters could be achieved only with the favor of the great God.

In contrast to the protection and rendition of the Qing officials, as Wenlin’s memorial to the Emperor points out, the document includes no words offering to return the Turfan and Urumchi districts to the Qing. On the contrary, it expresses that as Muslims, they entirely rely on God, and that they succeeded in conquering and ruling the wide region including Turfan and Urumchi, which was a former territory of the Qing, by the favor of the God in whom they believe. Also considering that in the first half of the document, in addition to describing the process leading to the situation, the justifiability of the conquest and rule appears to be insisted upon, it can be surmised that behind this part of section vii lies Ya'qūb Beg’s desire to see the Qing acknowledge the establishment and continuation of his regime and the rule over the territory that he was actually governing at that time, on the pretext of the will of God. In short, it can be argued that this part of the document is where Ya'qūb Beg’s standpoint as a Muslim ruler is declared to the Qing Emperor.

viii. {seal} 1284 (year)
Muḥammad Ya'qūb

As mentioned there is no doubt that the name Muḥammad Ya'qūb in the seal impression on the reverse side belongs to Ya'qūb Beg. The year of 1284 AH in the seal, which can be considered the year of the seal’s manufacture, almost corresponds to 1867, when Ya'qūb Beg established his power over Alti-shahr or the oases region in the west part of the Tarim Basin. Because Ya'qūb Beg’s regime over the wide area was established in this year, it is possible to argue that this was the year in which the seal was made.

3.3. Ya'qūb Beg’s Activities and Intentions Regarding the Document
To the best of our knowledge, in sources written by Muslim authors there are no indications that any letters were sent to the Qing by Ya'qūb Beg other than this document.
According to Qing records, in 1874 (DZ 13), while negotiating the release of Mihrabanu, who was the Princess-consort (Ch. fujin 福晋) of the former Hami qinwang 貴王 (Imperial Prince) Beshir (r. 1813–67) and the mother of the current Hami qinwang Muḥammad (r. 1867–82), and who was herself being held prisoner in Bughur at that time, Yaʿqūb Beg sent a letter to the Qing stating that he would return her when he received a seal-affixed letter from the Agent of Hami (i.e. Wenlin).\textsuperscript{57} However, this letter has not yet been found. The diplomatic negotiations for peace during the Qing army advancing into Yaʿqūb Beg’s territory in 1877, which were conducted through the mediation of the British government, constitute a better known political approach from Yaʿqūb Beg to the Qing. However, at the negotiating table it is not clear whether a letter from Yaʿqūb Beg was handed to Guo Songtao 郭嵩焘, the Qing minister to the United Kingdom in London, by Sayyid Yaʿqūb Khān, Yaʿqūb Beg’s envoy. Accordingly, there is no contradiction in stating that at present, this document is the only existing official letter from Yaʿqūb Beg to the Qing.

It is said that during the re-conquest of Xinjiang by the Qing, Beg Quli Beg, the eldest son of Yaʿqūb Beg, sent an envoy to the camp of the Qing army in Aqsu for negotiations. It is probable that the envoy took a letter from Beg Quli to the Qing,\textsuperscript{58} but even if it is discovered in the future, it will not provide material to investigate Yaʿqūb Beg’s policy toward the Qing, because it would be a document dating from after Yaʿqūb Beg’s death. In that sense, the existing document and the Qing archives give us insight into the situation and the relationship between Yaʿqūb Beg and the Qing when they made contact with each other directly and are very valuable materials for examining the policies of Yaʿqūb Beg and the Qing toward each other. Furthermore, they shed light on their understanding of the circumstances, and their intentions and mentality behind the policies.

In the records authored by the persons under the command of Yaʿqūb Beg, for example, TS, the historical works written in Turki, and the descriptions by the English or Russians who visited Xinjiang under the rule of Yaʿqūb Beg, descriptions that inform us as to the situation when the document was sent by Yaʿqūb Beg or his intent and reason for sending the document cannot be found. Besides, we cannot find in these sources any descriptions of Yaʿqūb Beg’s release and return of the Qing officials who had been imprisoned by the Tungans in Turfan and Urumchi. Consequently, particularly with regard to Yaʿqūb Beg’s intentions and reasons for sending the document, we cannot help but speculate regarding Yaʿqūb Beg’s actions and activities before and after the time when the document was sent, the contents of the document, and the trends of Yaʿqūb Beg’s diplomatic policies.

According to Qing sources, Yaʿqūb Beg returned to Turfan from Urumchi on February 2, 1871. Subsequently, Mei Zhenqing, who between February 19 and 28 was informed by Yusu Han that he was allowed to return to the Qing by Yaʿqūb Beg and that a letter would

\textsuperscript{57} MZSL, 373: 26b–27a, TZ 13. 11. jiwei [1874.12.28]. In 1873 (TZ12), Mihrabanu and Muḥammad were captured by the Tungans led by Bai Yanhu 白彥虎 from Shaanxi. Although the Qing army relieved Muḥammad soon, Mihrabanu was then carried off by Yaʿqūb Beg and taken to the Nanlu. She was finally rescued in Aqsu by an army under Zuo Zongtang in 1877 or 1878 (Su and Huang 1993: 16; Saguchi 1995: 236–7).

\textsuperscript{58} Kim 2004: 102.
be sent to the Qing by Ya’qūb Beg, left Turfan on March 1. He then received the letter at Lukchun, on the way from Turfan to Hami, and reached Hami on March 12. In light of such circumstances, we can conclude that the document was authored while Ya’qūb Beg was staying at Turfan and that he forwarded it, pursuing Mei Zhengqing, after he let Mei depart from Turfan. Accordingly, it can be clarified that the letter was sent from Turfan a few days after March 2.

On the other hand, as mentioned before, Ya’qūb Beg had already left Turfan before April 8, 1871, probably when Bai Shitai arrived in Turfan carrying the “Letter of Admonition” in his hand. It is difficult to clarify the exact date of Ya’qūb Beg’s departure from Turfan, but based on materials including the description of TH, it is possible to narrow the range. If we suppose that Ya’qūb Beg went straight to Qara-shahr from Turfan, considering that according to TH, Ya’qūb Beg arrived at Qara-shahr in the month of ḥamal, which corresponds to the period from March 21 to April 20, 1871, and considering that, according to TH, Ya’qūb Beg stayed in Turfan for two months before he left for Qara-shahr, he reached Qara-shahr in the middle of March at the earliest and in the beginning of April at the latest. Based on Kim Hodong’s study, Ya’qūb Beg returned from Qara-shahr to Aqsu on June 8, 1871. Considering that it must have taken a certain amount of time to take measures to subordinate the Torghuts around Qara-shahr, and that it took a certain amount of time to move from Qara-shahr to Aqsu, there is a high probability that Ya’qūb Beg departed from Turfan around mid-March. Accordingly, he left Turfan not long after he sent the letter to the Qing in the beginning of March.

In this way, Ya’qūb Beg took leave of Turfan, not waiting for the response of the Qing to his letter, although he approached the Qing by authoring and sending the official letter to the Emperor. In light of this fact, it is probable that at least at that time, he did not consider the relationship with the Qing as an important matter with which he should have grappled most urgently. Presumably, Ya’qūb Beg supposed that the Qing could not afford to undertake an offensive to Turfan, which had come under his rule, because the Qing could not take any effective countermeasures against the Tungan rebels after the success of the Muslim rebellion, apart from dispatching a few officers to Turfan and Urumchi to reconnoiter the state of affairs within the Tungan domains, while the Tungans continued to govern Urumchi and Turfan.

In addition, surveying the circumstances of the territory under Ya’qūb Beg’s rule at this time from the viewpoint of a longer time span and wider geographic range, it is noteworthy that the tense relationship with neighboring Russia weighed heavily on Ya’qūb Beg. During the period from the completion of Ya’qūb Beg’s conquest of Alti-shahr in 1867 to the expedition to Turfan and Urumchi in 1870–71, Russia occupied Naryn in 1867 and con-

59) TH/J: 92a; TH/A: 455.
60) Kim 2004: 96.
61) In Qara-shahr, Ya’qūb Beg constructed a fort on the bank of the Qara-shahr River on his own initiative and took measures to subordinate the Torghuts. In particular, he secretly took a woman leader (i.e. Khatun Khân) of the Torghuts away to Korla to keep her in custody (TH/J: 92a; TH/A: 455–7).
structured a fort there in 1868, the result of which was stronger military pressure on Ya'qūb Beg. He was forced to oppose Russian’s military threats by stationing his troops in the area near the Russian borders. At the same time, he dispatched an envoy to Russia in 1868, but his diplomatic efforts, which probably included an attempt to ask Russia to acknowledge the legitimacy of his government, failed. It is known that in 1870, when he was on the expedition to Turfan and Urumchi, by chance Ya’qūb Beg and Russia sent envoys at the same period to the regime of the Muslim rebels in the Ili districts, which was not incorporated into Ya’qūb Beg’s regime. In June of 1871, a few months after Ya’qūb Beg subjugated the Turfan and Urumchi districts, Russian forces advanced to the Ili valley and occupied the district, probably one of the purposes of which was to contain the development of Ya’qūb Beg’s regime. Finally, Ya’qūb Beg and Russia established official trade relations in 1872 after diplomatic bargaining.

Considering such a tense situation between Ya’qūb Beg and Russia, it is unquestionable that Ya’qūb Beg regarded diplomatic issues with Russia as a serious problem. In other words, it can be assumed that at least at this time, Ya’qūb Beg assessed that diplomatic actions with regard to relations with the Qing Dynasty were a less pressing matter than those concerning Russia. In fact, when Bai Shitai carried the Qing reply to the Turfan Basin from Hami, although he arrived at Putaogou close to the city of Turfan, the local office of the Ya’qūb Beg regime in the city did not react. Bai Shitai, who could not hand the reply letter to Ya’qūb Beg, had no choice but to stay at Putaogou for seven months. This fact enables us to conjecture that Ya’qūb Beg did not attach such great importance to the direct contact with the Qing at this point in time.

However, it would be wrong to assume that Ya’qūb Beg did not have any intention to establish official relations with the Qing and to negotiate for these in the future, based upon the grounds that he left Turfan, a front line for the contact with the Qing, soon after he sent a letter to the Qing. It is important to consider the fact that in the contents of Ya’qūb Beg’s document, his inclination to negotiate with the Qing is suggested. As far as

64) “С. Петербургъ, 1 августа, 1873 года,” Туркестанский сборник, 45: 210–1.
65) As the document was addressed to the Qing Emperor, it would have taken a long time for the document to reach the Emperor at Beijing and only then would his reply be sent to Ya’qūb Beg. If so, Ya’qūb Beg may have thought it better to entrust his officials at Turfan with contacting the Qing officials and to move to the west without delay in order to take the necessary measures for the important matters in the western region of his territory, which included the relationship with Russia, than to stay in Turfan for a long time and await the Qing Emperor’s reply, although he expected a response from the Qing government to his letter. However, the Qing officials appear to have believed that Ya’qūb Beg had to receive the reply from the Qing in Turfan (SGXHF, 253: 13a–b).
66) SGXHF, 253: 12a. It is said that in the 4th month of the 10th year of the Tongzhi reign (May 19–June 17, 1871) the troops of the local militia under the command of Xu Xuegong made an assault on Urumchi, captured Ma Zhong and killed him (KXJ, 1: 14a). The news of the incident reached Ya’qūb Beg immediately (TH/J: 92a-b; TH/A: 460). It is probable that Ya’qūb Beg supposed that it would be too hasty to establish a concrete relationship with the Qing before the circumstances around the Urumchi district could be sufficiently stabilized.
we can learn from the context of its text, it is obvious that the document is not a one-off greeting with little political significance, attached when the Qing officials were sent back.

As mentioned, in the first half of the text of the document, Ya'qūb Beg described the process of his conquest systematically, suggesting the appropriateness of the existing fact that the territory that had been a part of former territory of the Qing was under his rule. The second half of the text, after expressing his peaceful attitude in releasing the Qing officials and returning them safely to the Qing territory, insists that his conquest and rule over the territory were based on the will of God. From such contents, we can perceive Ya'qūb Beg’s aim to express to the Qing that he had no hostility against the Qing, and to ask the Qing to recognize the fact that he held effective control over the territory that he had conquered.

Needless to say, Ya’qūb Beg established his regime inside Qing territory by taking advantage of the situation of the Muslim rebellion against the Qing, and extended its sway across territory which eventually corresponded to nearly all of Xinjiang. If the negotiations to establish an official relationship between Ya’qūb Beg and the Qing had been opened, for Ya’qūb Beg, the primary purpose at the negotiations would have been to have the Qing acknowledge the existence of his regime and his rule over the area in the Qing’s former territory. Accordingly, considering that the text of the document implied Ya’qūb Beg’s justification of his conquest and rule, and implied a political appeal to ask the Qing for the acknowledgement of his actual control over the territory, it is not wholly wrong to argue that the letter was dispatched with the intent of expected future earnest negotiations with the Qing.

It is true that there is no evidence that Ya’qūb Beg attempted to make official contact with the Qing during the period after that time until the advance of the Qing’s army into his territory. Surveying Ya’qūb Beg’s foreign policy within the longer span of time, Ya’qūb Beg concluded commercial agreements with Russia in 1872 and commercial agreements with the United Kingdom while he received the Forsyth mission in 1873–74, and in 1873 he established a formal relationship with the Ottoman Empire, which dispatched a few military instructors to Kashgar with some armaments to assist Ya’qūb Beg’s regime in 1875. In short, in the span of just a few years, he rapidly succeeded in using diplomatic strategy to get influential states to recognize his regime, and to receive substantial assistance from two of these states. This fact shows that Ya’qūb Beg’s foreign policy at that time placed more emphasis on the establishment of formal relations with the other influential states than on negotiations with the Qing.

However, given that Ya’qūb Beg was considering the necessary conditions to solidify his regime for a long time, it would be correct to assume that he intended to negotiate with the Qing to establish the formal relations in the earlier period of his regime, although it is difficult to determine when he first started to think in this manner. In fact, it is believed that in 1873–74 he stated to T. D. Forsyth, a representative of the British mission, that he hoped to dispatch an envoy to the Qing Emperor directly. However, it would not have become

possible unless the actual conditions to proceed favorably with negotiations with the Qing had been met. Accordingly, since he made it a priority to establish a relationship with the other states over the negotiations with the Qing, it can be understood that he might have planned to earnestly work on the negotiations with the Qing for recognition only after he solved the diplomatic problem of gaining international recognition for his regime, and as a result, he received the international backing of the influential states. Ya'qūb Beg would have expected that gaining Qing recognition would be relatively difficult, since he had taken advantage of the rebellion against the Qing, and was now ruling over what had been Qing territory. At any rate, it is true that the negotiations with the Qing were not actually conducted, but it is hard to say that Ya'qūb Beg had no intention of doing so. There is a strong possibility that the contrary is the case.

From the above, it can be concluded that the document sent by Ya'qūb Beg in 1871 had an extremely political meaning. It is probable that, seizing the opportunity posed by his success in extending his territory through the conquest of Turfan and Urumchi and the chance contact with the Qing officials, Ya'qūb Beg hoped to convince the Qing of the appropriateness of his rule over the territory and his standpoint as the Muslim ruler, as a precondition for any possible future negotiations with the Qing. Moreover, keeping this point in mind, it is very interesting that in the negotiations between Ya'qūb Beg and the Qing in 1877, the condition that Ya'qūb Beg’s effective control over his territory should be maintained was presented by the British government, who spoke for the Ya'qūb Beg’s envoy. It is probable that, in this condition, the outline of his intention is revealed and is in common with that of the 1871 letter, although the situation was different.

4. Reactions of the Qing

Until the Qing received the letter from Ya'qūb Beg, they had not yet taken any action toward him. However, now that a buffer area between the two powers had disappeared through Ya'qūb Beg’s conquest, the Qing had no choice but to address the situation.

4.1. Translation of the Letter into Chinese

After Mei Zhenqing returned to Hami on March 12, 1871, Wenlin and other Qing agents in Hami immediately translated Ya'qūb Beg’s letter into Chinese through the mediation of a Turkic-Muslim, who was well-versed in Manchu (Ch. qingyu 清語), under the control of the Hami qinwang.}

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68) In 1870, the British in India urged the Qing government to recognize Ya'qūb Beg’s regime, but it was in no mood to comply. At that time Prince Gong 恭親王, head of the Zongli Yamen 紫禁衙門, informed British Minister Thomas Wade that Xinjiang was a part of China (Hsü 1965: 29).


70) JZ, 107187: f. 2.
Translation

[With regard to] the conquest of the Eight Cities, I send [this letter] to clarify matters. In the 1281st year of the Muslim, or the 3rd year of the Tongzhi reign of the Great Qing (1864), because a Muslim traitor in the Nanlu, Siddiq, revolted, I was dispatched by the Khoqand Khan and advanced to Kashgar. Accepting the grace of Heaven and with [the efforts] of many people, I brought Khotan, Aqsu, Ush, and Kucha under my control; the peace [of these places] had been as usual. Because, in the 9th year of the Tongzhi reign (1870), the Hanhuis (i.e. Tungans) in Turfan and Urumchi revolted, ran into the Nanlu, and conspired to occupy Kucha, I immediately led [my] soldiers to beat the rebels (i.e. Tungans), [then] conquered Turfan and attacked Urumchi advancing from Turfan. Now, I had already arrived in Urumchi and strictly punished the Hanhuis, some of whom were taken prisoner; therefore, the force of the rebels became weaker. The [Qing] officers, who had formerly come to Urumchi, now have already returned Turfan. I already presented details of the matter to Mei daren (i.e. Mei Zhenqin). Prostrating myself and thinking, the fortune of the Great Emperor is warm. Muslims are also good people and only seek peace for this area; we enjoy the benefits of Rain-Dew. Prostrating myself and thinking, all the matters [mentioned above] are of the Will of Heaven. All the matters will be explained by Mei daren himself in detail.

Despite some parts omitted, summarized, and supplemented, this does grasp the basic meaning of original letter in Turki. However, in the original letter Ya‘qûb Beg explained his military movements and rule in Xinjiang as a result of the “favor of the Great God,” while in the Chinese version it was based on the “Will of Heaven” (Ch. tianyi).

Traditionally, the terms for God in Islam (Allâh) and the related matters are often expressed with the word tian 天, or “Heaven,” in ancient Chinese cultural and terminological concepts. This identification probably reflects the unequaled and universal character of both Allâh and tian. However, referred to as tian, the terms were situated and recognized

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71) JZ, 107188: f. 1. The punctuation marks in the text have been inserted by Onuma.
72) The “Eight Cities” (Ch. bacheng 八城) refers to the main oasis cities around the Tarim Basin: Kashgar, Yangi-hisar, Yarkand, Khotan, Ush, Aqsu, Kucha, and Qara-shahr.
73) The word daren 大人 is used as a proper title, corresponding to “Mr.” when affixed to the end of a name.
74) The word yulu 雨露, or “Rain-Dew,” is a metaphor for “favor, benefit, blessing.”
75) As an early example, Allâh is described by the tianshen 天神, or “Heavenly God,” in the Jiu tangshu, 198 (1975: 5316).
within the Chinese worldview. On the basis of the Qing logic, “under Heaven” (Ch. tianxia 天下), a man possessing the “Will of Heaven” was none other than the Qing Emperor, who was referred to as the “Son of Heaven” (Ch. tianz子); hence, even the Muslim was only a person to enjoy the benefits. The interpretation of Ya’qub Beg’s achievements in this was also evident in the “Letter of Admonition” described in the following section. Hereafter, the Qing discussed and decided its policy based upon this Chinese translation.

From the content of the letter, Wenlin read a certain obedience of Ya’qub Beg to the Qing. However, there was no phrase “to swear allegiance and to return the [conquered] cities” (Ch. toucheng jiaocheng 投诚交城) to the Qing. According to the report of Mei Zhenqing, Ya’qub Beg took the Han-Chinese away to Kashgaria after shaving their heads and, building military camps and digging trenches, made steady progress in occupying Urumchi and Turfan. The concern of the Qing authorities in Hami was that, in league with the Tungans, Ya’qub Beg would plot to invade further east. Hami was thus dangerously isolated because it lay between Turfan on one side, and the Shaan-Gan district, a core territory of the Hui-Muslim rebels, on the other. To prevent this situation, Wenlin took the three measures described forthwith.

4.2. The Dispatch of the “Letter of Admonition”

First, Wenlin sent Ya’qub Beg the “Letter of Admonition” to urge him “to swear allegiance and return the [conquered] cities” to the Qing, and under this pretext, tried to watch Ya’qub Beg’s activities. We have divided our analysis of the “Letter of Admonition” into eight parts.

Text

(a) 警和諧安集延佩夏知悉。

(b) 照得本大臣，於同治十年正月二十二日，據前差赴吐魯番等城招安回衆委員花翎副將梅振清・隨帶跟從人等到哈，帶來該伯夏回字稿子一紙。本大臣當即謹細開，內稱：『該伯夏，於同治九年因吐魯番・烏魯木齊等處漢回變亂，向南路逃竄，盤踞庫車，當即帶兵，勸誘歸順。』

76) We can often observe changes in logic like this, on the premise of the difference among languages, in the Qing period. One good example is the stela inscribed in Arabic-script Turki and Chinese within the Madrasa-i Maymūna (Ch. Sugongta 蘇公塔) built by the second Turfan jinwang, Sulaimān, to commemorate the achievements of his father, Amin Khwāja (1969: 79–84). The inscription in Turki expresses the depth of the gratitude for Allāh; the text in Chinese, on the other hand, declares that an old subject of the Qing emperor is repaying a “Heavenly kindness” (Ch. tian’en 天恩). This reflects the dual nature of the Turfan jinwangs not only as loyal followers to the Qing Emperor, but also as Islamic ruler over the local Muslim inhabitants (1986: 225–8; Shinmen 2005: 216). Taking this point into consideration, it might be noticed that a Turkic-Muslim belonging to Hami qinwang participated in the translation of Ya’qub Beg’s letter. We can point out a possibility that the skill in translation acted in the process, which was accumulated by experience to avoid inconsistency under the infidel’s rule.

77) JZ, 107187: ff. 6–7; SGXHF, 242: 16a–17a. However, Khodjaev guesses that Ya’qub Beg did not intend to invade Hami and Barköl (1979: 54–5).

78) JZ, 107189: ff. 1–3. The punctuation marks in the text have been inserted by Onuma.
収復吐魯番，復由吐魯番起程，攻陷烏魯木齊。現已至烏魯木齊，將漢回大加懲創，亦有擒獲，賊勢窮蹙。從前赴烏魯木齊官員，現在已回吐魯番。將始終緣由業經告知梅大人轉奏。」等因而來。

(c) 本大臣細閱檔子。並據梅振清面稟各情，查該帕夏因漢回逆天行事，帶兵攻剿，殺賊収城，護救漢官漢民。一心為大皇帝報効出力，深明大義，實堪嘉。尚未大臣一覧此信，歡喜不盡。擬即據情，奏請大皇帝破格施恩，將帕夏從優獎勵，以酬其勞。一俟欽奉詔旨，即行專差委員賜送吐魯番，交帕夏収閱。況我朝廷深恩厚澤，遍被遐邇，無分中外，一視同仁。斷不能泯滅帕夏勞功也。

(d) 再，吐魯番及南路八城，皆係國家版圖。該帕夏既如此知恩順命，必能將地方交出。俟呈報來京，以憑本大臣奏請大皇帝，安官設兵。防守俾符舊制，該帕夏等亦得共享昇平，各安生理矣。

(e) 至於烏魯木齊城池，仍係漢回佔踞。本大臣亦即調撥大兵，會同本地義勇，剋期進剿，以靖賊氛。近聞俄國人衆，常與安集延回衆結仇打仗。鄰封不和，亦非正理。今帕夏如此報効順可嘉。一俟大告，本大臣即行奏明大皇帝諭勵俄國頭目，罷兵息戰，同和好。

(f) 再查，帕夏蠻子內所說，前往烏魯木齊委員烏仁泰・柴福伯克・馬得成，並跟役人等，已到吐魯番。仰帕夏將該委員並吐魯番委員莊義慶・陳兆魁等，令其回哈。以後好與帕夏，來往送信說話以資熟手。

(g) 再查，梅振清原稟恐坐烏魯木齊提督軍門成[祍]委員。現已令其進口，與成大人送信去矣。俟該委員回哈之日，即令其仍赴吐魯番，與帕夏送信。第思，梅振清進口，道路遙遠，恐其多需時。茲本大臣先派本營總兵衛副將白世泰帶領跟役人等，馳赴吐魯番，奮送印諭。帕夏親閲此諭，便知細情。並仰帕夏選派老成能事玉蘇伯克一二二人隨同此次委員先行來哈。本大臣將一切事件面為商明後，即令仍回吐魯番，斷不能扣留一人。帕夏儘管放心，不必疑慮也。

(h) 餘情已稟委員面述，不贅此論。並問帕夏近好。

Translation

(a) We admonish the Pasha (i.e. Ya'qūb Beg) of Khotan and Andijan to understand [the following].

(b) The Minister (i.e. Wenlin) [knew] that on the 22nd day of the 1st month of the 10th year of the Tongzhi reign (1871.3.12), the Special Delegate with Feather, Mei Zhencing, and the attendants following [Mei Zhencing], who had formerly been dispatched to Turfan and other cities to urge the Muslim people (i.e. Tungans) to submit [to the Qing], arrived in Hami with a letter from the Pasha in Muslim (i.e. Arabic) script. The Minister immediately translated it into Chinese and read it, in which you said, "Because, in the 9th year of the Tongzhi reign, the Hanhuis in Turfan and Urumchi revolted, ran into the Nanhu, and conspired to occupy Kucha, I immediately led [my] soldiers to beat the rebels, [then] conquered Turfan, and attacked Urumchi advancing from Turfan. Now, I had already arrived in Urumchi and strictly punished the Hanhuis, some of whom were taken prisoner; therefore, the force of the rebels became weaker. The officers [of the Qing], who had come to Urumchi formerly, returned to Turfan. I already told the details [of the matters] to Mei darein.”

(c) The Minister read the letter in detail. In addition, according to situations directly
reported by Mei Zhenqing, the Hanhuis disobeyed Heaven and caused trouble; the Pasha attacked and beat [them] with the soldiers, killed the rebels to recover cities, and gave aid to the Han-officials and Han-people [of the Qing]. [By such action,] you wholeheartedly showed your loyalty and did your best for the Great Emperor and deeply clarified your great duty [to the Qing]—this is truly commendable. The Minister, having looked at the letter, was also filled with joy. On the basis of the matters, I immediately memorialize a request that the Great Emperor does [you] a special favor and treats the Pasha well in repaying your distinguished service. After respectfully accepting the edict, I immediately dispatch the Special Delegate and send [the edict] to Turfan to deliver to Pasha for your reading. Above all, the deep and dignified favor of my dynasty spreads to places both near and far, does not distinguish between the inside and the outside, and treats all with the same benevolence. I will never demean Pasha’s distinguished services.

(d) In addition, Turfan and the Eight Cities in the Nanlu are entirely [the Qing’s] dynastic territory. The Pasha, who in this way understands respectful devotion [to the Qing], therefore should certainly return [to the Qing] the places [which you gained]. After the report [that you have returned the places to the Qing] arrives at the military camp [in Hami], the Minister will memorialize a request that the Great Emperor set up officers and soldiers [of the Qing]. If the defense is adapted to the former system [of the Qing], the Pasha will also enjoy peace and everyone have a stable life.

(e) Urumchi City is still occupied by the Hanhuis. The Minister also immediately levies large troops and, deciding the timing, advances with the local militia [into Urumchi] to exorcise an evil air. Recently, I heard that the Russians are constantly at war with Andijan Muslims. Discord with a neighboring country is not proper. Now, it is commendable that the Pasha, in this way, has shown loyalty and sworn allegiance [to the Qing]. [Therefore,] after these great services (i.e. the return of Turfan and the Eight Cities in the Nanlu and the conquest of Urumchi) are achieved, the Minister will immediately memorialize a request that the Great Emperor issue to the leader of Russia an Imperial edict to withdraw troops and stop fighting in order to achieve peace and harmony with each other.

(f) In addition, judging from Pasha’s explanation in the letter, it seems that the Special Delegates, Wurentai, Chaifu Beg, and Ma Decheng, and the followers who had formerly proceeded to Urumchi have already arrived in Turfan. It is hoped that the Pasha will let the Special Delegates (i.e. Wurentai, Chaifu Beg, and Ma Decheng) and the Special Delegates in Turfan, Zhuang Yiqing and Chen Zhaokui, return to Hami. After this, when we befriend the Pasha, the exchange of people, sending of letters, and engaging in dialogue can be handled chiefly [by them].

(g) In addition, Mei Zhenqing was originally a Special Delegate of Cheng[lu], the Imperially commissioned Provincial Military Commander (tidos) of Urumchi. Now, I have already made him go to the Interior [of China] to send a letter to Cheng daren. When this Special Delegate (i.e. Mei Zhenqing) returns to Hami, I will immediately make
him return to Turfan to deliver a letter to the Pasha. However, I think, because the Interior is very far, Mei Zhenqing may need several days [to return to Hami]. Hence, the Minister first dispatches the Colonel (fujiang) Bai Shitai, treated as the Regional Commander (zongbing), of the military camp [of Hami] with followers to Turfan, where he will deliver this Letter of Admonition under [my] seal. If the Pasha personally reads this Letter of Admonition, you can immediately understand the detailed circumstances. I hope, at the same time, that the Pasha will select and dispatch one or two experienced and able persons [like] Yusu Beg to Hami following the Special Delegate. After meeting [them] and clarifying all the affairs upon deliberation, the Minister will immediately let [them] return to Turfan again; I will never take a person into custody. I hope that the Pasha will be at ease and will not be suspicious [of us].

(h) For other matters, I have already ordered the Special Delegate to explain verbally; I will not waste [space in] this letter of admonition. In addition, I ask after the recent health of the Pasha.

One glance is enough to appreciate that the “Letter of Admonition” is written in a relatively amicable tone. After quoting part of the Chinese version of Ya'qūb Beg’s letter (b), Wenlin extolls Ya'qūb Beg. In Wenlin’s view, the action to defeat the Tungans, to recover Turfan and Urumchi, and to give aid to the Qing officials were regarded as showing Ya'qūb Beg’s loyalty and clarifying his “great duty” (Ch. dayi 大義) toward the Qing Emperor. Moreover, although Ya'qūb Beg was not among the Qing’s subjects, Wenlin made a definite promise that the Qing Emperor, who intended “not to distinguish between the inside and the outside” (Ch. zhongwai bufen 中外不分) and “to treat all with the same benevolence” (Ch. yishi tongren 一視同仁) in the Imperial vision, would do a special favor to repay the distinguished service. It is well known that, ideologically, the favor of the Emperor, deriving from his “virtue” (Ch. de 德), spread beyond the limits of geographical boundaries. From the Qing perspective, the Tungans were “rebels” (Ch. zei 賊) opposing Heaven; therefore, when Ya'qūb Beg overthrew them, it was exactly ascribed to a “great duty” for the Qing Emperor, possessing the “Will of Heaven” (c).

However, the next part emphasizes that Turfan and the cities of Kashgaria under Ya’qūb Beg’s power had originally belonged to a “dynastic territory” (Ch. guojia bantu 国家版图) effectively controlled by the Qing, which must be returned to the Qing because Ya’qūb Beg had already overthrown the Tungans. The Qing’s legitimacy to rule Xinjiang is explained here; it stands in opposition to the principle of God’s will, insisted on by Ya’qūb Beg. In addition, Wenlin advocated a restoration of the former ruling system of the Qing, setting up officers and soldiers (d).

On the other hand, Ya’qūb Beg entrusted control of Urumchi to Ma Zhong after the conquest. Wenlin thus supposed Urumchi not to be directly returned from Ya’qūb Beg, but that it would be necessary to recapture it through a resort to arms. Although in the text the Qing’s objection was directed toward the Tungan “rebels,” we can here read a desire to restrain Ya’qūb Beg. Furthermore, Wenlin pointed out that the Khoqand Khanate was
in crisis facing the Russian invasion\(^79\) and that, when Xinjiang was restored, the Qing was prepared to negotiate with Russia for a cease-fire. This passage seems to urge Ya’qūb Beg to return the occupied territory (e).

Wenlin then asked Ya’qūb Beg for the prompt repatriation of the Qing officers remaining in Turfan and Urumchi, and using them as intermediaries, suggested the possibility of constructing a relationship on the assumption that Ya’qūb Beg would continue to be in Turfan (f). For the first step, Bai Shitai was sent as envoy with the “Letter of Admonition.” Furthermore, Wenlin asked Ya’qūb Beg to dispatch Yusu Han and others to Hami based upon Bai Shitai’s return (g).

It follows from what has been said that this “Letter of Admonition” does not treat Ya’qūb Beg as a target of blame. His conquest and rule of Xinjiang were recognized as remarkable services for the Qing Emperor. This point differs very much from how Zuo Zongtang afterward branded Ya’qūb Beg as an invader from the outside world. However, at the same time, claims were made for the return of the territory, as the Qing’s “dynastic territory,” and a restoration of the ruling system, and suggestions of a plan for a military campaign for Urumchi and a proposal for settling disputes with Russia. It is noteworthy that the “Letter of Admonition” viewed Xinjiang as the Qing’s “dynastic territory” and declared its right to possess it. The cession of the frontier zones and the delimitation of borders in the late 19\(^{th}\) century\(^80\) gave an unprecedentedly clear outline to the Qing’s territory; it pressed the Qing to change its traditional ways of perceiving space. We may also trace an intensification of consciousness of sovereignty over “practical” territory in the late Qing period from the context of the “Letter of Admonition.”

It is also noteworthy that the “Letter of Admonition” does not deny the existence of Ya’qūb Beg himself. It concurs with the 1877 negotiations in London: Ya’qūb Beg approves the Qing’s suzerainty and the Qing, on the other hand, permits Ya’qūb Beg to rule his territory.\(^81\) However, what position Ya’qūb Beg would hold after recovery of the cities remains vague and unexplained.\(^82\) Perhaps the Qing had never had direct relations with Ya’qūb Beg until then, and so had no clear image of him. We can see from the following section that, with the repatriation of the Qing officers and the exchange of the letter this time, Wenlin hoped to maintain contact with Ya’qūb Beg. Taking this point into consideration, it can be said that the primary aim of sending the “Letter of Admonition” was not to take a concrete measures toward Ya’qūb Beg; rather, it was to assert the Qing legitimacy to rule Xinjiang and to test Ya’qūb Beg’s attitude by providing several conditions.

\(^79\) When this letter was written in 1871, the Khoqand Khanate, which was completely annexed to Russia in 1876, had already become a protectorate of Russia.

\(^80\) The principal events in years surrounding 1871 include the cession of Primorski Krai to Russia by the Aigun Treaty in 1858 and the Beijing Treaty in 1860, the cession of Semirechye to Russia by the Tarbaghatai Treaty in 1864, and the cession of the western region of Tannu Uriankhai to Russia by the Khovd and Uliyasutai Treaties in 1869.


\(^82\) The Qing Court in Beijing, accepting the memorial of Wenlin, instructed Wenlin to define the privileges offered to Ya’qūb Beg in the “Letter of Admonition” (SGXHF, 242: 20a–22a; MZSL, 308: 17b–19b, TZ 10. 4. jiaxu [1871.6.2]). However, we do not possess Wenlin’s reply to this.
4.3. Cooperation with the local militias

The second measure was cooperation with the Chinese leaders of the local militias. At that time, certain local militias existed around the Urumchi and Barköl areas, rallying the Han-Chinese people who had escaped from the Tungans. The largest of these was a group led by Xu Xuegong based at Nanshan, whose size was estimated at 50,000. The leaders, regarded as the “officials of the encampment” (Ch. yingguan 營官) by the Qing authority, carried on resistance against the Tungans. However, they were also out of the Qing’s control because they sometimes attacked villages within the Qing sphere of influence. As mentioned above, Xu Xuegong submitted to Ya’qūb Beg after the conquest of Turfan and took part in the expedition to Urumchi. Their opportunistic movements were dangerous to the Qing. The Qing authorities in Hami tried to strengthen cooperation with them to prepare for a future invasion by Ya’qūb Beg. However, it is not apparent whether such efforts influenced Xu Xuegong’s attack on Urumchi, which caused the second expedition of Ya’qūb Beg to Urumchi.

4.4. Cooperation with the Tungans

The third measure was cooperation with the Tungans in Urumchi. Wurentai arrived in Hami 15 days later than Mei Zhenqing. He brought along a secret letter from Ma Zhong. In the letter, Ma Zhong said, “All of us are subjects (Ch. zimin 子民) of the Great Qing. Why need we submit to Andijan Muslims?” and expressed an intention to follow the Qing rather than Ya’qūb Beg. Wenlin judged from the letter that Ma Zhong “was acquainted with Confucianism and recognized word and justice”; moreover, he wished to “follow not the barbarians (Ch. yì 弓) but Chinese and to atone for his rebellious sins by rendering services to subjugate Kashgaria together with the Qing.” However, because the letter lacked Tuo Delin’s signature and either of their seals, the Qing authorities could not believe the contents immediately. In order to confirm the Tungans’ real intentions, Wenlin decided to dispatch Wurentai to Urumchi to meet Tuo Delin and Ma Zhong. Wurentai was assigned the task of bringing the Tungan leaders along to the Qing military camp in Jimisar. In addition, Wenlin stated in his order to Wurentai that if the Tungan leaders would visit Hami to ask to officially submit, he would have them return to Urumchi soon after issuing “regulations” (Ch. zhengcheng 章程).

The Qing had originally regarded the Tungans as “rebels” and blamed them harshly. To look for cooperation with the Tungans is at variance with the Qing attitude expressed to Ya’qūb Beg in the “Letter of Admonition.” This change arose because the threat of Ya’qūb Beg, who had conquered Turfan and Urumchui and had come close to Hami, became greater.

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83) In fact, Xu Xuegong was wearing a hat with the Button of uher da (in Manchu, Ch. zongguan 總管, or Supervisor-in-chief) and Double-eyed Peacock Feather (“Из Ташкента,” Туркестанский сборник, 75: 75).
84) JZ, 107187: ff. 7–8; SGXHF, 242: 17a–b.
85) JZ, 107190, TZ 10. 2. 29, the memorial of Wenlin; JZ, 107191, TZ 10. 2. 29, the Order (Ch. zhaoan 批文) of Wenlin to Wurentai.
86) JZ, 107192, TZ 10. 2. 29, the Order of Wenlin to Wurentai.
than that of the Tungans.\textsuperscript{87)}

The Qing authorities in Hami sent the peaceful “Letter of Admonition” and tried to ascertain the real attitude of Ya’qūb Beg. At the same time, they began to explore cooperation not only with the local Chinese militias, but also with the Tungans for defense against Ya’qūb Beg. However, as mentioned above, Ya’qūb Beg had left Turfan for Qara-shahr before the “Letter of Admonition” arrived. Accepting this report, Wenlin recognized that the “abnormal” action of Ya’qūb Beg was a sign of the invasion to the east. The Qing Court also reached a conclusion: “The statement to follow [the Qing] is not worth trusting.”\textsuperscript{88)} As a result, the first official contact between the Ya’qūb Beg regime and the Qing government in early 1871 did not develop into ongoing negotiations. In 1872, Zuo Zongtang, who suppressed the Muslim revolt in the Shaan-Gan region, advanced into Lanzhou and began preparations for the re-conquest of Xinjiang.

Conclusion

In 1870, Ya’qūb Beg went on an expedition to Turfan and Urumchi and extended his territory to the east. The buffer area between the Ya’qūb Beg regime and the Qing Dynasty disappeared; the two powers came to border each other. In this stage, Ya’qūb Beg released and returned the Qing officials captured by the Tungans. In this study we introduced the Turkic document that was officially sent to the Qing from Ya’qūb Beg at this opportunity and which is now stored at NPM.

The goal of this letter was not just to inform the Khāqān-i Chīn of the restitution of the Qing officials. It carefully attempts to legitimate his conquest and rule of Xinjiang. The first half of the letter states in orderly fashion the process of the conquest, describes the injustice of Siddiq Beg and the Tungans, and suggests that the old territory of the Qing was now under his control. The latter half, after showing his friendly attitude by the protection and restoration of the Qing officials, rationalizes his actions as the will of God beyond human intelligence. From the letter, we understand Ya’qūb Beg’s wish to have the Qing recognize that his practical rule was an accomplished fact. Moreover, we can also point out a commonality between the intension of the 1871 letter and the conditions proposed in the 1877 negotiations in London.

The Qing authorities in Hami, having received the letter from Ya’qūb Beg, replied cautiously with the “Letter of Admonition,” but also tried to cooperate with the local militias and the Tungans as countermeasures against Ya’qūb Beg. These are the first substantial policies of the Qing toward Ya’qūb Beg. Moreover, a clear view that Xinjiang was part of the Qing’s “dynastic territory” is set out in the “Letter of Admonition.” The Qing replied to Ya’qūb Beg by asserting its legitimacy to rule Xinjiang.

\textsuperscript{87) However, because Tungans attacked Changji at the end of May, 1871, the Qing stiffened its attitude again (SGXHF, 253: 12b–14a).}

\textsuperscript{88) SGXHF, 253: 13a–14a.}
However, Ya’qūb Beg had left Turfan for the west before the “Letter of Admonition” reached him. It can be surmised that the relationship with Russia, which was an important problem for Ya’qūb Beg, was the primary motivation for this action. In fact, the diplomatic policy of the Ya’qūb Beg regime after this gave priority to establishing relationships with Russia, British India, and the Ottoman Empire as opposed to negotiations with the Qing. It was highly unlikely that negotiations with the Qing would gain Ya’qūb Beg recognition of his own nation. Perhaps, after gaining international recognition, Ya’qūb Beg hoped to enter into negotiations with the Qing government on a more favorable footing. We believe that he aimed to impress the Qing with the assertions in this letter for arguments in the future, too.

This study has introduced Ya’qūb Beg’s letter to the Qing and shed light on the new stage of the Ya’qūb Beg regime. The first contacts made between Ya’qūb Beg and the Qing in early 1871 were stillborn. However, keeping in mind the contents of the 1877 negotiations in London, it is noteworthy that both Ya’qūb Beg and the Qing insisted on their legitimacy to rule Xinjiang on the basis of each other’s logic.

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