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An Unlikely Convergence: Evolving Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) Theory and Counterinsurgency (COIN) Doctrine

Volume 1

Desmond John Molloy

PCS, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies

PhD Dissertation

Academic Supervisor: Professor Kenji Isezaki

June 2013
An Unlikely Convergence: Evolving DDR Theory and COIN Doctrine

Abstract.
Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) and counterinsurgency (COIN) are related practice areas. DDR has become an essential aspect of many post-conflict peacebuilding efforts in addition to being applied to improving security and economics in a COIN environment. After twenty years of practice of DDR, a body of guiding theory has grown from scholarly analyses and practice-based evidence. Counterinsurgency (COIN) has developed its doctrine in response to the systematic doctrine-driven insurgency of Mao and Che that focused on ‘winning the people.’

COIN doctrine has learned to coopt that focus on ‘winning the people,’ their perceptions and attitudes. Despite this, COIN practice tends to be insurgent-centric. DDR theory has also realised the necessity of ‘winning the people.’ However DDR practice is generally ex-combatant-centric. In both cases, with COIN campaigns and DDR processes focusing on quantitative rather than qualitative metrics, outcomes are predominantly less than optimal.

This study traces the evolution of the theory of DDR and the doctrine of COIN respectively, considering selected case studies and definitive literature, professional documentation, phenomenological experience and peer consultation. It finds that the critical factor in achieving optimal outcomes in both COIN and DDR is indeed, as both doctrine and theory advise, the perceptions and attitudes of the people. The crux in applying the doctrine/theory in practice exists in how a range of security dilemmas is managed. Neglecting them results in failure to ‘win the people;’ their perceptions and attitudes.

What are these security dilemmas and how do they impact on practice of both COIN and DDR? What is the relevance of the existence of the phenomenon of security dilemmas jointly in both DDR and COIN and what is the impact of their neglect?

A comparative approach to reviewing the joint phenomenon of security dilemmas in COIN and DDR offers an opportunity to draw synergy in considering solutions to the problem of less than optimal outcomes and contribute to improved outcomes; to lives saved, to the establishment of appropriate normative systems and to the enhancement of both security and human security.
An Unlikely Convergence: Evolving DDR Theory and COIN Doctrine

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As a latecomer to scholarship, I am indebted to so many people; I fear that an accurate acknowledgement of all who have contributed to this effort would exceed the size of the dissertation. However, I’ll focus on latter years and those who have encouraged me to take my experience in practice, build on it and maybe even carry it to “the dark side.”

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In Sierra Leone, Bengt Ljunggren of UNDP stimulated an intellectual approach to DDR and curiosity regarding post-conflict recovery. I am pleased to make this attempt to do some credit to his mentoring and continuing encouragement.


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## Glossary of Acronyms

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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>AfD</td>
<td>Arms for Development programmes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFRC</td>
<td>Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Sierra Leone)</td>
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<tr>
<td>AMF</td>
<td>Afghan Military Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANA</td>
<td>Afghan National Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>AO</td>
<td>Area of Operations</td>
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<td>APRP</td>
<td>Afghan peace and reconciliation Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARVN</td>
<td>Army of the Republic of Viet Nam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>AVR</td>
<td>Alternate Violence Reduction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCPR</td>
<td>Bureau of Crisis Prevention and Recovery (UN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BICC</td>
<td>Bonn International Center for Conversion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRIAM</td>
<td>British Advisory Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>Civil Affairs (in the context of COIN operations it is a military activity; in post-conflict interventions usually a civilian activity)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAAF</td>
<td>Children associated with armed Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CACD</td>
<td>Community Arms Collection and Destruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAPS</td>
<td>Combined Action Platoons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBO</td>
<td>Community Based Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCC</td>
<td>Command, Control and Communications</td>
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**CD** - Capacity Development

**CDF** - Chiefdom Defence Forces

**CF** - Community Forae Projects (Afghanistan)

**CHSR** - Corporate Human Security Responsibility

**CIA** - Central intelligence Agency

**CIDGs** - Civilian Irregular Defence Groups

**CID** - Commander Incentive Programme (Afghanistan)

**CIMIC** - Civilian, military cooperation in development (from military perspective)

**COIN** - Counterinsurgency

**CORDS** - Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support

**CPA** - Comprehensive Peace Accord

**CPS** - Center for peace Studies, (Tromsø University)

**CRS** - Corporate Social Responsibility

**CS** - Community Security

**CTT** - Troop Contributing Country

**CVR** - Community Violence reduction

**DDR** - Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration

**DDR-R** - Disarmament, Demobilisation Reinsertion and Reintegration

**DfID** - Department for International Development (GB)

**DNH** - Do No Harm framework
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<td>DPKO</td>
<td>Department of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>D&amp;R</td>
<td>Demobilisation and Reintegration</td>
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<td>DRC</td>
<td>Disarmament and Reintegration Commission (Afghanistan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>DSR</td>
<td>Defence Sector Reform</td>
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<tr>
<td>EBAO</td>
<td>Effects-Based Approach to Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<td>ECCAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of Central African States</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAdH</td>
<td>Force Armes de Haiti</td>
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<tr>
<td>FBA</td>
<td>Folke Berndedotte Academy, Stockholm</td>
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<tr>
<td>F3EA</td>
<td>Finding, fixing, finishing, exploiting and accessing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FGM</td>
<td>Female Genital Mutilation</td>
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<td>FOB</td>
<td>Forward Operating Base</td>
</tr>
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<td>GAGP</td>
<td>Grant Assistance for Grassroots Projects (Afghanistan)</td>
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<td>GOLIAGS</td>
<td>Government officials linked to illegal armed groups (Afghanistan)</td>
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<td>GTZ</td>
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<td>ICC</td>
<td>International Criminal Court</td>
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<td>ICF</td>
<td>Interim Collaborative Framework (Haiti)</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICG</td>
<td>International Crisis Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDDRS</td>
<td>Integrated Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Standards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Persons</td>
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<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Office</td>
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<td>IMPP</td>
<td>Integrated Mission Planning Process (UN)</td>
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<td>INGO</td>
<td>International Non-government organisation</td>
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<td>LLOs</td>
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LRA - Lord’s Resistance Army (N. Uganda/CAR/DRC)
MACP - Military Assistance to Civil Powers
MAP - Military Assistance Program
MDU - Mobile Disarmament Unit (Afghanistan)
M&E - Monitoring and Evaluation
MIF - Multinational Intervention Force
MoPR - Ministry of Peacebuilding and Recovery
MoU - memorandum of Understanding
MPAJA - Malayan peoples Anti-Japanese Army
NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NCDDR - National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
NRO - National Resistance Army (Uganda)
NSAG - Non-state armed Group
NSP - National solidarity Project (Afghanistan)
OAS - Organisation of American states
PBRU - Peacebuilding and Recovery Unit
PCRF - Post-conflict reconstruction Fund
PCS - Peace and Conflict Studies (Tokyo University of Foreign Studies)
PIRA - Provisional Irish Republican Army
PKO - Peacekeeping Operation
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<td>Psychological Operations</td>
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<td>Responsibility to Protect</td>
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PREFACE

P. 1 General background to the study

From the perspective of scholarly and technical quantitative assessment and evaluation, counterinsurgency (COIN) and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants (DDR), associated with security and human security, are highly disputed concepts in relation to their effectiveness and their translation from doctrine/theory into practice.

Despite institutional and practitioner commitment to DDR by the United Nations (UN), World Bank (WB) and main bilateral donors, and a common belief that it forms a critical element of post-conflict intervention, a decade of scholarly investigation has failed to secure clear empirical evidence that the processes of DDR actually work in contributing to post-conflict stabilisation and the socio-economic reintegration of ex-combatants.

Now both the institutions and practitioners, and a number of investigating scholars are asking if perhaps, the wrong questions have been asked as regards the impact of DDR. Perhaps the real impact is not the quantitative results that can be directly attributed to the processes and counted; the number of guns collected, the numbers of combatants demobilized or the numbers of ex-combatants securing sustainable livelihoods as a result of reintegration support. The real impact is qualitative. It is the belief, the perception amongst direct stakeholders; the combatants, the host communities, primarily at a sub-national level, despite inherent dilemmas; security, moral, cultural, ideological, legitimacy and interpretational... hereafter ‘security dilemmas,’ that security and related human security have improved as a result of the implementation of DDR.

Sub-national and community supportive perceptions and attitudes in addressing the security dilemmas increase the potential for successful stabilisation of the post-conflict environment and the resulting transition to development. Over the past decade, the evolution of the theory of DDR has gone some way to recognising the criticality of these qualitative elements of perception and attitudes as appropriate indicators of achievement. This is reflected in consensus regarding the benefits of, and the moves towards bottom-up approaches and conflict sensitivity in addressing the multiple dilemmas such as through the establishment of 2nd Generation DDR, Community Violence Reduction and Community Security approaches. The attempts at DDR and community violence reduction (CVR) in Haiti 2005-2009, a counter-criminality environment, and subsequently adapted to Somalia and Cote d’Ivoire, also reflect some of the complexity and the risks associated with security dilemmas.
Addressing the security dilemmas through these bottom-up approaches is time-consuming, labour intensive, requiring ethnographical expertise and capacity, deep consideration of crosscutting issues, a conflict sensitive approach, local agency, long-term commitment and is expensive. As a result, it is often placed on the back-burner and constitutes a deficit in addressing perceptions and attitudes in and effort to gain ‘quick-fixes’ in politically charged and volatile environments, contributing to accentuating the security dilemmas that undermine confidence in the processes. This dissertation contends that relegation of the efforts required in managing the security dilemmas at a local level and thus addressing local perception and attitudes, in favour of the apparent ‘quick-fix’ by focusing directly on combatants in DDR processes, constitutes a frequently decisive deficit that reduces the quality, impact and sustainability of outcomes. Further, the higher the intensity of the dilemma, the greater the negative impact of that deficit.

From the perspective of the state, COIN is an existential environment, often encompassing elements of DDR. Examples of attempts to apply DDR in a COIN environment rather than in the traditional post-conflict environment, that reflects the additional complexity of offering a ‘soft’ option to insurgents, and the related heightening of the security dilemmas, include Colombia, Somalia, Afghanistan and South Sudan.

Failure of COIN at its worse can be reflected in the demise of existing regime or system. Getting it right therefore poses the highest stakes imaginable. As with DDR, despite the emergence of a doctrine that emphasises the value of a ‘soft’ approach in COIN, the imperative for ‘quick-fixes’ through a direct focus on the source of threat, an insurgent-centric focus rather than a people-centered focus, while not adequately addressing the multiple security dilemmas, has been the choice of recent major expeditionary COIN campaigns. This represents a qualitative deficit that has accentuated the intensity of multiple security dilemmas that impact on the same areas as are inherently critical in DDR and has contributed to the defeat of COIN.

In COIN the polemic persists between those who advocate the overwhelming application of power and technology against insurgents versus those who advocate the merits of a ‘softer’ approach through a commitment to addressing the security dilemmas, ‘winning the people’ through addressing their perceptions and attitudes and thus separating the insurgents from the people... ‘the fish from the water.’ Interests, capacities and professional ‘comfort zones’ drive much of this argument.

However, a study of the evolution of COIN doctrine through relevant case studies from Malaya, through Indonesia, Viet Nam and into current day Afghanistan and a review of outcomes of COIN
operations seems to point to the wisdom of the latter approach, ‘winning the people.’ The concept of a major army or coalition of armies in expeditionary operations having the capacity to effectively apply a COIN approach that focuses on ‘winning the people’ in light of the complex paradoxes presented by the various associated security dilemmas, remains deeply contested. This remains particularly so in US Defence and Military Industry Complex circles in relation to COIN efforts from Viet Nam to Afghanistan.

Considering the current questioning of the legitimacy in the application of theory/doctrine of both DDR and COIN, the study of the comparative elements of convergence in evolving DDR theory and COIN doctrine highlights that in both practice areas, the deficit in addressing the multiple inherent security dilemmas impacts adversely on the elements of perception and attitude of the key catalytic stakeholders, communities at sub-national level, and ultimately on outcomes. Greater recognition of the place of perception and attitudes of those communities in achieving desired outcomes and of the danger inherent in the current deficit in practice, even if duly considered in DDR theory and in COIN doctrine, will offer the opportunity for the emergence of more effective DDR and COIN conceptual foundations and the impetus to appropriately apply the requisite training, resources and time.

P.2 Definitions of key terms.

As many of the technical terms used in this dissertation are essential to the problem statement, their definitions, specific to this dissertation, are placed early in the Preface. They are not generally drawn from the formal literature by the authoritative institutions engaged in the practices of DDR and COIN. They represent the author’s interpretation based on phenomenological professional experience in the field as a practitioner of both areas and in scholarship and may be adapted from formal definitions. Terms selected for definition are limited to those that are not fully defined in the text of the dissertation, that may be contested terms or for which meaning may not be self-evident.

Attitudes: Attitude is a word that can mean several different things depending on context. In this thesis we consider attitude in the context of social psychology. It is the external demonstration of perception, manner, feeling, disposition, posture that “expresses favour or disfavor towards a person, place thing or event”. The importance of ‘Attitude’ can be

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judged in that it forms the “A” apex in Galtung’s famous ABC Triangle of Conflict Analysis, together with “B”, Behavior and “C”, Contradiction.²

Counter terrorism: Counter terrorism is an array of security practices, strategies tactics and state of awareness that governments, police, military and corporations employ to counter terrorism or acts of terror. Sitaraman says that as with conventional war, counterterrorism is based on a ‘kill and capture’ strategic foundation, as opposed to one of ‘winning the people’ in counterinsurgency.³ Considering that terrorists may not be seeking legitimacy or need a close relationship with the people, unlike insurgents, counterterrorism has connotations of a level of offering choices of expediency and urgency somewhat greater than counterinsurgency. As such, it is frequently used to excuse the use of disproportionate force or methods the legitimacy of which may be in dispute. e.g. the targeted drone executed extra-judicial killing of suspected terrorists outside the theatre of operations; extraordinary rendition, collective punitive activities etc.

Crises of legitimacy: Legitimacy in the context of this dissertation is the perception held primarily by the people, relevant home populations and donors/financial and material backers, that a party; government, insurgent force, COIN force or a UN mission, is operating within the scope of law, international and national, in the interests of the people and that it occupies the ‘higher moral ground.’ A crisis of legitimacy arises for the party for which this perception is not widely the case.

Demobilisation: Demobilisation as an aspect of a DDR process marks the point at which an ex-combatant is separated from the command, control and communications (CCC) structure of the armed faction. It marks the official point at which a combatant is deemed a civilian. However, demobilisation is also a psychological process of converting the mindset of a combatant to a civilian mindset is a product of Reintegration and this conversion of mindset is a long-term process.

Disarmament: In this thesis Disarmament means more than the physical removal of weapons from belligerents/ex-belligerents in post-conflict environments, but includes processes that place weapons beyond use through creating an environment where they are not deemed necessary to achieve basic needs and access to a livelihood.

Human Security: Human Security is a contested concept developed by UNDP and launched in the Human Development Report 1994 to securitize the development issue drawing focus and funding onto an approach to development that addresses the plight of humans rather than purely to state security. The objectives of the concept are represented in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The concept has been championed by specific states, particularly Canada and Japan. The concept, contested in several elements, despite offering overarching guidance to development programme design and implementation, remains under discussion in the General Assembly. However, from the perspective of the humanitarian practitioner, Human Security is more than a cold concept. It is a state of mind that offers an overarching people-centered philosophy in planning and implementing humanitarian interventions. In this thesis, the term ‘Human Security’ is used predominantly in this meaning.

4 Definitions related directly to the practice and theory of DDR including Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration and Reinsertion are drawn from the Integrated DDR Standards, (IDDRS) for which the author is a practitioner contributor and a member of the peer review, and also from Molloy 2009, 2010 and 2011.
Perception: ‘Perception is reality’, this clichéd truism expresses what perception is to individuals and groups. (External) perception is a complex human phenomenon much studied in philosophy and psychology, describing the process in which the brain interprets sensory information from the world around it so as to give it meaning.\(^5\) Within this dissertation we see perception as a complex mental construct influenced by observation, language, demeanour, culture and cultural sensitivity, awareness, religion and belief systems, sense of safety or threat, sense of mutual respect or its absence, mental health and anxiety, sense of justice, anger, response to attire, etc. As such it is influenced by all the senses, emotions, social nuance and experience. It is of critical importance especially where relationships are important, as they are in DDR and COIN environments.

Prisoners Dilemma: The Prisoners Dilemma is a specific type of security dilemma in which trust is undermined between parties, where a third party/arbitrator may be suspected of manipulating parties. It implies an absence of clear communications between parties. In a COIN environment the Prisoners Dilemma could arise between counterinsurgents and Insurgents; between opposing or separated factions of insurgents; between the insurgents and the people; between the counterinsurgents and the people. At the end of a conflict it can arise between factions during peace negotiations and after a cessation of violence particularly during the disarmament and cantonment phases of DDR programmes.

Reinsertion: Reinsertion is an intermediary phase in DDR as an aspect of demobilisation. It marks the immediate period post-demobilisation (in UN terms, 12 months) where it is deemed that the process may be unstable and support to the ex-combatant may be uncertain, primarily for organisational reasons, increasing the risk that disgruntled and impatient

ex-combatants undergoing DDR, may return to violence. A reinsertion phase permits responsibility for support to the initial phases of reintegration, (a process mandated to be managed by development agencies) to be funded for a 12-month period by the UN Assessed budget. This reduces the risk of any hiatus in cash flows and the knock-on impact on the delivery of support and services with associated security risks.

Reintegration:

Reintegration (social, economic and political) is a long-term process that sees ex-combatants undergoing a DDR process to rejoin their communities as a constructive and law-biding contributor to society. In a broader sense, Muggah’s maximalist approach to DDR, addressed later, implies support to the capacity of a community to develop the socio-economic and human capital resources to offer a functioning community to receive that reintegration. Political reintegration is also a critical aspect of reintegration that implies the return of the combatant as a participant in the elements of a legitimate normative political system rather than in reverting to violence in applying political influence.

Rules of Engagement:  

RoE are the carefully stated policy of a military force offering clear guidance to an individual soldier as regards the use of live ammunition and the various levels of force permissible. RoE can be operational concurrently at several different levels e.g. at national level... the troop contributing country (TCC); at institutional level... the UN or NATO etc.; at theatre level relevant specifically to the area of operations, and down to a specific base level and may even be adjusted to address a specific operation. It is critical that a soldier understands which RoE have priority at a given time. It is critical that RoE are clearly documented and verifiably disseminated to relevant troops as they impact on the

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6 The definition of RoE is drawn from the author’s professional experience as a military officer for 20 years, including on missions with the UN.
demeanour and posture of each soldier and dictate his reflexive response to a given threat without further orders from his superior officer.

Security: ‘Security’ is most frequently used in relation to state security and is synonymous with defence. Security implies the capacity of the state to control the legitimate use of force and impose the rule of law. From the mid-nineties the definition of security began to include a broader perspective of political, economic and societal and environmental security, moving towards supporting human security. In this thesis we tend to understand security in its former meaning and treat it separately from, but complementary to human security.

Security Dilemma: The classical security dilemma... ‘the security dilemma,’ a phenomenal concept relevant to modern international relations, was popularised by John Herz and described in 1951 as:

a structural notion in which the self-help attempts of states to look after their security needs tends, regardless of intention, to lead to rising insecurity for others as each interprets its own measures as defensive and measures by others as potentially threatening.

Such a notion is not exclusive to international relations. Within the context of COIN and DDR, such a structural notion is inherent in the political objectives and design of processes and is perceived by some actors as a threat. It exists at all stages of the planning and implementation of operations and can be construed as security dilemma. Security dilemma is thus an aspect of perception. It is an apparently contradictory phenomenon where decisions implemented to increase security have the opposite effect to that intended and in fact, increase

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7 John Herz, Political Realism and Political Idealism, Cambridge University Press, 1951, p7
threat. The associated decision to implement an activity or procedure in considering the potential opposite effect is the dilemma. There are many types of dilemmas associated with both COIN operations and DDR; security, moral, cultural, ideological, interpretational and dilemma of legitimacy. Such dilemmas impact on the critical factors of perception and attitude of the actors in both COIN and DDR, and if unaddressed, have negative impact on the outcomes, ultimately security outcomes. For the purposes of this study, such dilemmas are grouped under the heading as security dilemmas. In noting the context specific justification of this grouping of dilemmas they are referred to as ‘security dilemmas.’

Security Paradox: In the context of this dissertation a Security Paradox is the apparent contradiction associated with a security dilemma. Note that ‘Contradiction’ forms the “C” angle of Galtung’s ABC Triangle of Conflict Analysis. (Footnote # 2)

Stabilisation: Stabilisation in the context of this thesis implies an intervention that is designed to solidify the capacity and legitimacy of a host-government in a conflict or post-conflict environment. Within the terms of US COIN interventions stabilisation is a somewhat purposefully nebulous term that implies scope for military forces to act beyond their normal security comfort zone in COIN, (often as they see fit) to influence the political, social and economic spheres including rule of law area, in supporting the strengthening of the supported government. In UN PKO terms it implies a role beyond peacekeeping and support to peace processes to capacity building and strengthening of legitimate governance in the host country. It includes the strengthening of the immediate post-conflict environment with support to SSR and DDR processes.

War on Terror: The War on Terror or the Global War on Terror, and when there was clearly not going to be a ‘quick-fix’, the ‘Long War’, terms first used by President G.W. Bush, represent the west’s response to the attacks on the
US on 9/11, with the prime stated objective of eliminating the threat of the extreme Islamic fundamentalism represented by al Qaeda. As with the term counter terrorism, use of the war on terror has become synonymous with a justifying narrative for the disproportionate use of force, abuse of human rights and practices questionable in law by various regimes including US, China, Russia, Sri Lanka, India, Pakistan etc. As such, the term is a disputed one, depending on perspective. In this thesis it is used with caution and some suspicion.

Winning the People: Drawing from Mao’s doctrine on Insurgency, both the doctrine of COIN and humanitarian intervention theory, including that of DDR, have acknowledged that ‘success’ or at least, acceptable outcomes are dependent on ‘winning the people,’ on gaining the trust and favour of the people (the population, the masses) who perceive the endeavor and the actors as ‘legitimate’ and in their interest. It is dependent, in the case of COIN on the adversary ‘losing the people’ and in the case of DDR, on a mutual ‘win/win’ environment for all actors.

P. 3 The Problem Statement
Critical discussion of the convergence in the evolution of the theory of DDR and the doctrine of COIN and, particularly in light of the potential for an increasing demand for ‘DDR in COIN’ operations in global ‘hot spots,’ makes sense as it will point the way towards drawing synergies from the relationship and improving outcomes by strengthening practice. Process tracing of the evolutionary process for the theory and doctrine to their current status offers a bulwark upon which the evidence of that convergence can be analysed.

The following three questions offer a framework that permit a focus on the difficulties experienced by both scholars and practitioners in identifying common elements critical to acceptable outcomes in DDR and COIN respectively. These difficulties exist despite a wealth of scholarly and practice-based analysis over decades and the emergence of debatably, a body of theory in the case of DDR and of doctrine in the case of COIN. The questions lay the foundation for the research and analysis undertaken in this study and are reflected as the theme through the literary review and the process tracing through case studies and in drawing on phenomenological experience.
i. How have the theory of DDR and the doctrine of COIN evolved?

ii. What are the common security dilemmas identified in the practice of DDR and COIN respectively?

iii. What is the relevance if convergence in the elements of security dilemma of DDR and COIN exists?

P. 4 Professional significance of the study.

DDR and COIN have more than a passing relationship. DDR is often an element of a COIN campaign in offering a ‘soft’ option for moderate (tractable) insurgents during the conflict or as a confidence building measure (CBM) in attracting insurgent combatants in stabilising a cessation of violence. It offers this ‘soft’ option in projecting a human security face in addition to offering disengagement trajectory options in the attraction of insurgent acquiescence towards the acceptance of the legitimacy of incumbent government in the midst of or soon after COIN efforts that may have heretofore addressed security and political problems primarily through military kinetics. It contributes to removing surplus combatants and arms from the conflict/post-conflict theatre in further stabilising the environment by permitting the expansion of rule of law and the authority of the government. Huge importance is placed on the ‘successful’ (i.e. the achievement of acceptable outcomes) implementation of both COIN and DDR and enormous resources, human and treasure, are committed to achieve such outcomes. Both areas, DDR and COIN, have vibrant theoretical foundations and are the subjects of intense scholarly and practitioner analysis in developing theory and doctrine to improve the implementation of practice in achieving positive outcomes. However, in both cases, practice predominantly falls short in delivering, in highly disputed environments, having often been launched with unreasonable expectations, what are universally judged through the analysis of evidence-based results as ‘successful’ outcomes. Something has been missing. This dissertation asserts that the missing element common to both practice areas has been in the context of associated security dilemmas and conflict sensitivity, the commitment to the management of the perceptions and attitudes of national stakeholders, particularly at sub-national level, regarding the benefits of DDR and COIN. Rigorous attention to this omission and addressing it will have decisive impact on the outcomes of DDR programmes and COIN campaigns and will greatly increase the levels of achievement of positive
outcomes and improve the return on the enormous investment in human resources, indeed human life, and treasure, while addressing security and human security matters.

Practically, in reviewing the influence of practice on the evolution of the theory and doctrine, the study offers the opportunity to collate appropriate practice-based evidence in identifying the deficit in the practice of DDR and COIN in order to move towards a more comprehensive evidence-based theory/doctrine influencing the appropriate human capacity building and resourcing for the implementation of more effective evidence-based practice that will contribute to a post-conflict stabilisation and save lives.

This study offers the opportunity to reassess what are the most appropriate type of metrics for planning and evaluation of DDR and COIN, quantitative or qualitative; to refocus practice on addressing the guidance of theory/doctrine with an improved capacity to appropriately weight prioritisation in the application of political imprimatur, resources; human and treasure, and time in addressing the security dilemmas. This will contribute to improved outcomes; to lives saved, to the establishment of appropriate normative systems for the people in supporting COIN campaigns and stabilising post-conflict environments and to the enhancement of both security and human security.

**P. 5  Overview of the Methodology**

This dissertation draws on a multiplicity of methodologies. In approaching a review of the evolution of the theory of DDR and the doctrine of COIN, the author draws initially on a wealth of phenomenological experience. Twenty years service, from the mid-seventies to the mid-nineties, as an army officer in an internal security environment in Ireland and UN missions to Lebanon and Cambodia give him a professional insight into the essentials of COIN. This is followed by five years in community development and emergency response and relief with both UN agencies and NGOs in conflict and post-conflict environments around the globe that offered grounding in and commitment to the principles of human security. The remaining twelve years have been fully engrossed in the DDR environment principally as Chief of DDR Programmes with Department of Peace Keeping Operations (DPKO) and Senior DDR Advisor with UN Development Programme (UNDP), but also various short contracts including with British International Development Agency (DfID) and US Institute for Peace (USIP) and US Council for Foreign Relations (CFR)... and related scholarship. The author lectures and
trains practitioners in DDR and Peacebuilding at multiple universities and international training institutions and is a member of the International Research Group on Reintegration. The author’s Masters Degree thesis was a study of the qualitative and quantitative indicators of achievement in DDR Programmes.

A review of principal literature influencing the evolution of the theory of DDR and relevant analysis from multiple sources including news reports and web-based resources is undertaken, reinforced with direct contacts and discussions in a process of peer collaboration with many of the principal authors. This is complemented with the appropriate and intermittent inclusion of ideas from the author’s writings on DDR including contemporaneous professional reports or articles published in peer-reviewed journals. COIN is also reviewed through principal literature, military manuals setting out the evolving doctrine in addition to relevant analysis from multiple public sources including relevant documentary movies.

For both DDR and COIN, the author tests his ideas through correspondence and discussions with a broad range of relevant scholars and practitioners in a process of peer collaboration from his professional network.

The reviews of the evolution of the theory and doctrine take a broadly chronological approach building on initial foundations from a set time in history, post-WWII in the case of COIN and the mid-nineteen eighties for DDR, in tracing the process of evolution to the present day.

The dissertation undertakes in-depth literary and professional review initially of the evolution of DDR theory and then of COIN doctrine, both cases through multiple case studies, consideration of the outcomes of different approaches, threats and opportunities, lessons learned and ultimately in identifying elements of convergence in that evolution. To this extent the study is comparative. Primary convergence significant to outcomes of the practice of both DDR and COIN is seen in relation to the neglect of multiple associated dilemmas; security, moral, cultural, ideological and interpretational, reflecting a deficit in practice. Having considered their considerable impact on outcomes in both DDR and COIN, the study will define these multiple dilemmas jointly as ‘security dilemmas.’ Their impact on the perceptions and attitudes of local communities, stakeholders often neglected in implementation because of the operational complexity, cost in resources and time required in considering them and the constraints in addressing the human condition, is decisive.
P. 6 Delimitations of the study

The review of the evolution of theory and doctrine in the case of both DDR and COIN in this study highlights the most important elements of that evolution and ultimately focuses on critical deficit elements of that theory/doctrine in practice, specifically in addressing the security dilemmas that impact on the perceptions and attitudes of host-country people at a sub-national level.

DDR has been implemented in some form or other in over 60 cases in the past twenty years (Muggah 2010). Literature is selected in the case of DDR as that deemed to be representative and most influential of those 60 or so cases that offer insight into the following major DDR typologies; DDR in COIN, Traditional DDR, Host government implemented DDR, 2nd Generation DDR (Community Violence Reduction CVR, and community Security CS) and that have impacted to a major degree on the evolution of the existing body of theory. The focus of the literature review is initially based on the work of the recognised founding fathers of DDR theory such as Colletta, Berdal, Lamb and Kingma. It goes on to draw on the work of many noted scholars such as Muggah, Bhatia and Kilroy and later on the recent work of scholarly contributors such as Bowd, Millett and Shibuya. The dissertation draws heavily on the experience-based writings and analysis of the author and the literary review is often cross-referenced with this.

Temporally, the focus on the evolution of the doctrine of COIN is launched from a period after WWII, the outcome of which being a major catalyst in the ignition of post-colonial and proxy-war-based insurgencies and the popular application of a systematisation of insurgency theory, most notably by Mao Tse-tung and Che Guevara, upon which the foundations of a systematic COIN doctrine were established.

Case studies in DDR are chosen as a result of the appropriate relevant and sufficiently influential literature being accessible (e.g. Central America, Colombia, Southern Africa, South Sudan) or where a particular case falls directly within the phenomenological experience of the author (e.g. Sierra Leone, Liberia, Haiti, CAR, DRC, Somalia, Nigeria, Sri Lanka and Nepal).

COIN in some form has been implemented hundreds of times since WWII (Kilcullen, 2010). An enormous volume of literature exists on the subject of COIN operations and doctrine and this has
increased dramatically particularly since the US led invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan. This dissertation has attempted to limit its purview to the most relevant and influential literature and on relevant scholarly work that is appropriate to the research questions. COIN cases are selected as a result of the accessibility of relevant definitive and influential literature and the impact of particular cases on the evolution of the doctrine.

The study is constrained within the parameters of interpretation of the definitions offered and within the context of the concepts initially outlined; sovereignty and its limitations, human security, responsibility to protect (R2P), etc. Within both practice areas of DDR and COIN, terms frequently have different meanings depending on perspectives and interests. The author’s perspective on relevant terms is guided by the DDR and Military practitioner’s experience supported by scholarly investigation. Those most prone to multiple interpretations or conceptual confusion have been presented specifying their meaning in the context of this dissertation.

P. 7  Organisation of the Dissertation

The Preface is a comprehensive introduction that offers the requisite elements of background, definitions, problem statements, significance of the study and delimitations. It also adequately describes the methodology being employed to preclude the necessity of a separate section on methodology. This study then launches immediately into its substance that is for convenience, divided into three (3) Parts.

Part 1 is the review of the evolution of the theory of DDR starting from its inception in the mid-nineteen-eighties to the current day in a process-tracing, broadly chronological review of seminal literature, relevant case studies, practice-based reports, lessons learned and the experience of the author. The recurring thread in the study, building an incremental and accumulative case, is for the validity of the claim that the qualitative elements of the perceptions and attitudes of the people, the local communities, have critical impact on the outcomes of DDR processes. How various security dilemmas are handled in DDR have a decisive impact on the perceptions and attitudes of the people and we identify and define the principal security dilemmas inherent in many DDR processes.

Chapter I looks at the origins of DDR in the Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) of the Central American peace processes at the end of the eighties, early nineties. Chapter II reviews the initial World Bank (WB) and BICC sponsored writings of those who laid the foundations of the theory of DDR, the
still relevant Kingma, Colletta and Berdal and considers an important review the early literary review of DDR by Lamb. Chapter III briefly studies the cases of a judicious selection of those DDR programmes that were considered ‘classic’ implementation of DDR in addressing identifiable armed factions in the context of peace processes primarily in intrastate post-conflict environments, but also in the complex multi-country DDR process in the Great Lakes region of Africa, the Multi-country Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (MDRP). It also considers the critical crosscutting elements of transitional justice and process communications strategies that have arisen in the classic DDR processes and that may not have been adequately covered in the context of the cases studied.

Chapter IV looks at the operationalisation of community security approaches in DDR, including Community Violence Reduction (CRV). It considers the role of NGOs in DDR, from the perspective of NGOs and how ethnography is revolutionizing approaches.

Chapter V considers if the new lessons and advice for good practice can actually be applied in practice.

Chapter VI reviews the conundrum of three separate DDR processes in Afghanistan during the past ten years. Chapter VII goes on to consider the UN approach to DDR with a focus on reintegration, the most complex of the three elements in DDR; Bowd’s view on the potential impact of ex-combatant reintegration in transforming social capital and reconciliation, in addition to recent consideration of innovative conceptual approaches to reintegration from IRGR based in CPS, Tromsø University. This chapter also reviews the current status of the practitioner’s dilemma in identifying appropriate metrics for evaluation and some of the scholarly views regarding that dilemma, particularly from Millett and Shibuya. Chapter VIII considers the current state of the threats and opportunities facing the theory and practice of DDR. A particular threat deemed as a US ‘shock and awe’ approach to DDR and a rampant poorly motivated privatization of the implementation of DDR. In considering opportunities in DDR, this chapter comments on the current UN soul-searching in seeking the way forward in DDR and closes with a review of the assertion by Usama Butt of the necessity for an alternative to western-driven SSR/DDR processes in Islamic revolutionary countries by using an Islamist-led SSR/DDR model in the Arab Spring countries (I-DDR). Chapter IX pulls together the theme of Part I, focusing on the deficit elements of perceptions and attitudes of the people in converting the theory to practice identified in the failure to address the security dilemmas in DDR.

In Part 2, we review the evolution of the doctrine of COIN post-WWII, again in a broadly chronological process-tracing effort. It draws on relevant literature, case-studies and definitive military
manuals, comparing varying national COIN doctrine, pursuing the thread of the importance of ‘winning the people’; in gaining their positive perceptions and attitudes in achieving acceptable outcomes in COIN. Again, the case is built incrementally and accumulatively to support this assertion. Having reviewed the principal convergences and divergences in evolved doctrines of principal topical COIN nations, particularly as regards the emphasis on ‘winning the people,’ we consider the common security dilemmas inherent in COIN and define them.

Chapter X looks at the fundamental concepts underlying COIN while Chapter XI considers the origins of insurgency theory drawing from the IRA in Ireland to the systemisation of insurgency theory by Mao Tse-tung and Che Guevara. Chapter XII launches the review of the evolution of COIN doctrine starting, as an aspect of the delimitation, with Galula in the mid-sixties, through the US experience of Viet Nam and into Nagl who looks back at the British experience in Malaya and compares it with the US experience in Viet Nam. Chapter XIII takes us to COIN during the ‘War on Terror’; Kilcullen et al, and reviews some of the crosscutting concepts such as the employment of ethnography in COIN, and stabilisation. Chapter XIV considers the dynamic within COIN doctrine in the first decade of the millennium; the new US doctrine by Patraeus, McCrystal’s efforts in Afghanistan; the writings of Sepp and Jones, the conservative resistance to COIN doctrine and British COIN approach before analysis of their experience in Afghanistan. Chapter XV takes us into Helmand Province with the British COIN experience in Afghanistan. Chapter XVI offers a critical look at the attempts at the ‘ethnographic turn’ in COIN in Afghanistan with PRTs and how it has failed to ‘win the people.’ Chapter XVII pulls together the general findings of the review of the evolution of the doctrine of COIN.

**Part 3** confirms the convergence inherent in the nature of the respective security dilemmas in both DDR and COIN and their impact on ‘winning the people’, their perceptions and attitudes. The conclusions consolidate the results of the study regarding the convergence reflected in the impact of a fundamental deficit in the failure to adequately address the security dilemmas, the loss of the positive perceptions and attitudes of the people. Closing comments suggest how both COIN and DDR processes can benefit from attending to this knowledge.

Chapter XVIII, in drawing the study to a conclusion, compares the principal sectors in the COIN doctrine of the US, Britain and Canada and notes the relativity to the evolving theory of DDR. It moves on to consider security dilemmas both in DDR and COIN and how the impact of failure to
address them, the deficit, in both DDR and COIN contributes to less than optimum outcomes. It offers the findings and recommends some potentially fruitful areas for future study.
Part 1

The Evolution of DDR Theory

Chapter I

DDR: The Practice and the Theory.

Chapter I opens Part 1 of the study with an introduction to the foundations of the theory of DDR and to some of the principal theorists; scholar and practitioner. It goes back to the beginnings of a specific practice area requiring a body of theory in the mid-nineteen eighties with a series of nascent peace processes in South and Central America that needed mutual confidence building measures (CBMs) and the rationalisation of strength and tasking of armed forces from both economic and security perspectives through processes of security sector reform (SSR), supported by DDR.

1.1 DDR: From a discrete post-conflict stabilisation practice to a body of Theory

Tracing the evolution of a body of theory that has always soared a considerable distance from practice is a complex undertaking. Practice of DDR has always struggled in a volatile political world far from the ideals and ethics of the theory driven by the imperatives of security and economics through demilitarisation and conversion guided by the overarching concepts of the human security agenda while seeking clear measurable outcomes and accountability. DDR occurs, occasionally during conflict, but more often as one aspect of a comprehensive peace-building intervention, in a post-conflict environment highly charged with political economic and social dysfunction; with predatory neighbours; possible absence of government in most of the respective territory; absence of rule of law; physical insecurity; devastated vital infrastructure; the pervasive presence of illicit arms, ammunition and explosives, a volatile and uncertain combatant/ex-combatant community used to attaining their wishes through violence and a civil population hoping for some level of predictability and safety to permit the ascension to an acceptable level of existence in a normative system.

The practice and the theory of DDR represent one of those clear scholar/practitioner gaps common in technical practices and especially ones related to social science associated with interventions where scholars and the practitioners live in very different worlds. Early scholar practitioners, often considered white collar practitioners, leading the WB entry into demilitarisation and conversion in global post-conflict environments, those who laid the foundations of the theory and collators of lessons learned who crossed the scholar/practitioner gap at a time when, rather than undertaking philosophical analysis of the processes, the early engaged institutions, particularly the WB, and the Bonn
International Centre for Conversion (BICC), were reacting to an exploding post-Cold War practice area by seeking lessons and the creation of an effective tool-box in developing the theory that would deliver DDR, efficiently, effectively and just as important, economically. This effort included the inputs of venerable scholar/practitioners such as Nat Colletta, Kees Kingma, Mats Berdal, Nicole Ball, Guy Lamb, Bengt Ljunggren among others. Latterly the scholarly world has seen the ascendance of younger bucks that have investigated and written prolifically, making important contributions in taking the theory forward. These are people like Rob Muggah of Small Arms Survey, Macartan Humphries of Columbia University and Jeremy Weinstein previously of Stanford, Sarah Meek of ISS, James Pugel, Walt Kilroy, amongst many others. They have been developing academic rigour and seeking evidence-based analysis, challenging the often intuitive and gut originated claims of practitioners, calling them to plan more carefully, monitor more systematically and account for their decisions, forcing them towards a more evidence-based, results-based implementation.

Many academic institutions and research networks, like BICC, CPS Tromsø University, Clingendael Institute etc., are following their lead and rigorous methodologies and are invigorating the development of the overarching theory. Such theory was to have been prepared for conversion to practice through such institutions as Pearson Peace Keeping Centre in Canada and the Swedish National Defence College/Folke Bernadotte Academy drawing on those early practitioners who have remained the bulwark of training for practice such as Kees Steenken, Hans Thorgren and Sophie da Camara. However, as in other areas of technical specialisation in reality, the theory reaches the practitioner only in a nebulous way. In theory the practice follows the theory; in practice it does not.

The scholar/practitioner gap in DDR is real, though thankfully tangibly diminishing. DDR practitioners operate at several different levels. One is in the HQ of the International Organisation: UN, WB; in New York, Washington or Geneva, in a politically charged cauldron of high international bureaucracy and interests, seeking the international political imperatives and funds to pursue the desired intervention to contribute to the required outcomes; stabilisation of a peace process, establishment of a political process, usually associated with a lead nation’s interests. A second is in the respective country office dealing with the country team, UN, International Organisations (IOs) and diplomatic missions in addition to the national political elites in encouraging national ownership or at least imprimatur for the DDR programme. The third, at the coal face, is eyeballing the ex-combatant and the community and seeking rapid solutions for the implementation of a complex human experiment; addressing daily crises, managing a team under constant threat, dealing with manoeuvring
local military/militias and political leaders and striving for results within the constraints of programme budgets, limited resources, tight timeframes and conflicting local interests while keeping a tentative group of risk averse organisational heads, resident coordinator, heads of engaged agencies and NGOs and interested ambassadors reassured.

The practitioner at the coalface has not read the scholar’s papers. They are written in the language of the political or social scientist for peer consumption, published in inaccessible specialist journals and just beyond the reach of the field practitioner who doesn’t have the time or inclination to search for the studies.

But things are changing...

The following chapters will consider the work of the scholar and the rare breed of scholar/practitioner, as they have developed the theory of DDR, an evolving and ragged edged theory. We do not talk about doctrine in the case of DDR. Doctrine implies a universal practice and acceptance, disseminated from an authoritative source for compliance by majority practitioners. No such body of doctrine exists for DDR. Despite the recent development of the UN Integrated DDR Standards on DDR, (IDDRS, 2006 and evolving, if currently stalled) which are ostensibly a dynamically developing tool-box of basic principles and ideas of areas to be addressed in developing case specific responses to very different contexts, input on DDR is derived from multiple sources with various motivation, as international institutions/ organisations and funds and indeed departments within those organisations, governments, academic and training institutions and practitioners make their play to contribute to the evolving theory based mainly on a process of post-implementation review in drawing lessons. We will trace the process of the evolution of this body of theory to its current state before looking back to consider the impact or lack of impact of this theory on practice; the tensions and the complementarities; the frictions that exist between the scholar and the practitioner and ultimately how it has evolved specific critical concurrencies with the doctrine of COIN.

When did it start? Who started it? Who were the practitioners and what institutions were managing them? How did DDR become a specific practice area debatably needing a body of theory? Who wrote the theory? What were the imperatives in that theory; the theoretical areas of conflict; the constraints? Were the practitioners associated with the development of the theory? Were the areas of conflict addressed? Was theory implemented? Was practice adjusted? Were the implementing agencies learning institutions?
1.2 When did it start?
We frequently hear from mature and early practitioners, many now revered DDR facilitators and consultants like Kees Steenken, former Head of the Secretariat for the UN Interagency Working Group on DDR (UN IAWG DDR) and Hans Thorgren, Head of the DDR Unit at the Folke Bernadotte Academy (FBA) in Stockholm, both having been military observers in the UN Observer Mission in Central America (ONUCA) in the late eighties, how DDR first reared its head in ONUCA. This was in the context of post-Cold War security readjustments giving rise to what Dean Piedmont has called “proxy DDR.”

1.2.1 CBMs in the Peace efforts of the mid-nineties in Central America.
In considering the growth of the practice from a concept, let us see if we can get back to the birth from which the practice has been nurtured to its current character. Varas et al, 1995 Confidence Building Measures in Latin America offers us a window into that maternity.

Central and South America, ‘Latin America’, from the turn of the twentieth century, was a cauldron of decolonisation, dictatorship, revolution, democratisation and the emergence of independent democratic states. The United States having marked its sphere of influence with the Monroe Doctrine in the early nineteenth century, still took its interests in the development of the states of South and Central America seriously in the mid-twentieth century; perhaps the Central American states, given their proximity and political ‘fungibility’, most seriously. As the Cold War ebbed and the Soviets dealt with their own ‘Vietnam’ in Afghanistan, confidence for a more self-determined independence arose amongst the states of Central America. They learned from the techniques of their neighbours, the Southern Cone states, a capacity to deal with the multiple interstate and intrastate conflicts that unsettled the region, accentuated by the existence of extremes of wealth and poverty and prevented the establishment of a relatively normative environment that would offer an acceptable level of human security.

As Latin America moved into this era of democratisation in the early eighties, the myth that democracies do not face-off each other militarily proved just that. Thus, Central American countries

8 Dean Piedmont, Senior DDR Desk Officer UNDP, in comments on early draft of this dissertation, 9 May 2013.
10 ‘Monroe Doctrine’ is a policy of US foreign policy introduced in 1823 in relation to protecting the US sphere of influence in the two American continents. With most South American countries already independent, the US stated that it would view as an act of aggression any further attempts at colonization by European powers. It confirms neutrality regarding existing colonies and that the US had no designs beyond its sphere of influence. The policy remains valid for almost two hundred years. New World Encyclopedia; http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Monroe_Doctrine (accessed June 27, 2012)
sought ‘soft’ mechanisms to allay concerns and move towards the desired ‘relations of cooperation.’\textsuperscript{11} With the growing levels of independence and the professionalisation of militaries, the increasing scope for related interstate tensions necessitated an increase for the coordination of government policies, including with the US, and the development of “non-confrontational mechanisms for military interaction in the region…”\textsuperscript{12} The end of the Cold War and the demise of military bipolarity did not end the conflicts in Latin America in the mid-eighties. If anything, as traditional geo-strategic interests gave rise to increasing tensions, the need for those ‘non-confrontational mechanisms’ became even more important.

Confidence Building Measures (CBMs), defined as “agreed military and non-military measures to enhance mutual understanding, convey-non hostile intentions define acceptable norms of behaviour, and allay excessive fears and suspicions” are a much-used tool of diplomatic dialogue dating from the eighteenth century to the current day (e.g. the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty SALT and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty START).\textsuperscript{13} CBMs are a tool that has been exceptionally well used amongst and within the states of Central America to address the post-Cold War environment. CBMs are particularly in evidence in the delivery of the Central American Peace Process (the combined Contadora Process, Arias and Esquipulas Processes from 1983) in Nicaragua that spread into El Salvador and Guatemala. Indeed, their use in facilitating hemispherical cooperation and tension reduction is visible in the Resolutions of the Organisation of American States (OAS) of June 1991 in relation to security matters, a practice subsequently taken up by many Latin American states in their interstate security management.\textsuperscript{14}

“CBMs exist in an international environment in which tensions and mistrust, often in the context of security dilemmas, exist between potential adversaries who lack adequate information on their enemy’s intentions and even their military capabilities.”\textsuperscript{15} Such an environment left to its natural progression could, “in a mutually reinforcing spiral of mistrust” escalate rapidly into an unstoppable military conflict. CBMs reduce the risk of such an eventuality. Such mechanisms were recommended between states in the June 1992 Special Report of the Secretary General of the United Nations.\textsuperscript{16}

Jack Child lists the following essential characteristics for CBMs: Transparency and openness; reciprocity, balance and adequate communications, and notes that CBMs are one aspect of a series of

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\textsuperscript{12} \textit{Ibid}, p 3

\textsuperscript{13} \textit{Ibid}, p 5


\textsuperscript{15} \textit{Ibid}

\textsuperscript{16} \textit{Ibid}, p 7
other conflict resolution approaches, ‘soft’ and ‘hard’, that could include peace enforcement; peacekeeping; peace observation; peace-building and peace-making. The CBMs associated with the Central America Peace Process (that combined the Contadora Process, Arias and Esquipulas Processes from 1983) merit particular mention. They constitute ‘peace verification’ where a neutral third party verifies that the conditions of a particular treaty are being complied with and ‘Zones of Peace’, an extensive geographic area where CBMs have been successful to the extent that the threat level in that area has been considerably lowered. Concepts associated with the somewhat utopian idea of ‘Zones of Peace’ include ‘disarmament, interdependence and integration.”

Child mentions the notion of CBMs within peace zones metaphorically as ‘peace dominoes” in contrast with “conflict dominoes.” Zones of Peace are also associated with the Tlatelolco Treaty that proscribes nuclear weapons in Latin America and the Antarctic Treaty that keeps the Antarctic demilitarised.

In considering the limitations of CBMs, Child points out that they will only function where there is genuine political will to make them work, where the tendency for mistrust in the context of the ‘security dilemma’ is allayed and where civil primacy is functioning as regards the authority of military hierarchy within the state.

Following the breakthrough in addressing the several Central American conflicts at the conference attended by the foreign ministers of Colombia, Mexico, Panama and Venezuela on the Panamanian island of Contadora in January 1983, the meeting of foreign ministers in Cancún in Mexico in July, in addition to incorporating CBM approaches to conflict resolution, such as in agreeing the provision of third party peacekeeping and verification; creation of joint boundary commissions; mutual notice regarding certain sized troop movements near frontiers and direct communications between governments, focused on specific concerns:

controlling the regional arms race; ending arms trafficking; eliminating foreign military advisors; creating demilitarised zones, prohibiting the use of one state’s territory to destabilise another’s and prohibiting other forms of interference in the internal affairs of countries in the region.

17 Ibid, p 8
18 Ibid, p 11
20 Ibid
21 Child mentions this in relation to “Prisoner Dilemma.” However, it is presumed that he is referring to “Security Dilemma.”
22 Ibid, p 13
23 Ibid, p 17
Over the following years, while aspects of the adversarial position between Nicaragua and the more US friendly Central American states persisted, the efficiency and effectiveness of CBMs were strengthened with the support of the UN and expanded into further agreements contributing to increased regional cooperation and a reduction in the chances of outbreaks of conflict. To a large degree these CBMs were included in the Esquipulas (Arias) Peace Plan of 1987 which led to cooperation between Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua in “security, verification, control and limitation of weapons” and continued on to discuss “arms reduction, force levels and the international military presence in the region”. This process facilitated the demobilisation of the Contras in Nicaragua from the early to mid-nineties, when CBMs where extensively used to encourage their disarmament.

Child says that CBMs were often ‘heavy on symbolism’ such as using scrapped Contra weapons to make prostheses and mentions a ceremony in Managua in November 1990 where, in the presence of ONUCA, all stakeholders and the media, 10,000 rifles surrendered by the Contras were cemented into a monument while the creation of a representative National Disarmament Commission was announced.24 The links between CBMs in addressing security dilemma, disarmament and the reduction of intra-state and inter-state armed violence in Central America was established.

1.2.2 CBMs in DDR

We have seen how DDR grew out of the utilisation of Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) in Central America in the mid-eighties. CBMs in addressing security dilemma have continued to be an aspect of DDR and one of the primary objectives has been to establish a level of trust between parties to the conflict that the decision to cease the conflict is real and not just a ploy to permit consolidation. The potential for the absence of trust has been the inherent security dilemma in DDR from its outset. Sarah Meek of the Institute of Strategic Studies (ISS) discussed the value of CBMs in the African Security Review in 2005.25 Noting that the Report of the International Conference on Disarmament and Development of 1987 has confirmed that in the “relationship between disarmament and development, security plays a crucial role”, security, disarmament and development are mutually reinforcing especially in countries emerging from conflict. CBMs have been making their contribution to security across the globe and have now spread beyond being an element of international treaty mechanisms and peace accord negotiations, but have also entered the arena of peacebuilding in

24 Ibid p 19
intrastate post-conflict environments and in addressing the proliferation of small arms in the context of DDR, small arms collections programmes and in general post-conflict peacebuilding efforts.

Ineffective disarmament as an aspect of a cessation of violence in a post-conflict environment is an indication of an absence of confidence by the warring parties and the potential for the reversion to armed violence is high. CBMs can contribute to restoring that confidence or in ensuring that it is not lost in the first place. Transparency in the provision of information and confirmation of reciprocity between parties is a critical aspect of CBMs. Meek mentions the device used during the disarmament of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and the Chiefdom Defence Forces (CDF) in Sierra Leone in 2001.\(^\text{26}\) Here units of the opposing forces were disarmed simultaneously in a process of rolling disarmament, moving slowly across the country thus avoiding the distrust common in a mutual disarmament process with the onset of ‘prisoners dilemma syndrome.’ The detailed arrangements were worked out between the parties at the Tripartite Committee in the presence of the UN and then the UN supervised the implementation of the disarmament. This led to a relatively smooth disarmament operation in phase three of the Sierra Leone DDR process.

Further, in light of the several conflicts raging in the late-nineties in West Africa; the porous borders and the uncontrolled trafficking of illicit arms, the Economic Community of West African States, (ECOWAS) unilaterally declared a Moratorium on the Import, Export and Manufacture of Light Weapons in 1998, a commitment to share information on small arms between states and a clear declaration of intent to address the problem. This was probably an impossible measure to enforce, but its declaration did constitute a higher-level attempt to build confidence.

Between states, transparency as regards security expenditure is a significant CBM, a process established in 1991 through the General Assembly of the UN. For the consolidated report of the year 2010, the General Assembly has received reports from 64 states not including the nil reports, which also offer a legitimate overview of a state’s import, export and manufacture of small arms.\(^\text{27}\) This mechanism, together with complementary measures, global and regional, to control the trafficking of illicit small arms and light weapons, is considered a major contributor to global transparency and confidence building as regards the manufacture and movement of small arms.

Small Arms Disarmament has moved from being a specific technical area of practice to being recognised as having a crosscutting impact, particularly an impact associated with development, crime prevention and post-conflict stabilisation, and CBMs are being used imaginatively in many areas.

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\(^{26}\) We will consider the origins and role of both RUF and CDF as we review DDR in Sierra Leone.

Meek mentions examples such as UNDPs various Weapons for Development Programmes, particularly successful in Nicaragua, Albania and Sierra Leone and NGO implemented Tools for Arms Programmes in Mozambique.

The value of CBMs to DDR is increasingly being realised with the example of Sierra Leone, innovative community focused and context specific Disarmament for Development type of programmes that are complementary to DDR being repeated in other DDR processes including DRC and Burundi as an element of the MDRP.

Meek also mentions the implementation of CBMs between the governments of South Africa, Mozambique and between South Africa and Lesotho in agreeing mutually verified weapons cache destruction operations. CBMs are a support for DDR and can contribute to breaking the cycles of insecurity and the related poverty with transparency and communications being the critical elements. Meeks closes with a warning that disarmament can also contribute to insecurity if its implication are not well considered and anticipated. This may reflect a failure to address genuine elements of security dilemma. The impact of the disarmament of the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan in 2004-2005 comes to mind.

1.2.3 El Salvador

Thomas Shannon Stiles in a chapter for Richard Millett’s (Ed) as yet unpublished new book on DDR, reviews the DDR process in El Salvador noting initially that it is considered to have been successful with no reversion to politically motivated guerrilla activities. This despite the major escalation of drugs related gang crime shifting the centre of gravity from violence related to a civil war to gang violence and bestowing on El Salvador the reputation as one of the most dangerous places on Earth. This reflects the continuing reversion to the lesson learned in the past eighty years in El Salvador that “killing can resolve social and political issues.” The Cuban inspired revolution of the early eighties led to a fluctuating level of US intervention and support for the right wing government, fluctuating depending on the electoral cycle in the United States. Cuban support waned parallel to the demise in its source of support by the USSR. This change in the global political environment opened space for the development, with support of the G.H. Bush regime in the US, for a negotiated settlement in El Salvador. By the early nineteen nineties, sensing a stalemate, exhausted and losing popular support, all parties to the conflict were ready to seek a resolution, supported by both Washington and Moscow, and

a reducing Cuban capacity. Atrocities on both sides, Government of El Salvador and the FMLN, the guerrilla movement, created domestic pressure, notably from the Catholic Church, to end the conflict. Multiple efforts were launched to establish a peace agreement with the groundwork being laid to secure a ceasefire in July 1990 that recognised the FMLN guerrilla movement as a legitimate negotiating partner. Major elements of constitutional reform were agreed including bringing the national police under civil primacy, some demobilisation of existing defence forces, reform of the judiciary and the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). The UN Observer Mission in El Salvador (UNUSAL) was also established. Efforts were being made to demilitarise the state, reform the judiciary and electoral processes and to address human rights issues. Talks ensued to affect the details for the demobilisation of the FMLN, the selected units of the government armed forces and the creation of the new civil police force resulting in the Chapultepec agreement of 1992 that offered a comprehensive approach to addressing concerns and launched the DDR programme. The UN and regional organisations such as the OAS, with the backing of the United States, supported these efforts.

The provisions of the subsequent DDR/SSR process were to include a reduction of the armed forces by 50%; the creation of civil primacy with a removal of law enforcement related tasking; increased education for the armed forces on human rights; an investigation into previous human rights breaches and an end to national conscription. Decisions were made on the proportion of former forces to be recruited into the new police force; an issue together with the vetting process that was to prove temporarily contentious. Reform of the judiciary, that conservative element of society that thrives irrespective of the system, proved a crux that remained unresolved.

The demobilisation process established several phased milestones as CBMs between government forces and the guerrilla movement with reciprocal demobilisations occurring simultaneously. Government forces reduced from 63,000 to 31,000 troops while the FMLM reduced by 10,000 cadres. With some obstructions arising in 1992, the demobilisation continued haltingly, with on-going demobilisation continuing together with steady disarmament, despite clear evidence of reserve caches being maintained. By 1993, almost 10,000 weapons including artillery pieces, 4 million rounds of ammunition, 9,000 grenades and over 5,000 assorted explosive devices were collected by the UN.

The Chapultepec accord had not considered a reintegration process but called on collaboration between the government side and the FMLN in a national reconstruction plan. This plan offered official documentation and limited subsistence support to demobilised ex-combatants and supporters.
Training workshops were established and access to micro-credit supported. Mid-level commanders were offered business training opportunities and access to credit. Business start-up opportunities and access to jobs market were supported. Access to land and land reform was a major issue in a country with the very high density of 300 people per square kilometre and this proved difficult and controversial, partially resolved by a scheme of access to credit to purchase rather than direct access to land. Agricultural technical assistance was also provided, as were vocational and higher education opportunities and scholarships.

Organisations were established to support and represent the interests of the demobilised and disabled ex-combatants. The issue of dealing with child soldiers proved difficult noting that 9% of the government forces and 20% of the FMLN had been recruited under the age of 15 years. Over 62% of the child soldiers were released from service without inclusion in any rehabilitation programme other than limited access to education, some support by bilateral agencies such as the German government development implementation agency GTZ, and some food subsidies.

Stiles says that though the levels of crime in El Salvador in 2012 are extraordinary, it is difficult to attribute any of this to the results of the DDR programme with many other sub-regional geopolitical and crime related influences at play including the endemic narcotics trade. Despite clear weaknesses in the programme, there was no return to guerrilla activity. The common challenge, as with all DDR processes, has been the provision of employment for the demobilised and the impact of the influx of demobilised ex-combatants into the labour market on the opportunities for the broader youth.

The mass repatriation of criminals from the US has also negatively impacted on both the labour market and on the domestic crime rate. Stiles does not see simple answers to the problems of crime and violence in El Salvador, but commends the DDR effort.

1.4 Chapter I Review

Chapter 1 has opened Part 1 of this study in considering the foundations of the theory of DDR in the series of peace processes in South and Central America at the end of the nineteen eighties and early nineties that were largely influenced by the changing environment of bipolarity at the end of the Cold War. Mutual CBMs were found to be an appropriate device to strengthen the perceptions and confidence of actors that the peacebuilding effort was genuine while SSR was critical in resizing and re-tasking respective security sectors, from an economic and security perspective in a post-conflict environment. These mechanisms of CBM and SSR were then also used in the various DDR efforts in
southern Africa. The case study of DDR in El Salvador is drawn from Millett et al to illustrate the processes and highlight some of the crosscutting issues and challenges arising in the early implementation of DDR.
Chapter II

The Foundations of the Theory

Chapter II launches the literary review in considering the early definitive writings of the early practitioner/scholars in recording policies of implementation devised at the highest levels of government and lessons learned that have evolved into the theory of DDR; primarily evaluation reports of early DDR processes in southern and sub-Saharan Africa for the WB and BICC by Kingma and Sayers, Colletta and Berdal, that offered lists of constraints to implementation and recommendations for good practice. It is appropriate to view their contributions sequentially as they build the foundations of the theory. We review a contemporaneous and definitive literary review by Lamb of ISS. In this way, we position the theory of DDR at the turn of the millennium, setting the stage for some of the classic DDR processes in Chapter III.

2.1 Early Considerations of DDR

In addressing the presence of surplus arms and combatants in the context of multiple post-Cold War cessation of (intrastate) violence particularly in the developing world, disarmament was identified as a critical need for both regional security and governments seeking post-conflict stabilisation. However, the process of demobilisation was identified as an intrinsic aspect of reducing the potential for a remobilisation and resumption of armed conflict. The question of what to do with the demobilised ex-combatants gave rise to the development of a process of reintegration support. In the early nineties, reflecting the ending of the Cold War proxy wars, rebel movements and the reduction in related external funding, the requirement for demobilisation of armies and armed groups exploded especially in the strategic geopolitical area of the Horn of Africa. Driven by security as well as economic and financial pressures, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Namibia, Uganda, Angola, Chad and Somaliland had already completed or were engaged in demobilisation processes. The future needs of Sierra Leone, Liberia, Somalia, Zaire (DRC), South Africa and Sudan were beckoning. The World Bank was heavily engaged with governments in the region in stabilising the economies and moving towards poverty reduction and development in the context of Structural Adjustment. German bilateral aid was also focused on the region and the practice area of demobilisation through the technical division of international aid effort, GTZ. Bonn International Centre for Conversion (BICC) was engaged in much research in developing a systematic response to the demobilisation needs of the Horn of Africa and undertook several studies. A workshop report by Kingma of BICC and Sayers of InterAfrica Group,
“Demobilisation on the Horn of Africa” 1994, published in June 1995 reflects the developing theory that was to be brought forward as the basis for DDR practice for several decades.\(^\text{29}\)

The objective of the workshop was to learn from global successes and failures in demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants, considering that there was little historical experience of the practice from the Horn of Africa that could be drawn down… in contributing to increased human security and development in the region.\(^\text{30}\)

The purpose was to avoid reinventing the wheel in designing demobilisation and reintegration programmes. Where long-running conflicts are ending and democratic practice is spreading, the call for demobilisation of armies and armed organisations is increasing throughout Africa, demanding greater participation of a broad range of actors, governments, bilateral supporters, and NGOs. These positive developments require support to countries in developing capacity for design and implementation of effective programmes.

The following basic tenets were noted and have generally been accepted by subsequent scholars, particularly Colletta and Berdal: The process of transforming a soldier to a civilian; disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration, (DDR) is a continuum rather than a set of separate processes. It requires sound planning and reintegration and in particular needs a culturally sensitive re-orientation towards civilian life in addition to the material and technical supports. Related decision making must remain cognisant of the broader political and security concerns, including factors such as the ethnic make-up of the new security forces after demobilisation and the relevant security dilemma sensitivities of demobilising forces engaged in the cessation of violence. Further, the potential security and economic impact of releasing a large number of ex-combatants into the community must be considered.

Cross border issues and the political will and cooperation between states is vital in managing surplus weapons and preventing arms transfers. The special needs of female, child and disabled ex-combatants must be considered. If the results are to be sustainable national institutional capacity building for government and the civil society sectors in supporting these efforts is vital to ensure national ownership of the processes of demobilisation and reintegration.

The report lists the most important lessons as follows:

a) **Demobilisation.**

For demobilisation to succeed, unambiguous cessation of violence is necessary. Regional security and stability contributes to demobilisation. Demobilisation should be specifically agreed in the peace


\(^{30}\) Contemporaneous experience had, at this time, yet to be studied.
agreement or political accord with the required institutional framework to implement the process
detailed, including any Security Sector Reform (SSR) concerns.
Credible central authority is necessary. DDR forms a continuum and requires a voluntary disarmament.
Effective demobilisation is dependent on effective rehabilitation/reintegration and ensuring no time lag
between the processes.
In the Horn of Africa, a cultural affinity to arms is a complicating factor. Legislative arrangements are
necessary to address this matter sensitively e.g. a licencing procedure. Initial creation of a unified
national force before implementing demobilisation avoids subsequent stigmatisation and also offers
improved control mechanisms on eligibility for the processes. Funds for demobilisation and
reintegration should be confirmed up-front to avoid cash-flow crisis driven insecurity. International
commitment to the completion of the processes must be confirmed and nationally led considering the
appropriate political, social and cultural context. Central assembly points can be useful to facilitate
documentation, orientation and counselling but offer specific security, logistical and social challenges.
Security and transparency in relation to arms collection and storage is critical.
Disarmament should not focus simply on individual ex-combatants but be considered comprehensively
in a national and regional context in addressing the broader phenomenon of surplus weapons,
preferably in the context of regional security arrangements.

b) Reintegration
Sustainable reintegration requires a ‘general process of democratisation’.
The reintegration programme must fit into the national development plan. Initial socio-economic
profiling of the caseload is essential. Demobilisation/resettlement packages should be uniform.
Career/sustainable livelihood counselling and access to micro-credit are important. Governments
should facilitate access to land, housing or business space. In designing and implementing
reintegration programmes, local social and cultural values of the individual ex-combatant and the
communities of resettlement must be considered. The problem of AIDS/HIV must be considered,
especially in Horn of Africa. Vocational and managerial training is vital. Sometimes that can be
offered pre-demobilisation. Management of reintegration support must be decentralised. The needs of
female and children ex-combatants and dependents must be considered. Special consideration of child-
combatants is vital. Psychosocial support will be necessary. While it may be desirable to implement
reintegration quickly, the determinant of the time needed is the achievement of the objectives.
2.2 Colletta on DDR

Nat Colletta says that work really started on the development of DDR theory in Uganda in 1992. It was driven initially by what would be considered in modern day as SSR considerations in trying to divert public expenditures from non-productive areas such as defence through a process of right sizing the military and not in pursuit of ‘peace’ per se. The word ‘peace’ along with conflict and security did not exist in the World Bank’s lexicon in those days. The recurring budgetary implication of over-sized militaries was a common theme for the Bretton Woods institutions back then. The early scholar/practitioners got busy and their output started to flow in 1994-1996 with a series of case studies on Uganda, Namibia and Ethiopia, published by the Bank’s Africa Technical Unit. These case studies later emerged in Colletta, Kostner and Wiederhofer, War to Peace Transition in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1996, still a seminal publication on the theory of DDR in Africa.

In the forward, Kevin Cleaver outlines the environment of a changing and fragile Africa. He refers to 25 million refugees, child soldiers, 20 million landmines, a huge percentage of arable farmland remaining fallow and severe limitations on freedom of movement in many areas. Long running wars, some as long as 30 years, civil wars are drawing to a close in the context of the end of the Cold War. In an environment of weakened civil and national institutions and a break down in rule of law giving rise to ‘warlord rule’, the structure of human and social capital in communities is disrupted with limited coping mechanisms to deal with disaster, natural or manmade. Countries in Africa are seeking ways to reduce capital expenditure and recurring budgets, until recently being expended on a now unsustainable security apparatus. World Bank pressure was insisting on a refocus on poverty reduction and national capacity building through an aggressive policy of structural adjustment. In this climate, demobilisation and reintegration programmes (DRPs), the downsizing of militaries and a focus on economic revitalisation were critical for the continental transition to development.

Under the leverage of the structural adjustment, African countries were seeking WB leadership in the design and implementation of DRPs, with specific requests for direct support coming from Uganda, Rwanda and Mozambique. This launched the development of a model programme in Uganda and the start of reintegration in Mozambique. The Rwanda support was delayed in light of the political crisis and genocide of 1994.

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31 Nat, Colletta, in an e-mail to author 21 July 2012
33 Kevin Cleaver, Director of the World Bank, Technical Department, Africa Region.
Lessons were drawn from a study, “Demobilisation of Military Personnel in Africa: The evidence from a seven Country Case Study (Oct 1992). As the WB study continued, additional candidate countries arose; Angola, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Djibouti, South Africa and Togo. Beyond Africa there were Cambodia, Bosnia and Sri Lanka. Namibia and Eritrea were also seeking further support.

The WB Africa region established a post-conflict rapid response team facilitated by the Post-conflict Reconstruction Fund (PCRF) to address the gap between relief and reconstruction. The guidelines for the direction of the work of this team was being developed through a (May 1996) three country study, analysing the lessons learned in three different demobilisation and reintegration environments; Uganda, Ethiopia and Namibia. Uganda is addressing a peacetime restructuring of military forces driven by macro-economic constraints and political consensus. This is clearly a security sector reform (SSR) process in modern parlance. Ethiopia is responding to emergency conditions. The sudden victory of the government of the day created the need to demobilise approximately 450,000 combatants of the defeated Dergue army. In Namibia, the UN and external party (South Africa) negotiated a settlement that was followed by a UN occupation and managed repatriation and demobilisation process, the complexity of the reintegration was left to the new government.

The primary findings of the study were that DRPs are vital in supporting the transition from war to peace. In the context of a comprehensive peace accord (CPA) or in the peacetime restructuring of public finances in favour of poverty reduction and peace building, DRPs facilitate a movement towards development. Reinsertion and Reintegration are part of the continuum in the transition from military to civilian life and are not distinct processes from demobilisation. From the outset Colletta identifies that the DRP is about rebuilding the community social fabric; rebuilding trust and national reconciliation. It requires several integrated actions: the classification of ex-combatants; the provision of a preliminary transition safety package; it must be supported by a simple delivery system, sensitization of communities and building on existing social capital. DRP must be coordinated centrally while offering decentralised implementation decision-making authority. DRPs must be fully integrated with on-going national development efforts.

The comparative study opens by giving an overview of the post-conflict political status of each country and the status of combatants.

Ethiopian economy and society was ravaged by the 29-year guerrilla war when the Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) seized power and established the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE) in 1991. Faced with almost half a million ex-combatants of the defeated Dergue
army, the TGE established a commission to design and implement a DRP. The immediate objective was to restore security and stability by restricting the movement of ex-combatants to transit centres with the longer-term goal of facilitating their social and economic reintegration into society. In Namibia, after the UN brokered independence in 1990, the repatriation and reintegration of combatants coincided with the creation of the new nation after seventy years of South African rule. Reinsertion and reintegration was not well planned and many ex-combatants failed to reintegrate economically. Pressure from disaffected veterans forced the government to act, unfortunately in a patchwork of ad hoc activities. In 1996 the government commenced to redesign what was hoped to be a more effective reintegration programme. In Uganda, after fifteen years of guerrilla war, the National Resistance Movement (NRM) came to power in 1989. However, sporadic rebellion continued across the country until 1991, causing a spiralling increase in capital and recurring budget on defence. When the military opposition was defeated in 1991, the government refocused national expenditure on social and economic development requiring a resizing by demobilisation, between 1992 and 1995 of 36,500 of the 90,000 strong National Resistance Army (NRA). The Uganda Veterans Assistance Programme (UVAP) was launched to implement this demobilisation. With the objectives of a) to effect the demobilisation and resettlement of the ex-combatants and their families, b) to facilitate sustainable social and economic reintegration and c) to restructure public expenditure redirecting to priority programmes such as economic and social infrastructure and services. Colletta asserts that the most important factors determining the success or otherwise of a DRP is the political commitment, realism and pragmatism of the national government and international community towards implementation. A government must not promise more than it can deliver. A programme that is ineffectively coordinated will lead to duplication of payment and effort and waste of resources. Sound strategic planning is critical. Swift cost benefit analysis must be undertaken during the design phase of the DRP and trade-offs will have to be made in such areas as coverage v. sustainability; expedience v. relevancy and control v. initiative, etc. Successful strategy is related to a) providing the minimum assistance package, b) simplicity in delivery, c) decentralised decision making, and d) building on existing social capital and the reorientation of local institutions. Programme implementation should be prioritised by simplicity first, completing simpler tasks first optimising use of resources and timely delivery of assistance. Long-term reintegration of ex-combatants should not be
neglected in favour of short-term pacification and repatriation. Stick to programme guidelines and do not create dependency syndrome.

Good socioeconomic data are vital and these can be collected during the encampment phase. Transition from soldier to civilian can be differentiated into three phases, demobilisation, reinsertion and reintegration. The safety requirements and individual needs are different in each phase. Transitory Safety Allowance (TSA) must be provided to bridge the gap between demobilisation and reintegration. Baseline data for programme design, socioeconomic profiling, job opportunity and market information, rural and urban, are essential. Reliable, durable and non-transferable ID with a photo is essential. Comrade Committees should support identification at the point of entry to the DRP.

Specific needs of females and children associated with the fighting groups must be addressed. This takes the approach to DDR beyond the minimalist focus purely on the ex-combatants, with implications not only on impact, but also on the scope, complexity and cost of the process. Encampment should be for as short a period as possible. It has security, logistical and cost implications. Urban reintegration is more complex than rural and needs due consideration, (planning, counselling, placement support and referral, vocational training and employment subsidy schemes). Demand driven training and job placement schemes must be linked.

An effective information system to beneficiaries is essential (opportunities, constraints, procedures) and can significantly reduce frustrations and enhance social and economic reintegration. The interplay of community physical and social capital, together with the ex-combatants financial and human capital will determine the success of reintegration.

Support of non-political social networks among ex-combatants contributes to social and economic reintegration. Government and donors need to avoid placing labels on ex-combatants that can stigmatise and alienate. Coordination within and between government and all relevant actors is critical in maximising the effectiveness of interventions. One civil agency to design and implement the DRP serves this purpose best. Central coordination balanced by decentralised decision making and implementation authority to districts contributes to an effective institutional structure. An effective technologically advanced Management Information System is essential. Decentralised field offices are critical to reach the client load.

Local communities should be directly involved in the decision-making as it relates to the community. Communities should be mobilised as intermediaries for problem solving through vehicles such as Community Advisory Committees. They also influence and guide the ex-combatants. Community
support should be fully utilised. Ex-combatant groups should have elected representatives who liaise with the program and represent their interests. The peace dividend needs to be understood and appreciated in social and economic terms as well as financial terms by all actors. Unless social expenditures are allocated effectively, a high ratio of social to defence spending does not necessarily translate to benefits for the poor.

2.3 Berdal on DDR
Mats Berdal’s *Disarmament and Demobilisation After Civil Wars* is another seminal study of the pre-DDR (the term not yet gaining common parlance) era, building on the lessons listed by Kingma and Seyers (1995). This is an analysis of the efforts to disarm, demobilise and reintegrate both government and guerrilla forces after prolonged internal conflicts that includes case studies of Angola, Mozambique, Somalia and Central America. He considers the impact of the continuing influence of the belligerents where a cessation of violence is achieved but without a decisive victory by either side. Berdal emphasises the dependency of successful demobilisation and reintegration on its linkages with parallel efforts of political, social and economic reconstruction aimed at addressing root causes of the conflict. He advises that disarmament must be voluntary since coercive disarmament will offer only short-term results. The focus should be on devaluing the necessity of arms in society contributing to consent based disarmament rather than seeking to eliminate them altogether. Demobilisation and reintegration processes must be better managed than heretofore while international support efforts must focus more on security sector reform (SSR) including advocacy for civil primacy and respect for human rights, local capacity and infrastructure building than on the implementation of the processes. The processes of demobilisation and reintegration have been difficult and internationally supported initiatives have experienced considerable setbacks during the nineties but the concepts will need to be addressed into the future.

2.4 An Early Literary Review
In 1997 Guy Lamb of the Centre for Conflict Resolution, University of Cape Town, carried out a survey of literature on the interrelated concepts of demilitarisation and peacebuilding in southern Africa in order to determine the state of scholarly affairs in these matters at the end of the Cold War.

34 Mats Berdal, *Disarmament and Demobilisation After Civil Wars*, Adelphi Paper 303, 1996
and “to possibly contribute to the general dynamic of demilitarisation and peacebuilding.”

His findings are instructive and probably reflect on how in scholarly literature at a global level, southern Africa as the spawning ground of the practice of demobilisation and peacebuilding and hence DDR, is contributing to the evolution of DDR theory. His overview merits a detailed review.

The end of bipolar rivalry has offered unprecedented opportunity for peace, locally and globally while at the same time opening the gates for fresh interstate and intrastate conflicts. Scholars have been focusing on how to encourage the opportunities while restricting the fresh outbreaks of violence through the production of a substantial volume of interdisciplinary literature, Lamb suggests, resulting in a fundamental shift in the direction of the theory of security, peace and conflict, including raising the concept of peacebuilding. The new global environment has also given rise to demilitarisation, particularly in those states that were affected by proxy conflicts, as was the case in much of southern Africa. Lamb looks at the nature of the literature and classifies it into several categories; mechanisms for peace and security, case studies and policy recommendations. He then considers the strengths and weaknesses of the literature and specifically notes the empirical wealth alongside the dearth of theory in the literature.

In considering demilitarisation and peacebuilding, Lamb notes an absence of consensus regarding definitions, which in turn, leads to analytical ambiguity. He draws on the UN discussion on peacebuilding from the Secretary General’s report of 1992, Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping, which outlines a comprehensive list of activities and range of mechanisms contributing to peacebuilding, including DDR, election monitoring, protection of human rights, government institutional capacity building; social and economic reform and reconciliation. He says that the term peacebuilding has become “a ‘catch-all’ concept for a range of vague theories about security, development and conflict prevention.”

The specific historical development of the concept of demilitarisation dates back to related debate on the existence of military in the 1860s in Europe. Post-WWII the concept of ‘demilitarised zones’ were realised as CBMs and as a buffer between belligerents. Lamb notes that during the Cold War the concept of demilitarisation became the almost exclusive domain of Peace Studies scholars. Post-Cold War, more than previously, the concept of demilitarisation is being analysed from the social and

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36 Randolf W. Rhea ofUiT concurs with the suggestion that there has been a dearth of theory in literature on DDR and asserts that this extends to the current day. From discussions with author in CPS, Tromsø University, October, 2012.
cultural perspective with ideas such as civil primacy, demobilisation of combatants, disarmament, cuts in military spending, the conversion of security industries and a growing debate on the ideology that views violence as a legitimate projection of politics.

He argues that the linkage of demilitarisation and peacebuilding are symbiotic since a focus on demilitarisation narrows the vagueness of the ‘catchall’ nature of peacebuilding while linking the contested concept of demilitarisation to peace reduces the conceptual confusion.

The bulk of the relevant literature in southern Africa, predominantly on peacebuilding, arrived in the nineties with the dominant themes being:

- regional security, CBMs, demobilisation and reintegration of combatants, military review and reconstruction, peacekeeping, disarmament and arms control and civil-military relations.  

The major sources of the literature, as we have seen, were international organisations such as the WB, UN and donors; NGOs and ‘think tanks’ like BICC, IDP, etc. and the reports of conferences and seminars. Lamb considers his three categories in some detail.

   a) Redefinition of Security. Dramatic change was occurring in southern Africa by the end of the 80s, early 90s. The thawing of the hostile environments and ideologically based distrust common to the Cold War period and the dismantling of apartheid required a redefinition of security, a “new security paradigm” was devised that:

      perceived security from being synonymous with defence, to a more inclusive understanding that took into account the political, economic societal and environmental dimensions as well. Such a framework envisages human security as ultimately more important than state security.  

b) Peacekeeping. This area includes many reviews of regional UN peacekeeping missions in addition to the ideas of building capacity of regional peacekeeping partnerships such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC).

c) Disarmament. With small arms seen as a major destabilising factor in southern Africa, the reduction of weapons and arms control was a major issue. Weak frontiers and the unaccountable trafficking of

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37 Lamb, *Op cit*
38 *Ibid*
the newly surplus arms were leading to proliferation of arms and localised destabilisation. With the growing perception that arms control was essential to the maintenance of peace, means of containing and controlling small arms, seen as an intrinsically political and long-term process, was a focus of research.

d) Conversion. Closely related to disarmament, this concept focuses on how resources heretofore applied to security might be converted to economic benefit. A small amount of this literature, particularly that from BICC, considers the macroeconomic contribution of conversion to social benefit such as poverty reduction and development.

e) Peace dividend and Economic Development. While a range of literature is pursuing the peace dividend associated with demilitarisation and peacebuilding, Lamb claims that in reality the peace dividend has been negligible for southern Africa.

f) Demobilisation and Reintegration. Lamb says that these are the most popular subjects of literature associated with demilitarisation and peacebuilding. He mentions that processes are context specific and often the “distinction between where the demobilisation ends and social reintegration begins differ… and lead to a degree of confusion.” The processes are volatile but if well managed create “opportunities for sustainable peace and development.” He notes that the bulk of the literature is in the form of case studies.

g) Civil-military Relations. This tends to be a scholarly (sociology and political science) approach that centres on the analysis of the relationships between the military and civil society. Its modern focus is on the concept of civil primacy, the ‘depolitisation’ of the military and the creation of small professional military forces.

Most of the literature is in the form of case studies, either single country or comparative cases, with Zimbabwe, Namibia, Mozambique, South Africa and Angola featuring in southern Africa. While a few of the studies are in depth analyses through multi-country studies, particularly those initiated by the World Bank, IDP and BICC, most are merely descriptive of the problems with little attempt to collate the analysis into a body of guidelines. With the collapse of the Bicesse Accords of 1992 and the return to violence between UNITA and the MPLA in Angola, much study focused on the reasons for that failure as opposed to the relative success of SWAPO in Namibia, a productive UN Peacekeeping intervention in Mozambique, the DDR programme in Zimbabwe in addition to the demilitarisation, military restructuring and peacebuilding in South Africa.
Lamb considers the case studies of Mats Berdal and Colletta, Kostner and Wiederhofer, as we have done. Despite conceptual confusion between the terms demilitarisation and peacebuilding, and their relationship, the case studies tend to be rigorous in data collection and descriptive presentation, offering insightful policy recommendations. However it tends to be focused on South Africa, vague and not reflecting long-term vision. More pointedly, it is lacking theoretical outlook with only limited effort to formulate propositions, hypotheses and general guidance, reflecting an ‘ad hoc’ approach to addressing demilitarisation and peacebuilding rather than “a coherent and theoretically driven approach that addresses the interrelated phenomena of peacebuilding and demilitarisation in a systematic and co-ordinated fashion…” Lamb notes that this is due to it being a relatively new field of study and that there are few individuals focusing on it. He does predict, with an improvement in general quality, it developing in to a field of research in its own right.

### 2.5 Chapter II Review

Here we have reviewed a series of seminal case studies by those who laid the foundations of the theory, based on the analysis of the early practice of DDR; Kingma and Seyers, Colletta and Berdal, primarily prepared as evaluation reports for the WB and BICC outlining the constraints and good practice in those early post-Cold War re-adjustment SSR and demobilisation and reintegration programmes (DRPs), an early term for DDR. These programmes, mainly in southern and sub-Saharan Africa, were deemed critical in guiding the transformation of the conflict to peace and in rebuilding the social fabric of communities; trust and reconciliation. This work provided the foundations defining the evolution of the theory of DDR for the next decade. Lamb’s insightful literary review of what he views as somewhat low-level existing theory of DDR in 1997, contributed to consolidating the lessons learned. He accurately predicts its evolution into a vibrant field of research in its own right.
Chapter III

The ‘Classic’ DDR Programmes

Chapter III, initially drawing on the author’s phenomenological experience as a practitioner and on definitive literature, reviews the evolution of the theory of DDR through brief case studies of some of those cases of DDR considered as ‘classic’ examples, often following post-Cold War dynamics and addressing identifiable cohesive fighting groups that emerged from the turn of the millennium; Sierra Leone, MDRP and the follow-on TDRP in Great Lakes region of Africa, Angola, Liberia to the difficulties for DDR in current day South Sudan. It considers critical crosscutting issues that emerged during the ‘classic’ cases and that may not be adequately addressed in the case studies; transitional justice (TJ) and communications. Chapter III lays the basis for consideration of the evolution of DDR theory towards the emphasis on community security and community based approaches in Chapter IV.

3.1 Sierra Leone.

The ten-year civil war in Sierra Leone launched in the late nineteen eighties not as an aspect of the diminishing post-Cold War proxy conflicts, but largely as a genuine social revolution of a disenchanted rural youth excluded from the political, social and economic life of the state, in their view, by a corrupt and avaricious urban elite. As such, the civil war in Sierra Leone may reflect a paradigm shift in moving from the post-Cold war dynamic. The conflict was greatly encouraged by the goading and support of neighbouring strong man, Charles Taylor, in funding his own internal conflict through control of the rich Sierra Leonean diamond fields in the North West provinces of Kono and Kailahun, from where the now infamous ‘blood diamonds’ were being scraped from the muddy waterholes by hoards of indentured hungry youth. This conflict was noted for its brutality with the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) exercising a process of terrorisation of the civilian population through wanton destruction, abduction, enslavement, enforced child combatants, rape, amputation of civilians and mass murder. With a weak state defence force, the Sierra Leone Army, (SLA) and the opportunist Armed Forces Revolutionary Council, (AFRC) minor players, a loosely organised force of mobilised population, largely comprising of traditional hunting groups, the Chiefdom Defence Forces (CDF), mounted a defence often offering similar brutality in response.

39 This section on DDR in Sierra Leone is a composite extracted from a number of documents. Desmond Molloy, Sierra Leone and Discovering DDR: Conflict Resolution and Peace Building in Africa: Lessons Learned, published in Japanese translated by Yujiro Tokumitsu, Ryuku University Kyoto, March 2011. Desmond Molloy, DDR in Sierra Leone 1999-2005, unpublished 2007; Desmond Molloy, The Qualitative Quantitative Dilemma: Indicators of Achievement as Used in DDR Programs, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, 2009 and author’s contemporaneous notes as Chief of DDR Section with UNAMSIL, Sierra Leone 2002 -2004.
In achieving the semblance of a negotiated settlement of a protracted conflict, particularly one in which there may not be genuine ‘good guys’ and in which an outright victory by either side is unlikely, a recurring theme, and one for which DDR takes frequent bad press, is the sacrifice of justice for peace. The extraordinary scene post-Lomé Accord, with negotiations led by the US’s Jesse Jackson, that saw Foday Sankoh, the instigator of the most brutal crimes against humanity during the civil war; mass rape, murder of civilians, amputations, enslavement of ‘bush wives’, abduction of child soldiers, enthroned as the Minister for Natural Resources and Vice President of Sierra Leone with control over his prime resource and source of fraternity with Charles Taylor, the blood diamonds… was a macabre projection of black humour that led to an arrogant sense of empowerment within the RUF. It encouraged their return to gross violence with the kidnapping of UN peacekeepers and the 1999 brutal attack on Freetown with the murder of over 6,000 citizens. Kenji Isezaki, in the opening of his account of his time as Chief of UN DDR in Sierra Leone from 2001 to 2002, is incredulous at the amnesty for Sankoh.\footnote{Kenji Isezaki, \textit{Disarmament: The World through the Eyes of a Conflict Buster}, Published in Japanese by Kodansha Gendhi Shinho in Jan 2004, Translated into English in 2011, p 54} He equates it, through the anecdote of a suggestion from a radio caller to a political show on the BBC soon after 9/11, on how to end the War on Terror, by the US nominating Osama bin Laden as its own Vice President. He mentions that while approximately 3,000 people died in the Twin Towers attack, Foday Sankoh was responsible for thousands of amputations of children and up to 550,000 deaths in Sierra Leone.\footnote{\textit{Ibid}, p 61}

In light of its impact on regional security in neighbouring Guinea, Liberia and Cote d’Ivoire and the potential for broader associated humanitarian crises, the UN Security Council encouraged a series of negotiations and approved intervention. This was with the support of the regional organisation, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). This resulted in UNDP launching a DDR programme that targeted more than 75,000 combatants. An authoritative institutional structure, the National Committee for DDR (NCDDR) was established and the WB was tasked with the marshalling of resources through the management of a Multi Donor Trust Fund (MDTF). The DDR process progressed in three phases, punctuated by the RUF attacks on Freetown, the massacre of civilians and incidents that included the mass kidnapping of UN troops, until the RUF were finally defeated in robust action by Nigerian ECOWAS troops and British SAS action, leading to the start of the effective DDR in the third phase in 2001.
The launch of the Special Court for Sierra Leone under the auspices of the ICC greatly subdued the leaders of the RUF and contributed to their subsequent low profile and the rapid demise of the RUF. In the initial post-conflict general election in 2002, the RUF, in the absence of any political platform or legitimacy, evaporated. Isezaki contends that the RUF leaders after the removal of the charismatic and deemed as mystical leader, Sankoh, conceded to the earlier lunacy of the conflict and did not seriously contest the election. Isezaki further comments that the attempted concession of peace before justice as led by the US in Sierra Leone might be a useful strategy for the US to use in its war on terror in Afghanistan, [other than in the narrow way that the US did in fact use such a strategy in forming the emergency Loya Jerga in 2002, but only to the benefit of their allies, the Pansjari warlords], noting that the crimes of the RUF far exceed anything that the Taliban have done.

Reconciliation is a term that we use frequently in the context of DDR. Isezaki contends that it may be over-fashionable and a contributor to this negative peace created by an approach of peace before justice.

The Lomé Accord 1999 offered the effective Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA), with international support authorised by Security Council Resolution 1270 (Oct 1999) and operationalized by a multi-agency Joint Operational Plan (JOP) involving the Government of Sierra Leone, ECOMOG, the UN Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone, (UNAMSIL) UNDP, UNICEF, WFP, DfID, GTZ and other partners.

Between 1999 and 2001, when the disarmament phases were completed, 76,000 ex-combatants, including 6,000 children, of all factions were registered by the NCDDR and disarmed, being processed through a short period in cantonment.

The programme recognised that demobilisation would require not only the formal break in the command, control and communications (CCC) capacity between the armed group hierarchy and the ex-combatants, those mechanisms facilitating a rapid remobilisation, but also the adjustment of the mind-set of the ex-combatants to allow reorientation as a civilian. The RUF evaporated as a cohesive military and political entity soon after the arrest of Foday Sankoh and RUF former cadres found themselves cast adrift and dependent on the DDR process, so the former aspect of demobilisation occurred by default as regards the RUF. The demobilisation of the CDF was a more nebulous affair with lingering rumours of their community based militia activities long after the formal demobilisation.

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42 Ibid, p 64
43 Ibid, p 65
44 Ibid, pp 69 -71
The demobilisation of mind-sets was to be a result of time and a successful reintegration process seeing ex-combatants take their place in civil society.

On demobilisation, ex-combatants were granted a Transitional Security Allowance (TSA) termed as Reinsertion Benefit in Phase III, of $150 which was based on the estimated cost of living while awaiting take-up in what ever reintegration option package and the start of the associated monthly allowance. British DfID, a senior partner in reintegration was very concerned that such allowance might be associated with the concept of weapons buy-back, and great effort was made to dissociate the allowance from the disarmament process. A review of the impact of this TSA/ Reinsertion Benefit by Isabela Leao in 2011 finds that it was very significant, sometimes more significant than the formal reintegration education or skills training packages, in permitting many ex-combatants to launch a sustainable livelihood. 45

The objective of reintegration in Sierra Leone was to support the return of ex-combatants to their home communities or communities of choice; to assist ex-combatants to become productive members of their communities; to use the potential of ex-combatants to enhance human and social capital in the community, to promote community based reconciliation and to spread the peace dividend throughout the community. Livelihood support options were offered to ex-combatants in the areas of education, agriculture, fisheries, vocational training, micro-entrepreneurial support, and included the payment of subsistence allowances for a period of six months and the issue of tool kits in most cases.

Of the total of 67,000 disarmed, a number that might include a significant amount of repeats over the three phases of disarmament, 57,000 opted for inclusion in the reintegration. Of the approximate balance of 10,000, 2,500 were absorbed into the newly tasked and restructured Sierra Leone Army, the defence system reform (DSR) being supported bilaterally by the British. It is difficult to account for the remaining 7,500 disarmed combatants. Some may have died or emigrated between 1999 and 2001, some did self-reintegrate having their own coping mechanisms or wishing to avoid the stigma of ex-combatant status. Others may have seen green pastures in joining the conflicts that spawned the RUF in Liberia and the emerging conflict in Cote d’Ivoire.

Chapter 6 of The New World of UN Peace Operations: Learning to Build Peace, by Benner, Mergenthaler and Rotmann “Reintegration: From Quick Fixes to sustainable Social Reintegration” uses this aspect of the Sierra Leone DDR process as an example for lessons learned from incomplete

They present a considerable potpourri of misinformation about the DDR programme in Sierra Leone in relation to these missing numbers and other elements of the DDR process. It starts by referring to the UN’s DDR programme in Sierra Leone, while it was a programme owned and led by the Government of Sierra Leone with funding coordinated by the World Bank through the MDTF with support from the UN PKO UNAMSIL, UNDP, UNICEF and other development partners. The UN mission was not responsible for the fund raising and the hiatus of funding at the beginning of the programme was associated with WB systems rather than any thing to do with the mission, which was ready to assist in supporting gaps in program delivery.

The chapter refers to disgruntled ex-combatants waiting for the support of the DDR process that became easy prey for Charles Taylor’s Liberian recruiters. In fact, some Sierra Leone ex-combatants joined several factions in Liberia including LURD and others went further afield to what may have appeared a more lucrative conflict in Cote d’Ivoire. Ignoring the extraordinary achievement of the process in processing 57,000 ex-combatants through a reintegration process, in focusing on the few thousand that may have crossed the frontier into Liberia, some of whom may never have entered the reintegration process, it is a long stretch to this reflecting “the disastrous consequence of the DDR programme in Sierra Leone.”

While we can acknowledge the difficulty in identifying the level of causality that can be attributed to the results of any DDR programme, the broad body of literature on DDR in Sierra Leone notes the success of the programme in that there was no return to organised armed violence and the subsequent peaceful hand-over of power in two general elections after completion of the process. These inaccuracies will lead to some reservations in drawing lessons from this otherwise useful publication.

There were indeed serious constraints and planning difficulties associated with the programme. While the NCDDR had estimated that 28,000 ex-combatants would present for phase III of registration, 47,000 turned-up and met the criteria. This contributed to the initial funding difficulties. Further, as the programme launched, two thirds of the country was still under RUF control with government not present, becoming accessible only in mid-2001 and with partner support (UNAMSIL, UNDP, UNICEF, DfID, USAID and GTZ in particular), NCDDR accelerated the delivery of reintegration support. The delays in cash flows, particularly late delivery of subsistence allowances led to local outbreaks of high profile and intimidating vocal aggression by groups of volatile and angry ex-

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47 Ibid, loc 2107
combatants and some very tricky situations for decentralised NCDDR staff and the staff of the UN DDR Section that operated regional offices.

In addressing the specific centres of concentration of the most volatile ex-combatants, those whose spontaneous return to armed violence could derail the process, the Chief of the DDR process, Kenji Isezaki, in consultation with UNDP and DfID, launched the Stopgap Programme, a series of targeted community based local infrastructure and mass employment projects, to cover about three months employment valued at about $30,000 each to engage approximately 100 workers, both ex-combatants and community members. These were not like the quick impact projects being implemented by Civil Affairs Section of the Mission and local NGOs geared towards the rehabilitation of vital infrastructure, but were a process of engagement, of contributing to reconciliation and of demonstrating the benefits of the peace dividend. They were planned and implemented through a community participative process engaging local government, traditional leadership and a representative committee including the sages, women, youth, vulnerable groups and CBOs. The programme had positive effects beyond the original objectives and won awards for implementation, while launching the concept of the Stopgap that has been replicated in many DDR programmes.

One particular area where the DDR process in Sierra Leone failed was in not ensuring the equitable, not to mention equal, treatment of female ex-combatants and woman associated with the fighting groups. They were generally omitted in the peace negotiations with cursory paternalistic and patronising mention in the Lomé Accord. They were doubly neglected by seeing many female ex-combatants and enforced ‘bush wives’, often among the most vulnerable of the society, stigmatised and rejected by their own communities, being hidden by armed group commanders throughout the reintegration process. They were frequently left without support or totally dependent on the amazing work of organisations such as Caritas in the town of Makeni, amongst others. Much has been studied regarding this neglect and much, as we shall see later, has progressed in the practice of DDR in the intervening years in reforming this failure in considering the gender perspective.

A specific feature of the Sierra Leone DDR process which led the trend with the UN move towards integration was the close relations that the UN mission DDR Section maintained with the development partner, UNDP. Through this, the two entities combined resources to develop synergy in delivering the Stopgap programme. They then set a further example by working in collaboration to deliver follow-on small arms control (SAC) programmes. This included the Community Arms Collection and Destruction Programme (CACD1) in which UNDP contributed to the capacity building of Sierra
Leone Police in addressing small arms control issues. This was a coercive measure immediately following the DDR process that involved police cordon and search of houses after a given amnesty for hand-in of small arms and respective sanctions for offenders. The Arms for Development (AfD) Programme was a sweep-up process involving the strengthening of the community will to ensure and arms free community, followed the CACD. This offered each Chiefdom community the opportunity of a self-chosen infrastructure project, planned and implemented in a participative and representative way, for a Chiefdom that could be declared as ‘arms free’ after a police investigation. The programme was successful and has been replicated in many DDR processes.

While a process of Defence Sector Reform (DSR) was launched to restructure the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) supported bilaterally by the British with its International Military Advisory and Training Team (IMATT), a team of mixed commonwealth training troops, approximately 2,500 of the demobilised ex-combatants were absorbed into the army. However, during either planning or implementation there were no consultations or any significant level of collaboration with the DDR process. The relationship between DSR and DDR was hardly considered. Looking back on the specific context in Sierra Leone, in light of the total defeat of the RUF and the inappropriateness of any large-scale absorption into the down-sizing SLA and in no doubt at this stage regarding GoSL’s control over the SLA, it is unclear if there was scope for any significant collaboration.

Did DDR work in Sierra Leone? Scholars debate the impact of the DDR process in Sierra Leone, often even debating its objectives. Macartan Humphreys and Jeremy Weinstein, as we’ll see in the next chapter, using rigorous scholarly methodology could find little evidence that reintegration support has any impact on contributing to sustainable livelihoods for ex-combatants in Sierra Leone.48

While it is indeed very difficult to apportion the impact of a DDR process on the stabilization of a peace process, considering that it is just one of the relevant interventions, it can be noted that this DDR process created a broad confidence in the commitment of the fighting groups to the peace. It addressed the main security dilemmas. Further, it removed many overtly surplus weapons from the theater and offered options for constructive engagement of many ex-combatants in civil society. It can therefore be considered that this DDR process did contribute to reducing the odds of a return to armed violence. Noting that Sierra Leone has never returned to organized armed violence and indeed has seen a relatively peaceful transfer of power after two successful elections, the DDR process implemented in

48 It should be noted that Isabela Leo in her study *Swimming against the Stream, Op cit*, of just over 100 ex-combatants spent three years, 2007 to 2010, developing the appropriate relationships to ensure that she had the confidence of the group and had the opportunity to get more accurate answers to her questions, had more positive qualitative findings.
Sierra Leone in the context of the Lomé Accord (1999-2004) can justifiably claim success. Certainly, in observing the successful democratic elections and transfer of power in Sierra Leone in November 2012, and in remembering the futility of one of the most brutal civil wars in recent history, things have clearly changed for the better in Sierra Leone.

As the process in Sierra Leone was drawing to a close in mid-2003 the UN, driven by energetic individuals in DPKO and UNDP, particularly Kelvin Ong and Spyros Demetriou, were planning the development of a body of policy guidance to offer some institutional direction for the ever-expanding practice of DDR. Much was been drawn from the lessons being learned in Sierra Leone and apparently being concurrently unlearned in Liberia. This was to emerge as the Integrated DDR Standards, (IDDRS) a body of guidance agreed by majority of UN agencies and collaborating international organisations, drawing together the most critical lessons of DDR implementation while reviewing in a systematic and dynamic way to ensure appropriate and timely evolution of that guidance to match the evolving contexts. The subsequent debacle in the launch of the DDR process in Liberia in late 2003 drew UNHQ management support and added impetus to the urgency in the development of the IDDRS.

3.2 MDRP

After two decades of multiple violent conflicts affecting half of the countries in Africa and a third of its population, the Multi-country Demobilisation and Reintegration Program, MDRP, led by the World Bank was the most ambitious DDR response ever undertaken in partnership with national governments, donors and International institutions. MDRP was the largest DDR program undertaken in the world with a total budget of $450 million. It operationalized unprecedented partnership with total of 43 partners, seven national governments, thirteen donors, eleven UN agencies, regional organisations and NGOs. It took a regional approach covering seven countries; DRC, ROC, Burundi, CAR, Uganda, Angola, Rwanda, but was implemented based on the principle of national ownership of the processes effecting each specific country. Each country, with assistance, established its own demobilisation, reinsertion and reintegration program; significant cross-border learning was realised and networks established to address security, political and development issues in the most volatile area of the world. Multiple issues were addressed, many in innovative ways; dealing with foreign combatants, addressing

50 These statistics from Skype discussion with DDR Desk Officer BCPR, NY 12 Aug 2012
elements of the gender perspective, child soldiers, transitional Justice and operationalization of traditional justice mechanisms, cross-border coordination requiring negotiation and diplomacy, country specific objectives addressed through regional action. After seven years in operation in the Great Lakes region of Central Africa, from April 2002 to June 2009, the MDRP closed having demobilised close to 300,000 ex-combatants.

With the imprimatur of the WB offering strong political signals to actors and donors at the outset, funds were pledged in advance and donor resources pooled. Overarching management institutions were established in Washington, an Advisory Committee and Technical Coordinating Group (TCG). They functioned efficiently but could have had greater direct impact if more policy discussions had been held in the field. The evaluators suggest that despite its huge scale, the MDRP had low visibility within the WB structure. Further, diverse reporting lines complicated the program management structure, often inter-departmental within the WB rather than internal to the MDRP hierarchy. Often, external experts were unknowledgeable of WB procedure leading to bureaucratic tensions. Better decentralisation, away from Washington would have made sense, with a visible and high-level field presence needed.

The MDRP offered daunting challenges with extreme logistical and operational complexity. Delays were often caused in specific country programs by political log-jambs and poor management at national levels. Still, most of the demobilisation and reinsertion targets were met. Clearly the greatest challenge lay in delivering sustainable reintegration of ex-combatants. Livelihood support must be realistic and market friendly, thus suggesting that this may not have been so. However, livelihood viability cannot be delivered by a DDR program focused on ex-combatants, but is dependent on dynamics in the larger economy. Technology must be practical, given local conditions and capacities. Resources must be earmarked for special groups. This worked in the case of child soldiers but not so well for female ex-combatants. Much of the support that female ex-combatants did receive, as with the programme in Sierra Leone, came later and from outside the program.

It is critical to develop a more professional approach to monitoring and evaluation (M&E). It must be programmed into the implementation and not considered as an ad hoc afterthought. Perhaps the M&E function within the MDRP could have been contracted to specialist agencies.

Considering the extraordinary challenges of the programme; security, political and development, the design was inadequate.
Donor commitment could fluctuate with political interests. Dedicated donor staff seemed to be rotating frequently leading to occasional poor inter-partner communications and also poor communications to HQ. Host governments, while welcoming the DDR support, were sensitive to policy decisions. Strong stable governments were better able to participate constructively than weak ones. Account needed to be taken of specific country capacities and ambitions to be scaled appropriately. In such a complex environment, roles and tasking needed to be spelled-out in a broad operational plan early in the programme. This could have been in the form of the roles matrix that was prepared by the WB.

The regional approach to DDR in the MDRP, while contributing to the complexity of implementation, was critical in light of the volatility of the Great Lakes region, the porous borders, the transferability of combatants and the range and inter-connectedness of local conflicts. In light of varying levels of national cohesion, interests and varying chronologies as regards implementation, continuous negotiation was needed to achieve the regional outputs. Country specific outputs were more easily realised than the regional ones.

The MDRP was deemed by the Scanteam evaluation as an efficient vehicle offering financial transparency and accountability, consistent management and harmonised reporting. In its cross-border functions, it offered opportunities for peer-learning and inter-country trust and confidence building measures. All mechanisms had to be adapted to country specific contexts and requirements. National ownership was deemed an essential quality. However the dilemma of government ownership versus broader national ownership was ever present and was initially poorly defined, often leading to tensions…“policy versus implementation dimension, the contextual understanding and its dynamics over time.”

Considering the broader community, including civil society could have brought in the potential spoilers and built trust.

Noting the significant capacity constraints within these devastated post-conflict countries; “political, management, technical and physical capacity needs...” and noting that Capacity Development (CD) is a long-term commitment, judicial consideration is needed into what degree of CD the programme should invest. However, knowing that DDR tends to extend beyond the initial planned time frame and that reintegration is not a time-bound process, CD could well prove a sound investment.

Further consideration was needed in the establishment and maintenance of knowledge management mechanisms. While the WB was proactive in knowledge management, the UN and donors could have contributed more in this area. The regional approach was the big success of the MDRP. However,

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51 MDRP, Final evaluation 2010, Op cit, p 4
52 The term ‘Spoilers’ can be very subjective, depending on perspective. It is used by practitioners and scholars with caution.
upstream [considerations] (policy and SSR) and downstream (sustainable reintegration) links to DDR needed to be systematically identified [and addressed]. The impact and sustainability of steps taken under DDR will increase with the inclusion into these broader agendas.53

MDRP institutional memory must be retained. The report notes that this DDR effort is the most high-risk endeavour ever undertaken by the WB.

### 3.3 Quality Enhancement and Innovation in Regional and Community Approaches in the TDRP

When the MDRP closed operations in June 2009 it had coordinated and provided assistance to over 300,000 ex-combatants in seven countries in the Great Lakes region and generated much literature offering lessons, good practice and recommendations.54 Still the job was incomplete. A four year follow-on programme, Transitional Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (TDRP), was launched with a multi-donor fund of US$33.2 million provided by the African Development Bank, Belgium, Finland, France, Italy, Norway and Sweden for a programme to be managed by the WB, to build on the lessons learned and the regional peacebuilding networking of the MDRP. The TDRP represents a financing mechanism of last resort, intervening only when county level and regional resources could not address critical needs in DDR.55 The primary objectives were to continue to provide technical assistance and support to on-going demobilisation and reintegration (D&R) programmes in the Great Lakes region; to expand D&R coverage by providing emergency financing to D&R programmes with funding gaps and to facilitate dialogue, information exchange and learning on D&R through a process of “Quality Enhancement and Innovation.” 56 This process of quality enhancement and innovation includes supporting and building the capacity of local and collective initiatives for reintegration and peacebuilding working together with academic institutions, community organisations and thus deriving synergies.

The TDRP focuses its efforts on Central African Republic (CAR), Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda and Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in supporting context specifically designed efforts towards capacity building for reintegration of ex-combatants.57 In CAR, which has recently returned to conflict

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54 Guy Lamb, Assessing the Reintegration of Ex-combatants in the Context of Instability and Informal Economies: The cases of the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo and South Sudan, TDRP, IDRP/WB December 2011, p 9
55 TDRP, Quarterly Report, July-September 2012, WB, Annex II, p 19
56 TDRP, Overview, WB, November, 2011
57 Technical details of the TDRP are drawn from “TDRP, Quarterly Report, October-December 2011”
with the overthrow of Bozizé in March 2013, a community reintegration programme is being implemented by INGOs with established foothold primarily in the communities. Such an approach makes great sense in light of the recent abortive DDR efforts at DDR in CAR by UNDP. The initial process offering national scope in 2004-2007, called PRAC, demonstrated the complexity of attempting to deliver DDR in an environment of instability and extraordinary obfuscation in the absence of political will and a penchant for elite prebednalism. The second effort in 2008-2009, funded by the UN Peacebuilding Fund (PBF), was based on the CPA signed at Libreville in June 2008. Its implementation was to be supervised by the Oversight Committee (Comité de Suivi, CPA). Again this attempt offered DDR in an environment of continuing instability and extraordinary obstruction.58

Initially, rapid progress was made in establishing the appropriate national institutional structure, specifically the National DDR Steering Committee (Comité de Pilotage), development of necessary documentation including a Joint Operational Plan, setting the parameters for DDR together with the belligerent factions, weapons criteria, securing lists of eligible combatants and the planning of a validation process to confirm that eligibility.59 However, the process was halted in an environment of elite capture of resources and rent taking, both by the government side and rebel commanders... with a perceived level of regional collusion. The community-based approach being pursued by TDRP is probably the most appropriate solution that could see benefits reach the most vulnerable and war affected communities and offer reintegration opportunities for ex-combatants, especially in the informal economy in the absence of a functioning formal economy.

In Rwanda, having demobilised and reinserted relevant ex-combatants, the focus is on continuing reintegration support for ex-combatants including children, women and disabled, through Government of Rwanda led programmes. The programme has successfully mainstreamed the ex-combatants into the state social services system. DRC saw WB/TDRP respond to requests for assistance in DDR by the UN Organisation Stabilisation Mission in DRC, MONUSCO. In driving towards regional ownership of the efforts, TDRP has been collaborating in developing capacity within the AU through DDR training in collaboration with DPKO. In addition to the five focus countries, such capacity building is considering the DDR needs of Cote d’Ivoire, Niger and South Sudan.

With the innovative approaches baring fruit and demonstrating the developing of regional capacity, the TDRP has extended operations beyond its planned completion date of 2012. The complexity and

58 The author was UN Senior DDR Advisor for the beginning of the latter effort.
59 The Comité de Pilotage of DDR in CAR was established by decree of the Comité de Suivi CPA at its fourth session in Libreville on 28 January 2009, attended by the author. Most technical data on the DDR process 2008-2009 is drawn from “Update on DDR Process, CAR: 29 Apr 2009,” a contemporaneous report to UNDP HQ and BPSO by the author.
challenges of the multi-country DDR environment and continuing volatility in the Great Lakes region remain daunting and the clear indication of adequate return on investment is difficult to quantify. However, this innovative approach of providing International Organisation (IO) technical assistance (advice) and support (training, material and on the ground management support) to regional DDR, developing regional capacity utilising community approaches through the process of Quality Enhancement and Innovation represents the application of lessons, potential good practice and a positive development within the evolution of the theory.

3.4 Lessons from Angola


Having seen-off the Portuguese in 1975 after fifteen years of guerrilla warfare with over half a million killed and several millions displaced, the two main independence parties, structured along ethnic and regional lines, Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) under Savimbi, refocused their attentions on positioning in an internal struggle for power. This was despite them agreeing on the establishment of a unity government. Over twenty-five years of oil funded and super power encouraged brutal civil war had destroyed the social structure of the country. US, South Africa and Mabutu’s Zaire supported UNITA against the communist MPLA supported by USSR, Cuba and Congo Brazzaville… a classic in the genre of proxy wars. The end of the Cold War forced the MPLA into a negotiating position and led to the Bicesse Accords in 1991, based on the development of a multiparty constitution. Elements of the Accords included agreed disarmament; release of political prisoners; general amnesty; the prohibition of acquiring weapons, on third parties in supplying them and elections after a disarmament and demobilisation process; SSR based on down-sizing and fair ethnic representation, all to be observed by a PKO. In 1992 Sivimbi and UNITA, shocked by electoral defeat, refused to recognize the result and continued the struggle. The US frustrated, changed sides and recognized the newly elected MPLA.

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government and introduced sanctions against UNITA. In 1994, Savimbi agreed to the Lusaka Protocol offering a second chance at a more representative result in further elections under UN implementation. However the end of the Cold War and the absence of Soviet backing for his rivals left Sivimbi optimistic that he could take all power and UNITA became a spoiler to the peace process, causing the movement to splinter with the ‘splitist’ element taking its place in the new semi-functioning government. UNITA went into a skirmishing decline until Sivimbi was killed in 2002. MPLA capitalized on this event by offering an immediate unilateral ceasefire and a peace plan, resulting in the signing of the Luena Memorandum between the clearly victorious MPLA, and a vanquished UNITA. The complex post-conflict emergency saw refugees, IDPs, foreign troops and approximately 50,000 UNITA exCombatants needing to be reintegrated along with approximately 300,000 dependents.

Here Nilsson points out that the series of accords, Bicesse, Lusaka and Luena, each building on the other in an environment of UNITA’s progressively declining fortunes had resulted in a very unequal set of provisions. While the projected DDR processes envisaged cantonment, disarmament and destruction of weapons, some absorption into the security forces and traditional reintegration support, the strong position of the government ensured that the processes were biased to their advantage. In line with the DDR provisions associated with the earlier accords, UNITA, while having officially demobilized two thirds of its strength and 10,000 being absorbed into the new armed forces, harboring severe reservations had maintained significant weapons in the bush and retained the capacity to remobilise.

After 2002 the DDR processes were totally nationally owned, unfortunately demonstrating a level of disorganization and lack of resources. While UNITA had estimated 50,000 combatants for demobilisation, more than 100,000 turned up to register for the processes with only 30,000 light weapons being registered in disarmament. By 2003 while it was estimated that between 3 and 4 million illicit small arms were still in circulation in Angola, UNITA was now deemed disarmed. Temporary cantonment sites were self-built by the ex-combatants and were characterised by poor conditions, disorganisation, food shortages, insecurity, crime and resurgent criminal violence. Female combatants were treated as dependents rather than recognized as entitled ex-combatants. Approximately 8,000 child ex-combatants were poorly managed and supported. By mid-2002 the Joint Military Commission (JMC) responsible for disarmament and demobilisation declared the processes complete and started to close the cantonment sites.
With the MPLA’s dominance in power as the Angolan army was being down-sized, the SSR process did not result in the ethnic and geographical mix within the security forces as projected in the accords, with the army retaining its de facto affiliation to the ruling party and lacking civil primacy.

Through the evolving post-cold war environment and into the late nineties, the UN engagement in Angola was limited and ineffective projecting a weak mandate of observation and verification. The UN was not involved in the negotiations and the resulting early Bicesse Accords that formed the foundations for future agreements, was underfunded, under resourced and badly implemented. The UN was poorly tasked reflecting the lack of the international communities experience in peacebuilding and conflict transformation in a post-cold war environment. While sanctions and limited controls on diamond exports did bite into UNITA capacities and contributed to Sivimbi’s subsequent isolation, the blind eye to corruption, primarily in the MPLA oil dealings, did skew the environment and contribute to the country’s continued impoverishment. MPLA exploited the UN early ineffectiveness in taking control of the environment in the aftermath of the Lusaka Accord of 2002 and further limiting the UN role and even observation. While it is clear that power interests both in the context of the Cold War and South African interests limited its capacity, the UN was to take the blame for the many failings in the protracted peace process from all sectors of Angolan society. Generally it is viewed that international engagement in Angola did more damage than good.

As regards reintegration, ex-combatants were returning into an impoverished post-war environment. After the Lusaka Accord of 2002, the demobilized ex-combatants were provided with reintegration benefits; travel documents, basic clothing, domestic items and agricultural tools and seeds, a WFP ration card and $100 transitional security allowance and five months salary by a range of national and international actors. In considering economic reintegration, there was to be up to a year of vocational training in their community of resettlement and access to micro-credit for micro business start-up support. Local mass employment schemes were envisaged with limited support to dependents. Consideration was also given to social reintegration through civic education, confidence building exercises and joint community activities. All activities were to be implemented by a dedicated government agency supported by the UN and international donors, under international pressure with the engagement of local communities. The complexity of the processes was compounded by the inclusion of the refugee and IDP populations in the benefits.

With the Angolan government requesting international support for the reintegration process, the World Bank (WB) included aspects of it, targeting almost 140,000 ex-combatants, into the MDRP.
Negotiations between the government and the international institutions and cash flows were slow, resulting in delayed implementation. This necessitated the launch by UNDP in cooperation with FAO of an emergency response funded by a basket of countries including Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, UK and the EC, with parallel programmes by US and Portugal, to kick-start the reintegration of UNITA ex-combatants. Addressing almost two million beneficiaries, this saw one of the most expensive humanitarian operations yet attempted in the world. Internal evaluations by both the WB and the government of Angola have positive findings about the reintegration process claiming that a very high percentage of target groups had received the benefits with peace and stability having been achieved. External evaluations are less positive. Some claim that the disarmament and demobilisation was too hasty and that failing to integrate the many parallel programmes working on socio-economic recovery had lost major synergies. They note an absence of political will for long-term support for reintegration of ex-combatants. While poverty remained widespread with most ex-combatants and their dependents remaining dependent of food aid after the process, there was little evidence of the potential of a return to armed violence other than some skirmishing as late as 2010.

Nilsson notes that while Angola has gone on to be an economic star performer in Africa at a high level of GDP, there has been little drip-down of the economic benefits through, for instance, the investment of any oil revenues in socio-economic capital. Considering that 32% of budget in 2004 was on defense spending, the current context is perhaps one of a negative peace. The lessons that Nilsson draws from her review are that the unequal post-conflict power between the protagonists, UNITA and MPLA, led to a victor’s implementation and a deficient, inefficient and expensive DDR process. SSR was not genuinely pursued and little pressure was placed on the Government of Angola to ensure an effective reintegration process.

International engagement was at play in all aspects of the conflict, during and post-Cold War, and contributed to the post-conflict environment that accepted ‘good-enough’ solution with a degree of democracy. Post-Lusaka Accord in 2002, the international community bore little leverage on the government of Angola and was pushed aside. Nilsson suggests that the limited democratic reform occurring in Angola may lead to a re-emergence of violence.
3.5 DDR in Liberia

Observing the evolution of the disaster that was the launch of DDR in Liberia was like having the overview of a pre-planned train crash. While the dynamics of the war in Liberia were different to those in Sierra Leone, the unbridled ambitions of Charles Taylor were a common denominator. While more a tribal conflict than the social revolution as in Sierra Leone, Taylor had retained his dominance thanks to the wealth of the Sierra Leonean diamond fields. With the demise of the RUF, Taylor’s fortunes also were doomed. In opposing Taylor, particularly with LURD coming from the north, the hand of covert regional support and some superpower logistical engagement was visible. Taylor was overcome and after a sojourn in Nigeria is now, and for the foreseeable future, a guest of the ICC. Taylor’s removal opened the doors for a peace process in a scenario repeated in Port au Prince two years later when Aristide was controversially removed as President of Haiti.

With LURD bearing down on Monrovia, a peace accord between belligerents was negotiated and signed in August 2003, Security Council Resolution established the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and the deployment was initiated more slowly than anticipated. Early during this deployment of UNMIL, certain bilateral representatives placed exceptional pressure on the mission to collect weapons quickly and at all cost. It was clear to external DDR experts that disarmament was being viewed as a solution to the on-going violence in the absence of an adequately negotiated political solution. With no experienced DDR expert in the Mission, the top management of UNMIL under this bilateral pressure pushed to disarm groups in what amounted to a ‘cash buy-back program.’ UNMIL advertised a cash reward for hand-up of weapons and struck a minimum criterion for entry into the process of 150 rounds of ammunition. In early December 2003, the Mission launched the DDR process at Camp Scheffelin, a military camp about 60 kilometres from Monrovia. The operation planned to receive 1,200 participants. Over three days, 13,150 armed elements came forward, many clearly not belligerents, but meeting the generous criteria and claiming the immediate cash benefit ($150 up front and $150 more on commencement of the reintegration option) and subsequent entry into the process to avail of the reintegration package. The huge numbers were unmanageable with UN staff in the field under threat, and a very volatile few days ensued which included riots in Monrovia in which at least eight people were killed. An armed threat was directed at UN HQ Monrovia. In panic, it was agreed that all claimants meeting the minimum criteria would be paid half of the promised cash incentive.

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61 Much of this account of the early course of the DDR process in Liberia is drawn from the first-hand observations of the author. In light of its importance in highlighting some of the critical lessons learned that have impacted on the evolution of DDR guidance, much is drawn and adapted in some detail from Desmond Molloy, DDR, The Qualitative and Quantitative Dilemma, 2009, Op Cit
immediately, $75, and the balance later. As such cash was not readily available to UN HQ Monrovia, a
helicopter was dispatched to Freetown to borrow from UNAMSIL’s bank account. Over a very
dangerous few day, with UN staff continuously under threat of violence, the payments were made. The
cash benefits were even paid out to children, against the basic principles of DDR pertaining to children
(the Cape town Principles and later formalized as the Paris Accord). Over 8,600 of mixed quality,
some unserviceable weapons and over 2.7 million rounds of ammunition were collected. There are
tales of former faction leaders and acting ministers who had held significant stocks of weapons getting
relatively rich at this time through employing gangs of youth to come forward, on a commission basis,
with a weapon to this virtual ‘buy-back’ process.

Certainly, at the early stages of the process, the co-ordination between UNDP, the agency tasked with
delivering the reintegration packages, and the Mission, which had responsibility for the Disarmament
and Demobilization aspects of the process were, to say the least, poor. This did not improve with time
as the relationship between the UNDP DDR coordinator and the individual selected to lead UNMIL’s
DDR effort were openly hostile. The same can be said of the Mission’s initial relationship with the
specialist agencies and NGOs that were to provide specialist support to the demobilization phase;
camp management, catering, medical support, handling of children, etc. The initial co-ordinating
efforts by the Mission with these agencies were in fact, dictatorial. This attitude had a lasting adverse
impact.

The absence of an appropriate philosophical basis or an integrated vision of the DDR process with a
blind focus only on the immediate disarmament, the collection of weapons, led to available resources
being used to fund the virtual “buy-back” with little left for the reintegration. By the end of
disarmament in 2005, 102,200 eligible claimants had entered the process for 27,000 assorted weapons,
including over 3,100 or 63% of a shipment of high quality Serbian Zastava M70 AB2 assault rifles for
which import records exist and 6.15 million rounds of assorted ammunition.62 If the success of the
DDR process in Liberia were to be measured solely by the numbers of beneficiaries absorbed, as the
Special Representative of the Secretary General saw it, then UNMIL could claim success. However
other criteria are more telling. The low ratio of just better than 1 weapon for every 4 ‘ex combatants,’
(the Sierra Leone ratio was approximately 1:2) points to the inappropriateness of the entry criteria. It
is clear that the policy of accepting 150 rounds of ammunition as the entry criteria, without any
mechanism for confirmation of beneficiaries as genuine combatants, to a program with an initial cash

62 Eye witness in Liberia, Wolf-Christian Paes from International Peacekeeping, No 2 Summer 2005
pay-out of $300 in addition to subsequent inclusion in a reintegration option valued in the region of $1,000, was attractive and was well exploited by a very UN savvy people.

Some sources claim that up to 60% of the total caseload consists of people who were never affiliated with any fighting force, in what has been referred to as a ‘commercialization’ of the DDR process.\textsuperscript{63}

The regional market for ammunition was well stimulated and those in Sierra Leone were aware of the movement of ammunition out of Sierra Leone to Liberia to avail of the benefits of the DDR program in Liberia. It is clear that many of the heavy weapons used early in the conflict in Liberia, 120 mm mortars and field artillery pieces, had been transported into Guinea and to Cote d’Ivoire early in the intervention process, before the effective deployment of UNMIL Force and Military Observers to the remote and rebel held areas of Liberia. The misdirection of this DDR process in Liberia seems to originate with the traditional pitfall of attempting to develop a solution to a political and security problem using a disarmament mechanism. This is a critical and classical error in any volatile post-conflict scenario, driven by the illusion that the collection of weapons will resolve the security problem. DDR must be the result of political agreement and must follow the political and stabilization process. The absence of any accredited DDR expert in UNMIL from its inception is an extraordinary failing for an organization with the resources of the UN. During a visit to the DDR program in Liberia in November 2003, it had appeared to the author that the presence of a DDR expert was viewed as something of a threat to predetermined decisions, presumably under particular bilateral pressure.

The UN inter-agency integrated post-mortem held after the Camp Scheffelin debacle of December 2003, in its formal report confirmed many of the causes of the problem predominately as being due to external pressure and abysmal planning.\textsuperscript{64} The damage was done, criteria had been established and the following years of implementation comprised largely of damage limitation and knock-on impact. A spin-off benefit of the huge numbers of beneficiaries included in this DDR process, even if it ‘broke the bank’ and extended the period of the DDR process for years, in fact to 2009, is that in subsequent analysis, particularly that done by James Pugal, clear positive impact was identified from the provision of the reintegration support to a significant proportion of the population.\textsuperscript{65}

\textsuperscript{63} ibid.

\textsuperscript{64} The author was a member of the UN integrated DDR review team in Liberia in 2004

\textsuperscript{65} James Pugal replicated the methodology that Humphries and Weinstein had used in studying reintegration in Sierra Leone in Liberia (2005-2006) having adapted the operationalization of the variables. He found that Reintegration support had significant impact on contributing to the sustainable livelihoods of ex-combatants
3.6 DDR Stalemate in South Sudan, 2013

DDR in South Sudan/Sudan Phase 1 (2005-2012) was approached from the perspective of the classic type of DDR process implemented following cessation of violence in a major civil war, and post-referendum, interstate war. This may have been the initial mistake. However, despite a virtual cessation of hostilities there was little progress. The absence of elements of trust between belligerents and the birthing pangs of the newly established Republic of South Sudan have resulted, despite the necessary national implementation and oversight institutions being established, in DDR in South Sudan being all dressed up with nowhere to go. It has been constrained and delayed, largely impeded by the Sudanese and South Sudan continuing security dilemma, regional tensions and local conflict that contribute to an absence of political will both within Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) and Government of South Sudan (GoSS) to implement either SSR or the associated DDR.

With the focus on the forces of the SPLA, now the national army of South Sudan, both the GoSS and international donors considered DDR as a vital process to contribute to the stabilisation of the peace process and transition to development, to be implemented in the context of a comprehensive SSR process.

The current plan (Phase II DDR) targets the DDR of 150,000 SPLA combatants and police. This as an aspect of SSR; resizing and re-tasking in addressing the 4 “A”s in delivering an Adequate, Appropriate, Affordable and Accountable armed force. This DDR process is to be implemented as a joint exercise by GoSS and the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). It envisages to start in 2013 and to run for eight years with a budget of US$1.2 billion of which 64% is to be covered by GoSS.

Continuing constraints and security considerations, including the continuing skirmishing in the Sudan/South Sudan conflict and tribal uprisings, have resulted in continuous recruitment by SPLA, a negative environment for DDR. This is compounded by austerity that has resulted from the closure of the oil pipeline to port in Sudan as a result of a dispute between the governments, thus shutting off South Sudan’s major source of revenue.

66 Much on DDR in S. Sudan is drawn from Jairo Munive “DDR in South Sudan: Feasible under Current Conditions?” African Arguments, Royal African Society, 6 February 2013, africanarguments.org/2013/02/06/disarmament-demobilisation-and-reintegration-in-south-sudan-feasable-under-current-conditions (accessed March 18, 2013). Some is also drawn from discussions with DDR practitioners in S. Sudan and also from discussions with facilitators and observing presentations on the S.Sudan environment at the HPC Primary Peacebulider’s Course, Japan, January-March 2013.

67 Piedmont suggests that this approach was wrong. The mistake was in pressing the classic approach against this conflict; and approach that did not address a) a non-binding CPA; b) a referendum for 2 state solution; c) the resulting two stronger armies; d) the level of specific needs groups (SNG) and the need for strategic Interim Stabilisation Measures; e) the necessity for 4 separate DDR processes in both countries (Sudan and South Sudan); f) the complexity of DDR ongoing in PKOs and non-PKO missions in both countries; g) international conflict and civil conflict occurring simultaneously; 8) the additional complexity of SNGs also prominent in the SSR caseload. Drawn from Piedmont in comments relating to early draft of this dissertation, 5 May 2013.
Now in 2013, in the absence of political will, capacity or requisite resources, it is planned to launch a pilot phase targeting just 500 SPLA combatants, down from an initial target group of 4,500 combatants. In light of the inability to proceed with the main SSR/DDR, the downsizing SPLA by 150,000, the UN has been recommending refocusing initially on Special Needs Groups (SNGs) in 2013 -2014, while continuing to engage with GoSS in planning the broader SSR/DDR process. These recommendations appear based on the following factors:

- There are few resources (oil shutdown to April 2013) or evidence of political will to proceed with main SSR/DDR. Therefore it is unlikely to move in 2013.
- Interim DDR programmes are already focused on Special Needs Groups (SNGs); Aged, Disabled combatants; Women associated with Armed Forces (WAAF) and Children associated with Armed Forces (CAAF) so that national and UN capacities are already developed to address this reduced target.
- Focus on SNGs will allow for progress while emphasising a human security approach. There is an estimated caseload of 12,525 in SNGs in S. Sudan
- The SSR/DDR process (150,000) will remain nationally owned, a critical factor considering the absence of UN leverage in driving it.

As a DDR programme in stalemate (March 2013), lessons are being drawn from many dimensions of the attempted launch of DDR in Sudan in 2004, to the current efforts in both Sudan and South Sudan including in the areas of UN integrated programming, pre-deployment assessments, Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP), political analysis, national ownership, DDR timing and realistic targeting. It remains to be seen how the proposed DDR in South Sudan can proceed.

3.7 Other Critical Crosscutting issues from lessons learned in Classic DDR

3.7.1 DDR v Mechanisms of Transitional Justice

3.7.1.1 The ICC

Ideally, war crimes and crimes against humanity should be addressed by the state in which they were committed. However the legislative framework and legal system of a fragile post-conflict state is likely to have limited capacity, resources or the political will to address the war crimes or crimes against

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68 The section on the relationship between DDR and transitional/traditional justice is adapted from Molloy 2009
humanity that occurred in the context of international law during the war. In such a case, mechanisms of transitional justice, formal and informal, ICC, national or traditional, can provide a way forward to accountability, truth seeking and ultimately, to facilitate reconciliation. However, in this context there are considerable potential tensions and complementarities between DDR and Transitional Justice.\(^{69}\)

The reduction of capacity of former belligerents to intimidate society as a result of engagement in DDR can facilitate the implementation of mechanisms of transitional justice. However, belligerents may be discouraged in entering DDR if they are concerned that they may be answerable to transitional justice, and this can delay the cessation of violence. This is the case with Joseph Cony and the Lords Resistance Army (LRA) in Northern Uganda and Central Africa. Collaboration as regards timing between DDR practitioners and ICC prosecutors could offset such outcomes. Prosecutors perhaps do not see things quite this way.

As with Sierra Leone in 2001, it is often realized that aspects of developing a sustainable peace associated with DDR are dependent on the ascendancy of a mindset among the population that is ready to sacrifice a considerable amount of justice for peace. However, the line is usually drawn in ensuring that those most responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity do answer... and the ICC can offer an effective mechanism of transitional justice to address this.

DDR implementers are often concerned that the launch of mechanisms of transitional justice too early in the DDR process will drive critical leaders, those who can deliver their fighters to the program and also the greatest potential spoilers, underground. This gives rise to tension between the DDR implementers and the prosecutors in transitional justice, and reflects one of the dangers of the uncoordinated and poorly timed launch of mechanisms of transitional justice.

On the other hand, the ICC prosecutor’s office is often frustrated by the reticence of DDR programs, in their serious commitment to confidentiality, to make data-base on participants available to any third party, including to the ICC. Such data often lists details of service, unit, locations, armament and actions in which the participant was engaged, which might contribute to prosecution evidence.

Beyond these tensions,

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\(^{69}\) This matter is considered in some detail in Johanna Herman and Chandra Lekha Sriram, “DDR and Transitional Justice,” Paper prepared for Tromsø University / NUPI conference on DDR, August 2008
security as society realizes that the impunity associated with the state of conflict is ended.\textsuperscript{70}

3.7.1.2 TRCs and DDR

Together with mechanisms of transitional justice through the ICC, post-conflict countries often consider the mechanism of Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (TRC) following the South African model:

The unfortunate fact is that it seems that such a mechanism needs the imprimatur of giants such as Nelson Mandela or Bishop Desmond Tutu and a facilitating context before they can be effective. In reality, TRCs rarely reach the truth.\textsuperscript{71} However, in the case of Sierra Leone it seems that the TRC did contribute somewhat to inculcating the concept of reconciliation. The attempt at a TRC in Haiti (1995/1996) was less useful and eventually, in a cloud of marronage,\textsuperscript{72} fizzled out without significant publication… following considerable intimidation of some witnesses.\textsuperscript{73}

3.7.1.3 Informal Mechanisms of Transitional Justice

Traditional transitional justice mechanisms, rituals and ceremonies specific to location, community, clan or tribe, have been used effectively in facilitating an environment for reconciliation in the context of DDR; cleansing ceremonies, courts of community elders, etc. The most celebrated example of such a community based transitional justice mechanism used in the context of DDR is probably the Rwandan Cacaca grass-roots courts.\textsuperscript{74} However, it is noted that the effectiveness of these mechanisms was diminished by attempts to nationalize it and standardize its procedures by the Kagame government:\textsuperscript{75}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{70}Herman and Lekha Sriram, 2008, \textit{Op cit}
  \item \textsuperscript{71} This assertion, cited in Molloy 2009 that TRCs rarely reach the truth is is drawn from Tim Kelsall, Truth, Lies, Ritual: Preliminary Reflections on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Sierra Leone, Human Rights Quarterly 27 (2005) pp. 361-391, John Hopkins University
  \item \textsuperscript{72} Marronage – (Haiti) Confusion may well be a mystery carefully nurtured in the traditional smoke and mirrors of Haitian life and culture that communicates through the ubiquitous Créole (Less than 20% of the Haitian population speaks French while the remainder speaks a French based Créole.) language speaking in proverbs and riddles, devised over centuries to confuse the “Blanc”. This language is accompanied by the almost impenetrable fog and confoundation of that particular Haitian phenomenon, seen as a fundamental cultural trait of Haitian life, “La Marronnage”, where even the clearest statement or action may or may not mean the opposite. La Marronnage – “(…) c’est la défection. Comme fil conducteur (qui) nous permet de mieux saisir les contre valeurs de cette contre-économie, de cette contre-culture, de cette contre-société. (…) Cette culture riposte (est) une réaction collective et structure de fruite. (…) La fruite suppose la dissimulation, dispersion et clandestinité (…)”, Barthélemy G., Créole et Bossale, Conflit en Haïti. IBIS rouge 2000.
  \item \textsuperscript{73} Molloy 2009, \textit{Op cit}
  \item \textsuperscript{74} Cacaca Courts, traditional community courts with local variations in procedure and authority depending on region of Rwanda were developed into an homogenized institutionalized structure of elected members by the government of Paul Kagame. This move largely dissipated the local legitimacy and community/customary nature by formalizing the practice.
  \item \textsuperscript{75} Herman and Lekha Sriram, \textit{Op cit}
\end{itemize}
A cautionary note to practitioners concerns emerging anecdotal evidence that in certain ‘cleansing ceremonies’ associated with the powerful secret community societies of Sierra Leone, the Poro and the Bundu, cases where it is alleged that reintegrating child soldiers were in fact drowned in water based cleansing ceremonies and female reintegrates subject to FGM.\textsuperscript{76}

It is critical to consider the effectiveness of such informal mechanisms of transitional justice and the preservation of their credibility and impact locally in the context of DNH awareness.

3.7.2 Communications Strategies in DDR

The dissemination of accurate and targeted messages and the management of expectations, perceptions and attitudes in all sectors of society is a critical and usually neglected aspect of contributing to positive outcomes in DDR. Even in a meticulously planned DDR programme that has pre-empted the critical needs and sensitivities of the ex-combatants, the community and the peacebuilding process can be subject to poor dissemination and misinformation, willful and accidental. This can create the prevalence of a negative narrative that undermines the potential of the programme by deterring support by bilateral actors, donors, government collaborating actors and parallel programmes, and ultimately undermine the programme in public opinion. It further discourages participation by belligerents that can contribute to volatility in the security environment. This must be addressed by the development of an adequately funded integrated and professionally designed communication strategy, with inputs of all relevant stakeholders in DDR, sending agreed messages on appropriate media to target audiences, in addressing the specific (and unique) context of the DDR programme. The funding, professional capacities and energy required to ensure the coherence, efficiency, effectiveness, appropriate integration and political sensitivity of such a communications strategy are frequently underestimated, leading to undermining of the potential of the DDR programme. Underperformance in the area of communications due to poor planning and under-resourcing is a lesson learned and relearned in the evaluation of multiple recent DDR programmes. The communications strategy of a DDR programme must be prioritised in the planning stages as it is one critical element in the management of perceptions and attitudes. The impact of frequent shortfalls in the planning and resourcing of integrated communications strategies are lately receiving attention in the evolution of the theory.

\textsuperscript{76}Molloy 2009, Op cit
3.8 Chapter III Review

In considering the influence of ‘classic’ cases of DDR on the evolution of the theory, the case of DDR in Sierra Leone is reviewed in some detail drawing on the author’s phenomenological experience and critically reviewing relevant literature. It considers, from the practitioner’s perspective, the effectiveness of the tested solutions to the many challenges experienced; the integrated relationships between UN agencies, the synergy of collaborative programmes and the beginnings of the development of standard guidelines for DDR within the UN system, the IDDRS. In reviewing the most complex DDR process yet attempted, the WB led multi-country MDRP in the Great Lakes region of Africa, Chapter III draws on in-programme and independent assessments that in the follow-on programme, TDRP, sees theory evolving towards a commitment to nationally owned and case specific community-based implementation of DDR. The challenges of nationally owned DDR in an environment of total military victory of one side are reviewed in the case of Angola. Liberia offers an overview, again from the author’s perspective, of the dangers of DDR driven by third party interests where the host government has little leverage. In current day South Sudan we see the challenges of attempting to implement DDR in an environment of limited international community leverage where intra-state violence remains rampant and where inter-state conflict may reemerge. The complementarities and tensions between DDR and mechanisms of transitional justice are reviewed together with an assertion of the vital role of an integrated communications strategy in DDR. The scene is set for a consideration in Chapter IV of the attempts at operationalizing community-based approaches to DDR, in line with evolving theory.
Chapter IV

The Operationalization of Community Security Approach to DDR

Here, again from the author’s phenomenological perspective, Chapter IV reviews the major challenges in attempting initially to implement a DDR programme along ‘classic’ lines in an inappropriate environment in Haiti in 2004/05. This was followed by the development in 2006 of a purpose designed community-based, bottom-up community violence reduction (CVR) programme, based on addressing the concept of community security. Despite its failure in Haiti, the concept, in following the ‘second-generation’ trend in DDR, with lessons learned, is being replicated and adapted with apparent better outcomes in complex conflict and post-conflict environments such as Somalia and Cote d’Ivoire. Practice, now responding to evolving theory, is reflecting an increasing emphasis on community-based approaches to DDR, linked closely to the potential increasing role of NGOs/CBOs, together with necessity for ethnographic considerations in offering locally conflict-sensitive approaches to DDR.

4.1 The Practitioner’s Perspective of DDR in Haiti, 2004 - 2009

Consideration of the UN mission in Haiti from 2004 and ongoing, the UN Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), will throw-up some perplexing and intriguing questions that would take a focused thesis to answer. What is the UN doing there? Why did it launch a DDR process in 2004? What has or is it achieving through its current presence in Haiti? Here, we will attempt to review the course of the related DDR/CVR programme in its specific context considering its impact on the evolving theory of DDR. Piedmont suggests that a key differential reflected here in this DDR process can be that following the initial misidentification of the environment as a ‘classic’ DDR model, practitioners demonstrated flexibility and ingenuity in turning, and bringing the establishment (Mission Management, UNSC, Lead Countries and GoH) towards an innovative approach to CVR.

In early 2004, the US took a clear lead in removing its protagonist and that of its facilitated elite in Haiti, Jean Bertrand Aristide, a liberation theologian priest, lately portrayed in the US media as a political despot. This intervention was initially covert, with the empowerment, allegedly through the

77 This section on DDR and CVR in Haiti includes the extraction and adaptation of relevant material drawn for the published and unpublished works, contemporaneous notes by the author including Molloy 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010 including the author’s post-earthquake ‘Wordpress’ blog of 2010. The author was Chief of the Integrated DDR Section, MINUSTAH from 2004-2007 and subsequently returned to Haiti for short stays in various capacities to 2010.

78 Dean Piedmonts comments on an early draft of this dissertation, 5 May 2013
support of the International Republican Institute and US Marine training, of a small team led by notorious thug and instrument of the bourgeoisies, Guy Philippe, which resulted in the expulsion of the elected President of Haiti, Aristide. In March 2004, within weeks of Aristide’s exit, a multinational intervention force (MIF) led by US, France and the Canadians entered Haiti, legitimised by Security Council Resolution 1529. Pushing constitutional capacity to the limit, a motley crew of expatriate and bourgeois Haitians vehemently opposed to Aristide and his popular movement Lavalas, (the flood), were drawn together to form the Transitional Government of Haiti. This transitional government was tasked with achieving the stabilization of the country and the preparation for democratic elections. The international community mobilized donor countries to form the Interim Collaborative Framework (ICF) that in June 2004 pledged over $1.3 billion to the reconstruction and democratisation of Haiti.

Also in June, UN Security Council Resolution 1542 established the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) to replace the MIF. This stabilisation mission, a new genre of PKO, was to comprise of over 7,500 troops, 1,500 policemen and 1,000 civilian substantive and support staff. In addition to the stabilization of the country and support to the transitional government in delivering the elections, the mandate of the Mission included, drawing from a deeply flawed pre-mission assessment, the implementation of a comprehensive DDR of all illegally armed groups including support for the women and children associated with the armed gangs. This process of DDR was to be done in close collaboration with the National Police of Haiti.

The basic prerequisites for DDR as outlined in accepted lessons learned, particularly from experience in West Africa; a post-conflict environment marked by a CPA between identifiable organised fighting groups, political capacity and will, a voluntary disarmament, did not exist. The Haitian environment could not be classed as “post-conflict” as the current intervention was not to address the culmination of a civil war but rather a period of national anarchy involving multiple political and criminal actors. The transitional government was clearly biased and contributed to the polarization of the political environment rather than developing any move towards national unity. The National Police of Haiti, who were to be supported in delivering DDR, have been, to a significant extent, a criminal armed group contributing to the problem and not to the solution. The Haitian judicial and penal systems were also in total disarray, reducing the odds of establishing legitimate rule of law.

DDR Section MINUSTAH was established in late 2004 as a pilot of integrated implementation, following the recommendations of the Brahimi Report 2000, combining members of the PKO and UNDP, to derive synergies through their combined institutional strengths in delivering DDR. The only
significant relevant baseline data on the security environment was Rob Muggah’s 2004 study on the structure, armament, motivations and prevalence of armed gangs in Haiti completed concurrent with the establishment of the DDR section. This offered a starting point and laid the base for the development of some level of appropriate response to the problems.

The pre-deployment assessment, in line with the common wisdom of the international community and to the amusement of many of the Haitian bourgeoisie, identified the greatest threat to State security and the delivery of elections as the rearmed groups of former military (Force Armes de Haiti, FAdH). They had occupied government buildings, mainly police stations, having expelled the police, in various towns in the country. In early 2005, with assistance of the Small Arms Survey study it was estimated that there were between 1,500 and 2,000 engaged in this rearmament. They were more seeking recompense and possible reinstatement for the indignity of their unceremonious disbandment, rather than any other political ambitions.

Through October 2004 to January 2005, the Section, working with the Ad Hoc Committee for DDR made of transitional government representatives, struggled to devise a coherent and appropriate strategy to address the unique and complex environment of violence in Haiti. On 11 May, the transitional government, MINUSTAH, UN Development Program and the President of the newly established National Commission for Disarmament signed the program document that had been developed in consultation to establish the National Program for DDR for Haiti. This signing created a financial mechanism to be operated under a Direct Execution Modality by UN Development Program that would channel voluntary contributions from donors to the DDR program. As we moved into 2005 it became clear that a multi-dimensional and innovative approach to DDR and violence reduction was necessary for Haiti. Despite continued encouragement from the DDR Unit in New York, the integrated DDR section was not sure to what extent it had the support of the executive of DPKO as it bobbed and weaved in trying to find a coherent way forward. This came to a head in summer of 2005 during a visit of Jean Marie Guéhenno, the Assistant Secretary General for DPKO. In his substantive presentation to Mr Guéhenno, the Assistant Secretary General for DPKO. In his substantive presentation to Mr Guéhenno, Chief DDR, overcome by a wave of exhaustion and frustration, blurted out the obvious and heretofore unspoken truth that nobody was going to do DDR in Haiti! In

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80 Detail of this environment from the practitioner’s perspective in Molloy 2009
81 ‘Direct Execution Modality (DEX)’ is a UNDP financial mechanism that permits the Resident Representative of UNDP to have disbursement authority, within certain parameters, of centrally allocated or donor funds, as opposed to the funds being controlled by host government... ‘National Execution (NEX)’. DEX is an exceptional financial mechanism used where the host government may not have the capacity to manage such funds.
subsequent reconsideration, a new approach was coined, Community Violence Reduction (CVR), supported by DPKO and reflected in subsequent Security Council Resolutions 1702 and 1743.

By mid-2005, it became clear that there was no quick-fix for tackling the disarmament of groups in Haiti. A consensus was therefore developed between the main actors for the need to revise the approach in which the focus would shift from a conventional logistical disarmament to addressing armed violence in all its aspects.\(^\text{82}\)

While it was now understood that the re-emergence of FAdH was something of a paper tiger devised by some of the clearly identifiable lead bourgeoisie to assist in re-establishing their primary coercive institution, armed youth in criminal gangs were recognized as a significant threat to the security of the community.\(^\text{83}\) As in other conflicts around the world, young men especially are widely available, pliable and cheap to recruit in order to undertake criminal activity or politically coercion.

The plight of children (in the context of the Cape Town Principles/Paris Agreement) and women associated with the armed gangs was a preoccupation of the UN family.\(^\text{84}\) The Integrated DDR Section initiated an expert assessment to identify the impact of violence on women, their role in armed groups and, to recommend appropriate interventions in the context of the DDR program. Canadian anthropologist and lawyer, Wisa Loutis implemented this study.\(^\text{85}\)

It had become clear by mid-2005 that those lessons learned in traditional DDR programs around the world for the previous fifteen years, particularly those prerequisites, held true! ‘DDR must follow the political process; it cannot lead. Political will is critical for disarmament. National ownership of the process is necessary. Political space and basic security are necessary. Credible deterrent is necessary. DDR is often an aspect of Security System Reform and reinstitution of rule of law’. None of the prerequisites emerged and we had to redesign our approach. Building on the emerging concept that DDR is about putting weapons beyond use in the context of improving Community Security, from mid-2005 to mid-2006 the programme developed its strategy while piloting DDR with several gangs in Port au Prince and individuals throughout the country. In the absence of national buy-in to DDR, the efforts bore limited results. Participants’ security could not be guaranteed and several were killed as a

\(^{82}\)Molloy 2009, *Op cit.*

\(^{83}\) It is interesting to note how Security Council intervention was now addressing Community Security in Haiti rather than any significant threat to international security... usually a critical criteria for UN SC intervention.

\(^{84}\)UNICEF 1999. Commonly called “the Cape town Principles”, this is the report of the 1997 working group with the NGO working group on the Convention on the Rights of the Child. Later adapted as the Paris Accord.

\(^{85}\)Wisa Loutis, *Evaluation de la situation des femmes dans le cadre de la violence armée en Haïti*. The entire report is available at www.unddr.org
result of their efforts to leave the gangs. In the context of government negotiations with gang leaders in September to December 2006, 108 gang members from Cité Soleil were processed through the DDR program. Of these, by mid 2007, 12 were confirmed to be dead and 15 more presumed dead as a result of inter-gang warfare and UN robust operations.

The DDR staffs in Haiti drew on lessons learned from other community security programmes around the world such as initiatives undertaken by NGO and from partner in the DDR process, Viva Rio, experienced in working in the violent favelas of Rio de Janeiro. They also drew from UNDP programs in Somalia and in Sierra Leone with the Arms for Development (AFD) and small arms control (SAC) projects. The result was an enhanced strategy that combined the impact of conventional DDR executed by the UN Mission with community disarmament and longer-term small arms control measures driven by UNDP. The UN in partnership with the Haitian government emphasized the need for a program that ensured that both grass-roots communities and government institutions play an active role. The program therefore adapted to its environment a multi-faceted approach for the reduction of armed violence in Haiti through a strategy articulated in 5 complementary axes of intervention:

i. Negotiation, disarmament and reintegration of armed groups,

ii. Prevention of recruitment, disarmament and the reintegration of armed youth and those youth associated with armed groups,

iii. Reintegration of women associated with armed groups and reinforcement of their role as vectors of peace,

iv. Reinforcement of the legislative and political framework to control the proliferation of small arms,

v. Community disarmament and conflict prevention.

The programme was designed in consultation with the Transitional Government. Its objectives were to address concerns focused on the reduction and prevention of gang violence in the absence of the state by empowering the community to address their fears, encouraged by the attraction of a good portion of community women and the youth that formed the recruitment base for the gangs. Local representative committees were to be formed (Community Committees for Violence Prevention and Development) in the most volatile quarters of Port au Prince, provided with an operating base and facilitated in identifying and addressing their vital needs through micro-infrastructural and social service projects, local confidence building measures, micro-entrepreneurial activities and local information, social and cultural peacebuilding activities. Concurrently the state was to develop the appropriate institutional and legal framework supporting the return of the state and the rule of law to the community; local
government, police and small arms legislation. This would discourage gang activities while an opening would be created to attract gang members into a DDR process being implemented by the NCDDR with the support of the MINUSTAH DDR team that would offer possibilities for alternative sustainable livelihoods.

Figure 1. The Community Violence Reduction Programme (CVR), Haiti
After the Presidential elections on 7th February 2006, Haiti’s president elect, René Préval indicated that he intended to create the political space for increased national political reconciliation, including the implementation of a targeted disarmament of illegally armed groups and the reduction of violence in Haiti. Whilst levels of violent crime reduced immediately after the election, it was clear that armed

86 Figure 1. The programme was designed by Daniel Ladouceur, Deputy Integrated DDR Section, UNDP/MINUSTAH. Graphic also designed by Ladouceur and created by Jonie Bioco, IT, Finance, Logistics Technical Support Officer, Integrated DDR Section. Figure 1 was also included in Molloy 2009
gangs had taken a “wait and see” approach. After one hundred days of the Préval government, the gang leaders demonstrated their chagrin at the failure to offer them significant material incentives and staged some audacious mass kidnapping and other criminal attacks in Port au Prince. Préval responded by announcing on radio in early August that gang members should join the DDR process or the state would kill them. He then sent for the UN DDR team and asked what is DDR?

The plan was presented to the Préval government in August 2006, including a newly appointed NCDDR, as a fully prepared concept. As was belatedly to become evident, having been devised during the transitional government, it was inadequately consulted with the new institutions. The very influential president of the NCDDR, Alix Fils-Amie, gradually came to see the strengthening of community capacity as undermining the institutions of the state, particularly the grossly under-resourced local government and social services sector, much as had been Aristide’s strategy in building his personal support through gang mobilisation in base communities. This, amongst a wide array of other constraints, greatly undermined the capacity of the DDR Section to implement the programme. However, the concept offered a new way to do DDR and represented a significant evolution of the theory that, with consideration of the appropriate conflict sensitivities, has been adapted for implementation in several more recent DDR scenarios.

Clearly, as part of the stabilization and recovery jigsaw, in addition to institutional Security System Reform; the police, judiciary and prison service, it is critical that violence reduction in Haiti is addressed from a community-based perspective. The dynamics of violence and gang activity in each quarter, each department, is different and no cookie-cutter approach will work across the communities of Haiti. Capacity must be established in each community together with the strengthening of local government capacity to support local solutions through the mobilization of community based initiatives supported by a strengthened rule of law; a top-down/bottom-up approach.

For the State to reclaim the volatile zones, it needs the support of the communities. The support and recruitment base for the armed gangs must be gradually strangled by providing alternate and constructive engagement and role models to the community. Impunity must perish and credible deterrent against criminal activities, particularly armed violence, established. The strategy as developed by the Integrated DDR Section based on academic research, implementation experience, piloting and broad consultation acknowledged this necessity and laid out a road map for implementation. The environment remained dynamic and the variables many, right to the devastating earthquake of January 2010 that certainly changed priorities and forced a step backwards in addressing
armed crime. In such an initiative, a very pragmatic and flexible approach to implementation is vital. Implementers and facilitators must weave their way through the dynamic environment in light of the variables. Imagination and pragmatism!

In this context, it is impossible to lay down a specific operational plan that can be implemented in a traditional way on a given timeframe. Who has ever achieved sustainable results in Haiti with a traditional approach? Continuous adaptation to the reality is critical.

While the election of President René Préval succeeded in bringing a popular government by mid-2006, optimism was not to bear fruit in an environment of continuing criminal chaos, La Marronnage, continuing corrupt judiciary, and the protection of the exclusive interests of the elite. Naïvely, and with notable exceptions within the programme senior staff of the Integrated DDR Section, lacking a clear grasp on the revolving history of Haiti, and the basic elements of the continuing aspirations of the elite, the bourgeoisies in their subjugation and exploitation of the marginalized masses of Haitians, MINUSTAH failed to realize that for those holding power and wealth, nothing has changed. The very tools that the UN espouse, the very language they use; conscientization, grassroots facilitation, community based organizations, community empowerment, are anathema, a threat to their ascendency and their death-grip on the resources of Haiti.

Maybe they are not wrong! A Haitian nation conscientized as to the instruments of their suppression, their unending poverty, would be a raging machine ripe for social revolution. If history can tell us anything, it will be bloody! The terror of the teachings and the praxis of neighboring Cuba, directed by the charisma of Fidel Castro and the eulogized Ernesto Che Guevara are probably not far from the minds of the MRE (morally reprehensible elite) and their eternal ally and end-user beneficiary, the USA. Perhaps another social revolution is the only hope for the people of Haiti.

4.2 Community Violence Reduction

Globally, the move to Community Violence Reduction (CVR) represents a shift in the paradigm of DDR as an instrument to address a conventional post-conflict environment to one addressing the scourge of armed violence in an environment of ongoing guerrilla or criminal chaos in a close to failed state. This is not something that has been tested before. It also reflects a paradigm shift within the security environment from a focus on ‘formal security’ at a national level to greater consideration of

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87 La Marronnage, originally referring to the escaped slaves hiding out in the hills, has come to represent a particularly Haitian characteristic of obscure and ambiguous narrative with which the Haitian takes pride in confusing the foreigner. See Footnote 72
88 This supportive attitude towards the notorious Haitian elite and the USA’s historical exploitation of Haiti’s poor as cheap labour reflects the broad thesis of Paul Farmer’s, Uses of Haiti, Monroe, Maine, Common Courage Press, 1994, 2003 and 2005
the impact of Rule of Law and security at a local level.\(^{89}\) There are areas of relativity with the gang violence in Rio de Janeiro, Los Angeles, Paris, London etc., but the experience in Haiti approached from the perspective of DDR is unique and is reflected somewhat in the evolution of Second Generation DDR and the CVR approach. Let us review elements of CVR beyond its inception in Haiti and how it is being applied in equally challenging environments.

4.2.1 CVR in Somalia 2008 -

UNDP Somalia, pre-2008 had attempted various types of small arms interventions, violence reduction and support for reduction of armed forces (SSR) in one or other of the three entities of that dysfunctional state; Somaliland, Puntland or South Central Somalia. Following an evaluation, appropriate conflict analysis and recommendations by the author in 2008 drawing directly on the experience in Haiti, UNDP shifted from support to de facto governments in removing surplus fighters from their militias, really an SSR function, to a community approach to creating a normative system by ‘placing weapons beyond use’ through contributing to the strengthening of Community Security/CVR as an aspect of its support to Rule of law and Governance programmes in Somalia. Daniel Ladouceur who had designed the CVR approach in Haiti developed and managed the resulting programme. In the most difficult areas of South Central Somalia, particularly in Mogadishu in the post-Islamic Courts era after 2009 when the more radical Al Shabab took control of large areas of the entity, the Community Security Approach required a carefully considered and very discreet “Do No Harm” (DNH) implementation. Building on the experience of such “grass-roots” initiatives and efforts to entice youth from piracy by NGOs like Norwegian Church Aid’s “Alternative Livelihoods to Piracy” (ALP) Project,\(^{90}\) this assisted established local NGOs and CBOs to develop and implement their own community social and economic projects. The approach mobilizes local influential opinion and religious leaders, involving very ‘light-foot’ or even invisible (and reducing) support of external actors. It is designed to encourage a deradicalisation of youth, the primary recruitment base for the Al Shabib movement, through community, family and peer pressure and to contribute to a reduction of violence in the community.\(^{91}\) This facilitated local solutions to local problems is offering locally led, therefore culturally and religiously sensitive, approaches to violence reduction.

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\(^{89}\) Piedmont in comments on an early draft of this dissertation, 5 May 2013


\(^{91}\) UNDP, UNICEF and ILO, “Community Security through engaging with Youth at Risk, A partnership between UNDP, UNICEF and ILO.” UNDP Somalia, December 2010
4.2.2 CVR in Cote d’Ivoire, 2013

DDR in Cote d’Ivoire (Cd’I) has been waiting in the wings as conflict continued since 2004. Now in an unstable post-conflict stabilising environment despite continuing skirmishes, organisations like IOM and UNOPS are preparing in 2013 to implement CVR programmes to support the Government of Cote d’Ivoire in further stabilising the peace and security through the reduction of community violence, particularly in the west of the country.² Having identified that the overarching reasons for the upsurge in community conflict is a knock-on impact of destruction by the war of community social cohesion, the lack of job opportunities for the youth and the absence of rule of law particular in the rural areas, they are adapting the Haitian CVR methodology in developing local committees to identify the problems in the community and to articulate the solutions. The committees will consider the following elements: identifying the zones of tension; strengthening the community for a community based approach; strengthening the capacities of local authorities; creating space for dialogue and implementing reconciliation ceremonies; legal assistance in addressing the fundamental causes of conflict; rehabilitation of critical community infrastructure in providing basic social services and creating employment opportunities for youth. It is intended to commence operations in specific communities with the capacity for local ownership and the best chance of success and to spread the programme naturally in a snowball effect. The evolution of CVR theory in applying DNH methodologies will continue to be stimulated by the new lessons learned.

4.3 Where is Community Security in DDR?

In connecting community security and state DDR, community security can be seen as the desirable end-state and the objective of DDR. However, from a state perspective, state security has priority. From a process perspective, community security can also be a characteristic of DDR. This requires serious engagement of community in all aspects of programming. In practice community participation and empowerment tends to present a level of complexity that is honored in form over substance. Further, DDR can be connected to community security initiatives, requiring DDR programme to be open to community involvement. DDR could be connected to community-based DDR initiatives.

² Information on the plans for CVR in Cote d’Ivoire is drawn from the work of Florian Morier with various agencies in Abidjan, including in the Integrated DDR Section of the UN Mission in Cd’I, ONUCI and as a private consultant; particularly from “Reduction de la Violence Communautaire Dans L’Ouest De La Cote d’Ivoire,” IOM, 2013
Otherwise, community security could be seen as a precondition for DDR, encouraging participation of ex-combatants through a process of community peer-pressure, facilitation and enticement.93

A clear direction of the evolution of DDR theory in the past ten years has been in the emphasis on increasing the bottom-up impact of reintegrating ex-combatants through a community based approach, specifically in consideration of community security. While drawing from the lessons of practice including phenomenological experience, one significant scholarly attempt to consolidate ideas on the community security approach to DDR was published by Peace, Security and Development (PDS) Network in 2009.94

By 2009 the concept of Community Security, though qualitatively valued by practitioners as an approach that will complement, synergize or even substitute top-down initiatives in DDR, is poorly defined within either practice or scholarship. This effort by the Working Group on Community Security and Community-based DDR considers the current state of community security as regards DDR policy and programmes and recommends context specific approaches for community-based DDR that will enhance human security and reduce the proliferation of illicit small arms. It highlights the ambiguity of the definitions of community security as representing both an ‘end-state’ in which communities feel secure, and a ‘process’ in which they contribute to creating that condition. The operative consideration is that achieving the condition is a participative process within the communities’ them-selves having identified and mobilised in delivering the elements that create it, with or without external assistance.

Community-based DDR can create the link between community security and DDR; the community-based label claiming to announce that the project is to have impact on the community. In the context of this report, community-based implies that the project is targeting both the ex-combatants and the broader “war-affected communities and that actively and truly involve these communities in the process of assessment, design and implementation.” The spectrum of community-based projects can include those conceived and implemented exclusively by the community to those implemented on-behalf of the community by donors, international organisations and governments.

Inherent weaknesses in state implemented and driven DDR programmes include the tendency to be isolated from the wider post-conflict recovery process, SSR and peacebuilding process; to miss a sense


94 *Ibid*
of real national ownership beyond specific government departments, into local government and the community. Further, the needs of the most vulnerable groups, child-soldiers, handicapped and females associated with fighting groups... tend to be neglected. In the euphoria of the immediate cessation of violence, the reintegration of ex-combatants that will prove to be the most complex, expensive and time-consuming phase, receives inadequate attention. The neglect of community security is a major contributor to these weaknesses. This neglect is due to the imperative urgency to stabilize the cessation of violence requiring a focus on the parties to the peace agreement and the immediate needs of ex-combatants themselves.

The concept of human security that, beyond state security, is people-centered and considers security through peoples’ empowerment (people’s agency) and development, provides the basis for linking community security with DDR. While DDR policy is moving towards attention to human security, in practice it is difficult to implement due to context, actor priorities, security, time and funding considerations.

In practice DDR and community security have rarely been linked, an omission that must change if the potential synergies are to be derived. The limited cooperation amongst DDR actors, state (government and donors) and local (NGO, CBO, local government and private sector) diminishes the potential positive impact of local engagement. Innovative and flexible models of collaboration and coordination must be devised to address and capitalise on specific contexts. Donors that play a significant role in the implementation of DDR programmes are admonished by Williams et al to overcome bureaucratic, cultural, administrative and interest-based difficulties to consider the value of developing collaborative and specific policies to encourage community security approaches to the delivery of DDR. The bottom line is the critical need for more community based, community security focused and fully participative implementation to develop the synergy of bottom-up support for DDR.

4.4 NGO perspective on DDR

Bart Klem and Pyt Douma’s *The Struggle After Combat* for the Dutch NGO Cordaid comprises three case studies of DDR, Afghanistan, Sierra Leone and DRC, with a synthesis study focusing on an angle rarely considered in scholarship, the role of NGOs.95 The case studies offer good historical background and review the outcomes of the DDR programmes drawing from interviews with NGO and beneficiary

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actors. The synthesis study considers DDR processes more broadly and how NGOs (national and international) have or can engage.

It considers the institutional contribution to the development of the theory of DDR reflected in a range of documents including OECD/DAC guidance on DDR 1997 in addition to its handbook on SSR (OECD/DAC 2007); DPKO guidelines on DDR 1999; various Secretary General Reports on DDR and the Brahimi Report 2000; GTZ et al handbook on DDR 2001; the Swedish Initiative on DDR report (SIDDR 2006); the NGO driven Cape Town Principles 1997 and through collaboration with the UN, the Paris Principles 2007 on children associated with armed groups and Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women Associated with armed groups.

It is noteworthy that a range of criticism of IDDRS is highlighted (Faltas 2004, Schramek 2003 and Pouligny 2004) including amongst other faults, the promotion of a centralised approach with cantonment sites, absence of sensitivity to failed states and lacking flexibility to local diversities. The comment that “in some ways, this criticism seems premature,” considering that IDDRS was published in December 2006, is an understatement.  

It does consider the difficulty in defining ‘success’ in DDR as such measure is dependent on perspective, and there are many. Three main perspectives are usefully considered. i) Spoiler contingency, a security/military perspective that focuses on dealing directly with ex-combatants. ii) A transitional perspective focuses on socio-economic reintegration contributing to broader and longer-term development issues. iii) A transformational perspective sees DDR as taking a long-term approach in “tackling the route causes of a conflict...” often social, political and economic exclusion... addressing human security and justice. Irrespective of perspective, the measurement of success or failure in DDR is difficult as every DDR programme has elements of both, a perspective also considered by Isezaki and Shibuya later in the this dissertation.

In considering issues and controversies, the study draws on the foundations of the early scholars (Kingma and Seyers 2005, Colletta et al 2006, Berdal 2006) noting particularly the inter-dependency between the political, security and socio-economic spheres and the success of DDR. A admonishment offered is that “caution must be exercised not to use interpretations and approaches inspired by western discourse.” This is a topical issue in considering heightened sensitivities concerning regional,

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96 Ibid, p 9
97 Ibid, p 10
98 Ibid, p 13
religious and cultural values in global interventions with regional institutions (AU, ASEAN, Arab
League, OAS, etc.) gaining capacity and responding to the threats of “globalisation.”

The synthesis study defines civil society and the NGO’s place in it, as:

> a multiform entity of human relations, comprising formal and informal institutions, organisations, networks, groupings and individual actors at all levels of society that aim to protect or extend their interests, ideologies and identities...situated between the state, the market and the family... NGOs... are a [...] subsection of civil society.\(^99\)

Caution is advised against exercising an “overly western conception of civil society based on egalitarian and liberal state models” as are prevalent in Western society. Civil society may be co-opted by political interests to address foreign expectations, or on the other hand, aspects of violent struggle might genuinely be representative of civil society interests. This is a gray area that requires extreme conflict sensitivity. NGOs are categorized as “brokers, interlocutors and capacity builders; international service providers; national service providers; CBOs and advocacy and watchdog organisations.” Some NGOs have a composite cross-section of these functions.

The section “NGOs in Development: Pressure from Above and Below” (pp18-20) is rich in relevance to the direction of this dissertation. Into the nineties, not everyone continued to view the activities of NGOs as “intrinsically good acts of altruism.” Scholars began to portray them as “part of the polity... patrimonial politics and... economic systems,” and thus as “part of the problem as well as the solution...” with “practice driven by relations, organisational dynamics and cultural factors...” and “policies merely used as a legitimizing discourse (Mosse 2004).”\(^100\) The role of INGOs in particular, are contested from both above and below. Below complains about the frequent exclusion of recipient communities and constituencies in participation in the planning and implementation of INGO programmes with associated “insensitivity to local realities... limited downward accountability... and sustainability... rapidly revolving staff... elitism and wasting money on staff salaries and expensive four-wheel drive cars.” Donor governments and host governments heap on pressure from above. Host governments are frequently concerned about infringements of their sovereignty and increasing foreign NGO interference while donor governments are calling for greater “efficiency, effectiveness, policy relevance and sustainability.” Particularly in emergency relief and post-conflict environments, NGOs are seen to have become “in effect, contractors for hire,” often in competition with the private sector.

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\(^{99}\) Ibid, p 17

\(^{100}\) Ibid, p 18
Duffield 2001, amongst others, notes that some large INGOs are seen to have become “no more than foreign policy instruments of Western states, or neo-imperial tools for fighting the ‘war on terror,’ and installing Western-style governments in poor countries.” Such a perspective is much contested particularly by some practitioners from the INGO sector citing how attempts to maintain professional autonomy have led to increasing tensions between INGOs and state.\textsuperscript{101}

In reviewing the evolution of NGO engagement in violent conflict and security environments, “no-war-no-peace contexts,” the study notes how activities have moved beyond purely humanitarian interventions to include reconstruction, rehabilitation and peacebuilding:

... contemporary conflicts are typically multi-dimensional crises that require development, political and military interventions, donor governments have propagated integration or 3D approach (defence, development and diplomacy). Similarly, military doctrine has come to place major emphasis on civil-military cooperation, political affairs, reconstruction efforts and the importance of teaming up with NGOs, donor agencies, local civil society and government actors.\textsuperscript{102}

Many of these issues apply also to DDR; development, political and military, as an aspect of war-to-peace transition. “Even programmes that did not fulfill their objectives (mainly in DRC and DIAG) had major political, military and economic ramifications.”\textsuperscript{103}

\section*{4.5 DDR’s Ethnographic Turn...}

As the focus of the early DDR programmes on security and conversion aspects of post-conflict stabilisation evolved to a broader focus on peacebuilding, socio-economic and political capacity-building and stabilisation, the realisation of the context specificity of post-conflict environments and the impact of socio-cultural aspects of that environment also evolved. The concept of Human Security arising in the mid-nineties pointed to people-centered considerations, leading to a new focus on the concept of community. The complexity and potential impact of external agency intervention in the community, particularly a community manifesting elements of the kind of considerable conflict that attracts intervention, needs analysis, respect and praxis... actions that address those considerations from the perspective of that community. This, in effect, implies, an approach of conflict sensitivity,
internalising the response and minimizing the sense of intervention. Such an approach requires a deep understanding of the ethnography of the community, or the multiple communities to be addressed.

Conflict mapping at a national level has been a tool of the DDR planner and practitioner from the outset, a practice that could be undertaken effectively by the military/political scientist. Consideration of a more local community conflict-sensitivity was rarely undertaken systematically until the advent of Mary Anderson’s reporting on groundbreaking work by a number of international and national NGOs in communities in conflict in the late nineties, the Local Capacities for Peace Project, (LCPP) that gave birth to the Do No Harm Framework (DNH).  

DNH required a more people-centered approach to aid and a deeper ethnographic knowledge and sensitivity. DNH awareness aims to:

- identify ways in which humanitarian or development assistance can be provided in a conflict setting so that, rather than worsening the conflict, helps local people to disengage from conflict and develop systems for settling and to find ways to ease tensions... [and] promote peace through supporting local initiatives, capacities and actions...

Anderson 2007 offers a framework to provide a systematic method for mainstreaming DNH awareness into conflict or post-conflict assistance through identifying and addressing the ‘connectors’ and ‘dividers’ that contribute to the escalation and reduction of tensions within communities.

Bigdon and Korf 2004, *The Role of Development Aid in Conflict Transformation: Facilitating Empowerment Processes and Community Building*, drawing on DNH awareness, analyses in depth the theoretical aspects of conflict sensitivity by development agencies in assistance programmes, focusing attention on ethnographic considerations. They note that peace cannot be imposed, but must be developed from within a society. Drawing from extensive literature (Hoffman 2004, Bush 1998, Ross & Rothmann 1999), they stress the need for detailed analysis of the conflict context in order to develop “a methodology for the assessment and evaluation of peace and conflict impact that offers a framework for peacebuilding.” They focus on the value of Track III initiatives, *conflict transformation* that refers to initiatives in long-term peacebuilding efforts targeting outcomes, processes and structural changes:

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that aim at overcoming revealed forms of direct, cultural and structural violence transforming unjust social relationships and promoting conditions that can create cooperative relationships.\textsuperscript{108}

Track III initiatives are typically implemented by grassroots organisations, local and international development agencies and NGOs, directly addressing those most affected by the conflict. They engage in local “training, capacity building and empowerment, trauma therapy, human rights, development work and humanitarian assistance.”\textsuperscript{109} The concept shifts the environment from one of conflict management to one of local empowerment. While the logic of conflict management views the environment from the perspective of ‘conflict frames’ associated with resources, interests and identities; the logic of empowerment considers more deeply the frame of identity:

\begin{quote}
articulation and confrontation of individual and collective identities... [with] their source in threats to or frustration of deeply rooted human needs such as dignity, recognition, safety, control purpose and efficacy (Azar 1990; Burton 1990).\textsuperscript{110}
\end{quote}

Recognition and empowerment are key processes in conflict transformation with emphasis on bottom-up strategies and local ownership of the initiatives... that can generate local non-violent struggles for social justice and structural change.

Drawing on Robert Chambers 1994 on Rural Participative Appraisal (PRA)... and the development of coping mechanisms through the process of social mobilization (Sachitanandam 1996), it emphasises the importance of local participation in all aspects of conflict transformation.\textsuperscript{111} While generally avoiding the language of Marxian Analysis, in considering empowerment approaches, the discourse distinctly takes on elements arising from the Theology of Liberation and options for the poor, particularly those detailed by Paulo Freire in his \textit{Pedagogy of the Oppressed}... processes that he termed conscientisation and praxis.\textsuperscript{112}[DM1]

Such considerations and now taken on board in the evolving theory of DDR that has moved on to a second generation; community security and CVR. An understanding of the socio-cultural and

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{108} Bigdon & Korf, \textit{Op cit}  \\
\textsuperscript{109} Track I, \textit{conflict settlement} comprises of the “official and formal activities of diplomatic and government actors. Track II, \textit{conflict resolution} concerns the process-orientated activities that aim to address underlying causes of direct, cultural and structural violence, typically addressed by non-government actors.  \\
\textsuperscript{110} Bigdon & Korf, \textit{Op cit}  \\
\textsuperscript{111} Robert Chambers, “The Origins and Practice of Rural Participative Appraisal,” World Development XXII,7, pp. 953-969  \\
\end{footnotes}
religious sensitivities of the ex-combatants and their communities is critical in designing all aspects of the programme. Knowledge of the conflict context and power relations within the community is indispensable in designing processes of reintegration and reconciliation. In developing aspects of local ownership and participation, attention is now paid to psychosocial status of both the ex-combatants and the community and to the socio-cultural environment as it relates to such deeply rooted aspects of identity as the gender perspective and masculinities, traditional power structures, generational relations, local coping mechanisms, belief systems and cultural norms.

Further, DDR planners and practitioners are conscious of the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats associated with the concept of external agency as opposed to community based initiatives, and the significance of the relevant degree of either.

4.6 Chapter IV Review

Chapter IV describes how practice began to follow the theory in addressing the constraints and complex security environment of urban criminal conflict that did not lend itself to the ‘classic’ style of DDR that was ‘ex-combatant-centric,’ with a broader community-based ‘people-centered’ approach considering the concept of community security in Haiti. This saw the development of a ‘bottom-up’ programme of CVR, a process that threw-up new challenges and constraints, a painful learning experience that failed to address all aspects of ‘conflict sensitivity.’ Chastened and with a better informed approach, the model devised in Haiti, the community security approach, is being adapted and replicated in other complex environments such as Somalia and Cote d’Ivoire. In this evolving approach to applying the theory of DDR, the position of community security in DDR, offering participation and empowerment of the community is reviewed together with consideration of the increasing scope for NGO engagement. Conflict sensitive approaches including the Do No Harm (DNH) framework are seen as critical to gaining the perceptions and positive attitudes of the people.
Chapter V

Can the theory be Applied?

UNIRP in Nepal in 2010/13 offered a small-scale DDR programme, a laboratory, in which some aspects of the evolving theory could be applied in practice. This particularly addressed the crosscutting issues of the gender perspective, psychosocial issues and improved job placement support. It is reviewed here in light of the author’s engagement and his efforts to apply the theory. In a very complex political environment, limited base-line data, inhospitable geographic conditions and unrealistic expectations, a complex and fragmented socio-economic environment compounded by absence of national buy-in to the process, UN institutional risk averseness and the resulting weak communications, some technical elements of the theory were well applied offering examples of good practice. However an effective community-based approach was not possible. While good job-placement results reflected the application of a system of dynamic M&E, the political and socio-economic environment did not permit optimum management of perceptions and attitudes.

5.1 Nepal

A peace accord in 2006 saw the effective cantonment of the Maoist army in seven main cantonment sites, each with three satellite sites spread strategically, from the Maoist perspective, around the country. While the violence of the civil war ended, the peace accord had been anything but comprehensive and left scope for prevarication from all sides in addressing the detail. With their surprise electoral success in 2006 the Maoists found themselves in a dominant political position. With support of a UN Political Mission, UNMIN, an Interim Constituent Assembly was established, originally for a period of two years, tasked with the drafting the national constitution and the delivery of the peace process through the integration of members of the Maoist army into the National army, or their ‘rehabilitation’ into civilian society. The Maoists objected to the term disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR), as they considered it to represent a process in which a defeated force would surrender and hand up their weapons. The term ‘Integration and Rehabilitation’ was accepted. A UN supported registration of Maoist troops in the cantonments in late 2007 identified 24,600 cadres of which 4,008 had been under 18 years of age on the date of recruitment or had been recruited after the cease fire. Close to 30% of these were female. Both the underage and the late recruited groups were considered ineligible for either integration or rehabilitation support, and as such,

113 The author was Senior Advisor Rehabilitation with the UN in Nepal from 2010 to 2012 and much of this section on DDR in Nepal is drawn from his memories, contemporaneous notes, occasional and End of Mission Reports.
the term “unqualified” was applied to them. Unfortunately, this translated into Nepali as something closer to “inadequate” and contributed to an enduring sense of injustice and marginalisation amongst the unqualified groups. The UN lumped both groups together and required the Maoists to remove the total of 4,008 from the cantonments. In an environment of political stalemate and Indian pressure in mid-2008 the Maoists ceded political power back to the pro-Indian parties (Seven Party Alliance) and move back into opposition. To December 2009 the Maoists maintained their cadres in the cantonments when they decided under international pressure that it was time to release the under-aged and late recruited (verified minors and late recruits, VMLRs) cadres. The majority of the VMLRs were minors, classified as child soldiers in the context of the Paris Accord, grouped together with the late recruits, were now expected to be ‘rehabilitated’ through reintegration back into the depressed socio-economic and feudal environment of their home communities. The UN Country Team insisted that it was necessary to offer support to the entire group of 4,008 VMLRs in rehabilitation into the community and in finding education, skills training or entrepreneurial opportunities for sustainable livelihoods. The government felt that this group was not entitled to any support and the Maoist leadership felt that the benefits being proposed by the UN were insufficient in considering the kind of promises that they had been making and the expectations created amongst their cadres. Both disowned the process of rehabilitation support to VMLRs, leaving the UN on a solo run.

Thus, in March 2010 in collaboration between four UN agencies, UNDP, UNICEF, ILO and UNFPA, the UN Integrated Rehabilitation Programme (UNIRP) was developed to support the rehabilitation of VMLRs.114 It was hoped that successful support to VMLRs would encourage the remaining 19,600 Maoist cadres in the cantonments by demonstrating that rehabilitation into the community with sustainable livelihood was feasible.

VMLRs were generally unhappy to be forced from the cantonment. In Nepal’s feudal cast-based society, the poor youth were at the lower end of the pecking order. Having contributed to ‘a successful revolution’, having achieved a level of self-actualisation and having lived in a relatively egalitarian environment in the cantonment for up to five years, return to a society that had not progressed significantly was a retrograde move. Girls especially experienced difficulty returning to their communities. Mixed cast-marriages had been encouraged in the cantonment, taboo in society that considers that they (girls in particular) had been living in a promiscuous environment. Further, many

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114 The official launch, in accordance with the funding period was in June 2010
young girls returning with children resulting from those mixed-cast marriages were finding a level of rejection from both their own families and their new in-laws. These challenges were coupled with the high expectations that were created prior to departure from the cantonment with cadres believing that having sacrificed for the revolution, they were entitled to permanent high-level jobs. The UNIRP programme design was limited by the Ministry of Finance that the value of the ‘package’ to the VMLRs could not exceed the total value of compensation paid to the families of 2nd level martyrs, approximately US$1,300. Within this limitation, the UNIRP could offer career counseling, guidance towards an optimum personal livelihood sustainability enhancement in education, skills training or micro-entrepreneurial development, limited psychosocial counseling and support particularly in addressing gender constraints to participation and some job-placement support. The programme did manipulate some additional benefits beyond this limit such as daily hot food to enhance the package.

In this challenging environment, with some direct Maoist leadership obstruction of the programme, just over 50% of the eligible VMLRs entered the programme. With a manageable number, despite volatile conditions, UNIRP was able to attempt to develop excellence in delivery in several areas. These included in improving career counseling, addressing gender constraints, health support and job placement support. By early 2012 more than 60% of graduates of UNIRP were engaged in sustainable livelihoods.

Despite considerable challenges, both national and institutional, the UNIRP has achieved extraordinary results and is recognized in the DDR community of practice as offering many examples of good practice.\textsuperscript{115} The implementation was supported by the mainstreaming into the routine management system of an effective Dynamic M&E Strategy incorporated into a Comprehensive Rehabilitation Information Management System (CRIMS) that pulled together quantitative and qualitative programme information to facilitate dynamic adjustment of implementation, manage expectations and to encourage improved levels of national ownership of the processes.

UN engagement in and influence on ensuring a human security approach to the rehabilitation of the 19,600 combatants who remained in Maoist cantonment has been prevented by macro-political influences and the assertion of a brand of national ownership that addresses narrow political interests in Nepal. As the dust settles on an imperfect politically driven process, cash lump sums are distributed to ex-combatants and as development partners scurry for engagement, the UN may yet have a damage

limitation role in picking up the resulting human debris in polarized communities and in reintroducing a people-centered approach to post-conflict rehabilitation in Nepal.
The UN experience of attempting to support the delivery of DDR in Nepal offers new considerations and reinforces many lessons learned in other environments offering considerable potential for contributing to the evolving theory of DDR. Here we review the most relevant and replicable lessons learned or relearned in Nepal.116

i. The planning environment

a) The CPA is only the beginning of the solution
The planning process for Integration and Rehabilitation (I/R) was greatly complicated by the ambiguous political environment in which the national adversaries assumed the provisions of the CPA as the starting point of negotiations for the details of the I/R process rather than an agreed position.

b) Absence of UN political leverage in Nepal post-CPA
The absence of political leverage by the UN, both the DPA Mission, UNMIN and the development agencies, which were largely overshadowed by the regional macro-political environment, undermined the capacity of the UN to insist on the application of international principles in planning and delivering an effective rehabilitation of ex-combatants or in a credible SSR process. The impact of this may have been underestimated at the outset.

c) UN responsibility to maintain a Human Security approach
While bilateral (diplomatic missions) partners have tended to focus on supporting their regional partners in exercising spheres of influences, prioritizing short-term political progress benefiting the political elite beyond the concept of longer-term human security, the UN in pursuing the rights/needs based commitments of the Charter must maintain its advocacy for solutions that contribute to longer-term human security.

d) The option for Cantonment should be undertaken with caution in DDR processes
One lesson from international practice of DDR relearned in Nepal is that challenges associated with operating cantonments for combatants, particularly before formal disarmament is undertaken, can outweigh the benefits. They can give rise to major security threats in that they offer a concentrated target; a consolidation and training opportunity to cantoned units that may delay implementation of the peace process and they are costly in human resources, materials and finance. As such, cantonments

116 These lessons are adapted from End of Mission Report by Senior Rehabilitation Advisor. Molloy, “UN Senior Rehabilitation Advisor, End of Mission Report”, March 2012
periods, where they are essential, should be as short as possible. In Nepal the existence of sustainable cantonments contributed to a political stalemate.

e) Investment by the International community in combatants in the cantonments was counter-productive

International support to sustainability of the Maoist combatants through infrastructural and educational investment over an extended period in the cantonments was contrary to international DDR principles and most bilateral funding rules, and may well have contributed to lengthening the political stalemate by reducing the pressure on the Maoists to leave the cantonment.

ii. UNIRP

a) A UN owned process...

It was a radical move to launch the UNIRP in the absence of national ownership. While this is contrary to international principles of DDR it does not constitute a failure as it permitted humanitarian commitment to a very vulnerable caseload, a record of this commitment and the establishment of a tenable moral position for the UN.

c) Absence of base-line data

The absence of sufficient baseline data on the ex-combatant caseload (socio-economic profiling, a process that was obstructed by Maoist leadership) and the labour environment (labour market analysis, local, national and beyond, as relevant) into which ex-combatants must reintegrate is a serious handicap for planning a reintegration process. This constrained the capacity of the UNIRP to design the optimum training options and support systems that would accurately target both the needs of the labour market and the capacities and aspirations of the beneficiaries. It led to a time lag in improving the delivery of the programme that was addressed through the implementation of a dynamic M&E system. The omission of adequate base-line data remains a recurring failure in DDR programmes.

d) A community-based approach-

The UNIRP failed to programme a robust community-based approach citing the wide geographical spread of participants and budgetary constraints. This failing was somewhat addressed though the inclusion of peace-building activities (engagement of the VMLRs with CBOs, women’s groups and youth groups in collaborative social, cultural and sporting activities) and improved outreach of necessary services to families of participants as the programme progressed. This failure at the outset to emphasise the community-based approach; a programme approach that would ensure the participation
of the community in all aspects of the programme design, implementation and as beneficiaries, was a shortcoming that should be avoided in future.

f) **Emergency and development approaches give rise to intra-institutional tensions**

DDR is usually an emergency programme operating in a dynamic and evolving post-conflict environment where rapid response is required to exploit short windows of opportunity to capture short-term objectives. This environment favors some degree of substance over form, i.e. moving rapidly with imperfect documentation to achieve results rather than waiting to ensure perfect documentation, and a level of political risk-taking. Development agency prerogatives on the other hand, must consider the longer-term political impact of actions and favor a nuanced and perfectly formed approach to interaction with political entities and the public of the host country. This is particularly so as regards both public information and relations with the host government. In the complex political environment in Nepal, and a very cautious attitude by the UN Resident Coordinator, Head PBRU, UNDP tightly managed these matters. The constraints that were placed on the DDR practitioners in the area of public information and dealing with GoN in this risk-averse environment led to considerable response-time delays and frustration. With greater latitude for the DDR practitioners, it may have been possible to deliver a more responsive public information capacity and better relations with MoPR leading to an enhanced public narrative regarding the UNIRP.

g) **The importance of collaboration with Parallel Programmes**

While tentative efforts were made to develop synergies through collaborating with parallel programmes purported to offer support to the war-affected communities or supporting youth employment, being implemented by GoN and bilateral development partners, the initiation of such collaboration did not materialize. Many excuses can be posed for this failure. It will be wise to reconsider the impact of this omission and to ensure political and institutional will for such collaboration that can optimise the outcomes of peacebuilding and development investment in the future.

h) **While context matters, the IDDRS are relevant**

A primary lesson learned in the planning and delivery of the UNIRP is that the lessons learned in global practice concerning DDR and its cross-cutting issues, and codified as a tool-box within the IDDRS, are relevant to the I/R environment in Nepal. However, IDDRS does not offer a template for application in Nepal. Innovation has been necessary in addressing a unique environment with specific political, security, economic and socio-cultural facets. The UNIRP has lessons to offer international
practice, particularly in the areas of Dynamic M&E, gender specific support, electronic information management and the innovative use of technology; psychosocial support and job placement support.

**iii. Rehabilitation of Ex-combatants in Nepal**

*a) Regional politics and the loss of the Human Security Approach*

Both the regional powers and the United Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (UCPN-M) have concluded that a lump-sum cash payment to combatants in the cantonments will achieve their differing objectives. Ostensibly, for India this may be that cash payment will rapidly dissipate the numbers of Maoist combatants in the cantonment; for the Maoist and perhaps also China, it will strengthen the political position of the UCPN-M while moving the political process in a direction that the international community will support. A people-centered approach under the overarching philosophy of Human Security has been abandoned. While bilateral and diplomatic partners may focus on short-term political progress, it is essential for the UN to advocate a rights/needs based approach to the reintegration of ex-combatants in compliance with the provisions of the Charter, and expressed within the Human Security concept. In addition to considering the rights/needs of the individual ex-combatants, this implies a broader community-based approach.

*b) Shift from a narrow focus on Ex-combatants*

The Maoist leadership has manipulated the combatants in the cantonments as pawns in a political power play since the signing of CPA. The rehabilitation of the VMLRs was an exceptional obligation to a specific group (the VMs) that fell to the UN and has been dealt with in an appropriate manner as a benchmark on the path to peace. Following the payments of lump sums to ex-combatants or their absorption into the NA, the exceptional treatment of Maoist ex-combatants is no longer justified as a critical element of stabilizing the peace process. Any further benefits to ex-combatants must be in the context of contributing to broader community development.

Can the theory be applied? The experimental environment in Nepal UNIRP suggests that it can, to some degree! The big failing in Nepal UNIRP was in its incapacity to apply an effective community-based approach to the socio-economic reintegration of VMLRs. This was because of the political, budgetary, geographic and time constraints, the absence of base-line data to support optimal programme design and particularly in the absence of economy of scale. The small scale of the programme did permit the incremental scale-up, as a result of an effective dynamic M&E system, of some of the lessons drawn from the evolving theory and offer examples of good practice in the areas of
gender perspective, psychosocial support and job placement support. In a complex political environment in Nepal and in the absence of national buy-in to the process precluding the development of an effective integrated communications strategy, winning the positive perceptions and attitudes of either the caseload of ex-combatants or the community was a major challenge.

However, the evolving theory, comprising of a critical analysis of the collection of lessons learned on good practice, must be viewed as offering overarching philosophy to guide implementation decision-making. Each context has its specific limitations that requires a process of triage in deciding which elements of the theory must be sacrificed in favour of strengthening elements that are more important, i.e. prioritisation.

Chapter V  Review

The UNIRP in Nepal addressing the reintegration of a manageable number of special case ex-combatants, 3,008 VMLRs, offered an opportunity, with the author as senior advisor to the UN, to apply many of the lessons learned and reflected in the evolving theory. These included the importance of the gender perspective, the need for psychosocial and health support, job placement support, functioning management information systems (MIS) and dynamic M&E. However, in a complex and contrary political environment and a suppressed and fragmented socio-economic environment in a feudal cast-based society, limited baseline data and an absence of UN leverage, significant constraints existed. National political actors were unsupportive of the process and the UN risk-averse in the absence of significant political leverage. Mixed messages, both purposeful and accidental resulted in unrealistic expectations by the caseload of VMLRs with resulting frustrations. With limited budgets and time, the absence of economy of scale, a very difficult geographical environment, significant aspects of the lessons for good practice in DDR emerging from the evolving theory could be applied. Effective focus on a community-based approach was not possible. This contributed to the difficulty in managing broader perceptions and attitudes. Despite this, significant results were achieved and the application of a mainstreamed dynamic M&E system with constant adjustment of the programme while strictly adhering to programme policy resulted in a gradually improving implementation environment. In applying the theory, risks must be taken and elements of the theory prioritised or abandoned in light of the context in ensuring acceptable outcomes.

117 Remembering that many scholars debate whether or not this can be referred to as a body of theory at all
Chapter VI

Afghanistan

Chapter VI reviews the lessons learned in one of the most complex multiple attempts to implement DDR in an ongoing volatile conflict in contributing to counterinsurgency (COIN) objectives. As such, Afghanistan is particularly relevant to this study both in terms of DDR and of COIN. It draws on scholarly and practitioner literature with the underlying question as to whether it is possible to apply the theory of DDR that is implemented under the overarching philosophy of human security, in a complex security environment with competing interests? Can the perceptions and attitudes of the people be gained?

6.1 DDR in Afghanistan

Even prior to Bonn 2001, which Bhatia and Muggah say was more a power sharing agreement rather than a peace treaty, while recognising the complexity, international actors considered demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants as a critical process in stabilizing the security environment and to demonstrate the peace dividend.\textsuperscript{118} They noted that Afghan ownership, leadership and political will for a voluntary demobilisation process that would target young fighters, deserters and vulnerable groups including female headed households, in offering viable alternative livelihoods would be necessary if it were to be successful.\textsuperscript{119} The Afghan Interim Authority in their security, demobilisation and reintegration framework adopted these DDR recommendations as an aspect of a broader SSR process to break command structures of illicit armed groups and armies in establishing new, legitimate and ethnically balanced professional armed forces of Afghanistan, answerable to the state. However, T. X. Hammes, concurring with Bhatia & Muggah, reminds us that the Bonn Accord 2001 was nothing close to a CPA as the Taliban and other Pashtun factions were not included.\textsuperscript{120} It was an agreement amongst the victors.

The complexity of the environment into which US, NATO/ISAF, Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and UN security and state-building interventions have stumbled in Afghanistan, initiated after the Bonn Agreement of 2001, has been a conundrum stumping security analysts and scholars for a decade. Later we will consider Afghanistan in the context of the evolving COIN doctrine. However, in this

\textsuperscript{118} Bhatia and Muggah, Op cit, p146
\textsuperscript{119} Toward a Programme for Reintegration of Ex-combatants, UNDP, ADB and WB, Draft Sector Report, December 2001,
section, through literary review, we try to focus on the main DDR elements of those operations; how they evolved in this specific case; what they achieved and what has been (re) learned from them.\textsuperscript{121} This is an international attempt to implement DDR processes in the context of ongoing COIN or counter-terrorism operations.

Bhatia and Muggah (2009) offer insightful analysis of the Afghan DDR environment drawing from an extensive base of critical international DDR experience and analysis.\textsuperscript{122} In their opener they note the UN preoccupation with “national ownership, comprehensive frameworks and community inclusiveness...” with a DDR approached as a “short-term, stand-alone initiative rather than a long-term strategic interaction,” whilst the IDDRS tend to emphasis “enabling frameworks and bureaucratic structures rather than the dynamics of demobilization or the often dynamic requirements of peacebuilding.” In this they identify the core of the struggle that both practitioners and scholars are currently gingerly engaged in as they tweak the evolution of DDR theory. They state that Afghanistan’s DDR programmes were “intertwined with the dynamics of statebuilding and the state’s effort to monopolise the use of legitimate force”. They consider how the current efforts in Afghanistan have challenged “certain basic assumptions governing conventional DDR programming.” Prime amongst the failures in both ANBP and DIAG are noted as “common conceptualization of commanders and combatants as homogeneous actors [and] the failure to recognize the complex relationships between former combatants and their communities... and essential factor in shaping mobilization...” They advise that if DDR is to generate “positive dividends”... it needs to extend its “perspective beyond rational choice and combatant-centric approach and better accommodate factors relating to real and perceived legitimacy, outreach and community peacebuilding.” They insist that the DDR must be pursued not as a narrow “economic process of reintegration, but rather conceived as symbolic, diplomatic, political and legal processes linked to local, national and international conceptions of legitimacy”... in Afghanistan necessitating the “ascendance of state armed forces and their acquisition of a monopoly over the legitimate use of force.” In addition to the structural flaws in the programmes... “the profound inability of the international donor community or the Afghan government to elaborate a coherent plan to promote security and minimize security dilemmas” was critical.\textsuperscript{123}

\textsuperscript{121} This chapter reviews the three most important DDR processes in Afghanistan since 2001. There are at least two further and more focused DDR programmes that will not be addressed here.
\textsuperscript{123} Ibid, p135
Ferks, Compelman and van Laar with Klem (2008) offer an excellent historical background and insightful overview of the course of both the Afghan New Beginnings Programme 2003-2006 (ANBP) and the Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups 2005- (DIAG). Nominaly, Afghan government administered both with UN support, the former focused particularly on the heavy weapons of the main Northern Alliance armed groups and was led by Japan while DIAG focused on the more resistance elements of the smaller Northern Alliance armed groups and was led by UNDP. Continuously threatened by the Taliban, these DDR processes represented aspects of foreign strategy “on the frontlines of the ‘war on terror’, that involved military interventions, re-establishment of Afghan state structures and reconstruction.” Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) were established, ostensibly to support the government in extending its authority, however, as we shall learn from our review of COIN, US commanders saw them as a contributor to force protection. The complexity of the effort was compounded by diverse regional interests reflected in the debatably nefarious interests of state or intelligence agencies of specific engaged countries through diverse interference and spoiling activities. While these DDR efforts were designed to address those moderates who would collaborate in the international plan for stabilisation and state-building in Afghanistan, the incorrigible insurgents including Taliban, Al Qaeda and criminal groups were to be faced with military means. Concurrently, the National Reconciliation Programme (NRP) was to encourage moderate individuals to leave those incorrigible armed groups and reintegrate into civilian life.

Multiple local leaders and regional warlords with forces ranging from a few combatants influencing local villages to full-scale armies controlling regions in ‘clientist’ relations, sometimes formal often referred to as government officials linked to illegal armed groups, (GOLIAGS) with the state authority, prevailed in a cauldron of ethnic, power, criminal, fundamentalist and identity challenges. This in an environment awash with arms, both light and heavy. Here, the US/NATO/ISAF chose to face their ‘war on terror’, dragging a reticent UN into a post-Taliban Afghanistan to support the establishment and stabilisation of the state and an acceptable humanitarian environment.

In this complexity, the initial focus of DDR, the ANBP, was on what was considered the lower hanging fruit, the warlords of the Northern Alliance, those who had built relations with NATO when fighting the Taliban and were on the national payroll as the Afghan Military Forces (AMF).

6.1.1 ANBP

124 George Ferks, Geert Compelman and Stefan van Laar with Bart Klem, The Struggle after Combat: The Role of NGOs in DDR Processes, “Afghanistan Case Study”, Cordaid, 2008 (Klem and Douma completed the associated Synthesis Study)
Progress was slow, finally pushed forward by the results of the Tokyo donor conference in February 2003, with US$141 million made available by eight nations... mainly Japan (also UK Canada, US, EC, Norway, Switzerland and NL). Japan was appointed as lead nation in DDR (primarily advocacy and funding) and ANBP programme administration and implementation was to be handled by the small UN political mission rather than a PKO, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA).\footnote{This was much to Kenji Isezaki’s surprise, the man asked by the Japanese government to head up their end in Afghanistan. He had considered that in light of the provisions of the Japan’s Peace Constitution and in particular its Preamble and Article 9, Japan would be risk averse to handling in the international arena, anything associated with weapons. However, he presumes that its extraordinary experience in demobilising millions of its own troops at the end of WWII came to the fore on this occasion, offering Japan the opportunity to make a major contribution beyond ‘cheque-book diplomacy’. Isezaki agreed to grant 12 months from his career as a university professor to this task.} This was under the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSRG) Lakhdar Brahimi, (of Brahimi Report 2000 fame) working closely with the Interim Authority’s Demobilisation and Reintegration Commission. ANBP was administered through a central office in Kabul and eight regional offices, each with both civilian and military staff and a Mobile Disarmament Unit (MDU). An international observer group (IOG) included representation from UNAMA and donors who offered “impartial oversight.”\footnote{Ferks et al, Op cit, p16}

Bhatia and Muggah suggest that despite the donor focus on DDR in Afghanistan the processes didn't move until three years after the fall of the Taliban largely because of Japan’s insistence on the prerequisite of comprehensive defense reform.\footnote{Bhatia & Muggah, Op cit, p131}

Isezaki, Head of the Japanese DDR mission in Afghanistan 2003-2004, notes that UNAMA at this time, in pursuing its ‘light-footprint approach’ was maintaining a passive posture in avoiding association with the US ‘heavy hand’. It highlighted “special circumstance’ in Afghanistan; the weakness of the interim authority, absence of political leverage and its total dependence on the cooperation of the warlords, and was initially recommending offering the incentives associate with DDR prior to the disarmament. This proposed Reintegration, Disarmament and Demobilisation (RDD) rather than DDR (the carrot or benefits... before the stick of disarmament). He saw this as offering an opportunity to warlords to take advantage of the interim authority and the international communities intensions by off-loading their non-operational (aged, disabled, etc.) cadres while keeping effective cadres and their weapons, thus retaining leverage for future demands.\footnote{Kenji Isezaki, Disarmament: The World through the Eyes of a Conflict Buster, originally published in Japanese by Kodansha Gendai Shinsho, 2004, translated into English in 2011, pp 96-97} He successfully opposed this idea to the extent that he ensured that at the February 2003 donor conference in Tokyo, Karsai stated...
that the D and D must be completed before holding elections and that it must be completed within a year.

Confirming the numbers of actual combatants in the field was difficult. While preliminary estimates had been between 40,000 and 50,000, combined warlords were now claiming up to 250,000. Concerned at containing the budget and scope of the programme, Isezaki forced the government to accept a total figure of 100,000 that he deemed closer to the truth. Isezaki further reasoned that by focusing on the main and most influential warlords of the Northern Alliance, particularly the two biggest groups that had been warring amongst themselves, the bulk of combatants would be included. The easiest way to grab the lowest hanging fruit was to focus on their heavy weapons, tanks, artillery, etc.¹²⁹

Isezaki draws attention to the further complication in Afghanistan, irrespective of the much-lauded benefits of national ownership, the DDR is being implemented, not by a neutral PKO, but by the Government of Afghanistan that cannot be deemed as neutral (“international”) considering that the strongest Panjshiri warlord is the Minister for Defense (Marshal Fahim).¹³⁰ In an attempt to mitigate the potential for resulting conflict and concerned with the pacifist commitments of its own Constitution, Japan insisted, as referred to by Bhatia and Muggah, and controversially using conditional ODA as leverage, on parameters regarding the ethnic balance within the recruitment of the ANA and of defense officials. This insistence offered an element of equity that allowed the SSR process being led by US to move forward.¹³¹

Isezaki is particularly proud having persuaded Brahimi to provide his military advisors as the core of the Military Observer Team, while also persuading other national diplomatic missions in Kabul to provide their military attachés as observers, to monitor the DDR process... “the first international observer group based on bilateral aid.”¹³²

In the meantime, in an environment of insurgency and an ethnically and regionally fragmented society, the US is struggling in leading the establishment of a national army. In the new government, key ministries have been distributed amongst the most influential warlords including the Panjshiri faction, with their clients as officials. Isezaki talks of “the simultaneous execution by the US of a ‘war process’ led by the Department of Defense, intended to eliminate terrorism and a ‘peace process’ led by the State Department (US embassy) that seeks to build a country.” The two are incompatible.

¹²⁹ Ibid, pp106-109
¹³⁰ Ibid, p 117
¹³¹ Ibid, p 118
¹³² Ibid p 120
‘Precision’ bombing is killing civilians. Even the futuristic drone “whack a mole” technology, operated from computer monitors as far away as Florida, that is supposed to kill targeted high value terrorists, including US citizens, apparently from a Presidential kill list, is plagued by human error, not to mention issues of international law. Hundreds of Afghan civilians have been killed in error. However, the US has used its airpower and mobilised local militias and tribal leaders in avoiding committing its own ground troops... that would escalate its own numbers killed in action. Those local militias and tribal leaders, while often receiving salaries and equipment from coalition forces, are masters in manipulating the US effort to their own ends, overstating local threats and in disrupting the DDR process. However, the US, its left hand not concerned with what its right hand is doing, has continued to pump large stocks of weapons into its favorite warlords, often rivals to those that have agreed to disarm thus totally undermining the impact of DDR and contributing to the security dilemma. Isezaki could have limited impact in pressuring the US to reduce this activity. In pragmatically acknowledging the “only game town”, the US activities, Isezaki did deviate from his “rule book” and agreed to remove some militias, those needed to support the counter-terrorism effort, from the list of militia factions to be disarmed... until the ANA would develop the capacity to address the relevant security concerns. The US government independently chose 5,000 former army or militia members and called them the Afghan Guard Force, agreeing that it would take responsibility for their eventual disarmament.133

From 2005 ANBP also undertook the destruction of anti-personnel mines and ammunition, destroying more than 5,000 tons of ammunition and mines during that year. Further it surveyed 722 ammunition caches containing more than 20,000 tons of ordnance, and cantoned and deactivated 12,248 heavy weapons across the country; approximately 98% of total estimated stock.134

The actual method of cantonment in Kabul, where the example was to be set, undermined the cantonment process. This was due to ISAF, without taking professional guidance, having cut an independent deal with the factions. It effectively divided the city amongst factions and contributed to rearmament.135 This mistake probably resulted from a convoluted and relatively uncoordinated command structure in the intervention, US, NATO, ISAF and UN, and mix of military and civilians with competing philosophies and egos.

133 Ibid, p 123
134 Ferks, Op cit, p 16
135 Isezaki, Op cit, p 111
Further, ISAF/NATO was not significantly deployed outside of Kabul and could not provide the level of deterrence that would support a DDR programme. US airpower only offered the ‘image’ of deterrence. This gave the resurgent Taliban scope for maneuver in the rural areas. As the elections of October 2004 approached, there were high expectations, not least by Isezaki, that the activities of PRTs offering infrastructural and socio-economic support to communities in unstable areas, operating under NATO control in the North and under ISAF in the South would ‘win the people’ in the context of a nod towards COIN interventions.\textsuperscript{136} This, while the bulk of resources remained concentrated on counter terrorism... traditional kinetic operations. As we shall see, expectations of the PRTs were largely wishful thinking.

Ferks et al note that with the ANBP addressing only the Northern Alliance, and with the new national army (ANA) made-up exclusively by them, other major groups in Afghanistan, particularly the Pasthun in the South experienced a significant security dilemma. The exclusion of the Taliban from the process was also considered by many to be counterproductive.

Still, the listed achievement of the ANBP is significant. 93,000 AMF names were removed from the MoD payroll saving recurring budget of US$120 million. 63,380 were disarmed with lists of those to be demobilized being compiled by regional teams and verified by demobilisation verification committees (DVCs). Individual demobilisation packages included food, a \textit{Shalwar Kamiz} (traditional Afghan man’s clothes), a medal of honour, and a certificate of good conduct. 260 units were decommissioned; 57,431 chose a reintegration support option; 57,629 SALW were collected, AMF was demobilized; conditions were created to facilitate the national deployment of ANA and additional associated benefits were distributed to 13,312 ex-combatants.\textsuperscript{137} Cantonment of ex-combatants was avoided as most combatants resided in their communities.

Those opting for reintegration support initially received a cash grant that was later suspended and factored into a stipend to reduce rent-taking by commanders; career counseling and support in finding employment or self-employment. The livelihood options included those traditional sectors common to DDR processes; education, agriculture, skills training and entrepreneurial support but included innovative ideas such as contracting teams to undertake local infrastructural contracts in a cooperative arrangement; teacher training and demining teams. This was in addition to the option for selected ex-combatants of engagement in the SSR process through integration into ANA or the police.

\textsuperscript{136} \textit{Ibid}, p 114  
\textsuperscript{137} Ferks, \textit{Op cit}, p 17
Approximately 50% opted for agriculture support, 25% for entrepreneurial support and about 20% for skills training.

A commander’s incentive programme (CIP) that included management and some foreign training was offered to about 500 senior generals and local commanders to encourage compliance and support for the programme.

By June 2005, UNDP was claiming that ANBP had effectively disarmed all Afghan Militia Forces and that it would therefore end the programme. However, total disarmament was not reflected by the facts on the ground. The Tajik-dominated units in Kabul and Panjshir remained active. Many had in fact reinvented themselves as police units. As Hammes comments, while the ANBP was certainly efficient in that it removed a lot of hardware from the field and took significant numbers off the state recurring defense budget, it was not effective in that it did not demobilize the armed groups that maintained their core structures and significant numbers of weapons. Isezaki contends that the DIAG as a stand-alone DDR process as an aspect of SSR did in fact create a security vacuum that permitted the return of the Taliban.

6.1.2 DIAG

The Disarmament of Illegally Armed Groups (DIAG) was designed to pick up those informal factions of the AMF under the control of individual warlords, engaged in various activities such as local security and power plays, support to drug trafficking and terrorist activities; deemed a threat to the integrity of the state and estimated to be about 120,000 armed elements. It was hoped that the DIAG would broaden the span of the government through the country, bring the monopoly on the legitimate use of force back to the state and gain the support of the people. Supporting legal framework was enacted including covering the control of private security companies and gun control. A management institution was established, the Disarmament and Reintegration Commission (DRC) with an executive body called the DIAG Forum supported by an executive secretary with decentralised implementation by Provincial Committees using local knowledge. Ferks et al notes that no role was considered for local NGOs or civil society.

Launched in June 2005, it immediately entered controversy with the DRC being tasked to vet candidates for the National Assembly and Provincial Council Elections to identify who might not be eligible due to associations with armed groups. Much pressure was placed on the DRC from all sides.

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138 Drawn from Hammes citing an ICG Report of February 2005
139 Isezaki, in discussion with author, May 2013.
140 Ferks et al, Op cit, p 29
of government for maximum accommodation in the interests of short-term security. Of 6,000 candidates, 1,108 were initially identified as suspected to have links with armed groups. However only 34 were finally disqualified.\textsuperscript{141}

DIAG had at its disposal a broad range of the “tools and levers available to the government: political, social and economic instruments, information and law enforcement.” \textsuperscript{[DM2]} With Weapons Collections Points established in each Province, DIAG was not offering individual benefits but development resources were to be distributed at a community level with the inclusion of stabilized areas into broad national recovery programmes. It was obvious that sound provincial government management and central government resourcing would be critical.

By mid 2006 the DIAG yielded almost 17,000 heavy and light weapons with about 86,000 pieces of ammunition. This however did not reflect a significant level of disbandment of illegally armed groups, a problem compounded by the continuous distribution of weapons by foreign intelligence agencies. By mid-2007 the numbers of weapons collected had risen to 26,000 light weapons and 3,900 heavy weapons, also deemed a disappointing yield.

Programmatic aspects of DIAG were not the greatest problems. The political complexity and their impact on security were the major crux. The absence of a CPA, the exclusion of Southern armed groups, absence of genuine political will for the process; the positioning and influence of particularly the Northern warlords and not least, ongoing conflict militated against successful outcomes, the stabilisation of Afghanistan and the expansion of the authority of the state.

Despite widespread pessimism, Bhatia and Muggah take a more pragmatic view of the result of the DDR efforts, ANPB and DIAG. They claim while the statistics of weapons collected, cantoned or destroyed, or numbers of combatants demobilised, do not necessarily equate to a reduction in armed violence there is “some evidence that the various DDR programmes served an important role in shifting the ‘balance of power’ away from regional warlords towards the Karzai government.”\textsuperscript{142}

In their conclusion Bhatia & Muggah identify the determinants of DDR ‘success’ in Afghanistan as investment in both diplomatic coordination and local outreach. “Ultimately, enhancing state legitimacy and its monopoly on the use of legitimate force is a sine qua non of DDR effectiveness.” It will require a “better understanding of the dynamics shaping combatant mobilization and the formation of armed

\textsuperscript{141} Ibid, p 30
\textsuperscript{142} Bhatia & Muggah, \textit{Op cit}, p 152
groups…” However both ANBP and DIAG were seen as “entry-point for addressing spoilers.” The overarching challenge remains in achieving real and perceived legitimacy.\footnote{Ibid, p 154}

6.1.3 APRP

As DIAG wound down, GoA developed a follow-on programme to address moderate opposition fighters including Taliban that could be encouraged to reintegrate into civil society with the Afghanistan Peace and Reconciliation Programme (APRP).

The International Research Group on Reintegration (IRGR) based in the Center for Peace Studies at Tromsø University in Norway looked at this programme from the perspective that Bhatia and Muggah said the UN often neglected... “the dynamics of demobilisation and the often dynamic requirements of peacebuilding.”\footnote{Bhatia & Muggah, Op cit.} Their study is not an assessment of the APRP but is designed to offer policy insights and to distill broader lessons on reintegration from the Afghan processes that might contribute to the research based evidence often noted as lacking when assessing reintegration processes.\footnote{Zuhra Bahman and Stina Torjesen, “ Double Disillusionment: Disengaging from the insurgency in Afghanistan” IRGR, CPS, Tromsø University, 2011} It utilizes four main concepts: i) trajectories, the direction taken by combatants as they leave the armed group; ii) a multi-centric notion of community, looking beyond the socio-geographic locus of family or lived space to a broader consideration of community, such as believers and comrades; iii) disengagement, changes in behavior during the ‘exit processes’. Twinned to ‘engagement’ it is driven by ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors... negative and positive forces that contribute to decision-making. iv) The final concept considers reintegration from its social, economic and political perspectives. Their primary methodology was through interview of participants in the APRP, former combatants and commanders.

The study finds that many fighters are deeply disillusioned with the Taliban and the direction of Jihad. However, APRP has also failed to address their needs and at worse has undermined their security in society with them becoming targets of their former colleagues. Thus, despite widespread exhaustion with war, the APRP does not provide significant encouragement for fighters to leave the Taliban, particularly in light of the strong group dynamics associated with the movement. In addition to the criticism of APRP, there have been some significant successes such as the provision of urban safe houses to participants under threat.

\footnote{Ibid, p 154}
\footnote{Bhatia & Muggah, Op cit.}
\footnote{Zuhra Bahman and Stina Torjesen, “ Double Disillusionment: Disengaging from the insurgency in Afghanistan” IRGR, CPS, Tromsø University, 2011}
The APRP is at the heart of Afghan politics in furthering the COIN effort by drawing moderates from the resistance and in spreading the legitimacy of GoA, contributing to both the military effort and also in creating conditions to encourage negotiations with the Taliban. The programme is thus highly contested as reflected in attacks and killings of senior officers associated with the programme.\textsuperscript{146} Such threats do undermine the capacity of the programme, contributing to the poor track record as regards outcomes of both ANBP and DIAG.

By July 2010 the APRP had processed 2,320 individuals with a further 1,845 in the pipeline. This is a relatively meager result considering the investment in both human and material resources.\textsuperscript{147} The programme is implemented in three stages that do reflect an assimilation of the global lessons of DDR, the evolution of the theory and a nod in the direction of Bhatia and Muggah’s concerns:

i) Social outreach, confidence building and negotiation where provincial and district leaders reach out to individuals and communities...

ii) Demobilisation, which includes registration and hand-over of weapons, issuance of ID and amnesty from arrest. Consideration is given here to ex-combatant’s security needs.

iii) Consolidation of peace focuses on the community and recovery from conflict.\textsuperscript{148}

Findings from the series of interviews indicate that the ‘push factors’ for demobilisation, disillusionment with the Taliban, exhaustion with war, needs to be with family etc., were reasonably strong. However the ‘pull factors’ of the APRP, that which could be offered to the ex-combatants, particularly as regards their post-demobilisation security where ex-combatants often found it safer to remain in urban areas than to return to their rural communities, were weak. Piedmont suggests that this analysis reflects preoccupation with the composition of the Taliban rather than consideration of the potential for transformation of the Taliban.\textsuperscript{149}

Generally this double disillusionment experienced by Taliban ex-combatants in the APRP does not bode well for positive outcomes in this case. However as Bhatia and Muggah have indicated in the case of ANBP and DIAG, it may well contribute to the spread of the legitimacy of GoA, a major COIN objective. It may also form the foundation for reintegration of ex-combatants in light of a potential softened attitude of the Taliban in considering participation in government post-US

\textsuperscript{146} Ibid, p 11
\textsuperscript{147} Ibid, p 13
\textsuperscript{148} Ibid, p 13
\textsuperscript{149} Comments by Dean Piedmont on an early draft of this dissertation, 9 May 2013.
From the DDR perspective APRP does reflect the implementation of an evolving theory of DDR that will offer lessons for further evolution.

6.2 Chapter VI Review

The US and NATO led post-9/11 invasion of Afghanistan with the objective of establishing a stable pro-western government operating along democratic lines was never going to present easy solutions. Following the routing of the Taliban, the Bonn Agreement offered an operating platform through the Karzai government, an arrangement amongst victors. In a fragmented country with multiple semi-independent regional warlords, their armies coopted onto the national payroll, an environment of continuing conflict awash with arms and an ongoing COIN operation, DDR was seen as a mechanism to assist in stabilising the situation and assisting in spreading the reach of that government. To some degree it was envisaged as a precursor to political solutions. Supported and assisted by the UN, the GoA ANBP, focusing on the armies of the warlords of the Northern Alliance, cherry-picked heavy weapons and managed to remove significant numbers of combatants from the national defense budget. Again with UN support, the GoA DIAG programme tried to pick-up selected remaining illegally armed groups not covered by ANBP with limited success. The GoA led APRP is a follow-on programme to DIAG that, in ongoing conflict and with obscured accountability and transparency as regards the application of finance and benefits, is having limited results. While scholars do consider that both ANBP and DIAG together did contribute to spreading the reach and legitimacy of the Karzai government, the inability of the GoA, DDR implementers or COIN forces to protect either the communities or ex-combatants undermined greater achievement by limiting the perceptions of the communities and the combatants that the processes are in their interests. Despite the difficulties, lessons being learned in the complex environment are contributing to the evolving theory. Should a more compliant Taliban decide to participate in non-violent politics with the drawdown of expeditionary COIN forces from Afghanistan in 2014, APRP could provide a platform for effective DDR.

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Chapter VII

UN Approach to Reintegration of Ex-combatants: a Theory and Practice of Reintegration under Scrutiny

Depending on perspective and context, DDR has different meanings to various actors. As such it remains a theory and practice under continuous scrutiny. Chapter VII reviews how the theory has evolved in light of changing and diverse contexts. In this flux, are IDDRs relevant in the context of UN implemented DDR? It considers how scholars are striving to develop evidenced based analysis. What is the UN position on DDR? What are the complementary mechanisms and concepts? In considering critical concepts in the most complex of the processes, the “R”, reintegration, we review Bowd and the recent work of IRGR, Tromsø University. How does the practitioner deal with the dilemma of identifying appropriate metrics to guide planning and evaluate progress? We consider a new school of scholar including Millett and Shibuya, who may be answering that question.

7.1 The DDR Context

In the light of scholarly challenge over the past decade, the conviction of the DDR practitioner based on intangible qualitative indicators and common wisdom, that reintegration support works seems no longer sufficient to support claims of the positive benefits of reintegration support within the context of DDR programmes. Where is the evidence? While a key question that continues, to a great extent, to be debated and represented by various definitions, may be simply what is reintegration, the answer is extraordinarily complex and context specific. This paper asks the following questions. Are IDDRS, as they relate to the reintegration of ex-combatants still relevant and sufficiently responsive in dynamic post-conflict environments, six years after their initial publication? What is the return on investment in reintegrating ex-combatants into post-conflict environments and is it sufficient? What new approaches to reintegration will improve outcomes? What are the opportunities and the threats?

7.2 DDR: the Evolution of the Theory

Kilroy mentions that in 2007, 19 DDR processes were underway in the world, involving 1.1 million combatants with a total budget of $1.599 billion. This represents significant global investment in

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151 An early draft of Chapter VIII was first aired amongst an array of DDR scholars and practitioners at the IRGR workshop at CPS, UiT in October 2012.
152 Walt Kilroy, Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration: The co-evolution of concepts, practices, and Understanding, Program on States and Security, Ralph Bunche Institute for International Studies.
capital and human capital. The questioning of the common wisdom especially as reflected in successive UN Secretary General Reports, that DDR including the associated reintegration support is a vital contributor to peacebuilding in a post-conflict environment is not new. The immediate impact of the initial political and security confidence builders, the disarmament and the demobilisation comes under little scrutiny. However, scholars like Muggah (2005, 2007, 2010, 2011) and Humphries and Weinstein (2004, 2005, 2007 and 2009), through the application of rigorous quantitative methodologies have been unable to confirm tangible evidence of the positive causal impact of reintegration support in DDR programmes. They have been unable to segregate the impacts of DDR programmes from the impacts of multiple other post-conflict peacebuilding interventions and circumstance. They have been calling for re-evaluation of the DDR processes and the development of functional metrics.

The first serious questioning of common wisdom derived practice was launched by Humphries and Weinstein to identify evidence of the benefits of reintegration support through a ‘large N’ survey of over 1,000 ex-combatants engaged in the Sierra Leone DDR process in 2003.\textsuperscript{153} Their chosen methodology of analysis was the application of refined regression analysis. They did not find any evidence. Their subsequent series of papers based on their 2003 dataset, as mentioned above, have pushed this fact in the DDR proponents faces; donor, practitioner and theorist. Practitioners were astonished at the null findings considering their conviction based on qualitative deduction from observation. However, they could not support their conviction with the required evidence.\textsuperscript{154} Pugel using a similar methodology to Humphries and Weinstein in Liberia had opposite findings.\textsuperscript{155} Further, Leao eight years later in a longitudinal study of a small group of the respondents to the 2003 survey,\textsuperscript{156} found that the survey may not have received the honest opinions of the respondents as there had not been an attempt to build any relationship with them and given that the survey was monetarily incentivized.\textsuperscript{157}

Despite numerous new reintegration programmes in multiple contexts, practitioners have been unable to present other than qualitative evidence that reintegration support works. Identifying what works

\textsuperscript{154} Desmond Molloy, DDR: the Qualitative Quantitative Dilemma: an Analysis of Indicators of Achievement as used in DDR Programmes, TUFS, 2009
\textsuperscript{155} Pugel James, What the Fighters Say: A Survey of Ex-combatants in Liberia, UNDP, 2007
\textsuperscript{156} Isabela Leo, Swimming Against the Stream: DDR in Sierra Leone, State University of Milan, (unpublished), Jan 2011
\textsuperscript{157} Eric Shibuya in a comment on an early draft of this chapter sees this phenomenon as “one of the most interesting problems”. That may not only reflect the impact of obfuscation and hedging, if not outright lying by survey respondents, it may also reflect the impact of seeing things differently in 2011 than in 2003.
implies that we know what we want it to do; that we know exactly the expected outcome for the investment being made. A review of UN institutional approach to the reintegration of ex-combatants with or without DDR, is timely considering the rapidly evolving potential demands that may soon be placed on the UN to support countries or regional organisations. This in consideration of the dynamic environment in the rapidly chilling Arab Spring countries, democratizing Burma, perhaps local solutions in Afghanistan, Sri Lanka and Colombia, a refocus on human security (for want of another appropriate theory) in Haiti, various African revolutions etc., in a reality of constricted global economic resources. In late 2012, UNDP’s Bureau for Conflict Prevention and Recovery, (BCPR) has called for a multi-country DDR programme research study that will direct the recalibration of UNDPs approach to DDR. The scope of this study as outlined in the terms of reference and the questions being addressed are an indication of how deep the current questioning is and how far the UN has moved towards the maximalist approach to DDR and that perhaps there is a place for those qualitative indicators.158

Concurrently, DPKO is seeing within its DDR Unit, a consciousness of the evolving environment reflected in the maintenance of strength while changing the guard (senior DDR staff) and, building on those methodologies painfully tested in Haiti and elsewhere from 2006 to date, a continuing focus on the development of second-generation approaches to DDR supported by the appropriate capacity and collaboration.159

From early in the new millennium, DDR planners and practitioners were aware of the weakness of many aspects of DDR design and implementation. Applying the practice of previous programmes in various contexts did not necessarily offer the elements of success expected. The variables of each context were heterogeneous and even a minor shift on the specific critical path offered significantly different trajectory.

In light of that heterogeneity, a body of directing doctrine cannot bind DDR. Rhea suggests that even a body of theory does not exist covering DDR.160 He says that 98% of the documented work on DDR is purely guidance of what works based on experience and as it is not sufficiently critically analyzed, this cannot represent “theory.”161 I contest that this body of documented experience, as reviewed here, does

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158 Millet suggests that this “maximalist approach” is an insurance policy for planning institutions so that they can’t be accused of missing anything important. From Millett’s comments on a draft of this chapter, Oct 2012

159 Molloy, 2009, pp 49-66. *Op cit*

160 Doctrine implies a classified body of well analysed guidance that is widely used and accepted as best practice.

161 In discussion with Randolph Wallace Rhea, who is PhD candidate and the coordinator of the International Research Group on Reintegration (IRGR) at CPS, Tromsø University, Norway, October 2012
represent the theory of DDR offering a range of conceptualization and is the deepest analysis of the practice area that exists.

Following the enlightenment of the Brahimi Report an enabling environment for innovation existed in the UN.¹⁶² Within DPKO this was led by its energetic and visionary head, Jean Marie Guéhenno. This innovation and movement towards integrated (UN working as one) programming necessitated the continuing development of theory and the operationalization of mutually agreed guidelines that would establish foundational principles in order to avoid waste of resources and in achieving desirable outcomes. And so at the operational end, driven by individuals like Kelvin Ong of DPKO and Spiros Demetriou of UNDP, drawing on agency representatives, practitioners and scholars, the collaborative UN IDDRS project was launched. This resulted in a body of agreed and dynamically evolving guidance initially published in December 2006. Shibuya comments that this drive to create common standards highlights the frustration of the theorist, as the best rule is that “there are no solid guidelines as everything is highly dependent on specific context.”¹⁶³

Since the publication of IDDRS, the idea of the evolving character of DDR, changing from a predominately technical logistical process, a technical aspect of a peace process supporting other confidence-building measures (CBMs) that address political and security concerns… Muggah’s minimalist approach (ex-combatants centric) gradually morphed to a more holistic attempt to contribute to positive peace through strengthening human capital addressing also development concerns… the maximalist approach (community centric).

This evolution of the scope of DDR towards the maximalist model has been partially tracked to date by the dynamic adjustment of the IDDRS through the continuous review and development of modules, overseen by a UN Interagency Working Group (UN IAWG) on DDR. This group includes representation by over 20 UN and implementing partner agencies, including the World Bank (WB).

The operation of the IAWG DDR is coordinated by a secretariat, to date located within UNDP, co-managed by DPKO and UNDP and a management team of main agency representatives. The energy and effectiveness of the IAWG DDR has been dependent on the support of donors and the collaborating agencies but probably to the greatest degree, on the enthusiasm, capacity and commitment of individual representatives of the agencies, the personalities, and the coordinating capacity of the secretariat.

¹⁶³ Comments by Shibuya on an early draft of this chapter, Sept 2012.
However, the process has been cumbersome and dependent on broad good will from donors, within the UN and commitment from the engaged individuals. It is debatable if the facilitation of multiple agency interests in this collaborative system has resulted in a focus on the essentials or the timely delivery of necessary guidance. In September 2012, as concerns DDR, there is a sense of flux within the UN system as regards the future direction of DDR. This is reflected in the promotion, rotation and departure of critical DDR managers, funding concerns for the IAWG DDR Secretariat and critical UN Agency and management questioning of the effectiveness and justifiability of the level of investment in DDR in terms of time, human resources and funds. The system of IDDRS administration and review may be under threat, or may indeed have outlived its use. This is particularly so in consideration of the low visibility of the tangible return on that investment.\textsuperscript{164} It seems that, pending re-evaluation of the roles, tasking and potential re-profiling of specific agencies in the context of the integrated approach to DDR, the dynamic review and adjustment process of DDR theory within the IDDRS system has slipped into hiatus. The continuing relevancy of the roles and tasking as outlined in IDDRS is under review, with agencies seen to be making more independent planning, particularly concerning the tensions between security and development outcomes as reflected in the Reinsertion/Reintegration dilemma. The findings of the independent review process are eagerly awaited.

A review of UN approaches to DDR is timely in light of the recommendations of a seminal high-level independent report on Civilian Capacity in the Aftermath of Conflict within the UN system.\textsuperscript{165} This report considers the need for a planned development of the professionalization and re-profiling of the UN system’s capacity to support global post-conflict intervention and peacebuilding into the future in an evolving and dynamic global environment. It envisages continuing resource constraints, working more closely with host countries and the community directed by appropriate policy. The guiding principles espoused by this report are the development of national ownership of intervention processes, increased global partnership, delivery with the appropriate expertise and nimbleness in addressing dynamic post-conflict environments (OPEN)… and suggests to the UN a new way to do business. The recommendations of this report, perhaps the most radical and visionary since the Brahimi Report of 2000, though lacking the accompanying fanfare, are critically important for the future of the UN in

\textsuperscript{164} Millett suggests that consideration is needed also of the cost of not implementing reintegration… another immeasurable aspect of DDR. From Millett’s comments on a draft of this chapter, Oct 2012.

\textsuperscript{165} The Guéhenno Report 2011. The panel drafting this Civilian Capacity Report 2011 is formed of an illustrious array of high profile diplomats and peacebuilders including the following. Jean Marie Guéhenno now retired from the UN; Rubem César Férnandes of Viva Rio; Ameerah Haq, SRSG in East Timor; Bruce Jones of the Brookings Institute; Ambassador Marion V. Kamara of Liberia and formerly of UNHCR; Carlos Lopes of UNITAR, Catherine Pollard, UNASG for Human Resources; Michael von der Schuenburg, ERSG in Sierra Leone and Ambassador Mitra Vasisht of India, formerly of UNDP.
light of the changing global environment. It reflects the recognition of the increasing resource constraints requiring the UN to rationalise intervention approaches that capitalise on its genuine capacities. Further, it tacitly acknowledges the inappropriateness of the UN to continue to field massive and costly missions with foreign expertise, perhaps lacking the requisite regional and national political and cultural sensitivities, to ‘deliver’ post-conflict stabilization and peacebuilding interventions in a paternalistic directive manner. Perhaps this realisation comes in light of glaring examples of the contracting levels of UN political leverage in certain regional interventions. Examples reflecting this phenomenon include the termination of the mandate of the UN political mission in Nepal in 2011, a mission undermined by significant regional hostility to the UN presence; UN failure to influence the conflicts in Syria, Gaza and Eastern Congo in 2012, amongst others.166

The thrust of the 2nd generation approach to DDR as outlined in a somewhat underestimated report commissioned by DDR Section in DPKO in 2010 is in harmony with the recommendations of the Guéhenno Report.167 The 2nd generation approach to DDR that emphasises the stabilization impact of the reinsertion of ex-combatants into the community supported by bottom-up approaches is clearly gaining ascendancy and finding its place in the UN system.

7.3 **ILO contribution to the evolution of Reintegration Theory**

International Labour Office, Geneva, published a 160 page *Guidelines for the Socio-economic Reintegration of Ex-combatants* in 2009 that offers a consolidation of lessons learned to date on the importance of the position of sustainable employment in contributing to a positive outcome in DDR.168

The guidelines lose some credibility as having been launched as a solo-run, being seen by some DDR practitioners to grandstand ILOs institutional position rather than contributing to the development of the multi-agency IDDRS and the UN working as one.169 ILO has a reputation amongst DDR practitioners for offering considerable technical advice for elaborate and long-term labour enhancement strategies in post-conflict environments and DDR contexts without having the resources or the capacity to support the implementation of the advice. This leaves DDR practitioners somewhat perplexed and unimpressed, perhaps with a tendency to underestimate the value of the advice. This

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169 Author discussions with IDDRS focal points from two UN agencies.
review is about to cherry pick from the opening stages of this document to highlight some of the useful guidance offered.

It acknowledges the complexity of the post-conflict socio-economic context, particularly as it relates to employment... and seeing DDR as a priority in peacebuilding, considers employment as a critical aspect of the R of the DDR. Employment creation is therefore central to the post-conflict effort. That employment creation goes beyond DDR and must be linked to all aspects of national socio-economic recovery, for which strategic planning should have started early in the post-conflict planning. The guidelines recommend that sustainable reintegration consist of “both up-streaming conditions for creating an enabling environment in three programmatic tracks at macro, meso and micro levels for boosting job creation... [and] down-streaming more specific and targeted supply-driven measures for reintegrating ex-combatants...” They cite as guiding principles for sustainable reintegration of ex-combatants the following. i) Making employment central to the response; ii) start early and phase interventions; iii) ensure inclusion of specific ex-combatant groups in programme design (i.e. despite the preference for community focused approaches... ex-combatants need special attention), and iv) ensure sustainability.

In following the common wisdom, it advocates greater emphasis on demand driven training of ex-combatants in reintegration programmes (rather than just offering training options to ex-combatants creating a supply driven market, training them for jobs that already exist, contributing to a demand driven market). The guidelines also call for a community-based approach to reintegration contributing to a holistic approach to socio-economic reintegration.

In general, these guidelines offer sound advice and may not be receiving the attention that they require from DDR planners and practitioners. This may be largely because of the degree of integration and collaboration at international and national level, required to contribute to the achievement of the strategic objectives outlined. Though highly desirable, it would require a level of pre-planning and broad coordination that is usually beyond the scope of a discrete, time-bound, budgetary constrained and pressured DDR programme operating in a volatile security environment. However, these strategic considerations can be profitably included as elements of relevant peace negotiations, ensuring that they are included as clauses in the CPA to receive the integrated attention required.

While the informal employment economy is mentioned as a target area for ex-combatants livelihoods, it is not sufficiently addressed. Lamb tells us that “ILO has estimated that the informal income generation comprises 48% of non-agricultural employment in North Africa, 51% in Latin America,
65% in Asia, and 72% in sub-Saharan Africa.”\textsuperscript{170} Given these enormous figures, consideration of the potential is clearly inadequate. Lamb 2011 does make a strong effort to collate relevant information on the rational and potential for better harnessing the informal economy for ex-combatant reintegration in the case of CAR, DRC and S. Sudan in the context of the TDRP. Building on Lamb’s analysis, ILO needs to take on board the implications of seeing the informal economy as a ‘legitimate’ objective for stimulation in the context of enhancement of post-conflict livelihoods.

7.4 What is the status of the UN approach to DDR in mid-2012?

Walt Kilroy looking back to the foundational theory by the early scholars such as Berdal, Colletta, and Kingma, reviews the many challenges in applying DDR effectively in dynamic contexts. However, he predicts the continuing need for DDR in post-conflict environments.\textsuperscript{171} He emphasises the general realisation that reintegration is the most critical element of the concept and the most difficult to implement. Kilroy reminds us citing the UNDP Practice Note on DDR of 2005 that the main beneficiaries of the programme should ultimately be the wider community.\textsuperscript{172}

Drawing from the data of the Escola de Pau series of DDR studies, he points out that 19 DDR programmes were underway in 2007… including programmes that may have been in hiatus or that were dealing only with a narrow constituency of the belligerents in a particular conflict.\textsuperscript{173} Three were in Asia (Nepal, Indonesia and Afghanistan), two in the Americas (Colombia and Haiti) and the remainder in Africa involving a total of 1.1 million combatants.

In reviewing the “success or failure” attributed to DDR programmes,\textsuperscript{174} Kilroy claims that there is a positive view on their impact, though recurrent shortcomings are noted.\textsuperscript{175} These include a neglected gender perspective, difficulty in setting entry criteria and problems caused by interrupted cash flows. However, the main difficulty is usually associated with socio-economic reintegration and the capacity of ex-combatants to find sustainable decent livelihoods.

\textsuperscript{170} Lamb, 2011, \textit{Op cit}, p 12
\textsuperscript{171} Walt Kilroy, 2010, \textit{Op sit}
\textsuperscript{172} UNPB Practice note on DDR, p8 as cited by Kilroy 2010, \textit{Op cit}
\textsuperscript{174} Professor Kenji Isezaki of Tokyo University of Foreign Studies (TUFS), an old DDR hand, contends in discussions with the author, that the use of the terms “success or failure” in relation to DDR is irrational and naïve. What is achieved in implementing DDR is neither, but maybe some level of both. However, DDR is a vital series of processes offering ‘breathing space’ for political and security outcomes to be achieved. The socio-economic outcomes are incidental and often the expectations of short to medium-term socio-economic achievement through DDR in a very disadvantaged post-conflict socio-economic environment are unrealistic. Both Millett and Shibuya address this consideration to some degree later in the dissertation.
\textsuperscript{175} Kilroy, 2010, \textit{Op sit}, cites Berman and Labonte 2006, who assert that the DDR programme in Sierra Leone led to a perceptible reduction in small arms in society.
While the policy recommendations drafted by those earlier scholars remain relevant, the theory is evolving. We are seeing the growth of best practice tool kits such as the IDDRS. Quantitative empirical studies are also arising and he offers the examples of Humphries and Weinstein, 2007 (He didn’t mention their 2004, 2005, 2006 and 2009); Muggah 2005 (amongst Muggah’s prolific output); Kingma 1997; Spear 2002; Batchelor and Kingma 2004; Knight and Ozerdem 2004. In particular, Kilroy draws from the early literature that the participatory approach and bottom-up impetus is critical for ‘successful’ DDR. IDDRS has offered a new best practice tool in the five principles that advise that DDR programmes must be people centered, flexible, transparent and accountable, nationally owned, integrated and well planned.\(^{176}\) Kilroy notes the difficulty in fixing rigorous quantitative evidence of the positive impact of DDR especially in the reintegration phase. He comments on the Humphries and Weinstein large N study of ex-combatants in Sierra Leone and their null findings as regards the impact of reintegration support. He cites Molloy (2009) who contends that skewing factors and difficulties with the operationalization of variables may have hidden positive results perceived in qualitative indicators, from the practitioner’s perspective. Human Rights Watch 2005 as cited by Kilroy attributes a failure to complete DDR in Sierra Leone as a contributor to the re-recruitment of former child soldiers to fight in conflicts in neighboring countries. Shibuya agrees with the comment but asks how do we know when an ex-combatant has “completed” the reintegration process.\(^{177}\)

Kilroy emphasises the current re-focus on the benefits of local participation in, and ownership of the DDR processes (Dzinesa 2006, Kilroy 2008, Ozerdem 2009) while acknowledging the complexity that this offers to implementers. In considering the priorities of the participative approach, Kilroy cites Bell and Watson 2006 in “recognising that [in the implementation of DDR] the ‘how’ is often more important than the ‘what’.”

Robert Muggah has a tendency to clearly identify the contentious issues in the complex world of DDR. His *Innovations in DDR Policy and Research 2010* maintains his reputation.\(^{178}\) In reviewing the DDR literature of the new millennium, he detects the shift from the security-first (minimalist) approach focused on military and policing priorities to a broader development (maximalist) approach that considers the holistic human security aspects of DDR. Further, he tells us, somewhat gratifyingly for a practitioner, that his review of literature detects “the progressive professionalization and

\(^{176}\) Desmond Molloy, “DDR: Niger Delta and Sri Lanka: Smoke and Mirrors?” *Journal of Conflict Transformation and Security*, Vol 1, No. 1, April 2011, demonstrates the relevance of these five principles and how they may be appropriately used to evaluate the potential of a DDR programme.

\(^{177}\) Shibuya’s comments on an early draft of this chapter, *Op cit.*

standardization of DDR practice within the multilateral, bilateral and non-governmental communities”. While early researchers were preoccupied with:

process and practice of DDR as a spatially, temporally and socially bounded activity… [they] seldom considered more fundamental issues of causality and correlation, actor agency or intervention outcomes.

Latterly, researchers are broadening their research areas and analysis to include comparative case studies and statistical assessments seeking more evidenced-based data on what works. These modern researchers are also testing the relationships between DDR and pertinent issues such as the “combatant agency, peace agreements, transitional justice, SSR and state-building.” Muggah tells us that more than 60 DDR processes have taken place around the world since the early 1990s, most in post-conflict environments of various contexts. The preoccupation with such processes has progressively broadened from the ‘minimalist’ approach towards the ‘maximalist’ approach. As DDR is an “inherently political and politicizing process, [designed to] reinforce and extend the reach and legitimacy of state authority,” it has increasingly come under the scrutiny of political and social scientists. He says that in its contribution to development in post-conflict environments, DDR is:

- designed to stem war recurrence, reduce military expenditure, stimulate spending on social welfare, prevent spoilers from disrupting peace processes disrupt command control of armed groups and prevent resort to weapons of war.

In identifying the trends progressively evolving through trial and frequent error during the implementation of the over 60 DDR process since the early 90s, as with Kilroy 2010, he sees a consensus settling on the importance of national ownership. Secondly, he sees that DDR is no longer viewed simply as a technical programme, but as “a technology of stabilization and state-building...” but one replete with political, economic, institutional and infrastructural, and social complexity and

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179 Human security, having been the DDR practitioner overarching guiding principle from the mid-nineties, is an increasingly disputed concept. This particularly since the refocus on security post-9/11, and also in light of a growing cognisance of the implications of its perceived Western value relativism on regional cultural and religious sensitivities, is notably receiving contracting mention in the DDR focused literature by the pragmatic and rationalist school of analysis, of which Muggah might be counted. Despite the commitment of the General Assembly in September 2012, to continue to discuss Human security, the author, in discussions with senior UN secretariat staff in late 2012 was told that the Human Security Concept is dead; killed largely by Japanese over possessiveness and pushiness in the General Assembly.

180 Muggah 2010, *Op cit*

181 Muggah 2010, *Op cit*
limitations. He sees hope in that the complexity and context specificity of DDR interventions are being recognised.

In considering the evolution of policy, Muggah notes the UN initiative in producing the IDDRS and how this prescriptive policy reflects the tensions between the UN approach to DDR and national ownership… often a difficult concept to maintain while insisting on international standards. He also highlights the danger of such a collection of good-practice guidance contributing to ‘template-thinking’ inhibiting flexibility. As in Kilroy 2010, the contribution of SIDDR is mentioned as helpful in underlining the complexity of DDR and its relationship with many crosscutting issues such as SSR and transitional justice. Two other major policy documents mentioned are the Paris Commitments and the Paris Principles on children associated with fighting forces and UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on women associated with armed conflict.

While acknowledging the struggle for results, Muggah contends that practitioners need to support their work with an improved regime of evidence-based analysis and evaluation using appropriate metrics to ensure that impacts and outcomes are achieved. In reviewing the topical programming debates, he considers the implementation dilemma; budget, resources and time versus clear best practice towards more sustainable outcomes, of targeting the ex-combatant versus the broader community. He considers the approach of ‘second generation peacekeeping’ and ‘stabilization’ missions and feels that the jury is still out as regards their efficiency. As regards theoretical innovation, Muggah contends that the imperatives of practice are driving research. Moving beyond the first generational focus on the institutional aspects and rational agency models, the ‘second wave’ of theoretical enquiry is testing assumptions, comparative analysis and the application of rigorous empirical methodologies of political and social science including in attempting to refine appropriate metrics of reintegration success and failure. Muggah’s closing paragraph reiterates the need for humility and effective communications in considering what can be realistically achieved by DDR. A strident and articulate critic, Muggah’s soft spot for the struggling DDR practitioner is, as always, evident in his constructive and encouraging optimism.

Drawing from the recommendations of SIDDR, Colletta et al in their Interim Stabilisation, consider the value, in appropriate circumstance, in the context of armed groups in the volatile immediate post-conflict period, of having the option of providing interim stabilisation measures, ISMs or ISMs.

182 Dean Piedmont of UNDP asks the intriguing question if DDR is intrinsically a political process or is there an emerging dynamic of political DDR, constructed around the process? October 2012

measures.\textsuperscript{184} Such ISMs are in fact CBMs offering a ‘breathing space’, and permitting the maturation of the peace at both the state level and the level of the community. Such measures, designed to specific contexts, while creating options for negotiators, may permit the continuation of the benefits of the relative security, camaraderie, cohesiveness and mutual support and hopefully mutual encouragement for participation by the armed group, a de facto community, in the process.\textsuperscript{185} ISMs may permit a period of orientation and adjustment, perhaps in “a holding-pattern,” to the changing political and social post-conflict environment for the state, the ex-combatants to be engaged in DDR and/or SSR and for the broader community, facilitating the transition from a prioritisation on security to development. The study offers a series of case-study examples highlighting the pros and cons of efforts undertaken in addition to the complexity of the design and implementation of context specific measures. These case studies include amongst others, Hun Sen’s pragmatic “Win-Win Approach” in taming the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia in the mid-nineties; the agricultural engagement option offered to members of the LRA in Uganda and the prolonged cantonments of the Maoist army while maintaining its structural integrity after the 2006 CPA in Nepal.

While the concept of ISMs makes sense, the reality is more complex. The tendency for the disarming and demobilising forces availing themselves of ISMs to seek strategic security and political benefits from the opportunities, particularly in some of the cases cited, is clear. While the Cambodian example is, with humanitarian, human rights and justice based reservations, highly successful, in Uganda, the LRA consolidated and re-launched their campaign of terror, spreading across Central Africa in the ‘cockroach effect.’ In Nepal, the Maoist remained six years in cantonment forging their MLA into a better trained, more cohesive and determined force, leveraging the political environment so that they, over time, achieved most of their original goals, to the extent that now, even generous attempts to ‘buy them off’ are faltering, leaving Nepal in a political shambles.

Piedmont considers ISMs in Afghanistan and South Sudan seeing them as contributing to an “enabling environment [while] the peace dividend can take root.”\textsuperscript{186} In a “structural” approach in Afghanistan (2004-2006) ex-combatants remained under military command re-tasked as civilian de-miners. In South Sudan for 2006-2010 a strategic approach was adopted through the launch of an interim DDR


\textsuperscript{185} See Bleie and Shrestha, \textit{Op cit}

process focusing on specific special needs groups, thus laying the groundwork for what would be recognised as a phased process leading to a more comprehensive DDR programme.

Prinz in a related study considers the element of the cohesiveness of the armed group, in a more specific focus on Non State Armed Groups (NSAGs), as an angle that is worth factoring into UN DDR programme design.\footnote{Vanessa Prinz, Group Cohesion in Non-State Armed Groups Gains and Challenges of Group Reintegration of Former Combatants in Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) Processes, Hamburg, July 2012} The value of the cohesiveness that ex-combatants retained from their camaraderie in and commitment to the armed group is underestimated in the anxiety of DDR practitioners to disassociate the ex-combatants from the armed group.\footnote{Shibuya suggests that Hoffman, African Affairs 2005 also examines this point from a different angle. Shibuya comments on an early draft of this chapter, \textit{Op cit}} The cohesiveness offers a significant coping mechanism in retaining elements of the supportive camaraderie associated with the group and if harnessed appropriately can contribute to socio-economic reintegration. Programme implementers have on occasion, seen this cohesiveness as an asset in relation to the reintegration of female ex-combatants in light of the particular constraints that they have experienced in certain contexts (e.g. Sierra Leone, Liberia and Nepal). Prinz notes the reticence to apply the same logic to male ex-combatants and suggests that this seems to reflect an issue of distorted masculinities on the part of the practitioner.

The Gender perspective in DDR has been the focus of much attention and ‘mainstreaming’ in the evolution of UN DDR theory, including in the IDDRS, and one that planners and practitioners are perceived to have been grappling with in a reasonably successful manner. However, E. Molloy suggests, drawing from her post-structural analysis to “read between the lines” of the UN institutional discourse as reflected in the language of the gender perspective in IDDRS, that the attention given to gender represents an awareness of the complex issues that include power structures, identities and norms.\footnote{Elizabeth Molloy, \textit{Gender and the Discourse of DDR: a Post-structural Analysis of the Gendered Discourse of the IDDRS and the Post Conflict Situation}, EGID, University of London, 2012} However, in considering the passivity of the language used in IDDRS in offering guidance on addressing the gender perspective in DDR, it does not represent a genuine attempt to instigate “action for social transformation.” She suggests that it is “seen to walk the difficult gendered tightrope between addressing traditional imbalance of power and preventing further conflict...” and that in the prioritisation of achieving peace it can be seen as “a tangential issue” that can put that objective at risk. From the author’s perspective, what a post-structural analysis of the language perhaps does not reflect is the determination of many programme planners and practitioners to deliver the spirit of the

\footnote{187 Vanessa Prinz, \textit{Group Cohesion in Non-State Armed Groups Gains and Challenges of Group Reintegration of Former Combatants in Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) Processes}, Hamburg, July 2012}

commitment to the gender perspective in DDR programmes, as in the UNIRP in Nepal that will be considered in the next section.

7.5 Bowd on Reintegration

Richard Bowd takes up the challenge of applying rigorous scholarship to analysing social reintegration of ex-combatants into war-affected communities, as opposed to economic and political reintegration, as an aspect of DDR in Rwanda. Somewhat in the genre of Humphries and Weinstein, he draws, largely from a series of informal interviews, on what people say; the actors, elite, community members and ex-combatants and an ethnographic perspective of communities, considering the impact of reintegration on social capital and reconciliation in the context of peacebuilding. He examines the obstacles faced by ex-combatants in their social reintegration and how they have overcome them. In doing this, he considers the impact of their reintegration on reconciliation “by applying the concept of social capital as a bridge between ex-combatant social reintegration and reconciliation.” His findings are that reintegration does impact on contributing to positive social capital (and to negative social capital in reintegration if not adequately supported and achieved) and points to the requirement for greater focus in DDR implementation on social reintegration in consideration of the transformation of social capital.

In defining social capital he cites Robert Putnam (Putnam 1993a), “the features of social organisation, such as networks, norms and trust, that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit.” Drawing from a review of definitive literature (Putnam 1993a, 1993b, 2000, 2002; Granovetter 1973; Homens 1950 Colletta and Cullen 2001, Woolcock 1998, Woolcock & Natayan 2000, Natayan 1999, Portes 1998, Uphoff 2000, and Fukuyama 1995), Bowd, using a model proposed by Halpern 2005, offers a composite three dimensional picture of Social Capital as a complex system, composed of networks, norms and sanctions at the levels of individuals, communities and nation through the functions of bonding, bridging and linking, that impacts on social cohesion. Social capital, influenced greatly by the security, political and economic environment reflects perceptions and attitudes at its different levels and is a dynamic qualitative phenomenon; a construct that is measured by case specific proxy indicators.

190 Richard Bowd, From Combatant to Civilian: The Social Reintegration of ex-Combatants in Rwanda and the Implications for Social Capital and Reconciliation, PRDU, University of York, September 2008
191 Ibid, p.1
Bowd’s research question is concerned with how reintegration can impact on social capital and reconciliation, his thesis adapts his work to consider how attention to social capital and specifically, perceptions and attitudes, can contribute to ‘successful’ DDR. Trust, communication, cooperation and coordination are critical aspects of both reintegration and social capital. Focus on these elements, in a conflict sensitive manner, permits interventions to influence social capital... [perceptions and attitudes], and to contribute, through “positive transformations in social capital,” to acceptable longer-term outcomes in the context of DDR.193

7.6 IRGR, CPS, Tromsø University, on Reintegration

A recently published trilogy of related and similarly formatted studies by International Research Group on Reintegration (IRGR) based in the Center for Peace Studies (CPS) of Tromsø University (UiT) in Norway, delve deeper into reintegration in the context of DDR through a process of case studies.194 They review reintegration in Nepal, Afghanistan and Somalia in seeking evidence of impact by going beyond the traditional programme focused quantitative metrics and attempting to come at the problems from innovative angles.

The Nepal Study considers the political social and economic environment in which DDR was to be implemented.195 It asserts that the UN “overlooked the critical historical, geopolitical and domestic dynamics for mobilization” of combatants and underestimated the meagerness of its own leverage and could therefore inadequately respond to the local environment leading to the early termination of the UN political mission’s (UNMIN) mandate in Nepal. While the findings of the study are instructive relating to the specific context of Nepal, the innovative framework of the study as reflected in the key organizing concepts is of particular interest in this chapter in the context of asking the right questions in planning, designing, implementing and evaluating reintegration aspects of DDR. That framework considers: a) the general political economy in Nepal, b) an explanatory framework of DDR in the specific context; c) the concept of trajectories... that paths that ex-combatants follow on separation from the armed group and the related variables; d) a multi-centric notion of community... community is not just what ex-combatants return to. Within the armed group, they have also formed a supporting community; e) the concept of engagement and disengagement that permits a focus on the complexity

193 Ibid, p 117
194 IRGR... of which the author is a member.
195 Bleie and Shrestha, 2012, Op cit
of the decision points addressed by an individual undertaking a reintegration process and f) the concept of reintegration in its maximalist interpretation with social economic and political dimensions.

The Afghan study reviews the current Afghanistan Peace and Reconciliation Programme (APRP) through the lens of the same key organizing concepts as used in the Nepal study. The prognosis predicted through this analysis is not optimistic and sees a moment lost in contributing to peace in Afghanistan as weary fighters, disillusioned about the Taliban have failed to receive the expected benefits of the reintegration process, social, economic and security.

The Somali study focus on the social reintegration of ex-pirates through the lens of the concept of disengagement and the process of deradicalisation considering primarily the social, cultural and religious influence on contributing to ex-pirate disengagement.

Taken as an innovative lens offering a focus on heretofore neglected elements of critical importance impacting on the “success or failure” of reintegration, considering specific qualitative metrics, these three studies combine to contribute to identifying the right questions in planning, designing, implementing and evaluating reintegration as an aspect of DDR.

7.7 The DDR Practitioner’s Dilemma.

Muggah does not provide answers to the real practitioner’s dilemma in advising the development of appropriate metrics for DDR evaluation, the question that is driving the current navel gazing, redistribution of resources and rethinking of the DDR paradigm within the UN. While believing that the implementation of DDR programmes has positive impact on peacebuilding outcomes, why is it so difficult for DDR practitioners to provide the metrics, the clear unequivocal evidence of the impact of their efforts or the ‘successful’ application of donor’s funds? Molloy 2009, DDR: The Qualitative Quantitative Dilemma suggests that the problem is too great a focus on quantitative indicators of achievement while the primary contributions of DDR to peacebuilding outcomes are qualitative. Those indicators of achievement dictated in the programme document tend to be static and do not reflect the reality of the dynamic post-conflict environment nor the changing DDR context. He recommended the establishment of a system of mainstreamed dynamic monitoring and evaluation (M&E) within all

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aspects of programme implementation. This involves the progressive reflection on both quantitative and qualitative outputs, weighting them appropriately in accordance with their perceived impact on the programme, evaluating in a process of triangulation, and progressively adjusting the programme indicators of achievement to reflect the reality of the programme developing priorities and the achievable results.

This methodology was piloted in the UN Interagency Rehabilitation Programme (UNIRP) in Nepal from 2010 and is ongoing, demonstrating extraordinary results in a very adverse environment. Frequent informal management meetings draw from the verbal and routine written reports of the regional offices and prioritise actions, making the required changes immediately. The informal and formal reporting systems are supported by an integrated management information system called Comprehensive Reintegration Information Management System (CRIMS) designed and created by the UNIRP IT and Reporting staff. The dynamic M&E is a management tool rather than purely an evaluation tool facilitating a more proactive approach to programme innovation, effectiveness and efficiency. The routine analysis of feedback and adjustment, has resulted in Nepal in the development of highly innovative and effective gender approach addressing the specific Nepali contextual gender constraints to Maoist female ex-combatants enjoying the benefits of full participation in their reintegration support option. Further it also facilitated in addressing difficulties associated with masculinities. The mainstreaming of a conflict sensitive approach to programme implementation supported by dynamic M&E facilitated rapid identification of ‘dividers and connectors’ between the community and the programme. This led to the adaption of a Do No Harm approach to programme delivery; the adaption of health support, identification of the need for strengthened psychosocial counseling, the design of effective career counseling, job placement and micro-enterprise support systems.

This DDR (“Rehabilitation”) in Nepal, UNIRP, could not in itself be projected globally as an example of ‘successful’ DDR. It was a very contentious pilot launched in adverse conditions where the Maoists even objected to the term DDR. It succeeded in attracting just more than 50% of its potential caseload (just over 2,200 of 4008) and was a process focusing on a vulnerable group, minors and late recruits to the Maoist army, which were ineligible for formal DDR support, taken up by the UN on

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198 Kees Kingma, at a reintegration conference in Tromsø in October 2012 suggested that such mainstreamed “dynamic M&E” is otherwise called “management”! The author will not argue this point but suggest that giving a name to this particular method of management helps to focus on effective implementation.

199 Do No Harm, see Mary Anderson, *Conflict: Lessons from Field Experience*, CDA, Cambridge, 2000

200 See Bleie and Shrestha, 2012, *Op cit*
humanitarian motivations. It was disowned by the Maoists as offering too little support for their cadres whose expectations they had greatly inflated and initially also by the Government of Nepal as addressing a group of Maoists that had no eligibility for support. It thus, until close to completion, reflected very limited national ownership. However the programme persistently strove to reinforce aspects of national ownership, gleaning some success in latter days. In the absence of national commitment or ownership early in the programme, the beneficiaries could expect little support for the sustainability of their achievements in the programme. How much support they can expect in the political shambles currently afflicting Nepal is yet to be seen. Despite these challenges, the innovation of the UNIRP currently being recorded in a proactive knowledge management process being led by Kees Kingma, and the developing professional capacity of the UNIRP team, offer a myriad of replicable gems that will improve the delivery of DDR globally. Further, UNIRP succeeded in establishing an integrated approach with four UN agencies (UNICEF, UNDP, ILO and UNFPA), close to the UN “working as one”, in a relatively harmonious relationship, each agency working to its institutional strengths. This demonstrated that integration based on a foundation of inter-agency respect in a collaborative arrangement could offer the synergies targeted in the much-debated concept of UN integration. Such piloting and testing of innovation, particularly the inclusion of qualitative analysis through dynamic M&E will impact on the evolution of DDR theory

7.8 Shibuya and Millett: A New school of DDR Scholar and the Answer to the DDR Practitioner dilemma?

Shibuya comes close to answering the question of those practitioner dilemmas. 80% of his book, *Demobilizing Irregular Forces*, is a systematic movement through the processes of DDR, extracting the major issues as highlighted in a broad range of literature. In his final chapter, Challenges and Conclusions, he focuses on his personal analysis and invoking the ubiquitous Rob Muggah, he asks that critical question; does DDR work? He reminds us that Muggah points out that there is little evidence that DDR works. If Muggah is right, then there are three possibilities. First, DDR may be a chimera offering only an illusion of achievement; second could be that it is being consistently oversold,

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201 Shibuya comments that in Afghanistan the idea of “national” identity is so weak and/or contested that the idea of “national” ownership may be meaningless, and that government buy-in might be the most one can hope for. He notes that while Nepal has neither national ownership nor Government buy-in, the UNIRP may be working better than DDR in Afghanistan. Fragmented identity and limited “national identity” is also an issue in Nepal. This merits further investigation. From Shibuya’s comments on an early draft of this chapter. *Op cit*

202 Robert Muggah, Desmond Molloy and Maximo Halty, “(Dis)integrated DDR in Sudan and Haiti: Practitioners’ Views to Overcoming Integration Inertia”, Muggah (ed) 2009, pp206-225, *Op cit*

and third, researchers and practitioners may not have been looking at the right things. Shibuya suggests that in considering the relationship between DDR and peace, there are enough ‘points of success’ in DDR to indicate that perhaps the latter two conclusions are the more likely.

Shibuya says that the most important element in DDR is the perception of progress, growing confidence within the population. This is difficult to quantify and is therefore poorly accounted for in assessments. He cites the greatest challenge to DDR as being unrealistic expectations that are frequently generated and exploited for political purposes and suggests greater effort by planners and implementers in managing expectations. Citing a point from Hazen in Civic and Miklaucic, 2011, he advises that if ‘complete’ reintegration is unrealistic from the outset, the use of more limiting terminology such as the term ‘reinsertion’ might address some aspects of inflated expectations.

He cites Themnér’s “Catch 22” question… if reintegration does not work, why do most ex-combatants not return to violence [and why do we keep doing it]?\(^{204}\) Themnér suggests two answers. The reintegration phase buys time and permits a ‘cooling off’ period for combatants, or, savvy ex-combatants have started to consider reintegration assistance as a right and so, governments/international agencies are forced to offer it, even if it doesn’t work. Shibuya again cites Muggah in his reference to the Humphries and Weinstein survey that despite finding no evidence that reintegration assistance contributed to sustainable peace, did identify an increased perception of security after the implementation of the DDR process. Shibuya says that this is “an extremely important insight [that] suggests a need for more subjective measures of performance.” This might better articulate some of the frustration expressed by Molloy regarding these findings and cited by Kilroy... It isn't about the quantifiable metrics... it's about the perceptions... and their impact on confidence and trust.

Shibuya goes on to discuss the planner/practitioner dilemma that Muggah has also focused on, the short-term minimalist (security-first) approach or the longer-term maximalist (development) approach. What is DDR supposed to achieve? He concludes here that there isn’t a universal answer that can be slotted into theory. It is case specific and the balance depends on circumstance. What is clear is that planners and practitioners of DDR need to be ready to take risks. The level of those risks deemed as acceptable must be calculated on good information and sound analysis of the expected return, particularly in relation to its impact on trust and perception.

In considering the other dilemma under heady debate, Shibuya asks whether DDR is an integrated concept or three processes implemented in a phased manner. He cites Civic and Miklaucic in suggesting that the development of the acronym has perpetuated the misleading perception of a "singular character" of DD and R. Shibuya says that perhaps not all phases of DDR need to be implemented at all, where doing so would be counterproductive. A phase could be omitted. If the focus remains on increasing peace and security, then stakeholders in DDR must be ready to see "an acceptable level of failure" in any phase of the programme, where the return on investment in achieving success in that particular facet of the programme, in terms of peace and security, is negative. This implies a dynamic assessment of the progress of the programme and careful weighing of the application of resources and effort. This is a very insightful observation by Shibuya and reflects the daily struggle of DDR program practitioner... where effort is often required to be spent on what are ultimately non-essential elements in maintaining adherence to principles or traditional programme structure. He advocates substance over form.

Another insightful observation is, drawing on elements of the civil-military collaboration in Iraq and Afghanistan that the focus of effort should be on maintaining good relations rather than on best practices. DDR is only one element in a complex set of processes contributing to peace. Planning and coordination with the complementary elements and assuming the capacity to accept levels of risk where doing so improves the capitalisation in the complementary processes are critical. This requires an environment of trust amongst actors. Sound leadership establishes trust with the ability to create a collaborative environment based on shared motivation. That includes the macro-level of collaboration, between the citizens and their communities and the communities and the government.

Having discussed the eternal argument of the efficacy of targeting reintegration support exclusively on the target group of ex-combatants or onto the broader community... Shibuya philosophises that these discussions are more important than the answers... that will always be contested. He derides the penchant for large organisations and practitioners to “template successful practices... to mechanise success”... irrespective of the idiosyncratic contexts of DDR environments. With a focus on the “underlying rational”... awareness must be retained that perfection will not be achieved in 'success' and that “certain levels of failure may be acceptable”. To a great extent, security, like community or nationalism, is "imagined." DDR is about creating that perception of security. This implies that the key

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to DDR is communications... management of perceptions, particularly regarding the levels of 'failure' that are acceptable.

The dilemma of national ownership is also considered in the light of the potential subversion of the peacebuilding objective to contribute to a post-conflict government's power base, often to the exclusion of significant ownership of the processes by civil society. The international community knowing where to draw the line in insisting on standards in what is intrinsically a national political process is problematic.

In considering the challenges in the evaluation of DDR programmes, a revealing and accurate statement by Shibuya is that in light of the difficulty in measuring the real impact of the processes, "agencies tend to fall into the trap of using measures of effort rather than measures of effectiveness."

Reverting to his earlier comments about the importance of relationships, he states that in communicating insights in an integrated approach to DDR, particularly so between military and development professionals, personalities are more important than organisations. Having the right people in place that will develop the functional relationships is critical. Some of his final thoughts are music to the ears of the beleaguered DDR practitioner, questioning his/her own relevance in seeing his hard fought efforts under a deluge of scholarly scorn and even cynicism. Shibuya reminds us that often "the things that can be measured are not the things that matter." He cites Kilcullen in equating the required flexibility in the field of DDR with that of COIN

The challenge for commanders and assessment staffs is... not to template previously developed metrics, but rather constantly develop and apply new indicators, based on a shared diagnosis of what the conflict is, and what is driving it.²⁰⁶

Millett in the conclusions of his soon to be published edited work on DDR that offers nine case studies, also focuses on the difficulties of measuring impact in DDR programmes.²⁰⁷ He reflects some of the views as expressed by Shibuya that perhaps scholars, not taking sufficient cognisance of the heterogeneity of various DDR programmes, have been looking in the wrong place. Being an advocate of the concept of CBMs, he, like Shibuya, looks beyond the quantitative metrics. This represents a development of scholarly consideration of DDR that may be addressing the dilemma and resetting the

²⁰⁶ David J. Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency, Oxford Press, 2010
heretofore unarticulated qualitative basis for the common wisdom, intuition, gut feeling of the DDR activist; funder, planner or practitioner, that these activities are indeed a sound investment.

Millett notes the importance of the engagement of international and regional organisations beyond the UN and NATO to include regional economic organisations such as OAS, EU, AU and ECOWAS, not only for their local cultural sensitivity and technical capacity but also for their capacity to focus attention and funds. Like Shibuya, he mentions the tendency to attempt to replicate success, often with disastrous results and also the exaggeration of expectations of what DDR can deliver. DDR needs to “strike a balance between what should be done and what could be done.”

As regards disarmament, he mentions the US penchant for gathering weapons, not referring to how fast the US tends to be pumping arms into where they might better influence their interests. He does however, with some reservations, raise a flag regarding the value of arms 'buy-backs'. He considers the necessity to support disarmament with improved controls on the trafficking of small arms, border controls, addressing organised crime, weapons legislation, etc. While mentioning the value of intelligence in supporting a disarmament process, he does warn on the potential risk to a DDR programme of coercive activity that can undermine the confidence of armed parties to the programme in their own continuing security, an occurrence that could undermine the momentum in the disarmament process. This was certainly an issue that arose in the activities of the UN Stabilisation Mission in Haiti during 2006 to 2008, in its dealings, both civil and military, with armed gangs, through the activities of its Joint Mission Assessment Center (JMAC), an issue that gave rise to particular tensions between the DDR Section and the JMAC.208

Security during and after the formal demobilising is also a priority. It is at this point that the 'crosscutting' issues and matters of the heterogeneity of the demobilising group tend to come to a head, female ex-combatants, children, dependents, gender perspective, transitional justice, SSR, disgruntled ex-combatants and spoilers, etc. Occasionally, in the case of incorrigible spoilers, the peacekeeping force will feel obliged to engage with credible deterrence, sometimes to the extent of using lethal force. Reintegration is the critical carrot that has drawn the mass of ex-combatants into the process, including the disarmament and the demobilising. Despite doubts and misgivings regarding its impact, it is indispensable. A point of consideration is that while economic regeneration is critical to offer absorption capacity for ex-combatants into sustainable livelihoods, “economic recovery itself does not guarantee successful reintegartion”. Dedicated funding will always be necessary. Funding is often the

208 The author was Chief of the Integrated DDR Section of the UN Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) from 2004 to 2007.
crux. In the current global economic uncertainty, it can be expected that there will be increasing difficulties to properly fund reintegration aspects of DDR programmes and international organisations and governments will be seeking more innovative and less capital heavy approaches to dealing the ex-combatants. This may see the 'crosscutting' aspects of DDR suffering most. Failed reintegration increases the chances of increased crime and a return to armed violence.

The relationship between SSR, rule of law and DDR was clear in several of the nine case studies reviewed in Millett's book. The critical factors have been the existence of political will for it to work and the professional competence of those charged with administering it. In this case nothing succeeds like success. Clear progress in these areas is the foundation for building continuing political will.

Millett draws attention to the disturbing and growing trend of the increasing privatisation of security. Often, in a poorly regulated sector, companies and individuals are of dubious provenance and may contribute more to problems than solutions.

In his sum up he notes the lack of consensus as to where DDR is going. He sees the problem, in light of the heterogeneity and complexity of DDR contexts, as not just learning from the past, but in knowing which lessons to draw. He sees the necessity for the right personality on the spot at the right time. Local knowledge and sensitivity are also critical. “Success is hard to measure and failure hard to conceal.” Quantitative metrics are dangerous and open to misinterpretation or even spin. The qualitative indicators are equally important. Measuring the success of DDR while the conflict is continuing is meaningless. This is a post-conflict process. We do not know where DDR is going until the fat lady sings. Millett mirroring Shibuya’s analysis, says that if the wrong questions are asked, the answers are irrelevant. Is violence decreasing? Are reintegration beneficiaries employed? Is community security improved? Is public confidence improving? Such questions are the key and “emphasise the continuing nature” of the DDR programme. As such, the national ownership, linkages between the international intervention and follow-on government programming and potential sustainability of the programme are critical.

Commitment, patience, caution and humility are the qualities… especially humility. We will only know for sure how DDR went after decades when the conflict has not returned.

7.9 Chapter VII Review

Shibuya comments here that while a focus on reinsertion over reintegration may be an option, better and more comprehensive understanding of the potential for economic development in the community and the options for sustainable livelihoods should be developed at the negotiation and peacekeeping stages of the peacebuilding processes. Shibuya’s comments on an early draft of this chapter, Op cit
DDR remains a theory and practice under scrutiny, despite broad supporting common wisdom, in light of the inability to identify agreed evidenced-based metrics to contribute to planning and evaluation of progress or achievement. Some scholars are even asking if DDR has theory at all. We trace the evolution of the theory, the scholarly questioning and the efforts to develop appropriate metric to facilitate evidenced-based analysis. Despite a decade of searching there is still not an agreed answer. The UN is now undertaking a search of its own. We see the movement towards a broad ‘maximalist’ approach to DDR beyond the ex-combatant-centric focus to community-based approaches. A rethink of IDDRS beyond a UN driven concept may be timely in light of increasing demand for support in an environment of tightening resources and capacity and more assertive regional and cultural sensitivities.

In considering complementary mechanisms and concepts, we review ideas on Interim stabilisation mechanisms (ISM); the value of ex-combatant cohesiveness, a phenomenon usually shunned in DDR processes and the reality of UN commitment to the gender perspective in DDR. Bowd considers the role of reintegration is transforming social capital and contributing to reconciliation in the community. The IRGR develops key organising concepts to facilitate the study of reintegration; political economy, context, separation trajectories, multi-centric notion of community, the concept of engagement and disengagement and a maximalist interpretation of reintegration with socio-economic and political dimensions.

The practitioner’s dilemma is primarily the failure to identify the agreed metrics for planning and evaluation purposes. The new school of scholar, and practitioner/scholar suggests that we have been asking the wrong questions. The functional metrics are not the quantitative metrics that have been heretofore the subject of focus... but qualitative ones... the perceptions and attitudes of the people that DDR is contributing to their interests.

Chapter VIII.
DDR: The Threats and Opportunities

**DDR is a concept under threat.** A US neo-conservative perspective sees DDR as synonymous with SSR, a function of security and US agency in the ‘shock and awe’ mode, to be tackled by “going in heavy” and at scale. Such a perspective is missing any commitment to people-centered approaches, to the overarching philosophy of human security. Linked to this threat is the current tendency to privatize and sub-contract the delivery of both in-conflict and post-conflict interventions to for-profit motivated PMSCs, in view of diminishing capacity and resources in the usually altruistically motivated IOs. Is the trend unavoidable and can the inherent dangers be mitigated?

Opportunities also abound. The consideration of regionally, culturally and religiously sensitive approaches to DDR/SSR through support for nationally owned and Islamist-led DDR/SSR in the Arab Spring countries offers considerable potential. Current UN soul-searching in relation to its approach to DDR is timely.

### 8.1.1 The Threat: DDR and SSR: Subversion of the Theory

“Maybe if the US rulers would not privatize everything in sight and sell it off to cronies, things would work out.”

Adaptations and convergences in the evolution of DDR theory can be detected between the evolving doctrine of Counterinsurgency (COIN) occurring in the experience of US/NATO forces and “the partnership of the willing” in Iraq and Afghanistan; many offering positive potential to both COIN and DDR. However the following review focuses on an evolving mindset within the US neo-conservative heartland that conveniently lumps SSR and DDR together to be dealt with through an iron fist of US mass and agency. Such a mindset mirrors the US neo-conservative opposition to the application of cultural sensitivities, time and human resources to win the people in the COIN context. The shifting of its gaze onto future potential DDR and SSR processes; lucrative markets, fusing them together, while ignoring both their often independent characters and the principles of the UN approach to DDR,

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211 In considering global civil/military industrial complex values of trade, it is estimated that in the region of 50% emanates from the US civil/military industrial complex; weapons trade, private security/ military services, etc., a particular focus on the US aspects of this trade’s impact on DDR/SSR is legitimate.
threatens to discredit the practice area and obliterate the overarching human security imperatives that have guided the evolution of DDR theory to date.\footnote{212} Laporte-Oshiro, drawing from the findings of a meeting of the USIP Working Group on SSR in September 2011 offers a disturbing demonstration of a conceptual convergence in the minds of US neo-conservative security professionals towards a hardline approach to COIN and the implementation of DDR.\footnote{213} It exposes the continuing arrogance and tendencies of the US right to apply mass, dominance and agency in its international interventions, including in the sector of DDR. The conclusions and recommendations of her paper are based on a very selective and indeed revisionist spin on recent US experience in SSR and DDR. They demonstrate limited concern for the outcomes of such processes for the host nation, lacking a people-centered approach, an extraordinary sense of US agency and seem to emanate from the perspective of the interests of the post-Afghanistan/Iraq US military industrial/services complex. These may be timely recommendations to address the interests of those recently enriched and euphemistically termed private military/security companies (PMSCs), predominantly US with a significant number British and South African, often viewed as corporate mercenaries not withstanding a dramatic increase in their use by the UN.\footnote{214} The recommendations are advising that the US in a post-Afghanistan period, must prepare to address SSR and DDR scenarios purely in the context of “consolidating legitimate force in the hands of the state” by “going in heavy, tackling DDR and SSR in tandem and consolidating US capacity to implement both tasks in a coordinated, scalable way.” Considering only a security perspective, they see SSR and DDR as critical interlocking processes in contributing to the return of the monopoly of force to the state. There is no evidence in this paper of consideration of the concept of human security. Without specifying details, the recommendations cite the US experience in Afghanistan, Iraq, Liberia, Haiti, Bosnia and Kosovo as contributing to these lessons. Certainly there are many lessons to draw from the US engagement in both SSR and DDR processes in these examples. Conceding that the considerable experience is

\footnote{212} UN Principles of DDR implementation; people centered, integrated, national ownership, accountability and transparency and sound planning.

\footnote{213} Alison Laporte-Oshiro, “From Militant to Policemen: Three Lessons from U.S Experience with DDR and SSR”, PeaceBrief 115, USIP, 17 Nov 2011. Panel members in the 11 Sept 2011 meeting of the USIP SSR working group, include Ambassador James Dobbins, RAND Corps; Lt Gen David Barno (retd), Center for New American Security; Ambassador John Blaney, Delotte Consulting LLP, Melanie Civic, Center for Complex Operations; Robert Perito, Director of USIP’s Security Sector Governance Center. The piece also draws on inputs from noted conservative and defense industry friendly scholars such as Seth G. Jones of RAND Corp.

\footnote{214} Lou Pinjegot, Dangerous Partnership: Private Military & Security Companies and the UN, Global Policy Forum and the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation, New York, June 2012. Further, Shibuya suggests, “in many ways, the PMSCs can be seen as a distorted reflection of the UN itself, and international community of like minded individuals working together.” He also points out that the founder and CEO of Blackwater, Eric Prince, has committed that “Blackwater will never work for a group whose interests are counter to US policy.” (Prince omitted to say that this is relevant as long as Blackwater is being paid by the US...) British PMSCs like Executive Outcomes and Sandline have never aligned their corporate philosophy with such national interests. Drawn from Shibuya’s comments on an early draft of this chapter.
‘checkered’ is something of an understatement as most experienced DDR practitioners would contend that the cited DDR engagements, particularly those DDR examples demonstrating a typical U.S. focus on weapons “buy-back” or the application of force, were, debatably and from a human security perspective, failures. The jury is still out regarding SSR and DDR in Afghanistan and Iraq, but it is difficult to be optimistic. The focus on US interests in the UN implemented Liberia DDR of irregular forces in 2003, parallel to the US PMSC implemented SSR process, contributed to a massive overrun in beneficiaries, time and cost; 102,200 rather than the 39,000 initially estimated, 8 years rather than the 3 originally estimated, costing $100 million rather than the $40 million budgeted. They were apparently focused more on cleaning up weapons supplied to the rebel faction LURD (the most significant anti-Taylor faction active predominantly in the north west of the country including in Lofa County) by the U.S. rather than on any commitment to DDR. The weapons collected in the US Marine supported DDR programme in Haiti in 1994 are still turning up in gang related crime in Port au Prince. In Kosovo, the conversion of the often criminalized and oppressive KLA into a coherent force, debatably with the prime objective of ensuring support for the preservation of US land-based aircraft carrier, the biggest US base in Europe, Camp Bondsteel, may certainly have addressed US interests but has not contributed significantly to improving the quality of democracy in Europe.

In Afghanistan, DDR implemented under the NATO/ISAF mandate, the ANBP, elements of which can be considered successful if weight of hardware collected is significant, while the programme did achieve its strategic objectives, it was the responsibility of Japan, not the US. As the disarmament of

215 Richard Millett, (2013, *Op cit*) mentions that US Ambassador Blaney personally carried home some ‘Redeye’ missiles from Liberia. One presumes that this refers to Redeye FIM-43, man-portable surface-to-air missile system 1961-1985, shoulder-launched anti-aircraft heat seeking. This missile system was replaced by the Stinger FIM-92 by 1985... a system shared with the Mujahedeen in Afghanistan with devastating impact on Soviet helicopter capability and popularly acclaimed as a game-changer during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Their presence in North Western Liberia in the hands of LURD in the early two thousands is highly significant. Considering that the UN in neighboring Sierra Leone was highly dependent on the use of helicopters for movement and resupply and on the formidable Mi 24 helicopter gunships to prevent infiltration by armed elements along the Sierra Leonean north eastern frontier with Liberia. Though, also presumably, the intended target of these particular Redeyes would have been Charles Taylor’s air capacity (small number of Mi-2 and Mi-8 Soviet era helicopters in a very dubious state of maintenance). Certainly, as Chief of UN DDR in Sierra Leone at this time (92-94), the author was not aware that LURD had Redeyes.

216 Wolf-Christian Paes, “Eye witness in Liberia”, *International Peacekeeping*, No 2 Summer 2005 and Desmond Molloy, “DDR and the Pitfalls in Liberia 2003-2006”, Unpublished, (Posted on academia.edu.com, 2011) In Civic and Miclaucic, *Op cit*, pp 175-181, the UN SRSG in Liberia in 2003, retired US reserve brigadier general Jacques Paul Klein admits that the priority at the time was the rapid collection of weapons. Such a priority was hardly developed with any level of consultation with DDR expertise within the UN system.


218 The author experienced this criminality within KLA business interests first-hand as Head of Finance and Administration and president of a contracts board for a UN agency in Pristina in 2000.
the selected heavy weapons of the Northern Alliance was underway in Afghanistan in 2004-2005, the US was in fact busy rearming their favoured warlords.\textsuperscript{219} The premise that “there is no good time to start SSR or DDR” is contrary to international experience and practitioner evidence based perception, but one presumes that the priority behind this statement is not host nation or human security requirements, but U.S. interests. The reference to a “golden hour” of opportunity that exists early in a post-conflict environment contradicts this premise. Admonishments against “light footprint approaches” are typical of the neo-conservative arguments in the polemic against the General Tommy Franks COIN “soft approaches” early in the Afghan campaign.\textsuperscript{220} Ignoring the potential of Nye’s “Soft Power,”\textsuperscript{221} this draws on the Galula, Nagl and Jones colonialist perspective favoring the exclusive agency by the occupier.\textsuperscript{222} The first lesson citing the necessity for US “going in heavy” completely ignores the potential for ‘local solutions’ and denigrates the concept of ‘national ownership’.\textsuperscript{223} It ignores the fact that US capacity has not delivered positive results in any of the examples cited or indeed, in those not cited where mass, technological superiority and ‘firepower’, in every sense of the word, were applied, and failed. The rationalization that when you fail with a specific policy, keep doing it until you get it right is what Jacobsen has referred to as repetition compulsion in relation to the application of firepower and mass in the ‘shock and awe’ policy in Iraq.\textsuperscript{224} This recommendation coming from the same neo-conservative mindsets that led to the US defeat in Viet Nam and the gross ambiguity and absence of long-term vision in both Iraq and Afghanistan seems to be directing the US down the same path of repetition compulsion as regards its engagements in SSR and DDR, but to do it bigger.\textsuperscript{225} The second lesson cited is that DDR and SSR must be tackled in tandem and reinforces the prioritization of an overarching philosophy of the security focus in addressing both SSR and DDR.

\textsuperscript{219} Kenji Isezaki, Disarmament: The World through the Eyes of a Conflict Buster, Published in Japanese by Kodansha Gendhi Shinho in Jan 2004, Translated into English in 2011 pp 122-123.

\textsuperscript{220} General Tommy Franks, first commander of US Forces in Afghanistan had entered Afghanistan envisaging a “light footprint approach” to COIN with no more that 10,000 foreign troops. Jones Seth (Jones, “Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan” Counterinsurgency Study, Vol 4, RAND, 2008) claims that in this intention, he was drawing the wrong lessons from the Soviet experience in Afghanistan. He says the lessons drawn should have not been about numbers, but about how they waged the war, conventional v. unconventional.


DDR is not only a security concept. While the disarmament and demobilisation processes have major security considerations, DDR is primarily as civilianizing programme. It is certainly political, but it is debatably in the realm of human security. While DDR can be an aspect of SSR, it is not universally addressed in tandem or dependent on SSR. There are tensions and complementarities between the two and each must be designed in cognizance and consideration of the other where they occur together, but they are not interdependent and while related, should not be intrinsically linked. When SSR is about making security forces more effective and context specific it is a security driven concept while DDR is ultimately a human security driven concept about putting arms beyond use in the context of developing community security.\(^{226}\) Human security views state responsibilities as including but being beyond that of security by simply maintaining a monopoly on the use of force. The social, political and economic responsibilities considered in the context of a social contract are equally important. The third lesson that US capacity must be consolidated to do DDR and SSR at scale ignores the primary lesson that should be drawn from the wealth of experience mentioned or omitted, is that the hubris of the U.S. neo-conservative right and the oversimplification of the security paradigm in the recent past, ‘\textit{a la Rumsfeld}’, has usually led to disaster.

\subsection*{8.1.2 Privatisation of DDR Interventions}

Modern approaches to DDR are confirming the efficacy of the commitment to bottom-up approaches; to community based approaches and in implementing Do No Harm Mechanisms in addressing community violence reduction (CVR). While USAID certainly can claim significant successes in certain programmes addressing violence reduction through competent implementing partners with a commitment to human security, such approaches are not to the fore in any of the examples cited in the context of the prioritisation on security. Under severe capacity constraints, particularly since the dramatic scale-up of needs in Iraq and Afghanistan, USAID and the State Department in particular, have been required to sub-contract programme implementation to a limited number of facilitated bid, reduced tendering process and rapidly engaged contractors such as the enormous Chemonics, PAE or Dyncorp.\(^{227}\) In considering the extent of the inherent threats associated with the privatisation of post-conflict intervention and development business, particularly in the case of US funded interventions,

\footnotesize{\(^{226}\) Shibuya points out that when SSR is about “legitimizing” the security forces as the upholders of rule of law and civil protection, it crosses into the realms of Human security. He comments that critical consideration of Weber’s assertion on the state and the monopoly on the use of force, must emphasise “legitimate” (legitimacy being decided by the people) monopoly on the use of force. From Shibuya’s comments on an early draft of this paper. Op cit

note an article posted on the Devex website in August 2012 that outlines a proposal penned by US Rep Steve Chabot (Republican) with bipartisan support and referred to the US Foreign Affairs Committee in July 2012.\textsuperscript{228} It calls for an interagency mechanism that coordinates all overseas development with the private sector... “to leverage the private sector expertise.” It requires that the private sector be engaged in the integrated planning of country development programmes; consulted when “developing country, sector and global strategies.” The article, in an understated way, suggests that advocates of rights-based, humanitarian approach to aid and those who support an altruistic approach to aid may not be happy!

This commercialization of aid is undermining the provenance of US post-conflict and development interventions, and through this, the subversion of the purpose of peacebuilding and development aid. This adversely impacts on global perceptions of western peacebuilding and development aid in general. The current US interest in SSR and DDR in the Arab Spring emerging (or entrenching?) nations is one potential example that could be subject to this phenomenon.

In a continuing absence of self-awareness, no account seems to have been taken of the global prejudice, general anti-Americanism and rejection of US military and private military and security contractor arrogance, particularly in response to US cultural and value-based insensitivity in third country interventions; what the Canadian COIN Manual refers to as value relativism and moral absolutism.\textsuperscript{229} Nation states tend to respond better to local solutions to their security and political problems, resolved in accordance with their cultural values and offering an appropriate normative system.\textsuperscript{230}

Muggah (2010) suggests that practice is moving beyond the traditional civil-military paradigm, probably reflecting the difficulty of developing the appropriate capacities within the security and development institutions, to greater dependence on sub-contracting to private security contractors. This might also reflect, to some degree, the increasing and aggressive political lobbying power of those contractors, and greater collaboration with national governments. The ability and preponderance of private security firms to ‘lobby’ national governments to favor their utilization is also a factor that can influence the selection of the agency undertaking the task.

From a comparative perspective, the PRT experiment in Afghanistan and Iraq has demonstrated the organisational and cultural difficulties in an “all of government approach” or the “Comprehensive


\textsuperscript{229} Canadian Army, Land Force, B-GL-323-004/FP-003, 2008, Op cit

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“Comprehensive Approach” in this context in a civil-military environment. The stuttering attempts to co-opt social science, as the Minerva project and the Human Terrain System in the US COIN marriage to the War on Terror, should have proven that civil-military coordination, particularly in the US case, means the dominance of military priorities. This is irreconcilable with either a social-scientific approach or the human security motivation of most in the professional social-scientific and humanitarian sectors. Taking Nagl’s assertion, supported by Kilcullen, that the U.S. military institution is not a learning organisation a step further, we could apply the same thing to the associated support-base for the military industrial/services complex. From the cultural and values based constraints to the complexity of civil-military cooperation, these recommendations demonstrate either that US hawks really haven’t ‘gotten it yet’ or that the concerns for the future role of the military industrial complex in the emerging world, particularly of the security services sector, are predominant.

Go in heavy, implement in tandem, whole of government approach, integrate capacity, US agency and resourcing; essentially this piece is about money rather than about results based interventions or either “successful” SSR or DDR. It ignores the dilemma of ‘agency’ and such an approach is ominously gaining traction. It is capitalizing on the tangible reducing capacity, human resources, funds, commitment and indeed the partial withdrawal from these sectors by international organisations like the UN and the WB in their engagement in SSR and DDR. These international organisations are, forced by funding constraints and as evidenced in the UN efforts to implement the recommendations for civilian capacity development as outlined in the Guéhenno Report of 2010, striving to focus more and operationalize their institutional strengths. While this effort will certainly necessitate development of an innovative approach to manning peacebuilding interventions, in opening the door to less than altruistically motivated private contractors, it will soon pose a serious threat to the design, planning and implementation of both SSR and DDR programmes.

PMSCs, mainly US, but also British, South African and Russian, many now facing reducing engagement in Afghanistan and Iraq having expanded their purview and capacities, have consolidated

231 “Comprehensive Approach”, this is an integrated cross-government and civilian-military approach to delivering COIN, designed to maximise collaboration and develop synergies in an effort strengthen local government and “win the people”. The Comprehensive Approach is clearly a parallel with the UN focus, since the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, the Brahimi Report of 2000, on Integrated Programming.

232 The Minerva Project, a fund of $50 million launched by US Secretary for Defence Gates in 2008, to encourage scholarly engagement, particularly social science, to focus on cultural concerns in security related issues, including the implementation of COIN in Iraq and Afghanistan. Human Terrain System (HTS), Human Terrain Teams (HTT), a system of embedding social scientists into US military formations in Iraq and Afghanistan to support COIN operations, Both of these initiatives are opposed by the American Anthropological Association (AAA) as subverting the application of ethnographical science. From Kelly, 2010, Op Cit.

233 John Nagle 2002, Op Cit
cozy relationships with governments and allegedly with policy making senior UN officers; enjoy nebulous accountability and limited legal constraints, questionable human rights records, unconstrained by the human security paradigm and are avaricious. In the US case some operate lobby groups on Capital Hill and are not subject to the standards of international law. The ‘infiltration’ of fundamentally humanitarian programme implementation by PMSCs is not an ambiguous threat. It is already happening, having seen their allocation of formal UN contracts increase by 73% from 2009 to 2010.\textsuperscript{234} This is happening in an environment of absence of transparency, clear policy or regulation. The current trend sees the PMSC industry also beginning to extend its tentacles beyond just Defence Sector Reform (DSR) related DDR as in Liberia in 2004 -2006, into broader DDR of irregular armed groups, an area seen as a lucrative growth sector, but for which PMSCs are poorly profiled or motivated.\textsuperscript{235} The feeding frenzy in the industry has already started. In late July 2012, US technical engineering and construction company GEOtest is among many speculators advertising for SSR and rule of law experts to implement programmes in Libya. US construction companies seeking DDR experts for work in Arab Spring countries have recently contacted the author.

The dangers posed by the use of PMSCs to handle security issues in international interventions are reflected in the debacle of the truncated interventions of US led (including former CEO of Blackwater Worldwide, Erik Prince) private security contractors (with alleged CIA collusion and funding from the United Arab Emirates) in Somalia in 2012. This intervention saw the creation of the Puntland Maritime Police Force with predominantly South African mercenary engagement in training. Trained teams of Somali military pirate hunters have been abandoned in the Somali desert as the funds expire. Further, a UN investigative group has uncovered a network of collaborating private security companies led by the secretive Sterling Corporate Services with registered offices in Dubai, a reimagining of the notorious mercenaries contractor Saracen, that have colluded to create a “brazen, large-scale and protracted violation” of the arms embargo in Somalia.\textsuperscript{236}

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{235} The task of SSR-DDR of the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) was contracted by the US State Department to the security contractor Dyncorp with the training of the restructured AFL to Pacific Architects and Engineers (PAE), from Josef Teboho Ansorge and Nana Akua Antwi-Ansorge, “Monopoly, Legitimacy, Force: DDR-SSR Liberia”, \textit{Monopoly of Force}, Eds. Melanne Civic and Michael Miklautz, National Defence University Press, 2011
\bibitem{236} Reports of the Panel of Experts and Monitoring Group on Somalia as well as the monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea. \url{www.in.org/sc/committees/751/mongroup/shtml}, (accessed Oct, 05,2012)
\end{thebibliography}
The for-profit motivated contractors may lack commitment, sustainability, human security or principled consideration, or even basic altruism. They are, apparently, neither constrained by the parameters of international law nor international diplomatic protocols. Thus, they are often leaving a bigger problem than they were originally contracted to resolve.\(^{237}\)

Thus, in the short-term, the threat of anachronistic ideological driven vision and profit motivation, coupled with a proposed sledge hammer power and mass methodology bodes ill for the prospects for DDR, particularly in countries deemed to be under the US sphere of influence.

8.1.2.1 Potential regulation of PMSCs activities in conflict/post-conflict interventions

There is an awareness of the threat accompanied by some efforts to regulate the industry. Legally non-binding guidelines, a code of conduct for the activities of PSMCs in armed conflict were initiated by Switzerland and the ICRC in 2008 resulting in the Montreux Document and agreed by seventeen states, including the US, UK, China, South Africa, Ukraine, France and Germany.\(^{238}\) This self-regulatory guide, while imposing little compulsion, offers consensus in relation to the obligations of states as regards international law, international humanitarian law and human rights law concerning the activities of PMSCs during armed conflict. It considers contracting states, the states in which PSMCs are operating and the home states of PSMC actors. However, the Montreux Document focuses on the responsibilities of states and does not consider the actives of PMSCs or ‘rehatted’ commercial mercenary companies in post-conflict environments or working with the UN.

Ase Gilje Ostensen in SSR Paper 3 has reviewed how the UN uses PMSCs and has recommended a way forward in 2011.\(^{239}\) He notes the increasing prevalence in a broad range of UN family agencies, programmes and funds using them and a noted absence of either transparency as regards policy or controls in relation to contracting. He specifically mentions their use in SSR and DDR, apparently convoluting the two practice areas, just as Laporte-Oshiro’s paper does. While suggesting that the UN should be the agency to globally regulate the activities of PMSCs, he feels that it should initially regulate its own practices in contracting PMSCs. In an ideal world the UN would not be contracting PMSCs but, in light of capacity constraints, the practice is unlikely to recede in the near future. He


\(^{239}\) Ase Gilje Ostensen, “SSR Paper 3 UN Use of Private and Military Security Companies: Practice and Policies”, DCAF, 2011 (Kindle for iPad)
advises that a way of regulating the practice would be for the UN to endorse the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Providers, associated with the aforementioned Montreux Documents. The UN would only contract PMSCs that are signatories to the code. While not addressing the issue of the need for a human security perspective, this would permit the UN to hold PMSCs accountable through contract termination or other sanctions in the event of human rights or international humanitarian law breaches, offering some improved protection to the institution.

The author suggests a more direct method of addressing the threat through the adaption of a code of conduct based on the currently voluntary EU strategy 2011 to develop a commitment amongst business to corporate social responsibility (CSR), as defined in ISO26000 Guidance Standard on CSR. However, appropriate regulation can be achieved by creating a code of Corporate Human Security Responsibility (CHSR?) based on ISO26000 to cover the activities of all agencies, funds, programmes and corporate entities working in conflict/post-conflict interventions applying public funds. By making adherence to this code a contractual obligation, the threat of unethical and conflict insensitive corporate activity that is not people centered, can be reduced.

8.2 The Arab Spring and a reboot with Islamic-led DDR

The Arab Spring countries in the Middle East North Africa (MENA) region have seen the uprising of the people against authoritarian regimes that were retained totally by the application of the security apparatus of the state. From that perspective, changing the system implies considerable SSR. Such dramatic SSR may need to be closely linked with a supporting DDR process. The nexus is inherent and in this circumstance we see analysts discuss SSR and DDR as two aspects of a joint process. Thus, as we consider the potential for SSR in Arab spring countries, we are also considering the utility and appropriateness of using DDR as a way to affect SSR. Usama Butt approaches the SSR/DDR conundrum in the Arab Spring countries in this way. His paper “SSR and the Islamists in the Arab-revolution Countries” is unique in considering this perspective and offers a challenge to the global institutional approach to both SSR and DDR in Arab Spring countries and flags some critical points that suggest the need for a new way to approach both. It is reviewed here in some depth.

242 Usama Butt, “SSR and the Islamists in the Arab-revolution Countries” 1-SSR issue no 4, IISA, 20 August 2012. Usama Butt is the Director of the Institute of Islamic Strategic & Socio-Political Affairs (IISA).
In his introduction, noting a distinct lack of enthusiasm by the international community for SSR in MENA pre-Arab spring, he asserts that where internationally led SSR and DDR have been attempted in the Islamic world, it has tended to deteriorate the environment rather than improve it (e.g. Iraq and Afghanistan). Successful SSR and DDR have tended to be nationally led operations. The Arab Spring or Arab-revolution was not about ousting personalities, but it was about ‘breaking the system’ (Asqat al Nazam). “The security sector is the face of the ‘system’.” Simply, the entire revolution is a “proto-SSR protest” in each respective country. That revolution is on-going and is struggling in most of the countries (Yemen, Tunisia, Libya and Egypt), while Syria has not reached that stage of revolution yet. Butt contends that SSR and DDR are inseparable from the revolution:

SSR seeks to reform the very system the revolutionaries have fought against. With this cohesion of interest; SSR can become not just any policy but ‘revolutionary policy’ [...] Since SSR is a highly political process [...] it has the potential to become ‘revolutionary politics.”

This is critical in an environment of poor capacity and poor record of implementation of SSR/DDR together with the tenuous approach of the western donors towards SSR since the start of the Arab Spring. SSR/DDR badly implemented may undermine the revolution.

In free and fair elections in MENA countries, Islamists will come to power (Fuller, 2004). Butt notes that they “will be the key actors to implement SSR [DDR]”. Islamists have been the victims of the security system that they will now be required to reform. As SSR/DDR remains a “western-driven agenda and practice, [...] the Islamist’s relations with the west is a key issue for successful reform...,” if the process is to be funded by the west. The security sector remains Islamist-sceptic and this will complicate an SSR process. Civil society itself remains polarised between an Islamist mindset and “liberal/secular trends.” The potential tensions between civil society and state with Islamists in power will further complicate the SSR process. Further, there is the potential that an Islamist victory can ignite a security sector backlash, as it did in Algeria.

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243 Ibid, p 3. Piedmont suggests that these failures of DDR may have been because DDR was not an appropriate tool in those circumstance... “Doing DDR differently might mean not to do DDR at all e.g. Haiti!” From comments by Piedmont on an early draft of this dissertation, 9 May 2013
244 Ibid, pp 3-4
245 Ibid, p 4
246 Ibid, p 5
247 Ibid, pp 4-5
248 Ibid, pp 4-5
Butt highlights the fact that the west has tended to misperceive the term ‘Islamist’ as a generic term; a misperception largely stemming from the narrative of Bush’s ‘war on terror.’ In fact there exists a spectrum of Islamists from “modernists, democrats, fundamentalists to Salafist, and militant Jihadists (both national and trans-national) etc.” Thus, “the intentions of Islamists are also widely contested.”249 Everything is not about ‘Shariatising’ the state. Butt cites several authors in claiming that “New Islamists” (Mandaville 2007, Carrie as cited in Mandaville) are open to the democratic political process. He notes the current gradual [and clearly, tentative and perhaps disguising... ['cloaking'... ] transition in the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) as an example. Butt undertakes a literary review (notably, all by western authors... Butt, 2011. Rogers, 2010. Booth, 2007. Eapoaito, 1999. Wickham as cited in Mandaville 2007. Mandaville, 2007. Roy 2002. Strick Van Linchoten and Keuhen, 2012.) in analysing the complexity of the Islamist relations with the modern nation state.250 It is indeed complex and Butt summarises:

Realities may be quite different from the myths. Islamists are not a monolith entity and predominant Islamists discourse is aware [...] on issues relating to democracy, human rights and pluralism, etc [... and they tend to be] more willing to engage with the modern state on a modern footing, however with some clear Islamic reference. However, [...] mostly ‘regime-security’ centric [states are] somewhat ‘reluctant’ to incorporate the Islamists.251

This does not preclude the potential for SSR/DDR from an Islamist perspective, either with international/western and Islamist government engagement, once the ground-rules are clear.252 Prior to the Arab Spring in MENA countries, “the resurgence of Islamic revival or Islamism,” was in fact contained by the security sector, often using the most brutal means. However, this gave voice to the Islamists to call for “participatory politics and democracy.” However, with the exception of Turkey, regimes and their security sectors tended to harden. 9/11 brought about a less critical form of support from the west, especially from the US, for this hardening towards securitisation, that saw the:

foundational tenets of [the] SSR concepts like democratic governance, accountability and transparency being shunted aside in favour of more militarized form of ’security and

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249 Ibid, p 6  
250 Ibid pp 5-10  
251 Ibid p 10  
252 Ibid,
development assistance that has often undermined and contradicted principles of democratic governance.*

Butt cites Isezaki (2004/2011) in the context of Afghanistan in saying that this represented a “misjudgment in SSR largely by superpower, i.e. the US, that causes[d] fundamental damage to stability.”

Despite the US drive towards securitisation during this post-9/11 period, the EU in its SSR support, tended to retain more focus on controlling migration (to the EU) and offering context specific SSR assistance tailored to the needs, particularly of the Maghreb (North African, predominantly Mediterranean) countries.

The SSR model being promoted by the west was generally top-down with little input by civil society, specifically the Islamists. Prior to the ignition of the Arab Spring, SSR efforts “were largely symbolic, sporadic, interest-based, securitized and at best, incoherent.”

In post-Arab Spring countries, with the exception of Libya, a strong (and contrary) security sector remains intact. This will offer a major challenge to any SSR/DDR effort by an Islamist led government. Noting how the west has failed in delivering successful SSR in Islamic countries to date (Iraq, Palestine, Afghanistan), it is wise to consider successful ‘home-grown’ efforts such as Indonesia, post-Suharto... a good start retarded by a “disproportionately powerful” military. The jury is still out as regards SSR in Turkey but an “Islamist lite” government does seem to be making headway.

Hamas, with “its ideological roots deeply embedded in the Egyptian MB”, is perhaps a terrorist organisation to the US and the west, but has gained the local legitimacy amongst its constituency as a “a blend of liberation movement and Islamist religious group.” Hamas has, according to Butt, to a large degree, done the SSR job in Gaza. This is despite the complexity of the conflict relations and overlapping areas of security responsibility with a generally dysfunctional Fatah in West Bank. Butt assesses in detail the level of that Hamas success. They returned a rule of law to Gaza based on Islamist principle and a ‘human security’ based on Islamic values, in a community-focused security approach, and they achieved effective SSR. The key point is

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254 Ibid, p 12
255 Ibid.
256 Ibid, p 14
257 Ibid, pp13-14
that they did this without external assistance. SSR efforts have failed in the “corrupt” West Bank, despite western assistance with a focus on technical assistance rather than governance and institution building. ($450 millions worth from the US and the EU since 2007)

In relation to SSR/DDR in post-Arab Spring states with Islamist governments, Butt is cautiously optimistic. Political power, despite continuing distrust, brings about improved engagement between the west and Islamists; a move towards realism in addressing polarised civil society and a more accommodating “New Islamist” perspective leading to levels of “auto-reform.” This “divergent, changing and modern” form of Islamism offers entry points for western supported SSR/DDR.

There are caveats. It must be an Islamist shared SSR project and a top-down model must be avoided. One can expect that any Islamist SSR/DDR collaboration with the west will be cautious. SSR/DDR will need a locally driven Islamist owned approach with less “strategic direction” than the west has shown heretofore and more “political will.” A key challenge remains the willingness of the strong security sector to be reformed as they face the dilemma of seeking both continuing power and a new sense of legitimacy following a revolution that sought to ‘break the system’ of which they are the face.

Butt does a round of the current situation. MB is in a delicate environment in Egypt with President Morsi and the MB attempting limited top-down SSR to appease the people. It may not work. Libya has so far avoided the advances of the US and UN in assisting in SSR/DDR and has turned instead to Jordan, Turkey and Qatar for training, (not that any of these countries have a record in this field). In Tunisia progress has been smooth but hostility to the Islamist government is rising. It may be open to western led SSR/DDR.

However, among Islamists there is little cohesion and no serious discussion of issues of concern including regarding the willingness of Islamist governments or those in waiting to undertake SSR/DDR. Butt advises that they need to start talking and Islamist governments should be undertaking SSR/DDR processes. Such processes would “seek clear reference to Islam or Islamic system of justice (Adl) and [...] may remain western-sceptic.”

In a discussion on this matter with leading Islamist, Prof Khurshid Ahmed, Secretary General of Jama’at Islami (JI), Butt was advised:

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258 Ibid, p 15
259 Ibid, p 16
260 Ibid, p 18
261 Ibid p 19
that the Islamist led SSR ought to conceptualise on three basic principles:

1. Islamic concept and practice of Adl (Justice) and Ihsan. Where Adl may stand for deliverance of duty and rights, Ihsan (excellence) is one step further. It goes beyond deliverance of rights and duties leading to a participatory society. Together an Adl wal Ihsan approach should serve as a fundamental principle for SSR process.
2. Education and awakening
3. Leadership Integrity

He further argued a complete focus on ‘human security’ approaches and the need of securing Islamist governments from the security sector. 262

Butt concludes that for a successful Islamist led SSR/DDR experience, Islamists must learn from the western successes and failures, in addition to the successes of Hamas etc. He suggests that a “regionally integrated formula, inspired by the principles of Islam and in consultation with western-led SSR donor community may be the right way forward.” Within his think-tank, IISA this is called I-SSR (Islamic world led Security Sector Reform). He emphasises that the term ‘Islamic’ is a cultural reference rather than religious, that encourages Islamic-led formulas and models. 263

In addressing necessary SSR and DDR processes in the post-Arab Spring countries it is clearly time for the international community, particularly the western donors pressing for stabilisation and skeptical of the Islamic agenda to consider a new way to do SSR/DDR that respects the regional culture and aspirations. The embrace of I-DDR may offer solutions to complex problems of national and regional security and superpower interests. How divergent cultural approaches to crosscutting issues are approached and addressed, e.g. the gender perspective, will probably dictate the capacity for inter-cultural collaboration.

8.3 The Opportunities: The UN approach to DDR

Despite the challenges and the threats, particularly those posed by the evolving convergence of the neo-conservative application of US COIN methodologies to the implementation of DDR, the prospects for the progressive evolution of the UN approach to DDR and especially the reinsertion and reintegration phases are positive. In the current flux within the DDR worlds in both DPKO and in

262 Ibid
263 Ibid,
UNDP while the activities of the IAWG DDR may be somewhat stunted, a new focus is developing on the essentials and on the more efficient application of institutional capacities in DDR.

DPKO is clearly adding impetus to its 2\textsuperscript{nd} Generation approach to DDR, going beyond support to disarmament through the inclusion of a reinsertion phase associated with demobilisation, a consideration that takes it, together with the development agencies, into the community. Piedmont suggests that the innovation in the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Generation is that it works in the environment to facilitate enabling conditions.\textsuperscript{264} DPKO is seen now to be maneuvering the appropriate staff at HQ level and the development of constructive collaboration throughout the organisation, notably with the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) and WB.

BCPR, UNDP has called for a research study of its engagement in DDR, specifically reintegration. The study is to utilise case studies to examine the appropriateness in approaches to reintegration writ large. A review of the published terms of reference (Sept 2012) emanating from various UNDP country offices in seeking tenders associated with this research study offers an insight into the depth of the current questioning and an indication of the importance now being placed on the broader impacts, primarily qualitative, of reintegration support.

Globally, UNDP, in coordination with other UN agencies, funds and the WB (MDRP until closed in 2009), and in multiple contexts with or without a PKO, is currently engaged in DDR in fifteen countries with a key focus on nine. In 2010 approximately $265 million of voluntary funding was channeled through UNDP in support of reintegration of ex-combatants. UNDP has developed considerable experience in the engagement of DDR programmes over the past twenty years and developing good practice; experience reflected in its contribution to the establishment and implementation of IDDRS and its continued contribution through the IAWG DDR. The experience has seen a progressive evolution of the DDR paradigm in approaches within the Early Recovery concept to include Community Security (CS) and Community Violence Reduction (CVR) to collaboration with DPKO’s 2\textsuperscript{nd} Generation approach to DDR.

The proposed research study will review achievement in seven DDR processes; Burundi, Cote d’Ivoire, DRC, Kosovo, Nepal, Somalia and Sudan, all cases that have DDR mandates and UNDP is assessing the Reintegration component. It will consider particularly the sustainability of DDR initiatives in the context of their political, socio-cultural and economic livelihood dimensions. The findings will

\textsuperscript{264} Piedmont’s comments, May 2013, \textit{Op cit}
contribute to the development of UNDP policy and strategies for support to the reintegration of ex-combatants.

It proposes to “define or redefine the theory of change implicit in the design of reintegration programmes;” to identify the relationship/convergence/integration with other parallel programmes being implemented in-country and to review lessons learned and best practice in the context of sustainable and relevant political social and economic reintegration. It expects to identify the evidence of benefits, consider the socio-economic impacts at national and local levels and identify direct supports and social benefits to both individuals and community. It will review the levels of participation of community in the process through “mechanisms of community based reintegration and community security” and to identify aspects of national mechanism for sustainability, through a process of deconstructing DDR-R and re-examining approaches.

The specific research questions proposed are equally instructive being posed under the headings of effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability, relevance and impact. They go beyond the traditional quantitative metrics and delve into qualitative results such as synergies at a national and community level. They question UNDPs institutional comparative advantage in delivering its responsibilities in such programmes through a process of SWOT analysis. They consider the efficacy of UNDP M&E systems, the sustainability of impacts, the effective operationalization of appropriate partnerships, the relevancy of programme design to the national and local context, the identification of broad impacts and the establishment of appropriate knowledge management systems. Such a research study, with appropriate recommendations efficiently and effectively operationalized, coupled with UNDP collaboration with DPKOs strengthening of its 2nd Generation approach, offers exciting prospects for the synergetic evolution of the UN approach to DDR into the future.

8.4 Chapter VIII  Review

The concept of DDR is under threat. US neo-conservative think-tanks aligned with the military are approaching DDR as synonymous with SSR and, following selective and revisionary review of US experience to date, are recommending US agency is addressing DDR/SSR in their sphere of interest by “going in heavy”... in the mode of ‘shock and awe’, addressing them together and at scale. The approach recommended is a pure security and US interests-based perspective, devoid of human security consideration. This threat is linked to the strengthening tendency to sub-contract in-conflict and post-conflict interventions such as DDR to for-profit motivated PMSCs. This threat is driven by
the diminishing capacity and resources of the altruistically motivated IOs such as the WB and the UN; the current availability of multiple PSMCs due to disengagement in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the emergence of neo-conservative motivated national policy supporting the privatisation of such interventions. While the tendency seems irreversible, the threat and resulting damage can be mitigated through the introduction of a regime of regulation, beyond current limited voluntary regimes of self-regulation pertaining to human rights or war crimes in conflict. New regulation could be either at a treaty or contractual level that would oblige private companies to comply with principals of human security and people-focused approaches to implementation in peacebuilding environments. There are also opportunities to strengthen the implementation of people-centered approaches to DDR. Butt suggests the need to consider the resistance to what are viewed as western value-laden implementation of DDR/SSR through support for nationally owned, regionally, culturally and religiously sensitive Islamist-led DDR/SSR (I-DDR/SSR) in the Arab Spring countries. The UN is currently soul-searching as regards its approach to DDR and may be beginning to ask the right questions in considering the qualitative aspects of perception and attitudes as the principal outcomes in DDR.

Chapter IX

DDR: The Theory and the Practice:

Chapter IX briefly reviews the process of tracing the evolution of the theory of DDR in the first eight chapters, bringing Part 1 of the study to a close. It considers the cycle of scholarly and practice-based
contribution to that evolution of a human security based theory, considering the threats and the
opportunities. It advocates the requirement for a ‘rebooting’ of the theory and practice in addressing a
dynamically evolving global environment. It dwells on the predominant practitioner and scholar
dilemma of identifying the appropriate metrics for evaluation and observes the realisation of the
criticality of the qualitative metrics of perceptions and attitudes of the people. In setting the scene for
Part 3 of the study, it draws attention to the multiple security dilemmas inherent in the processes of
DDR, the management of which has decisive impact on those perceptions and attitudes, and ultimately
on outcomes.

9.1 DDR Theory and the deficit in Practice

From the outset in the late nineteen-eighties in Central America and the post-cold war reduction in
conflict in Southern Africa to the present day, DDR theory and the practice has evolved beyond a
simple confidence building contribution to a peace process, addressing security dilemma and offering
political breathing space and/or an activity to reduce expenditure on security. It is now considered
an essential process, approach, vehicle, programme or operation, offering multiple impacts in
contributing to regional and national post-conflict recovery. Which configuration is dependent upon its
objective and context, DDR can take on any of these characteristics. In the complexity and dynamic
nature of heterogeneous regional and national political, social and economic contexts, the clear
definitive objectives of specific DDR programmes have been difficult to fix and to track with a
capacity to attribute causal effect directly to the DDR programme. Acknowledging that the
reintegration aspect of DDR is the most complex aspect of all, much scholarly and practitioner
attention has focused there. In developing the theory, since 2006 IDDRS has offered a toolbox of
lessons learned and best practice to guide the UN approach to DDR programme design and
implementation. However, the IDDRS process is cumbersome and slow in formulating the required
guidance to a dynamically evolving practice area. With UN multi-agency institutional will to support
the process strained and perhaps personal commitment of the founding enthusiasts exhausted as they
progress in their careers, together with the dramatic evolution of the global/regional conflict and post-
conflict contexts, the continuing relevance of the IDDRS process is in question. Perhaps the most

265 Nat Colletta, Marcus Kostner and Ingo Wiederhofer, War to Peace Transition in Sub-Saharan Africa. 1996; Kingma Kees and
Vanessa Sayers, Workshop Brief No. 4 “Demobilisation on the Horn of Africa”, Proceedings of the International Resource Group on
Disarmament and Security in the Horn of Africa (IRG), 4-7 December 1994, held in Addis Ababa, published June 1995; Millett, 2013,
Op cit
266 Piedmont’s comments, May 2013, Op cit
sustainable relevance of IDDRS is in offering a body of policy guidance that supports the five main principles of the UN approach to DDR: people centered, national ownership, integrated, accountable and transparent, well planned.

Further, groups such as the IRGR of Center for Peace Studies, University of Tromsø (UiT) are developing new analytical frameworks with which to study the environment for reintegration, contributing to planning design, implementation and evaluation and identifying the appropriate metrics, either qualitative or quantitative. Such Indicators of achievement, if they exist in general rather than specific contexts, have not yet been defined that permit identification of the benefits of the enormous resources being applied especially to ex-combatant reintegration in the context of DDR. At least scholars and practitioners are beginning to consider if the right questions are being asked.

The changing contexts within global order are influencing the evolution of multiple conflict issues. Potential trouble spots include the impact of the US wind-down of engagement in Iraq and Afghanistan; the prospects for global conflict in the context of the (chilling?) Arab Spring; problematic polarized superpower approaches to conflict in Syria; the democratization of Burma; nuclear Iran; posturing North Korea; the issue of the South China Sea island ownership struggle and the growing military and economic influence of China; increasing Western austerity and the potential for further calls for UN engagement. Threats of damaging subversion of DDR theory and practice by diverse global approaches exist, particularly the convergence of US heavy-handed approaches to COIN methodology with DDR implementation, and the aspiration of for-profit organisation (PMSCs) to impose a very narrow interest form of DDR/SSR devoid of human security motivation. Implementation of DDR programmes without due consideration for long-term human security will create conflict environments for the future. In spite of the approaching tsunami of for-profit motivated implementers in post-conflict interventions, the task of altruistic, rights-based and scholarly motivated institutions is to strive to create an enforceable code of conduct (CHSR?) to place DDR where it belongs, being owned by and serving the people of the host-nations. It is time to refocus on elements of human security, a currently unfashionable term that guided the development of many of the better practices of peacebuilding.

A ‘realist constructive’ UN approach to DDR is timely. It is necessary to be in a position through possession of the appropriate leverage, to clearly demonstrate to political powers, donors and institutions that the
common wisdom regarding the perceptions that DDR well implemented in the context of human security is beneficial, are based on fact; facts that may be either quantitative or qualitative.  

DPKO seems reasonably confident of its strategy for future engagement in DDR, in light of agreements towards collaboration with WB and the UN Department of Political Affairs, empowered by the acceptance of its 2nd generation concept in addition to global circumstance directing it back towards traditional DDR. UNDP, in line with the current UN institutional consideration of civilian capacities in the organisation, is soul-searching while rapidly distancing itself from DDR per se. It has launched a research study to investigate its current policy and strategies with the objective of re-profiling and recalibrating its policies to better and more synergistically apply its institutional capacities to economic reintegration. It does appear that UNDP may now be beginning to ask the right questions; thus refining its engagement and commitment to the longer-term needs of DDR-Reintegration and related livelihoods issues. The prospects for both organisations, DPKO and UNDP, as leaders of the UN approach to DDR, and the prospects for a strengthening in the delivery of reinsertion and reintegration support to ex-combatants through second-generation and community based approaches in a maximalist interpretation of DDR, are positive, provided competent and experienced leadership is placed in key management positions in this practice area. 

Major tensions remain within the theory supporting the practice of DDR. Such tensions revolve around the multiple dilemmas and paradoxes that arise in the complexity of dynamic crosscutting security, political, economic and socio-cultural and religious issues that make up conflict/post-conflict societies. These issues are accentuated in the potential for an aspect of ‘clash of civilisations’ in attempts to apply what are considered western value-laden concepts of DDR in the stabilisation of post-conflict Arab Spring countries being led by Islamists. These issues are further complicated by the unpredictability of the most complex of all conundrums, the human condition.

267 Consider J.Samuel Barkin, Realist Constructivism: Rethinking International relations Theory, Cambridge, 2010

The concept of ‘realist constructivism’ as conceived by Barkin is an approach to international politics that balances consideration of facing reality ‘head-on’ and addressing it in a traditional ‘realist’ way with using ‘soft’ constructivist approaches to changing the environment to achieve desired outcomes.
In tracing the evolution of DDR theory, it is clear that lessons learned in practice are applied more in theory than in practice. The primary lesson to be drawn from a review of the theory must be that the key to gaining positive outcomes in applying the theory of DDR is to address that human condition... in insuring that locally owned processes address the perceptions and attitudes of the relevant stakeholders at a sub-national level, the communities.

In comparing the theory with practice, it is clear that the critical components of local perceptions and attitudes, though often mentioned in theory, have tended to be neglected in practice. This is particularly in light of a range of broad dilemmas, security and otherwise, that place implementers in difficult positions from the perspective of political imperatives; security considerations; timing, resources, human and material, and professional capacity. The impact of neglecting these ‘security’ dilemmas on outcomes in DDR, their convergence with similar security dilemmas experienced in COIN and the potential benefits of addressing them will be discussed in Part 3.

An Unlikely Convergence: Evolving Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) Theory and Counterinsurgency (COIN) Doctrine

Volume 2

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Part 2 The Evolution of COIN Doctrine
CHAPTER X

Insurgency and Counterinsurgency (COIN): The emergence of the Doctrine

Opening Part 2 of the study that traces the evolution of COIN doctrine, Chapter X briefly considers the fundamental concepts influencing the context under which COIN is implemented; the State and sovereignty, international law and individual responsibility, human rights and social contract in addition to considering the concept of value relativity. These concepts exist in an environment of differing interpretations of the meaning and position of the concepts of human security and responsibility to protect (R2P).

10.1 Fundamental Concepts: the Context of Counterinsurgency

Counter insurgency (COIN) strategies and activities have been developed and implemented for as long as aggrieved groups have taken up arms in insurgencies to overthrow incumbent governments, to gain autonomy over their own entities or to shake off the shackles of grievance and oppression. The primary interest of this section is the evolution of the doctrine of COIN in the post-World War II era, a time predicated by a growing hunger for democratisation and self-determination throughout the world, heralding a rapid escalation of epoch changing revolution or counterrevolution and decolonisation leading to the creation of new states joining the ranks of independent peoples. The cold war and its dependent proxy wars spawned a rash of insurgencies often in those newly independent states. The fall of the Soviet Union and the realignment of global power gave rise to new tensions. This is carried into the current era marked by a revolt against the forces of globalisation by those small numbers who find their cultural identity, religion and existence under threat; wielding a new and effective weapon, in its modern form a product of that very globalisation, international terror.

In considering the context in which COIN is implemented one must review some critical fundamental concepts. The concepts of the State and Sovereignty, first formalised in the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, debatably considered as marking the beginning of the modern era, when the princes of Europe and the Holy Roman Empire agreed on the ultimate authority and responsibility of leaders within the

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269 The massive counterinsurgency activities of the Nazi Wehrmacht, together with collaborating forces, throughout occupied territories, which demonstrated how an immoral power can apply raw terror, retribution and disproportional collective punishment on non-combatants of the communities that might thwart their will, and how that failed, though not forgotten, will fall outside the scope of this study. Its contribution to the evolution of COIN doctrine may have been a warning that such behavior has long-term negative impact. So too the many post-WWII counter insurgencies of oppressive regimes in South and Central America, Iberia and Greece where the sledge hammer approach to COIN resulted in longer-term defeat of the oppressor. I have selected relevant examples based on their global importance to the evolution of doctrine and their contribution to this dissertation.
geographical boundaries of their own states. While the treaties focused particularly on autonomy regarding the state religion, they established the equality of states in law and formed the basis of the foundation of the UN with every member state, irrespective of size, having an equal vote in the General Assembly. Westphalia established the state as an entity rather than the personal property of its ruler and placed an absolute value on sovereignty. However, such values as the territorial integrity of states remained within the political elite of Europe and did not curtail the era of colonisation of peoples beyond Europe or the subjugation of weak neighbors and further remained more about authority over the vassal state than any obligation of responsibility to the citizens. As noted by the Secretary General of NATO in 1998, the principles of humanity and democracy were essentially irrelevant to the original Westphalian order….and “the principle of sovereignty that it relied on also produced the basis for rivalry, not community of states; exclusion, not integration.”270

Together with the concept of sovereignty, the principle of responsibility to citizens by the state was evolving through the somewhat polemical moral philosophies of Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau, amongst a stream of modern derivatives.271 They developed and argued the concept of Social Contract… the assertion that with the authority of the state, an entity, comes a state’s responsibility to citizens, people; a responsibility to protect and to provide survivability and basic services.

Pre-WWII, the authority of the state was not contradicted in any way by the emergence and broad acceptance of the Laws of War, a body of treaties and custom that outlines the justifications for going to war (Jus ad Bellum) and the parameters of behavior during war (Jus in Bello). These included concepts originating from the concerns of Henry Dunant and the International Red Cross Movement,272 in particular the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907,273 and the four Geneva Conventions of 1929 that established International law to guide the treatment of non-combatants, of prisoners, the wounded and sick on the field or at sea during war.274

271 Social Contract… originating with the ideas of Socrates, Social Contract is most associated with modern moral and political theory, particularly as philosophised by Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau, concerning the contractual reciprocal obligations, responsibilities and duties between state and citizen. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy http://www.iep.um.edu/soc-cont/, (accessed June 25, 2012)
272 Henri Dunant, (1828-1910), a Swiss businessman and social activist founded the Red Cross Movement with a number of colleagues in horror at the remaining carnage and suffering on a battlefield in Northern Italy in 1857. He shared the first Nobel Peace Prize. http://www.betterworld.net/heroes/pages-d/durnant-bio.htm (accessed June 25, 2012)
273 The International Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907, attended by US and European leaders, issued a series of treaties, known as The Hague Conventions, outlining the critical laws and customs that together with the Geneva Convention formed parameters of waging war. They formed the first formal statements of the Laws of War and listed war crimes in a body of secular international law. Encyclopedia Britannica Mobile, m.eb.com/topic/251644 (accessed 27 June, 2012)
An Unlikely Convergence: Evolving DDR Theory and COIN Doctrine

Pre-WWII, controversial German philosopher Carl Schmitt articulated a realist political theory that “Sovereign is he who decides the exception.” This is currently a topical concept in the light of the US attitude towards international law and the Geneva Conventions concerning the operation of the ‘black hole’ of Guantanamo detention centre in Cuba and the justification of the nebulous status of illegal combatants. Schmitt emphasised, as was customary interpretation, the absolute authority of the state as a sovereign entity. In the aftermath of WWII, the expansion of the scope of International Law, the Laws of War, was demonstrated in the Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials, indeed mechanisms of victor’s justice, by confirming for the first time the definitive responsibility of individuals in authority for actions taken in the name of the state. Schmitt, stunned by these developments, decried the passing of the Eurocentric global order, particularly for its achievement in limiting wars through International Law and regulation amongst sovereign states. In his *Nomos of the Earth* he traced the achievements of that European order and how the progressive changes in the position of the State are impacting on global progress, forecasting the new world order being appropriately led by the US. Despite the emergence of the responsibility of the individual, sovereignty remains the foundation of International law. Such new responsibility on individuals for their actions within the state was reinforced by the codification of the responsibilities of the state to citizens, and indeed the responsibilities of humanity to humanity, in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948. The expansion of the Geneva Conventions in 1949 and protocols in 1977 relative to prisoners and the treatment of other non-combatants and civilians in not only international conflicts but also in non-international conflicts, took this even further. This Fourth Protocol in relation to intrastate conflicts has particular relevance on the responsibilities of the state to its citizens… heretofore considered by states as the sole business of states. Building on the Four Freedoms as outlined by Franklin D. Roosevelt in his state of the Nation address in 1941; freedom of speech, assembly, from fear and from want, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was launched in 1948 on a world generally stunned by the slaughter of WWII and the growing existential threat of nuclear war. While the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is not a treaty and is not legally binding on states, its attachment to the Charter of the United Nations as

2) Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the condition of the wounded, sick and ship wrecked members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug 12, 1949;
3) Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug 12, 1949;

A concept of personal responsibility may be somewhat under review in light of the quashing by the ICC Appeals Chamber in 2012 and 2013 of the convictions the principal Army officers of both the Croat and Serbian armies for war crimes during a period of atrocities attributed to troops under their command, but perhaps not their control, during the Bosnian war

incorporated into the International Bill of Human Rights makes it legally binding on states that endorse the Charter of the United Nations, i.e. member states.\textsuperscript{278} Despite this, some ambiguity arises where element of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights have belatedly been considered by some states and cultural or religious communities of states, as not addressing the cultural, traditional or religious values of states beyond the Western developed country value set. This gives rise to a dilemma for those attempting to establish overarching guiding philosophies to direct strategies being implemented in states beyond the developed West, whether related to security or humanitarian strategies. This has left evolving and directing concepts such as Human Security\textsuperscript{279} and Responsibility to Protect (R2P)\textsuperscript{280} that address the needs of Western value systems in relation to humanitarian responsibility in something of a limbo at the level of the United Nations General Assembly… even if endorsed to an adapted degree, by some Regional Security Arrangements.\textsuperscript{281}

COIN is implemented, particularly by Western states, and in states under the influence of Western states, in this evolving environment as regards attitudes to international law, the absolute position of sovereignty, the social contract and also to broader humanitarian concepts such as human security and R2P. An additional variable impacting on the evolution of the doctrine of COIN in Western states has been the fluctuating emphases on value systems, usually shaped by national interests. Further, this dynamic environment has contributed to the necessity for the doctrinal evolution of COIN.

\section*{10.2 Chapter X Review}

\textsuperscript{278} The International Bill of Human Rights. The combination of the UN General Assembly Resolution, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and two treaties, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966 (ICCPR) with its two optional protocols and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966 (ICESCR) is informally called the International Bill of Human Rights… Authors comment…progressively more disputed, elements of the International Bill of Human Rights as seen by some states and communities of states as a projection of western values rather than truly universal ideas of human rights sensitive to cultural and religious differences. This leads to an unresolved diplomatic conflict in understanding of the related obligations associated with UN membership and indeed, in agreement relating to the norms in human rights. http://www.unhchr.org/documents/publications/factsheet2rev.1en.pdf, (accessed June 27, 2012)


\textsuperscript{280} Responsibility to Protect (R2P or R to P) is a highly contested concept initiated by the UN in 2005 based on an emerging assertion that sovereignty cannot be an absolute right, but also a responsibility. R2P envisages placing the legal obligation on the international community to address Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes including genocide and ethnic cleansing within a state and is predicated on three prime principles. a) The state has a primary responsibility to protect its population against atrocities; b) the international community has a responsibility to assist the state in delivering this primary responsibility; if the state fails in this responsibility, the international community has the responsibility to intervene through coercive measures to redress the wrong. Military intervention is considered the last resort...

\textsuperscript{281} Matthias Dembinski and Theresa Reinold, The Culture of Regional Security: EU and AU Approaches to Responsibility to Protect R2P, http://www.scribd.com/doc/54737305/AU-and-R2P, (accessed June 27, 2012) We can understand that R2P can be and is a contested concept primarily in that it calls into question the absolute nature of sovereignty, the authority of a sovereign within his own borders. Both EU and AU, Regional Security Arrangements appropriate the concepts of R2P and Human Security to a significant degree and interpret them according to their own cultural and political norms, adapting to regional circumstance custom and traditions, accepting or rejecting as they see fit in a process of ‘pruning.’
Chapter X sets the scene for tracing the evolution of the doctrine of COIN by presenting the fundamental concepts underlying the context in which COIN is implemented. They include the concepts of the State and the sovereignty of the State; the evolution of international law post-WWII and its impact on individual responsibility for actions contrary to international law, even when supporting State interests; the concept of human rights and social contract... all against a backdrop of regionally varying value systems and dispute in relation to the meaning of human security and R2P.

Chapter XI

Evolution of classic insurgency theory

Before considering the evolution of COIN, it is appropriate to review the evolution of its raison d’être, the ‘classic’ doctrine of insurgency. Chapter XI opens with an insight into the development of the IRA.
approach to insurgency, drawn from what is probably the longest running insurgency in history, six hundred years, and arguably in latter years, one of the most successful. We approach this from their own perspective in reviewing their guiding handbooks. We will then review the two masters who developed the doctrine of modern insurgency, Mao Tse-tung and Che Guevara, through their definitive textbooks and the circumstance that inspired them. In the case of Mao it is through the authoritative translation of his Magnus opus on insurgency and commentary by Samuel Griffith, USMC. The key to their philosophies is that insurgency is a people-centric endeavor. Both the IRA and T.E. Lawrence are in agreement with this.

11.1 The IRA on Insurgency

The IRA Handbook on Guerrilla Warfare (circa 1975) is no scholarly tome and is filled with statements of historical revisionism. However, it offers us a concise insight into the priorities of a guerrilla movement that was to evolve into one of the most efficient low-intensity insurgencies of the twentieth century in its fight against British Forces and the Unionist community in Northern Ireland. Here let us briefly review the opening comments for illustrative purposes to demonstrate the progression in the development of guerrilla tactics, the reason d’être for COIN. The opening line in Chapter 1 claims that nowhere has guerrilla warfare been applied as in Ireland in its fight for independence from the British oppressor. Recounting the foundations of an honorable tradition and revolutionary identity, it lists, in a stylised form, examples that can be found in any Irish junior high school history book, of the glorious application of guerrilla tactics by Irish nationalist heroes from the early days of the demise of feudal independence through six hundred years of revolution. Art Óg MacMorrough held out against the armies of Richard II in the thirteen nineties. Fiach McHugh O’Byrne defeated the British at Glenmalure using pure guerrilla tactics. The Great Hugh O’Neill harassed British forces for nine years. Learning from his failure at positional conventional warfare at Kinsale, he redeemed his guerrilla reputation, harassing the forces of Essex with multiple small attacks and with the destruction of Marshal Bagenal’s 5,000-strong army with a large-scale ambush at the Battle of Yellow Ford near the City of Armagh. Owen Roe O’Neill defeated General Monroe at Benburb in June 1646 with guerrilla tactics, isolating the cavalry, neutralising the artillery and sweeping up the unsupported foot soldiers with an army of 5,000 poorly armed rebels.

Despite these examples, in early practice where insurgencies consisted primarily of military actions, the insurgents have attempted to stand against conventional armies, copying their marshal tactics,
formations and maneuver, without having the commensurate training, discipline, support or arms, and they have been beaten. For example, in rebellion of 1798 in Wexford in the South East of Ireland, 20,000 rebel pike-men the United Irishmen massed on Vinegar Hill and in the city of Enniscorthy, encumbered by thousands of women and children facing formations of 20,000 British troops baring flintlocks and with artillery support. While incomplete encirclement by the British Forces allowed a considerable number to escape further afield and to widespread skirmishes, the slaughter of rebels and their families was massive. Though isolated practice of guerrilla tactics had occurred as mentioned above, no general doctrine had been developed in the disorganised and sporadic incidents of revolt through the centuries. The results of this battle of Vinegar Hill 1798 in particular precipitated a general change amongst Irish rebels to small unit guerrilla tactics for the next hundred and thirty years, with the exception of the 1916 military fiasco. These lessons, drawing also on global practice, were developed into a doctrine of insurgency brought to the level of a science or at least a macabre art form in the mid to late twentieth century by the Provisional IRA. Those insurgents claimed the mantle and legitimacy of that original Irish Republican Army of 1916 and subsequent provisional parliaments pending independence, in their low intensity campaign against British interests in Northern Ireland. The IRA Handbook eulogises the Irish tactician, Fintan Lalor, cofounder of the Fenian Movement in the mid-nineteenth century, for his understanding of guerrilla tactics before ever Mao put pen to paper. While the adaption of their ideas and indeed their words is evident throughout the IRA Handbook, it perhaps judiciously does not mention either Mao or Che anywhere. One can surmise that the linkages with communist insurgency might not have gone down well with funding base of the IRA of the second half of the twentieth century, the Irish diaspora, 40 million or so in the USA and the routine collections in the bars of New York, Boston and Chicago. Following the decisions to end the

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283 The term Guerrilla originates from the militias of Spanish partisans (Guerra de guerrillas… war of little wars) who formed to harass the rearguard of Napoleon’s retreating armies in the Peninsular Wars (1808-1812), hitting at opportunity targets and withdrawing, as pestering mosquitos in the dark…

284 In Dublin City Easter 1916, an attempt at large unit operations remerged. In a partial mobilization, due to miscommunication, poorly trained and equipped rebel units of a few hundred men and women of the Irish Republican Army took control of city strong points, notable the General Post Office in the city center, and waited for the inevitable attack by the professional British army. The rebels were routed and its leaders captured. While the military action by the rebels had been itself futile, it is the subsequent execution of the seven main leaders of this rising; poets, scholars and union leaders, that is considered the turning point of public opinion in Ireland and indeed Britain regarding the British 600 year occupation of Ireland. This led the British withdrawal from 26 of the 32 counties of Ireland in 1922. Indeed this episode is a classic lesson on how insurgent action, even a failed attempt at conventional tactics, is not only about military victories.

285 IRA Handbook on Guerrilla Warfare, Op cit

286 Fintan Lalor (1807-1849) was an Irish journalist and revolutionary born in the rural south midland county of Laois, into politics, as his father was one of the first Catholic Members of the British Parliament. Fintan Lalor cut his teeth on land tenure issues and was always a champion for the oppressed agrarian population. He led several abortive risings against oppression including the rebellion of 1848. Fintan, in his writings, despite a short life, influenced several future patriotic leaders of revolution in Ireland. He died of an illness in 1849. http://www.Irishmidlandancestry.com/content/laois/people/lalor_james-fintan.htm (accessed July 6, 2012)
conflict as detailed in the Good Friday Agreement of April 1998, it was indeed the linkages with terror post-9/11 that dried up that source of funding and contributed to the resolution of the conflict. In drawing that mantle of the Irish Republican Army of 1916 and the continuance of its Proclamation of Independence for the whole island of Ireland, the 32 counties, the Provisional IRA in its members handbook, the IRA Green Book, Vol. I&II, in the cover page, following an admonishment to members to maintain total silence; “loose-talk costs lives,” with a hint of Marxism, launches into a claim of legitimacy and moral high ground:

…Its struggle, both military and political is morally justified and that the Army is the direct representative of the 1918 Dail Éireann Parliament, and that as such are the legal and lawful government of the Irish Republic, which has the moral right to pass laws for, and to claim jurisdiction over the territory, air space, mineral resources, means of production, distribution and exchange of all of its people regardless of creed or loyalty…

These are truly hyperbolic claims, defying logic considering that the Irish Free State, Éire, made up of the 26 southern and northwestern counties, had gained autonomy under the British Commonwealth since 1922 and freedom as the Irish Republic since 1949, with a government duly elected by the majority of the people of the Republic of Ireland.

11.2 Mao and Che

In the twentieth century, despite the writings of Lenin, it was the exploits and writings of Mao Tsetung and Che Guevara that brought a systemic and broader political perspective to insurgency strategies. Their writings on insurgency have laid the foundation for the development of COIN strategies. The foundation of COIN doctrine is largely based on a response to the seminal ideologies of communist insurgency, Marxist and Maoist, established and popularly articulated by those giants of revolution, Mao and Che. We’ll review the views of both Mao and Che on guerrilla warfare before reverting briefly to that IRA Handbook.

11.2.1

287 It is a complex agreement, detailing mechanisms to generate socio-economic equality for the communities of Northern Ireland; a new system of government and the nature of its relationships with the UK and the Republic of Ireland; a commitment by the PIRA to ‘decommission arms’ together with the normalisation of British security activities in Northern Ireland; the release of ‘political’ prisoners and an improved respect for human rights and the traditions of the communities of Northern Ireland. Agreed by referendum in N.I in May 1998 concurrent with a referendum in the Republic of Ireland to agree a requisite Constitutional Amendment, denouncing its claim on the territory of Northern other than unification of the two parts of the island in time and by political means. http://www.dfa.ie/home/index/asdex?id=335 (accessed July 6, 2012)

Mao

Mao Tse-tung on Guerrilla War was translated by Captain Samuel B. Griffith US Marine Corps in 1940 and published by the US Marine Corps for internal instruction in 1961 with an introduction, summary and conclusions by the now Brigadier General Griffith.289 Griffith’s work and its publication by the Marine Corps offers an indication of Mao’s place in the literature on Insurgency and the belief that familiarity with it will assist in preparing commanders to address insurgencies. Griffith’s knowledge of Mao’s work is in itself instructive. In his introduction, Griffith warns that it is both Chinese and Soviet Communist Party policy in 1960 that the pace of “wars of liberation will be stepped up” and that it is certainly Soviet policy to “support just wars without reservation.” Such wars could be expected to be anti-Western and distinctly anti-American. Post WWII, many in the underdeveloped world experienced great expectations that the West would change their lives for the better and now many in of those feel that they are being forgotten as the West pulls up the ladder of development. Nowadays (1960) the potential for revolution exists in any country where the government has failed to deliver a basically decent standard of living to their citizens. Where a revolutionary movement that can provide the doctrine and organisation exists in an environment of social injustice, wealth and poverty, guerrilla activity can be easily initiated. They see successful examples of social revolution to imitate… where the structure of society is changed. The constituent parts of the revolution are, in context specific proportion; military, political, economic, social and psychological. Revolutions, especially those ones including guerrilla activity, have a depth and dynamic quality that ‘orthodox’ wars do not have, and they necessitate serious military consideration. Despite technical simplicity, guerrilla warfare is highly sophisticated combining an extraordinary range of social, physical and intellectual phenomena permitting it to operate in primitive conditions. It contains the complexity of man. “While not always humane, guerrilla warfare is human.” It is political and ensures that all its cadres are appropriately politically educated. Mao required his commanders to constantly focus on explaining the political doctrine to the cadres and to the people, to ensure sound organisation, to inculcate loyalty and to ensure that they all understand the nature of their fight. In his early writings, Mao compared the guerrillas to fish that swim in the water of the people. If the political temperature is right, the fish will thrive. The priority then is to ensure that the political temperature is right. Griffith mentions how Ho Chi Minh and Che Guevara have studied the works of Mao in developing their successful revolutions although guerrilla warfare existed long before Mao. Closer to

289 Mao Tse-tung on Yu Chi Chan (Guerrilla Warfare), 1936, Translated by Samuel B Griffith, USMC, 1940, Published by USMC, Quantico, Virginia, USA, 1961
home in the US War of Independence, Francis Marion in South Carolina, ‘the Swamp Fox’, frustrated the regiments of the British commander Cornwallis with a ‘rag tag’ bunch of sharp shooting guerrillas, working in collaboration with organised units… using, according to his British detractors, “ungentlemanly and un-Christian tactics”. He remembers the original Spanish guerrillas who had harried Napoleon’s supply lines and rear guards in the Peninsular Wars. He mentions the Cossacks and peasants who harried his retreat from Moscow in 1812; a scene repeated against Hitler’s war machine in 1945. Lenin launched guerrilla warfare with all its political potency, but it was Mao Tse-tung who first systematically provided the definitive and masterly instruction on techniques with which he himself had changed the world.

In a profile of the man, we hear that Mao grew up in a very strict middle-income agricultural family and had the benefit of an excellent education. He was a prolific reader but drawn especially to political science, particularly to Marx and Lenin. He realised that the chaotic and grossly unjust system in China of his day was untenable and studied the options, choosing Marxism as the best one. To survive, China had to change. He associated with the communist intellectuals and joined the Party in 1921. The China of 1921 was culturally homogenous but politically and economically it was in feudal chaos; its potential having been virtually eaten up by encroaching and bullying Western powers and Japan, leaving it, in Mao’s term, ‘semicolonial,’ with over 400 million peasants living from hand to mouth; many not owning their own land.

In 1926, just as Chiang Kai Check took command of the National Revolutionary Army, Mao went about his business of agitation, almost on a solo-run, targeting the critical and most divisive issue of land reform to address the needs of the landless peasants in his home province of Hunan. Advocating the expropriation and a more just redistribution of land, he didn't make many friends amongst the landed gentry, the influential sector of the community that the nationalists were anxious to keep onside. Mao envisaged the elimination of this class. In May 1927, Chiang executed a pogrom against communist and labour leaders in Shanghai and targeted communists within the National Revolutionary Army. The Communists left government as Soviet advisors quit China and the Communist leaders went into hiding in remote areas. Mao fled to a mountainous frontier area and began to develop his army. He gathered in local bandit chieftains who joined the Communists and Mao focused on political indoctrination, gradually expanding revolutionary activities, establishing district soviets, confiscating and redistributing land and funding activities by collecting ‘taxes’ from business interests. A base area established, Mao now commenced operations against the national army provincial out-posts. In 1930
the Central Committee of the Party ordered an offensive against urban centers held by the nationalists. The following attacks were not successful and it led to a reassessment by Mao and a refocus away from attention on the winning of the urban population to a focus on the rural agrarian peasants. This critical decision is what has differentiated the Maoist from the Marxist revolution that focused on the industrial proletariat and Mao’s choice has proven the more successful of the two. Late in the same year Chiang launched his army against the Communists, and subsequently three more times in the next two years, all being failures. In 1933 he launched a more systematic squeezing-out of the communists from their base areas, using artillery and air support, and most effectively, evacuating villages as they moved. This worked and the communists, loosing their supporting masses, were forces to seek new bases of operation through the Long March, a 6,000 mile trek, initially North, constantly under attack, over difficult terrain to eventually settle in Yenan Province. Here, in 1936, with Chiang’s army preoccupied with the Japanese invasion, Mao wrote his theory and doctrine on guerrilla warfare.290

Guerrilla action is only one of a series of phases in gaining political control of the state and a critical element in an agrarian revolution. The first phase is the “organisation, consolidation and preservation of the regional base” which is located in a remote area. This is where the guerrilla army is indoctrinated and gradually built-up in a systematic and clandestine way, drawing from the disgruntled inhabitants establishing a loyal base and source of supply. Local militias are formed to provide a home guard and strengthen the movement by dealing with anti-revolutionary elements. In the second phase, “progressive expansion” direct action gains importance with time. It included acts of sabotage, terror, elimination of collaborative threats, hitting remote police and military out-post while procuring arms and ammunition and other necessary supplies. Political indoctrination, reaching to adjacent areas continues throughout this phase. Phase three, the destruction of the enemy occurs when the movement is consolidated as a mass movement with an orthodox establishment, capable of engaging the enemy in conventional combat. During this phase, the movement may be engaged in negotiations but not for the purpose of compromise, simply to gain time and to support strategic political, military, economic and social maneuver. Successful guerrilla movements will offer few critical concessions. Intelligence is the key to success and is gathered from multiple sources, pervasive and deep within all areas of society. Everyone is a source of intelligences. Guerrilla movements will rigorously deny information to the enemy. Secrecy is the key to survival. By controlling information the guerrilla maintains the initiative. Guerrillas fight only when they will win. If the odds suddenly change against the guerrilla, he

290 Mao Tse-tung, Yu Chi Chan 1936, Op sit.
withdraws. The guerrilla relies on good leadership, imagination, surprise, subterfuge, deception, innovation, distraction and mobility to ensure the advantage. “Attacks are sudden, sharp, vicious and short.” Guerrillas “are experts at running away,” remaining fluid, flexible and amorphous, retaining freedom of action. The prime target is the minds of enemy leaders. They must be unsettled, uncomfortable, exhausted and fearful. Griffith quotes from the Chinese guerrilla rule… “Uproar (in the) East. Strike (in the) West.”\textsuperscript{291} However, Mao’s primary rule remains to “preserve oneself and destroy the enemy.”

The guerrilla ranges over a wide area in a decentralised organisation permitting local leaders with sound local knowledge to use initiative. “The enemies rear is the guerrilla’s front. The guerrillas have no front.” Logistics supply is courtesy of the enemy.

Griffith analysis Mao’s ‘Principle of Opposites’ and equates it to the ancient Chinese philosophical concept of Yin-Yang; explaining the critical strength of opposites working together; male-female, dark-light, hot-cold, recession-aggression and thesis-antithesis resulting in synthesis. He considers the paradox of strength in weakness. In the asymmetric condition of the conventional force and the guerrilla movement, apparent disadvantages become advantages, resulting in the con-foundation of the conventional army. Quoting Sun Tzu, he comments that it takes a good general to recognise the strength in weakness.\textsuperscript{292}

Griffith draws some conclusions. A partisan resistance begins and then it is organised. A revolutionary guerrilla movement is organised and then it begins. History suggests that it will be unlikely that a revolutionary guerrilla movement will be destroyed once it passes the first phase of revolution and has co-opted a significant portion of society, maybe 15 to 25%. Other factors affecting the success of a guerrilla movement include terrain, communications, and quality of enemy leadership, internal and external support, foreign fighters and the military capacity of the incumbent government. Griffith lists his variables in a pair of matrices, considering Castro v. the Batista government in Cuba and Ho Chi Minh v. the French in Vietnam. a) Appeal of the programme, b) popular support, c) quality of leadership, d) quality of troops, e) Military efficiency, f) internal unity, g) equipment, h) base area terrain, j) base area communication and k) sanctuary; rating them from 1 to 10, 5 being satisfactory. He concludes that it should have been easy to predict the success of the guerrillas. It is unfortunate that

\textsuperscript{292} From the Chinese characters… “Shen Tung, Chi His”

\textsuperscript{291} Sun Tzu… Military general, strategist and philosopher who lived in China approximately 500 BC, who contributed to Asian history as much through the mythology surrounding him as his literary legacy. His influential opus, the Art of War, has been an indispensable textbook of military strategists for over two thousand years, perhaps laying the basis, in particular, of guerrilla tactics. http://www.scribd.com/doc/51851445/Sun-Tzu-The-Art-of-War/12054715797228.html (accessed July 4, 2012)
later COIN operations did not employ Griffith’s matrix and consider more deeply the significance of his chosen variables in influencing the outcomes of guerrilla wars.

Topically in the context of current day COIN, Griffith turns his attention to the optimism being expressed for the potential impact of nascent technology, “gadgetry”, on future guerrilla wars. He is skeptical as the complexity of men’s minds is the dominant technology in guerrilla warfare.

Having expressed an opinion on how and when assistance should be given to guerrilla wars, Griffith states that anti-guerrilla operations (COIN concept not yet having been coined) can be expressed in three words; location, isolation and eradication. He initially misses the entire relevance of the masses, the people, and instead, unsurprisingly for a young Marine officer, focuses on the agency of military kinetic action in defeating a guerrilla revolution. He advises that guerrilla tactics must be used against guerrillas. Finally Griffith does consider the question if it is possible to ‘create effective counter-guerrilla forces. Mao was adamant that it is not, but Griffith says that this position does not stand up to examination, with some context specific cases offering the exception. However, Griffith is clear that military measures alone will not defeat a revolutionary war.

Griffith mentions the influence of Sun Tzu’s philosophy on Mao and says that his advise remains valid 2,400 years later. Mao’s massive Chinese guerrilla movement is unprecedented in its organisation and coherence of the military political and economic perspective. In his 1940 comments as a young Marine Captain, Griffith has underestimated the social element in Mao’s guerrilla warfare. In his further note added as a Marine brigadier general in 1961 he quotes Mao, considering the guerrilla war against the Japanese, “the moment that this war of resistance disassociates itself from the masses of the people is the precise moment that it disassociates itself from hope of ultimate victory.”

Having reviewed Griffith’s introduction, summary and conclusions, we can look briefly and directly at some of the key elements in Mao Tse-tung’s Yu Chi Chan (Guerrilla Warfare). Mao, having castigated the detractors of guerrilla action stresses the necessity for organisation and political coherence with sound political and military leadership. Quality is more important than quantity; discipline, loyalty and integrity being critical qualities. Guerrilla tactics are based on alertness, mobility and attack adapted to enemy dispositions, strength terrain, communications, weather, the situation of the people and also adapted to context, focusing on the enemy’s rear while the guerrillas exposes no front or rear… they are amorphous.

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293 Mao Tse-tung 1936, *Op sit*
Guerrilla movements that are not supporting the emancipation of the masses must be opposed. Guerrilla warfare and conventional warfare are not comparable. Guerrilla warfare is not an end in itself but a phase of a larger war and should be ready to collaborate with supporting conventional forces (consider the context of opposing the Japanese invader) Guerrilla warfare in its final phase will move towards conventional warfare to defeat an opposing conventional force. Guerrilla warfare can be considered as “a necessary strategic auxiliary to orthodox operations.” In reviewing historical examples of guerrilla wars Mao contends, “historical experience is written in iron and blood.”... its example will spread across the world. History demonstrates that a people united in a righteous cause cannot be defeated.

The guerrilla band is formed from the masses, drawing expertise wherever it can be found incorporating a wide range of skills. Strength is in diversity. Organisation is vital, with all, in addition to the core guerrilla units, engaged in supporting the war effort including local security, indoctrination, anti-propaganda operations, vigilante activities, information gathering and misinformation dissemination, prevention of local counter-revolutionary activity, etc. The guerrilla is lightly equipped, scavenging arms and ammunition from the enemy and supported by the masses. Political indoctrination is critical at all stages of operation, both within the movement at in attracting the masses and in “awakening national consciousness... the complex objectives of emancipation must be explained to simple peasants.” The “revolutionary army has discipline that is established on a limited democratic basis.” In detailing how the guerrilla will behave to the local population, Mao lists the 3 Rules and the 8 Remarks.294 Treat enemy captives decently and propagandise them. “Conserve ones own strength and destroy the enemy’s.”

Guerrilla units start from nothing and grow. Guerrillas retain the initiative and plan attacks carefully in a protracted war of strategic defence; complement operations of the regular army (against the Japanese invader); establish bases; understand the relationship between the attack and the defence; develop mobile operations and have sound leadership.

Surprise, secrecy, speed, persistence, unpredictability, flexibility an fluidity, with the guerrillas maintaining the initiative to wrong-foot the enemy through alternate concentration and dispersion and independent action, are the mark of guerrilla tactics.

294 Mao’s 3 Rules and 8 Remarks for behavior with local populations:
Rules: 1. All actions are subject to command; 2. Do not steal from the people; 3. Be neither selfish nor unjust.
8 Remarks: 1. Replace the door when you leave a house; 2. Roll up the bedding on which you have slept; 3. Be courteous; 4. Be honest in your transactions; 5. Return what you borrow; 6. Replace what you break; 7. Do not bathe in the presence of women; 8. Do not, without authority, search the pocketbooks of those you arrest. From Mao Tse-tung, 1936, Op sit
Such is the seminal guidance from the Master to guerrilla movements throughout the world for the foreseeable future.

11.2.2

Che

Che Guevara dedicated his Guerrilla Warfare to his fallen comrade, fellow giant of the Cuban Revolution, Camilo Cienfuego, eulogising his friend’s qualities as a guerrilla fighter. He includes inner vitality, tenacity, intelligence, loyalty, devotion, a man of the people, and above all, audacity… those critical guerrilla qualities that defeated an oppressive regime. Guevara says that the success of Cuban Revolution against Batista oppression demonstrated that a people could indeed free themselves from oppression by means of guerrilla warfare in three fundamental lessons. a) Popular forces can win against a conventional army; b) one doesn’t need to wait for the right conditions; the insurgency can create them, and c) in an underdeveloped environment, the rural setting is the best place for guerrilla fighting. He says that oppression by an illegitimate government is already the end of peace in which dissent can express itself in active forms as a final option of the oppressed. If the government has come to power by legitimate means; a popular vote, and maintains “at least an appearance of constitutional legality”… peaceful means to resolve dissent have not been exhausted and insurgency should not be promoted under such conditions.

Guerrilla warfare is the basis of a people striving to rescue itself from injustice through liberation. Guerrilla warfare is a phase of war that follows the ‘law of war’ but also must develop context specific characteristics. Guerrilla warfare is the people against an oppressor … it is a war of the masses, one that must have the full support of the people. It is a war of social reform, a response to the anger of the people at their oppressors and a social system that subjugates the unarmed masses.

Rural guerrilla warfare requires good local knowledge and capacity of rapid maneuver with the support of the people. This is facilitated by operating in “wild places with small populations;” places where the struggle for livelihood is greatest, facilitating an agrarian revolution. In such places the burning issue for social reform is usually the issue of land ownership and the desire of the population to be the owners of their means of production. He mentions that Mao learned this at the end of the Long March and shifted his focus from urban workers to the rural masses. Ho Chi Minh’s struggle was also based on the grievances of the rural peasants. He points out that the revolutions of both China and Vietnam

had their roots in the framework of Japanese invasion and occupation, spurned on post-occupation by land issues. He says that the insurgency against the French in Algeria also had its roots on land ownership issues. Cuba was no different.

In developing guerrilla tactics he reminds that this is a phase of war until the capacity to take on the oppressor in a conventional way is gained. By then, the people have been won and it is too late for the oppressor. Until then, the guerrilla must undertake no action unless it can be won. He says that guerrilla warfare is treacherous, secret, with surprise being the key to success. “The guerrilla is the Jesuit of warfare”… who acts far from any ‘sporting’ ethic perceived to be associated with war. He will take advantage of the enemy’s weak points, hitting where and when unexpected in ‘hit and run’ tactics. His priority is to live to fight another day, continuously and progressively developing through the phases of guerrilla warfare the conventional capacity to annihilate the enemy as a regular army. The guerrilla fighter must be ready to die not for an ideal, but to deliver the outcomes. Therefore he hits like a mosquito, striking and disappearing. In fighting for social justice, even such tactics gain nobility.

The enemy, a conventional force, is driven to achieve the total destruction of each component of the insurrection. The guerrilla analyses the enemy’s necessary resources to achieve this, logistics, mobility and popular support, while himself maintaining the final objective of their defeat. Guerrilla activity will gradually weaken the enemy, harassing and tormenting at every opportunity. The enemy soldier must not be allowed to sleep; he must feel surrounded, threatened. The cooperation of the people is critical and intensive work must be done on insuring the support of the people. The guerrilla and the people must know “that the victory of the enemy against the people is impossible.” The work of popular mobilisation must be done in secrecy.

General strike, the disruption of economic activity, demonstrating the anger of the people, is a vital tool of the revolution.

Zones of operation must be gradually expanded as capacity increases, indoctrinating populations and ‘quarantining’ incorrigible enemies of the revolution. As the guerrilla units expand, they must move into new territories, choosing the most difficult places, while maintaining collaborative communications with their old units.

Mobility is the mark of a successful guerrilla unit, with a capacity to hit the enemy unexpectedly and from an unexpected direction, drawing a counterattack and hitting them again from another direction
drawing them away again…“the minuet.” Night operations should unsettle the enemy ensuring that he feels surrounded and cannot rest.

The guerrilla collects the arms and ammunition of his fallen comrades and equips himself for the enemy’s resources. The guerrilla travels light and his fighting will be recognised by his judicial use of firepower, making each shot count.

The guerrilla is flexible and adaptable to his environment, taking advantage and being opportune. His form of fighting is very different from the enemies. The guerrilla attacks with surprise and fury and then quietly disappears... only to re-attack as the enemy relaxes.

Acts of sabotage are critically important as a multiplier in the insurgency... while distinguishing acts of sabotage from acts of terror. Terror attacks the innocent whilst sabotage hits those that deserve to be hit. He says that in revolution, acts of terror are counterproductive, as they tend to alienate the people from whoever is deemed responsible for them. Sabotage should not alienate the people from the guerrilla. Ambush of enemy road and rail transportation is very effective in procuring resupply and demoralising the enemy. The guerrilla must also be innovative in manufacturing his own weapons and ammunition.

The guerrilla must treat local populations with decency, recognising the rules and traditions of the zone, demonstrating the ‘moral superiority’ of the guerrillas over the oppressors. Special exception may be made for informers and those engaged in assassination, those collaborating directly with the enemy.

While only ferocity is demonstrated at the instant of attack, after the battle, clemency is necessary for those enemy soldiers who believe they are going about their duty.

While it is always a good idea to take no prisoners, survivors should be freed.

A guerrilla unit should be small, not more than fifteen to twenty men, being even smaller in difficult terrain, and will operate within a comfortable distance of its base. The guerrilla must work on the masses. Indoctrination should be continuous, ensuring the unity of workers, peasants and other social classes in the zone. Enemy elements must not be permitted to contaminate the masses and must be ruthlessly eliminated.

The principal difference between Che’s theory of insurgency and Mao’s is that Che believed that it was not necessary to wait for the conditions for revolution to be ripe. He said that the insurgents could create the conditions for revolution. Contradicting Mao, he believed that this could be done without a mass movement or a vanguard party, but that the “small, mobile and hard-hitting band of insurgent,”
could form the focus for the revolution... \textit{foco insurrectional or ‘foco’}.\textsuperscript{296} His unsuccessful experience in attempting to raise insurrection throughout Central and South America using the \textit{foco} resulted in his early grave in Bolivia in 1967.

\subsection*{11.3 Provisional IRA in the mid-nineteen seventies}

Having reviewed the views of both Mao and Che on guerrilla warfare, I look back briefly at that mysterious IRA Handbook.\textsuperscript{297} Following the stylized historical romp of Chapter 1 as reviewed earlier; it opens its Chapter 2 by defining guerrilla warfare as... “Resistance of all the people to enemy power... the guerrilla act as the spearhead of that struggle.” It uses principles now familiar to us: Dispersed fighting needs initiative at a junior level. Units must be self-contained. Always maintain the initiative. Mobility is critical. Stage successful retreats. Intelligence is key. Organisation is critical. Guerrilla operations must involve the people. Volunteers are inspired by an ideal. Information must be managed. It is the peoples struggle. The people and the world must see that the guerrilla is on the side of moral justice. Keep it simple. Withdraw, live to fight another day. Never fight on the enemy’s terms. It states that the guerrilla “must strike not one large blow, but many little ones; he hits suddenly, gnaws at the enemy’s strength, achieves surprise, disengage himself, withdraws, disperses and hits again.”

\subsection*{11.4 Lawrence on mobilisation of local Insurgencies}

An early example of successful development of local solutions facilitated by third agency coordination of an insurgency against a conventional force, an asymmetric conflict, is outlined in the strategy as implemented and documented by T.E. Lawrence, an archaeologist, at the turn of the century Arab Revolt by the Arab tribes of the Arabian Peninsula against the Ottoman Turks.\textsuperscript{298} He offers detailed, graphic and occasionally tedious accounts of Arabian geography, Arab culture and relationships between the British technical assistance and the tribal leaders in developing a cohesion and strategy to defeat the Turks through the application of local guerrilla tactics; raids and ambushes, to the destruction of Turkish tenuous supply and communications lines across the Arabian desert. The pay-off was to be Arab independence from colonial rule. This, belatedly and having spilled a lot of blood, was eventually granted by the British... though through the installation of “friendly” leaders, thus

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{296} From MOD, Army Field Manual, Volume 1, Combined Arms Operations, Part 10, Counter insurgency Operations (Army Code 71749), July 2001, pp A1-A5
\item \textsuperscript{297} PIRA Handbook on Guerrilla Warfare, \textit{Op cit}
\item \textsuperscript{298} T.E Lawrence, \textit{The Seven Pillars}, \textit{Op cit},
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
creating puppet regimes. This laid the basis for modern super-power manipulative insurgency engagement through technical assistance and engagement and pointed the way to modern COIN.

11.5 Chapter XI Review
Before tracing the process of the evolution of the doctrine of COIN, we are considering its raison d’être, the emergence of a systematic doctrine of insurgency. Chapter XI opens with a review of the doctrinal position of the Provisional IRA in the mid-nineteen seventies at the height of intensity in their low-level insurgency against the British Army and Unionist communities in Northern Ireland; a struggle that culminated in a partial political victory and a turn from violence to political means. Their handbooks, in justifying their struggle and violent means, offer a revisionary view of its ‘glorious’ history. They discretely draw on the teachings of both Mao and Che in advocating a people-centric struggle. Mao Tse-tung, in his mobilisation of the Chinese rural masses against feudal oppression and poverty set out the definitive rules of successful revolution, based on the aphorism that the insurgents must be the fishes swimming in the sea of people. Here he has laid firm foundations for a doctrine, detailing strategy and tactics... with winning the people as the central theme. He directs moving in phases from the launch of guerrilla warfare when the conditions and time are right to the military, political and social defeat of an oppressive regime. Che Guevara built on Mao’s lead with the exception that he advises that the revolution itself creates the time and conditions as the focus... foco. Both the IRA and T.E Lawrence agree with the premise of the focus on the people with Lawrence emphasising that support for local insurrection must understand local culture and adopt local methods.
COIN: The Evolution of a Doctrine, The Twentieth Century and the impact of Viet Nam

The doctrine of counterinsurgency (COIN) post-WWII emerged in response to the guerrilla wars of independence and Marxist and Maoist inspired revolutions in movement towards a post-colonial era. Galula’s textbook drawing on his extensive experience in attempting to offer France a ‘dignified’ exit from it’s now unproductive engagements in Indochina and North Africa, became a reference for an American neo-conservative military complex that never came to term with its defeat in Vietnam. That traumatic experience failed to convince the US military or the military industrial complex, non-learning institutions, that its firepower and technology was not the answer to cause-inspired revolution and would not overcome the asymmetry of insurgency versus armies; that winning the people through an effective COIN strategy would offer results. Resistance to COIN, a doctrine that might sideline the interests of the military industrial complex, persists. Nagl builds on Galula, drawing from Mao and recognises the faults resulting in the Vietnam outcomes but appears blind to the dangers of foreign agency in COIN. The British experience in Malaya offers a successful example from which to cherry-pick.

12.1 Galula on COIN, 1965.

David Galula’s COIN, Theory and Practice, 1964, is frequently cited in modern COIN literature as the foundation of COIN doctrine. This is possibly because he was writing in English, despite a stream of perhaps more erudite prominent French COIN practitioners/analysts writing in the sixties, fresh and chastened from the experience of Indochina and Algeria. Galula was ostensibly encouraged in his writing endeavors by one of the US’s controversial legends of COIN, Air Force and Intelligence officer, Major General Edward Geary Lansdale. Lansdale is attributed with contributing to the development of civil action, psychological operations and the rehabilitation of captured guerrillas as an aspect of counterinsurgency during his period of support to the Government of Philippines against the Hukbalahap communist guerrillas in the early fifties. Lansdale was also active in COIN operations in Viet Nam, in addition to concurrent anti-Castro activities.

While primarily a textbook for COIN, the military profession in particular has belatedly resurrected its perhaps unwarranted contribution to doctrinal development. He asserts that in a COIN environment,

299 David Galula, Counterinsurgency: Theory and Practice, Praeger Security Int., Westport, Connecticut and London, 1964. Galula graduated from Cry University in 1939 and served in the French Army in military campaigns in North Africa, Italy Indochina and Algeria. He retired in the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. He wrote his COIN classic while on fellowship in Harvard, a seminal work on COIN that was duly ignored by US military high command that maintained their focus on conventional strategies.

300 Early French COIN practitioner/writers. See Footnote 413

two different wars are being fought concurrently, under different rules. While insurgents have limited capacity to confront conventional forces, they do have a certain amount of political control over at least some of the population. Therefore, they have a “shield from behind which to strike.” COIN is a competition between the government and the insurgents for the support of the people. It cannot work if the people do not feel protected from the insurgents. While intelligence from the population is critical and the insurgents must be targeted by intelligence, Galula advises not to mass fire power based on local intelligence alone. Sound intelligence is based on a good relationship between COIN forces and the population. He does comment that “sadly, the military industrial complex does not build many tools for fighting insurgents,” a fact that is later evident when we review the US effort in a COIN environment in Vietnam and that may contribute to the current continuing polemic between COIN and conventional means.

He says that conventional forces are too prone to offensive actions, killing and capturing terrorists. However, those killed or captured are soon replaced if they have support within the population. He recommends various physical methods of population control, simple methods with a priority on COIN presence within the population… “boots on the ground.” This implies a very high ratio of troops per head of population, compared with conventional tactics. He emphasises the centrality of information while the key terrain is the population. Galula advises that minds must be adapted to COIN and that there exist a range of irregular warfare disciplinary needs; cultural, anthropological, economics, political science, international relations and linguistics in addition to military skills. He points out the dangers of rigid doctrine that cannot adapt to the reality of the environment. Insurgency has no rules. It simply needs the support of the people. “Insurgency is a protracted struggle, moving through the phases step by step to achieve intermediary objectives leading to the overthrow of the existing order.” Insurgents initiate the conflict and remain a nebulous menace until they are in a position to reveal their intentions. Their underlying objective is winning the population, noting that political power is dependent on, at the least, the acquiescence of the people. Thus, politics becomes the instrument of the operations and must be duly considered at every move. Insurgents whose party (politics) is the force have the advantage over COIN forces whose government (politics) is separate from the Army. Insurgency is cheap while COIN is expensive. Insurgency is inherently fluid while COIN is more rigid. Insurgencies primary asset may be just a cause. In propaganda, insurgents and not constrained by the truth and insurgents are not held accountable for promises while COIN credibility is undermined by undelivered promises. Galula focuses on the cause as the main prerequisite for insurgency.
He outlines the inherent weaknesses of COIN as the need for national consensus, frequent weak leadership with limited knowledge of COIN; the need for effective political structures to control populations and the impact of geographic conditions and national border status. Galula reviews the theory of insurgency and advises that adopting the strategy of insurgency does not work in COIN as national institutions implementing insurgency will lose the support of the people. COIN requires an intensity of effort, usually requiring a successive rolling effort, area by area, rather than broad concurrent action, an approach that also has significant disadvantages in considering the mobility and flexibility of insurgents, a phenomenon described recently as ‘the cockroach effect.’ Contact with the population is critical, providing security assurance and a level of predictability, ultimately establishing COIN authority over the population and isolating them from the insurgents. COIN must win the people to make the insurgents irrelevant.

John D Kelly in his 2010 review of Galula notes that whilst Galula was writing in the mid-sixties, current day military COIN exponents such as John Nagl are embracing his ideas enthusiastically. Kelly quotes Nagl, that in a void of functioning COIN doctrine post-Vietnam, the US did not turn to the lessons of the failure in Vietnam, but to the work of David Galula. Kelly claims that this is a neat solution except that Galula is always focusing on COIN in the context of Maoist revolution, an environment that is no longer the case. In his forward to the published version of Patraeus’ 2006 COIN manual, Nagl treats Galula as the voice emerging from the wilderness, his wisdom having been neglected. Kelly notes Galula wrote in an unashamedly colonial context and that his focus on the asymmetry of the conflict, the need for a ratio of 20:1 COIN troops to insurgents in a search and destroy mission, is anachronistic. This is hardly appropriate guidance for modern day COIN. Galula’s focus in COIN is the defence of capitalism and imperialism, co-opting the French COIN doctrine vision of a common global enemy that combines communism, anti-western nationalism and anti-colonialism into one adversary that supports local insurgencies. The insurgent is projected as a stereotype of the charismatic Che image, fronting a convincing cause. However, irrespective of that

302 The Cockroach Effect: A term coined to describe how, when attention is focused on one concentration of target incorrigible miscreants in a local rather than a global manner, those miscreants would migrate omni-directionally to and thrive in an area outside those receiving the attention. For illustration, it was used recently in relation to UN attention to criminal gang members in Port au Prince in Haiti or the focus of the international flotilla on Somali pirates off the coast of Somalia.


304 Ibid, p 69

305 Ibid, pp 4 and 68, Kelly notes that the Patraeus’ US Army/ Marine Manual 2006 was downloaded millions of times and was published for wide distribution by University of Chicago Press in 2007 with a forward by Nagl; an unusual degree of distribution for an Army manual and is clearly targeted at the public rather than just a military audience.

306 This description of French COIN doctrine’s consideration of the adversary is from Peter Paret, French revolutionary warfare from Indochina to Algeria: The Analysis of a Political and Military Doctrine, 1964
cause, the side that can protect the people wins and therefore an increasing threat through kinetics offers an opportunity to the COIN forces to ‘protect the people’. Kelly is dismissive of this characterisation of an insurgency and COIN. Kelly contends that the adoption of Galula’s ideas both on how to defeat insurgents but also in establishing the moral economy of COIN “as a new type of war” in the 2006 manual ignores the many earlier criticisms of that typically French immediate post-colonial approach. Kelly suggests that it is perhaps Galula’s “post-colonial quiescence with imperial, even totalitarian style in political planning” that is appealing to Nagl and “the US military imagination.”

12.2 COIN in the mid-nineteen Seventies
In 1975, as the Vietnam war was coming to a dramatic end with the US evacuation of Saigon, leaving many of their supporters to face the music, Andrew Mack was reviewing COIN of the expeditionary type, primarily that being implemented under US COIN doctrine and methods.  

He could have looked at the efforts of European colonial powers in their attempts to address the birth prangs of a throng of newly independent nations emerging from colonial oppression from the nineteen sixties onwards but the US COIN efforts offer some of the most instructive examples. He asks why did the massive effort in Vietnam fail when light footprint interventions in Latin America could fair better? Has torture become an accepted tool of the COIN trade?

The Pentagon definition of COIN in 1975 was:

those military, economic and civil actions taken by government to defeat subversive insurgency’… adding, “in the current context, subversive insurgency is primarily communist inspired, supported and [exploited].”

While pointing out that the COIN repertoire includes ‘dirty tricks’, torture, assassination, manipulation of aid and trade agreements, he goes on to state, “COIN is the cornerstone of US foreign policy in the Third World.” Its stated aims were… national security and freedom. Mack comments that a political leadership drove it by an obsession with the containment of Communism with both the idea of national security and containment being simplistic and rationalistic. As regards freedom, the US was contemporaneously supporting and propping up some of the most oppressive regimes in the world. It was clearly concerned with the security of US overseas interests rather than any degree of local territorial sovereignty. By 1975, Mac in considering the reasons for US presence in South Vietnam

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quotes the McNaughton Memo suggesting that the US presence was 70% to avoid US humiliation, 20% to keep China out of South Vietnam and 10% for the people of Vietnam.\footnote{McNaughton Memo’, prepared by John McNaughton, US Assistant Secretary of Sate for Defense for International Security in March 1965 recommended damage limitation and ultimately, a way out of Vietnam for the US in a deteriorating political and military situation. \url{http://vietnam.vassar.edu/ladrangvalley/ladrang03.html} (accessed June 27, 2012)}

Between 1798 and 1945, the US deployed expeditionary forces… to protect US interests or to restore order, 46 times.\footnote{Mack is drawing from Michael Klare, \textit{War Without End}, Knopf, NY, 1972} Prior to World War II, colonial powers had controlled vast territories with minimal forces. Mao noted that when native insurgencies combatted metropolitan invaders on the latter's term, the natives lost. However, after WWII, the situation changed and colonial powers with massive armies failed to stave off defeat in native insurgencies. The French left Indochina and Algeria; the Dutch left Indonesia; the British despite a successful COIN in Malaya left, and also withdrew its colonial administrations in Palestine, Aden and Cyprus.

The US interventions in Korea (conventional) aid to the French in Indochina, the Philippines, Lebanon 1958, Quemoy-Matsu 1958, Iran 1953, Guatemala 1954 were small compared to the massive operations post-1960.\footnote{Quemoy-Matsu, The second Taiwan crisis, 1958, in which the Peoples Republic of China shelled the islands of Matsu and Quemoy in the Taiwan Strait with the view to seizing them from the Republic of China /Taiwan. Dug-in and under heavy artillery bombardment, the RoC lost about 2,500 troops and PRC about 200. In accordance with the 1954 defense treaty between RoC and USA, the Eisenhower administration provided assistance and deployed naval vessels to support the RoC government. Tactical nuclear strikes were considered. The Soviet side was offering advice to PRC. As a stalemate developed with the mutual testing of new weapons, e.g. the Sidewinder air to air missile by the US, the offensive pattered out, the PRC having fired close to half a million artillery shells. \url{http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,894019,00.html} (accessed July 4, 2012)} In compliance with the Monroe Doctrine\footnote{‘Monroe Doctrine’; see footnote 10.} and the Open Door Policy in Latin America and Asia, US intentions were always indirect political and military control through economics.\footnote{‘Open Door Policy’ was a ‘statement of principle initiated by the US in 1899 and agreed with the European Powers and Japan for the protection of equal privlege among countries trading with China and in support to Chinese territorial and administrative integrity. It remained the cornerstone of US foreign policy for forty years’, Encyclopedia Britannica Mobile, m.eb.com/topic/429642 (accessed June 27, 2012)}

Post-WWII US military doctrine was based on massive retaliation; war deterrence rather than war fighting… with the main focus on the deterrent value of the nuclear arsenal. It was not well prepared for limited wars or ‘bush-fires.’

President J.F. Kennedy was aware and concerned about this ill preparedness and drew focus on the development of COIN doctrine to offer a ‘flexible response’ in demonstrating an increased COIN capacity. Mack refers to the flurry of publication in COIN related articles in the early sixties reflecting this focus. The increasing interest in COIN was mirroring the increasing commitment of the Military Assistance Programme (MAP) to Third World countries. This reflected J.F. Kennedy’s efforts to
increase national capacities to redirect the emphasis from Hemispheric Defence by the US to Internal Security efforts by friendly states, focused on countering the threat of communist insurgency. This period saw a focus of resources on increasing COIN capacity; a big increase in Special Forces, scholarly study of insurgencies, Mao, Che Guevara and Giap, counterinsurgency experiences and a new consideration of what social science could bring to COIN. By 1965 the Department of Defence was spending in excess of $10 million on COIN related behavioral, political and operations research programmes which saw social scientists doing ‘soft-ware’ research on COIN in the Department of Defence, universities and affiliated and nominally independent national foreign policy think-tanks like RAND.

In this ‘soft’ overview of the COIN environment, the political and social causes of insurgency were emphasised and consideration given to how these causes might be overcome. While it was generally accepted that pending the establishment of the ‘soft’ programmes, civic action, political reform and pacification programmes, military repression could be necessary initially to stabilise the environment. However, repression would not deliver the critical success in separating the people from the insurgents. Mack, drawing on Mao’s analogy of the fish and the water confirms that the realisation that the key to success in COIN is ‘winning the people’ is being accepted as the common wisdom.

Mack refers to the natural bias that scientists have over the ‘soft’ approach to dealing with insurgencies as it fits within the comfort zones of their often liberal outlooks together with the fact that they tend not to have any level of control over the military domain. He mentions the controversy over the Camelot Project, US efforts to develop a scientifically developed non-violent pre-emptive strike COIN action. While not directed at Chile, these efforts were publically broken there by the wrath of the anti-US Allende regime, anger that reverberated through the world of social science and a Congressional hearing that drove the social-scientific approach to COIN underground for a considerable time. We will consider the current day application of ethnography to COIN later in the dissertation.

While ascendant scholarly attention (Huntington, etc.) focused on the elements of winning hearts and minds of populations, hawkish revisionism largely affiliated with the military and the military industrial complex associated institutions and think-tanks like RAND, saw their interests and profession being affected by a liberal, less material and technology heavy scholarly approach to COIN.

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313Camelot Project controversy; a controversy potentially orchestrated as much by a hawkish right that was uncomfortable with this social scientific ‘tree hugging’ approach to what they viewed as a professional military issue resolved by firepower and technology, as much as by a scientific intelligencia scandalized by the potential use of social science as a tool of oppression. While suspended in Chile, some significant US COIN related scientific research and implementation continued in Thailand.
They were busy refocusing the narrative on military capacity, i.e. how to prevent the social base from assisting the guerrillas, as Charles Wolf put it, “to influence peoples actions rather than their loyalties and feelings.”314 This was to be crystallised in the strategic decision to destroy that social base… with the social scientists then brought in ‘post-hoc’ to rationalise the policy already chosen. Mack quotes the statement of Bloomfield and Leiss that ‘policy makers don't listen to researchers.’315 He notes that in Vietnam, social research had little impact on COIN with scant investment in social reform, perhaps willful failure of pacification programmes to emphasise that only military professionalism and the application of massive firepower counted. In the belief that the military option would offer the quick fix, any commitment to political and socio-economic reform was virtually abandoned, other than limited lip service, as a policy of firepower over manpower dominated. He comments that whilst social scientists have little bargaining power compared to the military, coupling the social scientist with military suppression negates the scientist.

In reviewing failures in COIN, Mack, noting the massive asymmetry between forces, the conventional force and the irregular guerrillas and points that it is not the military attributes that defeat the conventional force. He focuses on the ‘Metropolis Effect’; the will of the expeditionary force home population. This is a major weapon for the guerrillas, by which they can defeat a conventional force by public opinion, creating war weariness and undermining the political will to support and resource the intervention. He illustrates this with the examples of France post-Dien Bien Phu and following the controversy over General Massu’s noted brutality in Algeria, in addition to the US in Vietnam. It’s not about the body count… but public opinion.316

In considering the cultural differences between the conventional forces and the guerrillas he says that in the Anglo-Saxon West, there is a clear separation between the political elites and the military elites. Such a separation is anathema to guerrillas where, as per Mao’s fundamental principles, the political and the military are one and anti-war sentiment is treated ‘as much the enemy as the enemy.’

Insurgencies and COIN are fought on two fronts, the field and the metropolis. Protracted insurgencies favor the insurgent as public opinion in the metropolis is strained. During the Nixon presidency, the

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314 Charles Wolf, *Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies: New Myths and Old Realities*, RAND Corp, 1965,
Jaques Massu, Career army officer from the days of the Free French Forces of the forties through Indo China to Commander of French Forces, Algeria from the late fifties into the mid-sixties. Algeria, a campaign where harsh measures were common, including, it is acknowledged, that torture and murder of prisoners was widely used by French forces against insurgents. Challenged in his dotage to face the consequences of what groups of French intellectuals were terming as war crimes, Massu died in 2002 aged ninety-four years.
cost of running the Vietnam War was his main consideration. He drove to have the war ‘Vietnamised’ in order to reduce US cost and commitment.

Despite the failure in Vietnam, US COIN operations could count considerable success, particularly in Latin America where all tools were applied, military support, CIA ‘dirty tricks’ campaigns, credit blockades, etc.; Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Venezuela, Uruguay… where the insurgencies lacked the sustainability or strategic capacity of the Vietnamese.

Mack notes the systematic and widespread use of torture in COIN operations, including in US interventions. These methods came into vogue particularly during the Algeria campaign by General Massu. He quotes an Amnesty International report, “that torture is a key technique of COIN strategy which is the cornerstone of US foreign policy is beyond doubt.” However, Mack claims that whilst torture might offer immediate information, the results gained through torture are usually short-lived with the long-term fall-out, including loss of legitimacy, hardly worth the risk.

### 12.3 “Destroy the Social Base”

Considering the desired outcomes laterally and in a Machiavellian way and without the constraints of humanitarian morality offers a choice of strategies particularly to expeditionary COIN operations or other amoral powers with massive firepower at their disposal in deciding how to physically separate insurgents from the people. In a realist analysis, one must either win the people or destroy the people. The latter is reflected in the strategy adopted for the US expeditionary war in Vietnam and epitomised in the term ‘to destroy the social base’, and also in Soviet operations applying massive firepower and blanket bombing in the invasion of Afghanistan in the nineteen eighties. In the major wars of the latter half of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first century, the choice of the lower moral ground in the context of humanitarianism, the wanton and disproportionate destruction of the people that does not reflect at least a degree of [reciprocity](#), has generally failed.

It was defeated, in the US case, more by modern communications and a diminishing domestic stomach of political will to support an ever diminishing return and extending timeline together with increased body bags returning home. This was occurring to an ever-increasing saturation of moral enquiry as a result of the media reports of depravity and non-combatant loss of life. Diminishing support on the

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318 Consider the current (June 2012) assaults by the forces of Assad in Syria against centers of population of his own people
319 It was generally strong public relations or graphic media reporting that drew global attention to the plight of the oppressed concerning Serb atrocities in Bosnia and later in Kosovo or the Indonesian savage suppression of the population in East Timor. In the case of Bosnia
home front has been more responsible for failed operations than failed military kinetic action. How the stark vision of such strategy chosen in the current domestic COIN operation in Assad’s Syria will end, in light of international outcry and self interested obstruction within the UN Security Council, has yet to emerge.

12.4 COIN: Asymmetry is to the insurgent’s advantage

Trial and error and much blood lost has taught the lesson that in an asymmetric combat environment, a weaker guerrilla/insurgent force must use their relative advantages to overcome a conventional force through circumvention and by making the strengths of the conventional force irrelevant… not in pitched battle. Those insurgent advantages may include a mix of the following characteristics; mobility, stealth/invisibility, local geographic, historic and cultural knowledge, local support and kinship, human intelligence, forage capacity and sustainability, secrecy and surprise, moral legitimacy, strong communications capacity, political integrity and cohesion, the intrinsic linkage of the political and the military. Where an insurgency does not have the support or at least the acquiescence of the people, the majority of these other critical characteristics will also be absent. In such circumstance, it is very difficult for an insurgency to gain traction, to operate and to survive.

A COIN force, particularly and expeditionary one, may have few if any of these characteristics, and from their perspective might not consider that they would be an advantage. What a conventional force may have is massive firepower and technological advantage… and depending on the length of time taken to defeat the insurgents, political will of the metropolitan support base, the home country.

12.5 Resistance to Doctrinal Development.

Much of the most widely acclaimed Post-WWII writing on COIN is focused on methods for the implementation of small unit COIN military operations. As such it is focused on the agency of the military and the political, psychosocial and socio-economic elements critical to the successful implementation of COIN operations receive cursory mention.

Duffy considers the on-going existential polemic within the US military establishment that permeates the evolution of COIN doctrine, notably WestPoint Officer Training Academy, regarding the role of it was those, the Bosniacs (Muslim Bosnians), who better managed PR with extensive US support, who gained the global sympathy and the means to triumph.
the US military in COIN small wars and insur- 
genies.\textsuperscript{320} He asks if the US failed in Vietnam because they failed to understand the political nature of the conflict and did not adapt their conventional strategies to address the insurgency. They ignored COIN and preferred to apply their stock in trade; that with which they had prepared for major wars. J.F. Kennedy ‘got it’ and attempted to drag the military into a COIN configuration, but the institution successfully resisted. The assassination of Kennedy in November 1963 undermined the impetus for COIN, the military certain that a force prepared for conventional warfare could deal with either a conventional war or an insurgency. Duffy draws on Larry E. Cable’s \textit{The Development of American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and the Vietnam War}, a much-debated work that calls attention to the failings of US military doctrine that led to defeat in Vietnam.\textsuperscript{321} The controversial book rigorously traces through primary sources, the development of US doctrine of war prior to and during the Vietnam War. His damning findings attribute the loss of the war in Vietnam to an organisational culture that successfully resisted change to address the reality of the nature of the war in Vietnam, an insurgency and therefore in need of a counterinsurgent strategy. US military institution rigidly protected the enemy-centric doctrine of firepower and mass; search and destroy; applied aggression. Cable differentiates between Partisan war and Insurgent war, the former needing military solutions and the latter needing a non-military approach including an emphasis on nation-building, probably one of the earliest references to such practice, and redress of socio-economic grievances with less emphasis on the use of weapons of war. Sound intelligence work, civil affairs, police activities and psychological operations take precedence over conventional military operations. In terms of the Cold War, the US tended to see all small wars as partisan with related sponsorship from the Communist powers. The US military institution saw guerrilla activity as a precursor to conventional invasion. However, the fundamental difference between conventional warfare and guerrilla warfare is the crux that wrong-footed the US military in its efforts. The centre of gravity for a conventional war is the enemy; for a guerrilla insurrection it is the people. Conventionalists within the military establishment in the 1960s as with today, would not buy this differentiation nor recognise how ill equipped the US military is to deal with it. WestPoint, other than increasing Special Forces training, tweaked its training programmes slightly in order to placate presidential concerns and would not make significant changes to its curriculum that would include a


focus on COIN training. Such ideas seemed justified when President Johnston dramatically increased the conventional commitment of US forces to Vietnam in July 1965. The initiative to win the people through a COIN posture from the outset was lost. Despite a deteriorating military situation in Vietnam through the late sixties, the US military establishment continued to focus on applying a failing strategy of increased firepower and technology, with a few tentative pilot projects in COIN.

Duffy contends that WestPoint, as a major cauldron of US military doctrine, continued to represent that institutional resistance to change. It remains today almost fifty years later a source of resistance to COIN, but at least it offers, in an otherwise conventional and tight-lipped organisation, a forum for that doctrinal polemic to air. We’ll consider it again in reviewing the attitude to COIN in the context of the current UN and NATO Afghan adventure.

12.6 Nagl on COIN

Nagl’s analysis of COIN failure and success has become a standard textbook for the counterinsurgent in both tracing and in contributing strongly to the evolution of the doctrine. He approaches his analysis from the perspective of how military organisations learn, focusing on the British and US Armies, drawing from their experience in Malaya and the latter in Viet Nam. He quotes Bismarck. “Fools learn from experience. Wise men learn from other people’s experience.” He claims in an assertion later taken up by Kilcullen, that the US Army was slow to learn in Vietnam while the British Army was a fast learner from its experience of implementing COIN in Malaya. Nagl, in a structures-focused comparison, describes the difference in organisational culture that identifies the British Army as a learning institution while the US Army is not. In reviewing the differing levels of organisational adaptability he claims that the difference is emanating from the experience of a more adaptive British parliamentary system over the US presidential system. This is illustrated in how the US organisational culture saw it move grudgingly towards a virtual implementation of President J.F. Kennedy’s clear instructions in the early sixties to focus on COIN. He highlights how the independent nature of military organisational culture led to tensions between military doctrine and the results of civilian decision-making.

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Organisational change is an adjustment of institutional norms, doctrine and procedures to address shortfalls in achieving outcomes, in response to new knowledge and understanding... and doctrinal change is seen as “the trailing indicator of institutional learning.”

Nagl says that the commitment of war to “total destruction of the enemy”; purely military action, is popularly misattributed to Clausewitz, and is actually better attributed to Antoine-Henri Jomini. Clausewitz more ascribed to the primacy of the political over the military. Mao Tse-tung realised the position of the political and in developing his peoples revolution, and during his Long March, shifted his focus from the urban population, who were less pliable and more comfortable in their coping mechanisms under elite suppression, to the rural population, a disenfranchised and marginalised constituency, barely surviving and more susceptible to mobilisation for social revolution. By 1936, at the launch of the Long March, Mao brought the peoples revolution through the 3 phases to a stage of symmetrical combat with the nationalist forces. As Mao asserts in his Guerrilla Warfare, they “appropriated nationalism in the face of the Japanese invasion… linking the people, the army and the government” creating the unity of spirit. In outlining his guidance for the implementation of the Peoples War, Mao published his 3 Rules, 8 Remarks. It is the people’s war. Support the people. Political mobilisation is fundamental. He listed the 3 phases of implementation as a) Organisation, consolidation and preservation; b) Progressive expansion and c) Destruction of the enemy.

Nagl observes that insurgents start with nothing but a cause and grow in strength, while COIN forces start with everything but a cause and gradually decline... as guerrilla warfare is used as a tool of political revolution. He observes the sudden decline in the power and prestige of the traditional nation state system post-1941. While Clausewitz believed that a people’s war could only be strategic defensive, Nagl mentions that this was prior to the increasing power of communications and evolving attitudes towards the state... harking back to T.E Lawrence’s mention of the power of the printing press.

Nagl asserts the “intellectual bankruptcy and blind optimism” of the US senior military thinking (in particular, he highlights General Harkins) that the war would be won by Men, Money and Materials

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323 Ibid, Loc 201 of 3473, Kindle
324 Ibid, Loc 227. Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831), German-Prussian soldier and military theorist; probably still the most important of the classical strategic thinkers who stressed the moral and political aspects of war. His work continues to influence military thinking. [www.conservapedia.com/Carl_von_Clausewitz](http://www.conservapedia.com/Carl_von_Clausewitz). (accessed March 11, 2013)
325 Ibid. Baron Antoine-Henri Jomini, (1779-1869) a French contemporary of Clausewitz ... “Military critic, and historian whose systematic attempt to define the principles of warfare made him one of the founders of modern military thought.” [www.clausewitz.com/readings/Bassing/Jomini/JOMINIX.htm](http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/Bassing/Jomini/JOMINIX.htm) (accessed March 11, 2013)
326 Ibid, loc 392. Mao Tse-tung, 3 Rules, 8 Remarks... see Footnote 294
(the 3Ms), i.e. by direct destruction of the enemy, with an absence of focus on indirect methods; a focus on political objectives while avoiding a frontal clash. Government authority rests on the twin bases of perceived legitimacy and credible capacity to coerce. However, in considering the options of how to separate the fish from the water, Nagl quotes Frank Kitson, that “in a liberal democracy… none of the attrition options are appropriate … the gloves off approach has a limited role to play in modern COIN Operations.” The US ‘total war’ approach in Vietnam was based on misinterpretation due to the extensive conventional war experience of commanders, and little else.

Robert Thompson in his Five Principles of COIN asserts the necessity for i) Clear Political Aims; ii) Functioning in accordance with Law; iii) An overall Plan; iv) Prioritise defeating political subversion, not the guerrillas and v) in the guerrilla phase, government must secure its bases. Nagl asserts that in COIN doctrine, victory equals the attainment of national objectives, not just military objectives.

In analysing the British COIN experience in Malaya, Nagl considers that Britain returned to Malay post-1945, having been expelled by the Japanese, with a degree of humility, no longer being the invincible empire and with a clear consideration of evolving British national aspirations in an era of the post-war growth in the commitment to decolonisation and liberal democracy. One of their first actions was to implement a limited weapons “buy-back” exercise in encouraging the most compliant and presumably redundant insurgent group, The Malayan Peoples Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA) to disarm and partially demobilise… an early example of DDR.

Britain, embracing and indeed projecting this liberal democracy and considering its commitments to all sectors of the Malayan population including the Chinese, Indian and other minority communities, envisioned an innovative consociationalised state offering equal rights to minority communities… an option that was opposed by the Malay population who stood to see their dominant status diluted. Disgruntlement, together with the influence of revolutionary China gave rise to a communist insurgency, manifest initially in attacks on planters.

Initial responses by the British were of a military nature, favouring major operations and draconian laws that imposed collective punishment on the populations of unsecured areas. While enlightened thinking and international displeasure ensured that this approach was rapidly reversed, military

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330 The JPAJA did establish a veterans association which retained the hierarchical chain of command
frustration early in the conflict led to a futile practice of ‘beating the bush’; ad hoc search and destroy operations in the absence of sound intelligence, in search of insurgents… seeking gratification in a ‘body count’. In 1950, prudence did lead to the development of a jungle training school in Singapore in order to capture and implement lessons and develop a range of improved military tactics for the COIN environment that heretofore had been limited by the lack of any coherent strategy. Through the focus on learning lessons, strategic principles evolved, drawing also on concurrent experience in Palestine. The requirement of the need to protect the population emerged as a major principle; the need for a spirit of ‘jointness’ (Mao’s unity of spirit); the need to separate the insurgents from the supply source (the fishes and the water)… and the key… win the population, rather than defeat the insurgents was articulated in the Briggs Plan.\(^{331}\) This implied the implementation of intelligence based kinetic operations combined with civic actions rather the ‘beating of the bush’.

The British Foreign Office realised that the COIN effort would require a highly integrated combined operation and that “a quick-fix” could not be expected. Metropolitan “imprimatur existed for institutional support for a protracted campaign”. It was understood that broad “ideological change was more important than local military success”. This represented a primacy of politics over military action. The COIN military commander focused on allowing the local commanders exercise initiative in winning the people locally by assuring them of security… separating the water from the fish. A process of education and propaganda was launched. As the organisation learned from trial and error, these gradual changes in strategy had limited success to the end of 1951. This changed with the arrival of General Sir Gerald Templer as High Commissioner and Commander in Chief… representing the civil authority and military commander in one, a ‘double hatted’ role, with clear primacy to British political objectives. His ace card was that he carried a large carrot that would please the broad population; his primary task having quelled the insurgency was to herald and launch the decolonisation and to initiate the independence of Malaya. Thus, Templer knew that he could harness nationalism as the issue of the national government against the insurgents, thus co-opting the primary cause. He professionalized the COIN implementation, prioritising intelligence and reporting systems, rule of law, public information and the strengthening of local security and governance systems. He provided clear guidance to his officers in the field directing a carrot and stick approach to dealing with communities, controversially using access to food by the people as the tool of coercion, and allowed the local

\(^{331}\) Ibid, locs 1048 - 1122
commanders to get on with it… whilst implementing stringent monitoring and evaluation methods, often personally arriving in the field unannounced.

These methods, evolved in a process of learning over a decade, succeeded in separating the population from the insurgents and ultimately during the years 1952 to 1957, defeated the insurgency. In considering why this British COIN campaign succeeded, the positioning of a critical visionary and energetic leadership within an organisational learning culture was pivotal. Templer was the man!

The US experience in Vietnam was a very different. They arrived with the Jominian vision of total destruction in a WWII mind-set with commanding officers of limited capacity. Their learning cycle was ineffective in recognising poor performance; monitoring and evaluation (M&E) was not in vogue and there existed an “organisational inertia to change and innovation.” Meanwhile, Ho Chi Minh (the Bringer of Light) was busy implementing Mao’s 3 Phases of revolution from North Vietnam, a drive that had brought success against French colonial forces at Dien Bien Phu in May 1954. From the outset, US forces rejected civil primacy and this manifest in open personality conflict between the military commander and the US Ambassador. In building a South Vietnamese capacity, the US expeditionary force, rather than developing a local force to resist the insurgency, envisaged building a local force, the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) in the image of the US Army, focused on external security, a conventional invasion from the north. In late 1959, a high level committee convened to review military strategy. It decided that COIN rather than being the major focus of the US forces in Vietnam, ‘fighting insurgents would be a lessor included capacity...’ US forces would focus on conventional strategies and major operations. Such a strategy left security vacuums at in uncontrolled areas in the absence of small, lightly equipped, mobile forces or any degree of local capacity. 1960-61 saw a major escalation in insurgency in keeping with Ho Chi Minh’s programme. In January 1961 President J.F. Kennedy convened a special group on COIN to address the realisation of the new emerging threat of insurgency and demanded the development of an appropriate doctrine. Early in the conflict, more enlightened sectors of the US security sector with a focus on foreign policy had realised, drawing from the observation of Mao’s staff officer, General Chang Ting-chen of the Central Committee, that COIN was 85% political and 15% military. They commenced adapting non-kinetic operations and localised solutions to address the environment of irregular forces, with the CIA taking the lead. This was considered a deep incursion into their professional turf by Department of Defence. Early in 1960 CIA operations established Civilian Irregular Defence Groups (CIDGs), informally called the Boun Enao

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332 Drawn from Roger Hilsman, *Internal War: The New Communist Tactic*, US State Department, August 1961
Concept and New Villages, Strategic Hamlets. However this initiative was neutralised by stealth in 1962, as total command of this civic action project reverted to the military that redirected the effort and assets towards conventional tactics in a claw-back by the military commanders in what was cynically called Operation Switchback. This was a successful concept destroyed by conventional thinking. “Organisational culture was a formidable barrier to learning, with quantity over quality” being dominant. The assessment of a British advisory team (BRIAM) that was reluctantly allowed to visit was that the current strategy was totally ineffective, US Commander, General Harkins was “a blind optimist of limited intellectual capacity.” This British assessment didn’t carry much weight with the US high command. Further, while there were indeed bright young leaders who saw the potential disaster, they did not get a serious hearing. The total focus of the US Commanders, General Harkins and General ‘Hanging Sam’ Williams... “blinkerled conservative conventionalists”... was on the capacity to repel a conventional invasion from North Vietnam. The net result was that from 1960 to 1964, the US Forces in Vietnam failed to develop an appropriate or effective COIN strategy. They had barely recognised the war as an insurgency and had failed to realise the significance of the functional capacity and threat of the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The US failed to recognise that indiscriminate use of airpower and artillery alienates peasants and turns them into enemies. Beyond 1964 the US consolidated their conventional strategy applying their massive logistical and technical advantage. Nagl quotes a telling comment from a mid-ranking officer that the new US Commander Westmorland was … “flying around in his helicopter fighting big operations with fancy names…” and never thought of “doing it any other way.”

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333 Boun Enao Concept (Special Forces) http://www:///ranger95.com/military_history/sf_vietnam_civ_def_gp.html (accessed June 27, 2012)

In late 1961 the CIA, with the consent of the Government of Vietnam, wishing to capitalize on the general ambivalence of mountain and minority tribes to the Viet Cong, commenced an experimental COIN programme known as the Civilian Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG) to train minority Rhade tribal villagers of Boen Enao in local defense. This process rapidly spread to villages further afield from Boun Enao. A detachment of mixed Special Forces troops (US and Vietnamese) would settled in the hamlet to conduct the training and to provide some basic social services, first aid, etc. The programme became popular and recruitment of local participation was rapid. These informal arrangements were highly successful and spread to non-minority villages. As a result of the success, the Government of Vietnam could declare the area secure by the near the end of 1962. Though nominally continued and expanded into the mid-sixties, the concept (Boun Enao) was effectively neutralised by the end of 1962 by internal US command turf conflict and a sense by the military command that troops engaged in CIDG were not being utilized effectively. Retaking command of the CIDG, the military command used the teams in more conventional operations and the innovative energy and COIN benefit of the concept was dispelled.


Lieutenant Colonel John Paul Van was an outspoken US career officer who on retirement returned to Vietnam as an official of the US Agency for International Development. In that capacity he concluded that the US strategy for waging the war was heading for disaster and that a more concerted effort at winning the people was required. His efforts to so advise the high command were rebuffed. Van died on duty in Vietnam. His life inspired the book and movie, A Bright and Shining Lie.

335 Ho Chi Minh Trail... The sinuous network of jungle paths from North to South Vietnam; often moving through Laos and eastern Cambodia, along which the Viet Cong could effectively manually transport their military logistics despite the absence of modern transportation infrastructure.

336 Nagl, Op sit, loc 2162
Some efforts at strengthening local capacity did arise including embedding US troops in South Vietnamese formations. Further, the Marine commandeer, Major General Lew Wall, initiated a process of deploying small units to remain in villages, to get to know the population, gain human intelligence and to develop a local defence capacity working with local forces in the hamlets… Combined Action Platoons (CAPs), a technique learned in Nicaragua and a model that gained some recognition as one of the few US tactical successes in the Vietnam War. However, CAPs were too little, too late.\footnote{CAP. http://www.capmarine.com/ (accessed June 29, 2012)} The US focus remained on firepower rather than achieving strategic objectives. Westmorland was fixated on the ‘body count’… at best an irrelevant metric that did more for alienating the population than defeating the insurgents. The prevailing strategy was ‘search and destroy’, which offered tactical objectives rather than strategic ones.

The North Vietnamese, the Vietcong (VC), operated a very effective method of dynamic M&E, a process of self-analysis after every contact and operation, public self-criticism and denunciation and adaption of practice to address failings or weaknesses in operational technique. This ensured that the insurgent force was dynamically adapting to the field conditions, changing profile, amorphous before a very operationally static and predictable enemy. They rapidly adapted to US methods, including developing ‘hugging’ techniques, stealthily maneuvering very close to US forces to counter close air and artillery support.

In the face of increasing attrition, the Abram’s Commission (PROVN Study):\footnote{PROVN Study, A Programme for the Pacification and Long-Term Development of South Vietnam, 1966, often called The Abrams Report.}\footnote{Nagl, Op cit, loc 2270} repudiated the search and destroy’ strategy, and advocated winning the population through support for government. It deplored false optimism and recommended the development of civil primacy by giving full authority to the Ambassador… the development of a single integrated plan… moving towards denying the capacity of the VC to encroach on the South.\footnote{Nagl, Op cit, loc 2270} Nagl contends that this was a dramatic recommendation that requested a reconfiguration of US forces from addressing a conventional threat to adopting COIN techniques to ‘win the people’ through intermingling and developing local capacity with methods such as the CIAs CIDGs prior to Operation
Switchback and the Marines CAPs. He suggests that Westmorland found the findings of the Abram’s Commission a direct threat to his conventional thinking and used procedural technique to have it delayed and shelved in a process of review terming it ‘a concept’ rather than a finding.

This interpretation of the events concerning the PROVN as presented by Nagle is hotly disputed in a recent scholarly reappraisal by Birtle, who claims that the recommendations of PROVN were nothing new to Westmorland and that the relevant COIN strategies were being implemented in as far as possible. Further, Bridle claims that there was little disagreement between Westmorland and Abrams and that other than an increase in the emphasis on Pacification, Abrams did very little different to change COIN strategy when he took over command of US Forces in Vietnam from Westmorland.  

In an environment of rising inflation and endemic corruption, Westmorland resisted being pressured to provide more troops for Pacification and Revolutionary Development (RD) operations that he saw as eating into his kinetic capacity. Concurrently, tension was widening a US leadership civilian/military rift. US Ambassador Lodge was advocating the reinforcement of Pacification operations with a 10% US led buddy system in the ARVN and a change to ‘search & destroy’ tactics to focus on RD to further distance the population from the VC. This resulted in a limited refocus on Civilian Operations & Revolutionary Development (CORDS) pulling together integrated resources; CIA, AID, USIA, State Department, Whitehouse and all military services, focusing military and civilian efforts on COIN in a combined political and military approach to problem recognition and resolution. This reconfigured the approach and encouraged innovation. It introduced dynamic CORDS M&E; launched a defector programme similar to modern DDR techniques; established a Vietnamese National Training Centre and established Peoples Self-help Forces after the Tet Offensive of 1968… shifting the process of winning the war towards national ownership. The President of Vietnam, Thieu responded by establishing the Central Pacification and Development Council to direct the campaign. However, Nagle quotes Komer, “Pacification came too late.”

341 Nagl, Op cit, loc 2288
342 Ibid
The huge loses by the VC during the Tet Offensive had little impact on the VC determination or capacity. However Westmorland viewed the body count as a victory for the US. All this effort was failing to separate the fishes from the water, failing to win the people. In general, asymmetry of forces and resources is also reflected in an asymmetry of required outcomes. Kissinger said that guerrilla forces win if they do not lose whereas a conventional army loses if it does not win. Cognisant of the US search and destroy strategy and slavish and ill-considered commitment to the use of its superior force and technology, the VC used its fluid capacity and limited resources to manipulate US forces “as a bull fighter uses his cape”… to keep the US military forces “lunging into areas of little political importance.”

In June 1968 Abram replaced Westmorland and he took a more pragmatic view on strategy despite an inability to overcome the inertia of conservative organisational culture… particularly as his conservative predecessor Westmorland had moved to a more influential post in Washington. It is a telling quote recounted by Nagl where a senior US officer could say that the “US army culture was more important than winning the war!” The US was blinded by its own doctrinal rigidity to responding to a non-conventional environment and to apply its capacity in a more intelligent and relevant manner. Blind optimism and rigid and resistant organisational culture resulted in the US army not being a learning organisation. The US rejected the lessons of its few successful experiments, as they didn't originate from the Army and threatened conventional tactics; CAPs and the Strategic Hamlets Concept… and resented the resources required to support Pacification and RD. The US Army with a non-learning institutional culture failed to evolve beyond its conservation and conventional thinking to adopt a COIN configuration.

On the other hand, the British Army, reliant more on its culture of traditional confidence, with no imposed doctrinal direction, was forced by greater economy of resources and technology and more accountability to civil primacy, to evolve, drawing lessons from the field and to address changing environments. The British army is therefore a learning organisation, as illustrated by its dynamic adjustment of tactical innovation to “out guerrilla the guerrilla” ubiquitously evident throughout the COIN campaign in Malaya.

On COIN principles, Kitson said that one must “regard force as only one plank in a combined political economic and propaganda effort…” According to Nagl, the key to success for the British, as it was a failing for the US forces, was having or not having the right man in the right place at the right time. Templer, as a product of an adaptive and flexible learning organisation, was steeped through his profession and upbringing in the traditions and cultures of diverse nations, with extensive politico-

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344 Ibid
345 As quoted by Nagle… from Walter Walker, Kindle for iPad loc 2,716
346 Kitson, Op cit
military experience and a proclivity to empower his subordinate officers, was given the appropriate political and military authority to get on with the job. The British did not depend on doctrinal guidance, more drawing on their confidence in the professional experience and socio-cultural sense of the right man in the right place, allowing for their geopolitical interests. As Templer expressed it, he saw his job as getting “the priorities right; get the instructions right; get the organisation right; get the right people into the organisation; get the right spirit into the people… let them get on with it.”

The US generals in Vietnam were non-adaptive personalities in a foreign environment, tied by inflexible doctrine that Nagle suggests was more driven by the US Military industrial complex and generals comfort-zones than by the required strategic outcomes. COIN strategy is not as material intensive as conventional warfare, requiring a more intelligent application of human resources, and would not be attractive to that Military Industrial Complex. Much of the conservative think-tank driven analysis of the Vietnam war places blame for the failure elsewhere, particularly in deploying insufficient fire power, supporting the Jominian concept of total war and the interests of the Military Industrial Complex. Ultimately, Nagle contends that the critical independent variable dictating these outcomes in comparing the US in Vietnam with the British in Malaya, is not the nature of national government, but the status of the organisational culture of the military institutions and their relationship with that government.

12.7 Chapter XII Review

A defining influence on post-WWII western COIN doctrine is launched with the work of Galula who drew from his apparently unsuccessful experience in fighting revolutionary societies seeking self-determination in the declining French colonies in Indochina and North Africa. His anti-communist approach and absence of sensitivity to foreign agency in COIN campaigns well suits the interests of the US neo-conservative military industrial complex... a super-institution that can place its short-term interests beyond learning from experience in what can be perceived as ‘repetition compulsion.’ Vietnam was a disaster for the US but that did not discourage the neo-conservative faith in firepower over an asymmetrically weak insurgency... irrespective of cause. It had worked in Latin America. The US unsuccessfully attempted to coopt the science of ethnography to stage-manage populations to acquiesce to its requirements. When it couldn’t win the people in Vietnam, it sought to destroy them. COIN that advocates a people-centric approach does not address the interests of the US military industrial complex and therefore meets strong opposition. Nagle asserts that the US military is not a
learning institution... as opposed to the British Army that is a learning institution. He offers the example of Templer’s COIN success in Malaya... ‘a man with a plan’ and appropriate political support, who could coopt the insurgent’s cause. The US in Vietnam didn’t get it. They were ‘old school’, body count merchants and non-adaptive personalities drawing on WWII experience. Ignoring the dangers of foreign agency and the necessity to ‘win the people,’ Nagl contends that organisational culture is decisive in COIN.
Chapter XIII

COIN and the ‘War on Terror’

Kilcullen takes us forward into current day COIN in the topical cases of Iraq and Afghanistan. Like Nagl, from a neo-conservative perspective, any consciousness of the dangers of foreign agency is carefully subdued and here concealed in a commitment to respect for non-combatants, socio-cultural factors and for the local people with a responsibility to protect. COIN is war and is conducted as such. He draws on Mao, Galula and Lawrence but emphasises the need for the projection of ‘soft power.’ He considers COIN in Indonesia and British experience-based COIN philosophy. Kilcullen reminds us that the objective of COIN is the provision of better governance. Chapter XIII considers the crosscutting issues of international law; COIN in democracies; leadership in COIN; the US attempts to coopt ethnography into COIN efforts, particularly anthropology; stabilisation and terror.

13.1 Kilcullen on COIN

Kilcullen, a soldier, focuses on the agency of the US military in COIN, particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan, and has written what has become an acclaimed textbook for COIN practitioners.\textsuperscript{347} He is described by Gusterson in Kelly 2010 as “one of the Pentagon’s culture warriors,”\textsuperscript{348} Kilcullen tells us that of 464 wars since 1816, 79 or 17% of them were conventional; a contest between reasonably symmetrical forces, usually, representing states and applying military strategies and resources in addressing the failure of international diplomacy.\textsuperscript{349} The majority of the remainder was asymmetrical conflict in an intrastate COIN environment. Those various experiences confirmed, as we know from Templer in Malaya and Nagl, that addressing an insurgency goes beyond military kinetic activity and requires innovative mechanisms that would “remove their oxygen,” the support of the broader community. Drawing from the principal sectors also listed in Patraeus’s US COIN Doctrine 2006, Kilcullen says that this implies the integrated application of military, paramilitary resources, political, economic, and psychosocial, cultural and civic actions. As with DDR, context is critical and that no cookie-cutter solution for insurgency exists. He identifies the defining characteristics that dictate the approach to COIN as a) the nature of the insurgency, b) the nature of the government and c) the nature of the environment and emphasises two overarching fundamental principles that will

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\textsuperscript{347} David J. Kilcullen, \textit{Counterinsurgency}, Oxford University Press, 2010. Kilcullen was Petraeus’s senior COIN advisor in Iraq in 2007.
\textsuperscript{348} Hugh Gusterson, “The Culture Turn in the War on Terror’ Kelly et al, 2010, \textit{Op cit}, p 289
determine the success or failure of COIN as local solutions and respect for non-combatants; principles of COIN that, we shall find, were poorly addressed in Afghanistan.³⁵⁰

He describes a Twenty-four hour cycle of intelligence led strikes… counter network operations hitting “middle layer planners, administration, facilitators and operators” through a process of “finding, fixing, finishing, exploiting and accessing (F3EA)³⁵¹

... an intensive and resource heavy approach that requires the capacity to “discriminate between reconcilable and irreconcilable… killing or protecting”.³⁵²

Kilcullen emphasises that successful COIN requires “scrupulous moral conduct alongside political legitimacy and a clear respect for Rule of Law that is an operational imperative.” Guerrillas are fluid while populations are static... ‘the fish in the water’. Therefore the operational imperative is to separate the guerrillas from the population; to “hardwire” them out of the community.

Expeditionary COIN raises an additional complexity in creating a third virtual entity in the conflict in addition to the state and the insurgency; the Expeditionary State... a virtual entity that may be attempting to contribute to the state through a complex process of state-building.

Once COIN was adopted in Iraq and Afghanistan the troops on the ground didn’t have the fundamentals “to link the theory with the techniques” to compete with the insurgents in ‘winning the people.’ While troops were told to be ‘state-builders, what kind of state could be built or was appropriate to build were not asked at the outset. As with Nagl, he contends that US military were slow learners and failed to adapt to the rapidly evolving dynamic environment “obstructed by a profusion of multilateral command structures…” and failed to draw on the lessons of COIN literature from T.E. Lawrence’s 27 Articles.³⁵³ Simply, the troops were not trained for COIN and the concept of winning the people in such foreign environments. Mirroring the DDR practitioner’s evaluation dilemma, McCrystal says that commanders measure what their leaders tell them to report on and that leaders prioritise kinetics… that treat the symptoms rather than the cause. Quantitative indicators are easier to measure than qualitative ones. Achievement in the socio-cultural elements of COIN is more difficult to

³⁵⁰ *Ibid*, pp 3-4
³⁵¹ *Ibid*
³⁵² *Ibid*
measure than the number of patrols undertaken or the body count. Therefore, military force usually neglects the non-kinetic activities, the projection of ‘soft-power.’\footnote{Joseph S. Nye Jr., \textit{Think Again: Soft Power}, Foreign Policy, 1 March 2006, YaleGlobalOnline, \url{http://www.yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/think-again-soft-power} (accessed June 28, 2012) Joseph S. Nye developed the concept of Soft Power in the early nineteen nineties and revisited it with his \textit{Think Again: Soft Power} in March 2006. His primary contention is that soft power is grossly underestimated in military strategy and political and military leaders need to reconsider. He says that it is about the power of ‘attraction’ not coercion or buy-off. It can be used positively as by Gandhi or Martin L. King or negatively as by Hitler. If it does not convince the direct subject of concern, e.g. Iran and the nuclear issue, it may influence the neighbors to exert peer pressure and achieve our objectives laterally.}

In Indonesia during Sukarno’s “Guided Democracy,” the concept of “Total People’s Defence (P4K)” devised by Abdul Harris Nasution was implemented in 1962… a Plan for Perfecting Peace and Security (Pacification), with the objective of consolidating territory, zone by zone through a combination of ‘civic action’ and psychological operations (Psyops).\footnote{Ibid, p 90. General Harris Abdul Nasution (1918 – 2000), Indonesian Chief of staff on two separate occasions under Sukarno. Joined the anti-Nazi Dutch Foreign Reserve Corps during the WWII and rose rapidly through the non commissioned officer ranks. Nasution went into hiding during the Japanese invasion of Indonesia in 1942 but is reputed to have offered some minor supporting services to the Japanese occupier. In 1945 he joined Sukarno’s new Peoples Security Army (TKR) and was immediately appointed Commander of the Siliwangi Division in West Java, rising to Deputy Commander of the TKR by 1948. He led with a reputation for ruthlessness, the fight against rising communist insurgency. By 1950 he was Commander of the national army. In 1952, having mobilise his troops in a show of force against civilian interference in military affairs, Nasution was fired. He now used his time to write the \textit{Fundamentals of Guerrilla Warfare} published in 1953. He was reappointed Army Chief of Staff in 1953 and immediately commenced a programme of restructuring and reorganizing the army to support Sukarno’s shift in the national system from Parliamentary Democracy to ‘Guided Democracy’. He led successful counterinsurgencies against the risings in Sumatra and Celebes in 1959 and was appointed Minister for Defence in Sukarno’s increasingly authoritarian government the same year. With a reputation for unflinching ruthlessness, he responded to the continuing communist insurrection and escalated assassinations of senior army generals in 1965, where he himself narrowly escaped, his six year old daughter being killed, releasing a rampage of military revenge in which hundreds of thousands of potential pro-communist and union leaders were killed. In the following years he fell out with Sukarno who was trying to limit military power and Nasution supported the accession of the Suharto dictatorship. Nasution remained a senior advisor to Suharto until his retirement in the early eighties. \url{http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/obituaries/1355904/General-Abdul-Harris-Nasution.html} (accessed July 4, 2012)} The ‘civic action’ was often coercive in forcing the people to participate in long skirmish lines to sweep across rough bush areas where insurgents were suspected to be hiding; pushed, often for days on end, like beaters at a snipe shoot, to drive insurgents into the guns of the COIN force focused on ‘free fire zones’. This process, much hated by the population was known as ‘the fence of legs’. Such ‘counterforce and enemy-centric’ operations were considered highly efficient from a military perspective because they controlled the population and concurrently minimised the military manpower needed to chase insurgents. They were effectively applied in East Timor in the late nineteen nineties… until global media exposure of the coercion and gross oppression of the population gave rise to an international backlash at a time when Indonesia was politically receptive to international favour and a more humanitarian and democratic approach to the grievances of the East Timorese.

Kilcullen cites Mao’s ‘three unities’ of insurgent action; “political action within insurgent forces; spiritual unity between insurgents and the people and the unity of political action targeting the enemies
cohesion”… He suggests that Mao missed one… the unity of perception… communications measures managing the international community.

In a cursory review of the non-military elements of COIN, he considers the significance of legitimacy and political power... quoting appropriate sound bites from Bernard Fall from 1956 … “The government that is losing to an insurgency isn’t being out-fought, it’s being out-governed.” Further:\footnote{356}

\begin{quote}
small war tactics are not to defeat the (bigger) of which they are incapable, but to establish a comprehensive system of control over population and the comparison of strength between governments and insurgents is functional, not structural. It involves the capacity to penetrate society; regulate social relationships, extort resources and to apply these resources to group ends.\footnote{357}
\end{quote}

The people can only be won by strength. They fear disorder and unpredictability and value clear rules in a ‘normative systems’; what Fall called ‘competitive control.’\footnote{358} Bottom-up community based civil society approaches are more successful than state-based ‘top-down’ approaches… “local agreements that are enforceable are just another form of normative system.”\footnote{359}

COIN uses a broader approach than Counter-terrorism… COIN is a “strategy of disaggregation that seeks to dismantle or delink… offering a unifying strategic conception.”\footnote{360} The current (mid-2012) US hypothesis is that the war of terror is equal to a war on global Islamic insurgency. If so, is COIN the best approach? COIN is not designed to address an international environment but intrastate conflict so a new paradigm is needed to address global insurgency. While COIN utilises systems analysis, global insurgency is too complex for traditional systems analysis and new methods and modeling are necessary. New methods would focus not on the destruction of global insurgency; an objective that can never be achieved in the dynamic hydra-headed environment of global insurgency; but a focus on disaggregation that can contain insurgencies within their own more manageable environments/states. Insurgencies, viewed as systems, are “organic social systems”…“energetically open but organisationally closed… self organising systems. Synergetic… meaning that insurgencies are more
such consideration needs “a new range of policies and strategic choices” acknowledging that successful COIN is linked to better governance.  

13.2 COIN and International Law

In considering the place of COIN in the Laws of War; how international law could or should apply to COIN, Ganesh Sitaraman asserts that COIN is the war of the future. He confirms that in law, the primary objective of conventional interstate and intrastate war, and indeed the recently evolved war on terrorism, is to implement a Kill and Capture strategy. The law recognises this reality and in ways facilitates it. COIN, on the other hand, rejects the Kill and Capture strategy, and while focusing on ‘creating a stable and legitimate political order’, implements a strategy of ‘winning the people.’ Sitaraman tells us that attempting to apply conventional strategy to a COIN environment is ‘likely to be counterproductive’ as it will contribute to alienating the population that are critical to stabilisation.

Sperotto in considering COIN, human rights and the Law of Armed Conflict in the context of US interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan identifies three main differences between conventional warfare and COIN. COIN is conducted amongst civilians; forces opposing the intervention generally avoid direct confrontation but use unconventional methods of attack and the opponents are often difficult to distinguish from the civilian population. Therefore, the degree of caution needed in conducting COIN is greater than is provided for in International Humanitarian Law (IHL), the law of armed conflict. When such a gap exists in IHL, it is supplemented by an additional body of International Law; International Human Rights Law. Such a provision, coupled with the additional provisions of “regional human rights treaties and the jurisprudence developed in regional human rights courts” should be sufficient to address the existing ambiguities in applying and interpreting IHL in a COIN environment. Rules of Engagement (RoEs) that govern individual soldiers scope for decision making as regards the use of lethal force towards the avoidance of mistakes in shooting innocent...
civilians, in the context of the rule of law, is a distillation of the provisions of these combined bodies of international law.\textsuperscript{368} Criddle is supporting this assertion of the necessity to combine both bodies of law in COIN environments. However the article notes a growing polemic between those who contend that the norms of IHL are dominant while others see International Human Rights Law as offering minimum standards.\textsuperscript{369} It contends, by way of offering a bottom line, that

... a state’s authority to use force under international law is derived from, and constrained by, the fiduciary character of its relationship with its people. This relational conception of state sovereignty offers an attractive normative framework for addressing conflicts between human rights and humanitarian law. When states engage in internal armed conflict and belligerent occupation, their assertion of public powers of governance over an affected population entails a concomitant fiduciary obligation to satisfy the strict proportionality standard of international human rights law.\textsuperscript{370}

13.3 Democrasies and COIN

Decades of research have projected the contested conclusions that democracies, with politicians who are accountable to a risk averse public deploring returning body bags and expenditure on foreign wars, and a free media feeding that public with war reporting, are prone to loose COIN wars. Jason Lyall through a process of rigorous quantitative analysis, using regression analysis on a dataset of insurgencies from 1800 to 2005, concludes that while it is a fact that democracies have had a historical tendency to lose COIN wars over a long period, there is no evidence of regime type being a causal variable.\textsuperscript{371} There appears to be a pattern of differing levels of state capacity between democracies and autocracies in addressing insurgencies efficiently and expeditiously. The fact is probably more related to the tendency for democracies to be engaged in expeditionary COIN wars of choice and the methods of COIN applied, while ruthless autocracies tend to face homegrown insurgencies with robust methods and without the constraints of a tentative metropolitan population. In the case of the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan, it was more due to the tenacity of the Afghan people, their survivability and external support. In particularly, the provision of ‘man pack’ Stinger anti-aircraft missiles curtailed the Soviet pervasive use of helicopters as gunships and for transporting troops in the inaccessible Afghani terrain,

\textsuperscript{368} Ibid, p 22
\textsuperscript{370} Ibid, p 1073
than to the impact of modern communications, anyway well controlled, on less than democratically governed metropolitan population.

Such an option as used by the Soviets in Afghanistan and the US in Vietnam, destruction of the social base, despite the history of failure, has been the favoured choice of the hawks, the conservative supporters of conventional military power and of the military industrial complex. This class represents the ideologues, scholars, think tanks and politicians for the application of superior firepower and technology... as offering the quickest and simplest way to achieve their objectives and protect their interests. It is a realist approach to separating the insurgents from the people; destroy the people. They are unprotected and more easily targeted with massive firepower and modern weapons of tactical mass destruction than the illusive insurgents; anti-personnel mine dispersal, blanket bombing, chemical exfoliation and crop destruction, free fire zones, etc. The ‘destruction of the social base’; destroying the people, will achieve the objective while stimulating massive business for the domestic military industrial complex. The crux of this option in the democratic West has been how to manage the two fronts of the war; one in the field and the other in home public opinion... the latter being a front about which the insurgents are only too well aware.

The other option, winning the people with soft-power rather than destroying them with kinetic energy, while in compliance with international law, is more complex, the rationalisation of the expected results more difficult and their achievement apparently less sure.\(^\text{372}\) The idea of winning the people is not new. With some notable exceptions, winning the hearts and minds of the population in the local insurgency has received extensive lip service, but few resources and commitment.

13.4 Leadership in COIN

Moyer,\(^\text{373}\) a much disputed scholar referred to by Hevia as a “bought scholar” considering his bias to the conservative agenda, in his Leadership in COIN, discusses the two schools of thought regarding the implementation of COIN.\(^\text{374}\) The enemy-centrist school that advocates a process of killing and capturing the insurgents is in the US hawkish tradition, while the population-centric school is favoured by the liberal social scientists and advocates a focus on winning hearts and minds to separate the insurgents form the people. Stanley McCrystal in his 2009 ISAF Commanders Assessment on the war

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\(^{372}\) Soft Power, See Footnote 354


in Afghanistan is advocating the latter, drawing ire from the hawks in the enemy-centrist school. According to Moyer, analysis of progress in Iraq and Afghanistan doesn’t confirm the superior efficacy of either approach. Moyer asserts that focus on either is to miss the point and that COIN is ‘leader-centrist warfare’ requiring having the right man in the right place in order to succeed. In his analysis of leadership qualities most appropriate for COIN leadership he has identified a list of traits as contributing to the most effective leadership. Deferring to the exponents of Trait Theory, he emphasises that these leadership traits are more important than the specific leadership processes.

While inferring that the requisite traits and not something learned in military collage, nor are they exclusively hereditary. They are probably acquired through a combination of nature and nurture, natural qualities and those absorbed through rearing and acculturation. While a solid foundation of the requisite traits is an advantage, it is possible for leaders to improve their leadership skills through a consciousness of the traits. Through analysis of nine COIN environments Moyer identified the following ten traits, possession of a good cross-section of which contributes to effective leadership: initiative; flexibility; creativity; judgment; empathy; charisma; sociability; dedication; integrity and organisation.

13.5 War Objectives v. Applied Social Science/Cogitative Science

[T]hose in social science ought to be acting as responsible and independent critics of their government’s policies... When the university turns away from its central purpose and makes itself an appendage to government, concerning itself with techniques rather than purposes, with expedients rather than ideals... it betrays a public trust.

In 1964, the US Army and Department of Defence Camelot Project was an early attempt in applying social and cogitative science to COIN. Anthropology, linguistics, psychology, sociology, economics, mathematics and political science were co-opted, together with the military, to analyse the impact of attitudes, support or acquiescence of the people and more pointedly, the capacity to control it in an

375 General Stanly McCrystal, Commanders Assessment: international Security Assistance Force Commander Recommendations for achieving Victory in Afghanistan, ISAF, August 2009
376 Trait Theory, an aspect of personality study that asserts that individual personalities are composed of broad dispositions directed by traits, which are relatively stable characteristics that cause individuals to behave in certain ways. http://www.psychology.about.com/od/theoriesofpersonality/a/trait-theory.htm (accessed July10, 2012)
environment of insurgency, particularly in the oil rich states of Latin America: “…to produce a deliberate political objective of social control.”

The intentions of the programme and the Department of Defence source of funding were leaked to the Allende’s Chilean government (by Johan Galtung, ‘the Father of Peace-studies’, of all people!), in light of its potential for blatant breach of professional scientific ethics, raised widespread outcry from social scientists in the US and globally. Their publicly voicing of concern at the use of their science as a tool of war, led to the public suspension of the programme following congressional hearings in 1965… amid claims that it has continued unabated in a covert form ever since. This incident raised some of the same ethical questions concerning the appropriateness of scientists with professional ethics; physicists, ethnographers, social scientists and anthropologists, working for the military that arose in the aftermath of the Manhattan Project of the early forties. The Manhattan Project saw the collusion of science in the development of the atomic bombs that were subsequently dropped on the civilian populations of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945. Kelly in referring to the exodus of scientists from war industry service quotes famous ‘government’ anthropologist Margaret Mead, “the social scientists picked up their marbles went home.”

It arises again currently with the “cultural turn” by the US military demonstrated in Patraeus’ 2006 COIN manual through the creation of the Human Terrain System (HTS). HTS is “to provide cultural guidance in occupied territories,” specifically for use in the COIN operations of Iraq and Afghanistan reflected in the deployment of Human Terrain Teams (HTTs), teams of military social scientists (or quasi-social scientists) embedded into US military COIN units. This approach was augmented with the launch by Secretary for Defence Gates in 2008 of the Minerva Project, a $50 million fund to draw scholarly, specifically social science, attention to address US cultural concerns on security related questions with China, COIN operations, Islamic fundamentalism and other open questions. The American Anthropological Association (AAA) kicked hard against any level of collaboration in the war industry, issuing rules to its members concerning ethical behavior on this issue. It has given rise to concerted and coordinated soul searching by ethnographers, some of it being the focus of the workshop in The University of Chicago in April 2008, that resulted in the publication of Kelly et al, 2010.

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379 Ibid, p 1 from Yans-McLaughlin 1986, p 214
380 Ibid, p 4
381 Ibid.
382 Ibid.
While a broad range of ethnographers with varying views, including some already working in the defense sector, attended this workshop, the bottom line coming from the workshop was that social scientists must not tell the military what they want to know, but what they, and indeed the world, need to know. Such ethnographers offer to support a ‘political anthropology’ that is not formed by value judgments, “but fine-grained knowledge of a complex and dangerous world, knowledge that might help to make good value judgments possible.”383 Kelly debates the concept of military interventions, and the associated support of ethnologists, making the world safe. Making it safe for what? The Wilsonian excuse to Congress for entering WWI was to make it safe “for democracy.” Kluckhohn and Benedict (1946)384 see it as making it safe for differences while Leo Strauss (1946) wanted to pull up the ladder and make it safe for Western democracy through a process of exclusion.385 Strauss’ concerns are accentuated in Chalmers Johnson’s Blowback that graphically warns of the dangers of foreign interventions resulting in threats at home.386 As might be expected in what may be considered the most liberal of constituencies, Kelly tells that social scientists and especially anthropologists, despite the varying opinions of the participants at the 2008 workshop, all rejected both the Wilsonian “one-size-fits-all imagery of symmetrical nation-states,” and the Straussian exclusionary idea of protecting Western democracy. All supported Benedict’s focus on making the world safe for differences.

Kelly explains that while ethnography has the power to “illuminate the complexities underlying contemporary order and disorder at national and global scales...” the contributors to his book “strongly believe in the importance of an independent anthropology.” The question for ethnographers is how to respond to “the overtures intrinsic to the ‘culture turn’ in the U.S military.”387 In his chapter Seeing Red, Kelly refers to what Hugh Gusterson called “weaponised anthropology,” and suggests that it is coming at a time when the military is “visibly failing on the ground” and are hoping that “science can replace government.”388 Science can contribute to the solutions, but on its own terms in supporting the transition from an expeditionary military force searching vainly for solutions to the development of local civil societal solutions. Kelly does not think that in embracing Galula, Nagl, Kilcullen and

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383 Ibid, p 8
384 Ibid pp 9-11 citing Kluckhohn and Benedict (Benedict 1946:15). Both noted American ethnographers, primarily anthropology, of the mid-twentieth century. Amongst his large opus in both philosophy and anthropology, Clyde Kluckhold’s noted publication of this particular era was, The Psychological Frontiers of Society. NY: Colombia University Press, 1945 and Kelly appears to be citing from Ruth Benedict’s, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture. Boston: Haughton Miffin, 1946.
385 Leo Strauss, On a New Interpretation of Plato’s Political Philosophy, 1946
387 Kelly et al, Op cit, p 3
Patraeus, despite lip service to the ‘culture turn’ are approaching COIN from anything other than a military or security-focused perspective and have hedged their bets. Wax is more virulent in castigating the absorption and corruption of ethnographical science (and scientists) in supporting and providing quasi-scientific justification, often post-hoc, for policy maker’s decisions of questionable morality. In reviewing US hegemonic practice, he cites the anthropological collusion in the early twentieth century in the formation of policies implemented in handling the aspects of cultural assimilation of the Native American populations, and in the internment of over one hundred thousand Japanese-Americans in the mid forties... terming the professional/moral gymnastics of the engaged anthropologists as the “warping effect.” In an analysis supported by Hevia, he projects such a negative effect to those ethnographers working with the HTS in the COIN context, in light of the “fundamental incompatibility between the aims and practices of occupying powers, however broadly imagined, and the aims and practices of anthropology.” While he admits that this is a moral evaluation, it is one that permits “the practice of anthropology among humanity.”

13.6 COIN and Stabilisation

The turn of the millennium has seen a rise in the use of the term stabilization; “a new term that has been applied to many old practices,” particularly in the context of a range of international interventions, UN or third party. It clearly has different meanings to different institutions. What is generally agreed about the term is that it focuses on the return of the legitimacy of government in terms of the monopoly in the use of armed force and in delivering rule of law... if not in mutual respect for the social contract by both state and citizens. Dennys advises that it is intrinsically a civilian led process that is effective in addressing political issues at sub-national level rather than an overarching strategic cover used in international COIN contexts to justify a broad range of activities beyond normal military practices, as has been the case in Afghanistan. Offering stabilisation at a sub-national level may be as simple as a judicial application of military operations in maintaining security for the population in order to allow local government to operate. Applied appropriately at a sub-national level, Dennys suggests that stabilization operations within COIN can have significant positive impact.

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390 Wax, Op cit, p 166
392 Ibid, p 9
393 Ibid, p 10
13.7 **Terror and insurgency**
The clear separation of the strategy of the war on terrorism and COIN lie in the difference in objectives. As with conventional war, the war on terrorism aims to kill and capture the enemy. COIN, must be to deal with the people to be governed, win them, or as in some of the examples that have been mentioned, to destroy them. There may be a third option if the context facilitates, as achieved by the Taliban when they became the state in Afghanistan; to terrify the people into submission.

13.8 **Chapter XIII Review**
Kilcullen, from a neo-conservative perspective, leads us to consider the US COIN efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. In what has become a standard current-day COIN textbook, he is an advocate of foreign agency in COIN while acknowledging it as the ‘creation of a third entity,’ reflecting the interests of the US military industrial complex, couching his advocacy in terms of respect for non-combatants and understanding of socio-cultural factors and the responsibility to protect the people. Reminding us that COIN is war he tells us that it must be population-centric. He says that as COIN was adopted in Iraq and Afghanistan, the troops didn't have the fundamentals to deal with it, the US military institution being a slow learner. Kilcullen considers some of the successful, if oppressive, COIN mechanisms used in Indonesia and draws on the philosophical views of Fall in reviewing British COIN.\(^\text{394}\) He notes that COIN is about creating ‘normative systems.’ In addressing terrorism he suggests that it needs to be disaggregated from a unified global phenomenon into ‘bite sized’ country units that can be appropriately targeted. The chapter then reviews crosscutting issues such as COIN and international law, where the strategy of ‘kill and capture’ is rejected in favour of creating that normative system with “legitimate political order.” Democratic states are not more prone to fail in COIN environments because they are democratic, but because decisive violent methods must be constrained as they would be unacceptable in liberal democracies, eventually becoming subject to the ‘metropolis effect’, rejection by home populations. Moyer tells us that good leadership is decisive in COIN and considers the predominant traits of good leaders. The US attempts to coopt social science to its COIN efforts are reviewed in Kelly et al. Basically, the advice is that the application of anthropology as a device in COIN is unacceptable and contrary to scientific professional ethics. The ubiquitous term stabilisation is reviewed before briefly defining the difference between insurgency and terrorism.

\(^{394}\) Bernard Fall. See Footnote 356
Chapter XIV
A New COIN Doctrine meets old Resistance
Patraeus’ US COIN Manual 2006 offers a sea change in the US approach to addressing insurgency... prioritising COIN principles over firepower, advocating state-building in a people-centered approach; particularly focusing on current efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Canadians in 2008 build on this advocating something of a ‘cultural turn’ in that people-centered approach to COIN. Sepp considers the failure of the focus on firepower and on the changing nature of insurgency. Jones suggests ‘going in heavier’ and says to destroy insurgents rather than win the people. McCrystal gets burned trying to implement the Patraeus concept of COIN in Afghanistan while the polemic on the pros and cons of COIN continues unabated. Before Afghanistan, British COIN depends more on experience than doctrine.

14.1 Patraeus and COIN Doctrinal Guidance, Iraq and Afghanistan 2006
An indication that US COIN doctrine has developed beyond the Conventional War and War on Terror focus on use of firepower and technology to kill and capture insurgents and has, at times, been moving towards a greater understanding of the need to win the people arose with the publication of the US definitive Army and Marine Corps manual on COIN in 2006. The fact that this came from General David Patraeus, the US military hero of the day, and subsequently for a relatively short period, head of the CIA, is especially relevant. Launching with the startling statement that US Army and Marine Corps personnel must be both “nation builders as well as warriors...”

soldiers must be: prepared to help to re-establish institutions and local security forces and to assist in rebuilding infrastructure and basic services... to facilitate the establishment of local government and the rule of law.

‘US forces must be adaptive and led by agile, well informed and astute officers.’ While US forces have neglected COIN, doctrine is evolving and, by definition, is broad in scope and involves principles, tactics, techniques and procedures that are applicable globally. In COIN the side that learns faster, wins. The purpose of the manual is to take that doctrine forward, drawing from global learning to offer guidance for practice that will win the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Quoting a US officer in Iraq, it claims that “COIN is not just the thinking man’s war, it is the graduate level war.”

396 Ibid. This is a startling statement, at least from the perspective of a professional development worker, noting that soldiers are not generally trained as nation builders.
Some of the basic principles initially outlined include: Success in COIN depends on people taking charge of their own affairs and consenting to the government’s rule. Armed forces alone cannot succeed in COIN. It is hard to sustain because a high ratio of troops is needed to protect the population. As a security situation begins to improve, the population’s expectations also rise, increasing the burden on COIN forces. Whilst the information environment is critical, it is usually the insurgents who can shape the information environment. COIN forces, to preserve their legitimacy must stick to the truth; Insurgents are not so constrained. It is a complex and fluid environment.

The manual mentions that the guerrilla tactics used by T.E Lawrence with the Arab allies to defeat the Ottoman Turks during the Arab Revolt provides considerable insight into the development of COIN strategies today. While considering the power of communications, it mentions the comment of Lawrence on the power of the printing press and both Mao’s and Che Guevara’s understanding of the power of communications. This is even more important and powerful in current times with an increased interconnectedness and technical capacity of communications. Such observations preempt the decisive impact of social media in the Arab Spring popular risings. Consideration is given to how in a protracted war insurgents can exploit the asymmetry of conventional forces. This follows the phased political/military approach as outlined by Mao. It emphasizes the dynamism of insurgency that requires a flexible response from COIN forces. Insurgency is dynamic in many facets; leadership, objectives, ideology and narrative. The primary weaknesses of insurgency are the dependence on external and local support, the need for secrecy and frequent internal divisions.

COIN is different from Peacekeeping; COIN must not offer space to insurgents to consolidate in quiet periods (e.g. Sadr City in Bagdad, 2003). COIN must clearly identify its opponent. COIN can appropriate the cause by addressing legitimate grievances. Historically, the primary objective of COIN is to foster effective government by a legitimate government. However, the concept of legitimacy that our COIN forces espouse is arising from a Western liberal tradition that might not be so relevant in foreign environments…as discussed earlier. Those Western liberal indicators of legitimacy of government/state would include:

provision of security, just and fair leader selection, high level of popular participation, culturally acceptable level of corruption and a culturally acceptable level of political economic and social development and the prevalence of the rule of law… \(^{397}\)

\(^{397}\) *Ibid*
... reflecting a Western understanding of some of the elements of the Social Contract. COIN cannot succeed without the host-government achieving legitimacy. It requires a unity of effort drawing all actors together in converging objectives, including civil society organisations, NGOs and humanitarian organisations, “with synchronised messages leading to synergies.”

The manual reminds us that COIN is 80% political and 20% military. Understanding the local environment is critical, noting that intelligence drives operations. Own actions generate intelligence, so detailed ‘after-action’ evaluation is critical. Insurgents must be isolated from their cause and support… the people. COIN requires a long-term commitment. In reviewing the contemporary imperatives of COIN, the manual mentions that the criticality of management of information and expectations; use of appropriate levels of force; learn and adapt, empowerment the lowest level and support for the host nation.

It considers a range of paradoxes that form the main security dilemmas that impact greatly on the outcomes of the COIN campaign. These paradoxes, ‘security dilemmas’, are central to the theme of this dissertation and we will consider them and additional security dilemmas in detail in Part 3.

The manual advises an emphasis on intelligence; focus on populations needing protection; establish and expand secure areas; isolate insurgents and conduct effective, persuasive and continuous information operations; offer amnesties and rehabilitation to those insurgents willing to support the new government; police should take the lead with the host-nation as soon as possible. The manual focuses on the need for unity of effort in COIN operations. Military and civilian activities must be integrated with a clear understanding of inter-governmental and host-nation parties. Planning must be collaborative with due consideration of political, social and economic activities. The needs of the population must be assessed and the logical lines of operation (LLOs), or Line of Effort, (LoE) in COIN must focus on the population… combined to offer a unity of effort.

In the ‘culture turn,’ it considers the need for local sensitivity; social norms and culture, identity and beliefs, values, attitudes, belief systems, language, power and authority, coercive force and a understanding of the status of local social capital which would include an overview of economic power, authority, interests, physical security, essential services, economy, political participation and grievances. It recommends an understanding of local objectives and motivations, prevalent political or violent activities, the prevalent local tactics, particularly those used against non-combatants e.g. terror tactics and a historical knowledge of popular local guerrilla tactics. It mentions the need to take risks

\[398 \textit{Ibid}\]
that might not be normal in conventional operations, considering cultural awareness and ethics. The doctrine emphasises a focus on building support through protecting the population and building support for the host-government while concurrently building the capacity of that government.

14.2 Canadian COIN Doctrine 2008

A further current synthesis of COIN doctrine drawing from global experience including Iraq and Afghanistan is presented in the Canadian COIN manual of December 2008.\textsuperscript{399} Noting that Canada has recently been drawn into complex COIN environments and that it is likely to be so to a greater degree in the future, this manual is presented as a timely first of its kind for Canada that aims to establish the appropriate doctrine. Insurgency is rooted in political and social problems so the military will be operating in a supporting role in COIN environments while other agencies and institutions create the conditions for peace. It is a comprehensive overview of insurgency and COIN in comparison with the US effort by Patraeus and offers a multi-dimensional view of the consolidated doctrine of NATO forces.\textsuperscript{400}

Insurgency is defined as “a competition involving at least one non-state movement using means that include violence against an established authority to achieve political change.”\textsuperscript{401} Insurgencies have elements of legitimate grievance that must be addressed in the context of COIN. COIN does not consist of discrete occasional events but are a campaign that forms part of a “continuum of operations” over a prolonged duration and across “the spectrum of conflict; offensive, defensive and stability operations”. There will be “predominant campaign themes” which can include major combat, COIN and peace support operations, in addition to “simultaneous conduct of different types of tactical activities,” termed “full-spectrum operations.” The associated operations that use a full range of kinetic and non-kinetic options are called ‘comprehensive operations.’\textsuperscript{402}

From the perspective of this dissertation, Stability Operations that go beyond the conventional offensive and defensives activities are of particular interest. They include the tactical activities such as security and control; support to disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR); support to security sector reform (SSR); support to civilian infrastructure and governance and assistance to other agencies. Some of these are realised through the low-intensity tasks such as cordon and search;

\textsuperscript{399} Canadian Army, Land Force, B-GL-323-004/FP-003 Counter insurgency Operations (English), Chief of Staff, 13 Dec 2008
\textsuperscript{400} \textit{i}bid, pp. 1/3 to 2/3
\textsuperscript{401} \textit{i}bid, Para 102, pp. 1-2
\textsuperscript{402} \textit{i}bid, Para 105,106 &107, pp. 1-4 to 1-5
observer and monitor missions; vehicle checkpoints; humanitarian aid delivery; training of indigenous security forces and crowd confrontation.\textsuperscript{403}

The basic tenets of an insurgency are a “cause; sound leadership; popular support; organisation; actors and a narrative.” Factors affecting it are “protracted war; choice of terrain; intelligence; the establishment of an alternative society; external support and concurrent activity”. The potential weakness in an insurgency include the need for “secrecy; resistance in gaining support; securing an operational base; funding; possible changing aims; controlling the pace of activities; and potential lack of moral authority.” Insurgent tactics are relevant to the rural or urban setting and require broad communications capacities.

In considering the principles of COIN it is clear that military means alone will not defeat an insurgency, as the political and socio-economic roots of the insurgency must be addressed. The military will play a supporting role in an integrated approach, addressing the population as the centre of gravity. The military must be cognisant of the necessity to maintain the legitimacy of the COIN campaign by maintaining the support of the people. The need to be compliant with law in order to maintain the high moral ground and indeed, legitimacy is emphasised.\textsuperscript{404}

It lists the principles of COIN that are worth repeating as the critical foundations of the particular COIN doctrine being established:

\begin{itemize}
  \item a. Effect political primacy in the pursuit of a strategic aim;
  \item b. Promote unity of purpose to coordinate the actions of participating agencies (including government machinery);
  \item c. Understand the complex dynamics of the insurgency, including the wider environment;
  \item d. Exploit intelligence and information;
  \item e. Separate the insurgents from their physical and moral sources of strength, including addressing their grievances, real and perceived;
  \item f. Neutralize the insurgent;
  \item g. Sustain commitment to expend political capital and resources over a long period; and
  \item h. Conduct longer-term, post-insurgency planning.\textsuperscript{405}
\end{itemize}

It’s about “winning the people”. The COIN practitioner is admonished to avoid moral relativism, recognising that in complex socio-cultural contexts, specific facets of morality are not universal and “no absolute right or wrong exists.” Relativism can confuse culture with morality. COIN must be cognisant of local custom and culture, giving rise to understanding that values may be different from

\textsuperscript{403} \textit{Ibid}, Para 107, pp. 1-6
\textsuperscript{404} \textit{Ibid}, Sec 4, Annex A, pp.4A-1 to 4A-3
\textsuperscript{405} \textit{Ibid}, Para 302 pp. 3-2, 3-3.
the western norms. In the same vane, it is critical to avoid cultural absolutism in attempting to impose inappropriate social constructs to the host culture and society.

The need for political awareness, acting within the law and minimum use of force is emphasised, stating that strategic level considerations include the primacy of law and host nation policies. In considering strategic objectives the elements reviewed include: threshold circumstance, understanding the phasing of the insurgency; understanding the appropriate level of military commitment that does not displace indigenous security capacity and in pre-planning a coherent and orderly exit strategy.

This manual represents a comprehensive synthesis of COIN learning in the past hundred years and presents a coherent doctrine of universally applied successful practice to address insurgency in an accessible and intelligent format. It is not constrained by the traditionalist firepower and mass argument or perceived liberal social science polemic that is prominent in the COIN controversy of its southern neighbour. It is not so driven by dogma or a dominant military industrial complex, but is seeking the most effective and efficient ways to use limited force and resources to address insurgencies in fulfilling its national and international obligations. As such, this is a critical work in contributing to the evolution of COIN doctrine and practice.

14.3 COIN in Iraq

Sepp’s process tracing of the evolution of the US COIN practice in Iraq, from the launch of the initial US air attacks on Bagdad in March 2003, tells a continuing sorry tale of unlearned lessons. He follows how the conservative establishment ill-advisedly clung to “Shock and Awe”, the application of massive firepower and technology to destroy Saddam’s administration, without due consideration of how to address a potential insurgency and the necessity of winning the people.

Having launched a campaign of ‘Rapid Dominance’ live on the international media, the US military found their advance unexpectedly hindered by bands of Saddamist guerrillas, signs of a longer campaign than envisaged. The reality of Iraq has changed perceptions and changed the way that this war is being waged. The idea of winning through application of massive firepower in a search and destroy posture, the “American Way of War”, has by 2007 dissipated with an ascendancy COIN.

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406 Ibid, Para 314, pp. 3-16 to 3-17
407 Ibid, Para 315, pp. 3-18 to 3-19
408 Ibid, Para 402 & 403, p 4-2
409 Ibid, Sec 3, Sec 4, Sec 5 & Sec 6, pp.4-3 to 4-6.
doctrine of ‘winning the people.’ Having started badly, this has been a process of learning in progress and to a significant degree, of damage limitation. The US military institution was slow to recognise the necessity of the philosophical and doctrinal change in how the war was been waged. Even if key individuals like Patraeus ‘got it’, many traditionalist commanders still believed that draconian measures that demonstrated military power, even if undermining norms of civil liberty, were how the ‘battlefield’ would be controlled rapidly. For them, firepower and technological superiority was the way forward, civilians being something of a distraction. Strategically, the US admitted that the problem was political rather than military. Political problems are resolved in the civilian sphere. The asymmetrical relationship between the US military and the US State Department, resource wise, did not reflect this reality; US global firepower having a monthly budget in the region of $30 billion whilst the State Department annual foreign assistance budget is something similar. As Nagl told us, since Vietnam, the US military has been preparing for major wars, shunning the concept of small wars and insurgencies as a side issue, the addressing of which is an ancillary function of a professional and technically superior conventional force. US adaption to the reality of irregular warfare in Iraq is uneven and painful. The culture of firepower and the application of aggression remain deeply ingrained. Institutional resistance to change is more than cultural stubbornness, is also somewhat ideological in promoting the conservative self-belief in doctrinal superiority and the “can-do” spirit. Where commanders at a decentralised level have demonstrated initiative and an understanding of the critical concepts of COIN, results have been good. Decentralised command is not the natural state of the US military. There is confusion. While the stated objective is ‘stabilisation’ of Iraq, that implies the reversion to the pre-conflict status quo. While the US is trying to build a new Iraq, not rebuild the old one, their real objective is obviously ‘destabilisation’. Their very presence in Iraq is contributing to destabilisation. The objective is a change of system, constituting a revolution, being led by the US military. Unfortunately, the change in the status quo and the change in balance from Sunni to Shiite dominance in Iraq will open the door of influence to regional neighbour; no friend of the US, Iran.

The multidimensional character of the insurgency in Iraq confounds many leaders. No longer in the mold of Mao and Che, modern day insurgent’s objectives can be to make a people ungovernable rather than seeking power. Thus they may not be dependent on the people for their survival, having globalised their means of support. This turns the focus of COIN on its head. For those early to mid-twentieth century insurgents, ‘terror was a method of action’. For the globalised insurgents of today, terror is ‘the logic of action’, being self-justifying in the effort to destroy the ‘existing global political
system’. The US military institutional culture grounded in ‘firepower and mass’ and the search for a blunt and simple ‘quick-fix’ is retarding the capacity to adapt to this new reality.

While the coalition effort in the ‘Partnership of the Willing’ is critical in contributing to success of this effort, there has been a tendency to neglect the all-important coalition with the people of Iraq. An approach of ‘Shock and Awe’ alienated those people from the outset and regaining trust is an up-hill battle. Consider how the altruistic and hugely expensive Marshall Plan was the required response to the massive destruction of Germany; the debatably extraordinary investment into Japan after WWII, investment in close collaboration with the people of both Germany and Japan. Consider also that recover took a decade. The requirement for the rehabilitation of Iraq is no less.

While many conflicting recommendations exist on which strategies to employ in Iraq over the coming years, some advocating early withdrawal, it is clear that the development of local capacity for efficient and reliable security, military capacity and rule of law is critical. Exit of US support before this is achieved could see the necessity of a repeat invasion down the road. Continued patient and progressive effort is necessary to avoid disaster.

The rush of ‘Rapid Dominance’ indicated a willful lapse of memory by the US political and military institutions, a ‘militarisation of US foreign policy’. Reflecting the findings of Deady in the case of Vietnam, the application of military conventionalism, firepower and mass using an army prepared for WWII, probably with China, to address a ‘small war’, was a mistake. Sepp quotes Robert D. Kaplan in suggesting that it if the US wants to impress China, it needs to succeed in Iraq. COIN operations need to strengthen the position of national government through a slow and patient social engagement with the people. This is not the ‘American way’ that seeks rapid results through the application of its strengths. It requires close collaboration with multiple allies of varying capacities and differing doctrines. It requires decentralised operations, somewhat anathema to US military tactics. However, the US Army, focusing on the next big war, rather than this small one, is divided.

In winning a small war of insurgency, the people must be won; their support cannot be demanded or terrorised from them. The COIN force must address the enemy’s weakness, it must be context specific, and frequently revolves around the support of the people. Shock and awe does not win this. In late 2007, it may be too late for US forces to win hearts and minds in Iraq, but they might still win respect.

14.4 US Agency in COIN in Afghanistan

In laying the basis for a review of the COIN doctrinal and practice polemic in Afghanistan, Jones 2008 for RAND is a good place to start. Considering the roles not only of the military but also the UN and NGOs, those engaged in state building, nation building and stabilisation, Jones finds that the critical requirement is to strengthen the capacity of the indigenous government and its security forces to implement COIN. This dissertation and the evolving doctrine suggest that the elephant in the room here is the people.

Jones’ approach continuously emphasises the agency of US forces in bringing about the necessary changes, including in the quality of local governance; US agency rather than the necessity for indigenous initiative. He notes that COIN will be won or lost in the rural communities of Afghanistan, not in the urban centres. He highlights the need to eliminate foreign support for the insurgency, particularly from the Pakistani Inter-service Intelligence (ISI) and their agents. Admitting the limited capacity of the US to wage unconventional war, he suggests that US should not take the lead but co-opt the support of other countries and international organisations such as the UN and NGOs in this effort.

Afghanistan is a critical theater, particularly post-9/11, from the perspective of ensuring that it does not become a haven of terrorist and criminals. Contrary to Nagle’s prioritisation, Jones denigrates the analysis of ‘winning the people’ as the primary objective saying the focus should be on strengthening government capacity rather than winning the people. In considering General Frank Kitson as quoted by Trinquier that external military capacity must be adapted to directly defeat insurgency, he suggests that this analysis is also forgetting the local actors. He says that Timothy Deady’s review of the US in Philippines and the overuse of Mao’s famous aphorism on the fishes and the water both make the same mistake of neglecting the importance of the role of indigenous government. While acknowledging that success in COIN in Afghanistan depends on the population’s implicit agreement, or at least

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412 Seth Jones, “Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan”, *Counterinsurgency Study*, Vol 4, National Defense Research Institute (RAND), 2008, and reviewed here, *In the graveyard of Empires: America’s War in Afghanistan*, W.W Norton & Co. NY and London, 2009. Noted for his rigorous scholarly techniques including convincingly combining quantitative and qualitative mechanisms, Jones is seen to have extraordinary access to the political and military establishment. Jones sometimes deemed to demonstrate a pro-conservative spin and is often perceived as something of a darling of the hawks in COIN matters. RAND is a conservative defense think-tank closely aligned with The Defense Department, the military and the military industrial complex.

413 Roger Trinquier, a French military officer and COIN (the Francophone acronym being DGR… Doctrine de Guerre Revolutionaire) expert, in the mode of Galula who was better known in the US than France. (not to omit Charles Lacheroy, popularly deemed as the founding father of the French School of COIN/ DGR… and including Jaques Hogard)... Trinquier was primarily a COIN practitioner who belatedly became a scholar writing seminal doctrinal material. http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/686-menea.pdf (accessed June 29, 2012)

acquiescence, and in an asymmetric environment the population offers a level playing field, the requirement of winning of the people is addressed by a legitimate indigenous government in the context of the Social Contract and R2P. Poor governance and related social injustice has often germinated the emergence of insurgency, spurred by external support. Continuing weak governance and the absence of rule of law and security capacity undermines all COIN effort. COIN is more about teaching people to fish than in doing it for them.

General Tommy Franks entered Afghanistan determined to maintain a light footprint, envisaging not more than 10,000 foreign troops. This was too few after the defeat of the Taliban. Franks took the wrong lessons from the Soviet experience which should not have been about numbers but about how they fought the war; conventional v. unconventional. Jones suggests that the effective COIN approach in Afghanistan must be to ‘clear, hold and expand’ territory using armed reconnaissance, exploiting technical advantage (areal and electronic surveillance) and cites the old US military maxim, “high tech tips the balance militarily.” Operations must be empowered at the lowest and firepower matters. Development partners must be nurtured in improving human intelligence and in supporting an integrated approach to SSR, DDR and strengthening justice.

In demonstrating his penchant for US agency, Jones says, “others, [‘The Partnership of the Willing’] are just not playing by the rules.” He sees challenges to military collaboration as the varying Rules of Engagement (RoEs); incompatibility of equipment; and above all, the absence of the unity of command. Jones’ analysis is constrained by the conservative spin and faith in US Agency that permeates his thinking and the absence of any constructivist vision in considering the benefits of ‘winning the people.’

14.5 McCrystal’s Commander’s Assessment, Afghanistan

Stanley McCrystal’s Commander’s Assessment of 2009 goes further in the direction of Patraeus’ manual in espousing the population-centric approach to COIN operations in Afghanistan.415 While not underestimating the need to strengthen indigenous capacity in governance and rule of law, it disagrees fundamentally with Jones in that McCrystal is convinced that the focus must be on ‘winning the people.’ It is unlikely that such an assessment could have emerged without the change in regime in the US. One cannot imagine a Chaney controlled regime tolerating this shift from the conservative and military industrial complex serving doctrine of kill and capture through the application of firepower.

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415 McCrystal, Commander’s Assessment, 2009, Op sit
this assessment, Mcrystal exposes a dramatic process of soul searching and perhaps some of the personal leadership traits mentioned earlier by Moyer. On the other hand, he demonstrates an almost megalomaniacal candid glibness and ill-judged bravado in his information sharing with RollingStone Magazine in mid-2010 that led immediately to his fall from grace with the US Obama administration; behavior that undermined the perceived legitimacy of his recommendations.416

Identifying the primary strategic objective as to “disrupt, dismantle and eventually defeat al Qaeda and prevent their return to Afghanistan,” he states the initial imperative is to insure that the Government of Afghanistan can prevail over the Taliban. He notes that current indications are that the security situation is deteriorating in the face of the perception of an uncertain resolve by the US to finish the job. He recommends a significant change in strategy, “and the way we think and fight”. The new ISAF strategy must be credible and sustainable by the Afghans, and “executed through an integrated civilian-military COIN campaign that earns the support of the Afghan people…” Afghan governance and security forces must be improved and the commitment to succeed must be self-evident. The fight must be redefined into a complex classic COIN operation. It must not be focused on seizing terrain and killing insurgents, but on changing perceptions and winning the people. In recognising the criticality of time, patience is needed while developing indigenous capacity. ISAF is a conventional force that is poorly configured for COIN with extensive socio-cultural weaknesses. The preoccupation with force-protection has distanced ISAF from the people. In pursuing tactical wins, the strategic objective is endangered in frequently causing non-combatant casualties. While the insurgents cannot defeat ISAF, ISAF can defeat itself. A new focus on the people and an improvement in the unity of command of the force are vital.

Focusing on the people requires an improved partnership with indigenous forces; prioritisation of accountable and responsive governance; ISAF gaining the initiative and a refocus of resources on protecting vulnerable populations.


Hastings, a journalist from RollingStone Magazine accompanied Mcrystal for a month in early 2010, the result of which was a wide-ranging article called ‘The Runaway General’, published in the July 8-22, 2010 edition of RollingStone. The article demonstrated journalistic understanding the history and technicalities of COIN and adopted a very wry perspective in considering the US COIN strategy in Afghanistan. It projects a bias towards the conservative opposition to a social scientific approach to winning the war. It focused on the foibles of Mcrystal’s relationship with the administration and a critique of his ideological approach to the COIN strategy in Afghanistan. Mcrystal, in his quoted and recounted comments, was less than complementary concerning the US administration, the President and the Vice President. His bravado, brashness and absence of professional diplomacy as portrayed in this article resulted in his removal from his post. The article is not optimistic regarding the chances of winning the war using the current COIN strategy.
He notes how this change of mind-set and focus on the people will take a military strategy out of its comfort zone and may increase risk for force protection. However, security does not come exclusively “from the barrel of a gun.”

the objective is the will of the people. Our conventional warfare culture is part of the problem. The Afghans must ultimately defeat the insurgency and we cannot succeed without significantly improving the unity of effort… protecting the people means shielding them from all threats.\(^\text{417}\)

While not offering any startling new doctrinal direction in the literary progression of COIN, McCrystal’s assessment does represent a concerted attempt at claw-back of liberal values in countering the conservative focus on firepower. The howls of dissent from hawkish quarters underline the threat of such a change in strategy to their perspective and to the realist interests.

14.5.1

McCrystal goes too far: Impact on COIN credibility in the US…

The Rolling Stone article by Hastings is instructive in both explaining some of the hawkish concerns regarding the COIN being implemented in Afghanistan and in articulating some of the real weaknesses in the approach to date.\(^\text{418}\)

It quotes a leading critic of COIN, retired Lieutenant Colonel Douglas MacGregor, as saying the that the ‘entire COIN strategy is a fraud perpetuated on the American people’ and that the idea that spending a trillion dollars on reshaping the Islamic world is going to make Afghanistan a safe place for the US makes no sense. MacGregor does not comment on how spending a trillion dollars on killing in the Islamic world is going the change things or to what degree the COIN strategy may also be a fraud perpetrated on the Iraqi and Afghani people, in addition to the American people. However, the comment does appear to have significant legitimacy as Hastings points out that the US spending of hundreds of billions of dollars to date has not won many hearts or minds amongst the Afghani people. McCrystal has taken the lead role in representing the international effort, significantly undermining the US Ambassador and bypassing civil primacy, calling the shots to the degree that it is hampering the effort to build ‘stable and credible’ government. COIN can’t work without credible government.

\(^{417}\) McCrystal 2009, Op cit

\(^{418}\) Hastings, see Footnote 416
COIN is more complex than the application of firepower in a conventional approach. Troops on the ground are having difficulty understanding new constraining Rules of Engagement governing when they can fire their weapons related to the COIN approach. Further frustration arises because of new emphasis on complying with the rule of law in dealing with suspected insurgents. McCrystal reminds them that firepower costs. The Russians killed over one million Afghans and achieved nothing. Its going to be difficult but… “We can’t kill our way out of Afghanistan.” Apparently, while McCrystal may have convinced Obama that COIN is the way to go, his troops who have to implement the policy are not convinced. Hastings claims that COIN draws its inspiration from some of the worse military failures of the past century including Algeria and Vietnam. Even if US achieved, victory in Afghanistan, ‘whatever that means’, despite all the complexity, it will not make the US safer considering how al Qaeda, the perceived threat, is significantly globalised.

Hastings advises that throwing huge amounts of cash at Afghanistan is not going to defeat the Taliban, and, given the obvious levels of corruption, is more likely to strengthen them. The Afghan people resent the US presence and how it is undermining the stability and predictability of their lives, their hopes for a normative system. This COIN strategy is alienating the very people, the Afghani people that it seeks to win.

The article is convincing if skewed towards the conservative side of the polemic in that it presumes that the main problem in Afghanistan is the focus on implementing a COIN strategy, rather than the damage done prior to the focus on COIN and the way in which that COIN strategy has been adapted and is being implemented.

14.6 Continuation of an Existential Polemic: COIN or Not?

The polemic on the pros and cons of COIN versus conventional tactics and on the way COIN is being implemented in both Iraq and Afghanistan continues between professional military experts in the hallowed halls of military conservatism in the US Military Academy of WestPoint, in an ‘existential debate’ publicised in the interests of academic freedom. Is the human resource heavy, time consuming and expensive COIN doctrine of winning the people in Iraq and Afghanistan dead? The question in focus is, what has the US gained after a decade in two wars? “Not a lot,” is the answer coming from the anti-COIN Colonel Gian P. Gentile, the influential Director of WestPoint’s military history programme; a waste of resources considering over 6,000 US dead and over $1 trillion spent.

Gentile is currently exploring his concerns in his soon to be published *Wrong Turn: America’s Deadly Embrace with Counterinsurgency*. He surmises, following MacGregor’s logic as cited by Hastings, that if the narrow objective of the war in Afghanistan is the defeat of al Qaeda and the prevention of their use of Afghanistan as a base for operations, why is the US pursuing the maximalist approach using extraordinary ‘blood and treasure’ by trying to rebuild the Afghan state in the US image. The objective should be to achieve the desired outcomes using the minimum resources. He suggests that COIN might work if the US is willing to remain there for ninety years.

His nemeses on this matter is the equally influential Head of the WestPoint social science department and former advisor to General Patraeus on COIN matters in Iraq and Afghanistan, Colonel Michael J. Meese, who claims that COIN has facilitated the capacity for the Iraqis to govern themselves and though it is clearly expensive and risky, it must not be discounted.

### 14.7 British COIN Doctrine before Afghanistan

Until the turn of the millennium British military operational approaches, including towards COIN, were less guided by doctrine than by an overarching confidence in the military commander’s competence and professionalism; his comprehension of the political imperatives and capacity to achieve objectives, supported by a range of best practice manuals. Earlier, we have attributed this British decentralised approach to military operational practice to the traditions of its parliamentary system and somewhat to the traditional ‘old school tie’ approach to officer selection and elevation that contributed to relations across state bureaucracy and common understanding. This, as opposed to the US centralized presidential system and more egalitarian traditions as regards officer selection and elevation. The preparation of the British Army COIN Operations field manual in 2001 (Br COIN Ops 2001) grew from the relatively recent British practice of documenting Army capstone doctrine into a composite manual and was part of the progressive push from the previous experience based practice of local ‘ad hocery.’

Br COIN Ops 2001 in considering insurgency, drawing on the work of Mao and Che and many of the examples that we have reviewed, looks further at the popular urban guerrillas and briefly considers the dangers of Islamism. In applying doctrine to COIN operations, it draws on Britain’s unique experience in ‘small wars’ over colonial centuries and its experience in Northern Ireland. It alludes to the changing environment where COIN operations are implemented under the scrutiny of “the law, the

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media, human rights organisations and other international bodies such as the European Court,” an evolving environment requiring an evolving doctrine.  

It mentions the poor record of the “attritional approach” (mass and firepower) in COIN operations and in any case, it is an approach that has limited role to play in liberal democracies. In advocating the ‘manoeuvrist approach’ it acknowledges that ‘Operations other than War’, will have tight political control. The Army must be able to adapt to the changed environment beyond conventional war-fighting... increasing the focus on the people, rather than just on the ground. It agrees that the ‘center of gravity’ is the support of the mass of the people, an objective only achieved through political action. However, neither military action nor political action alone can address insurgencies. There must be balance. It lists the principles of COIN as i) Political Primacy and Political Aim; b) Coordinated Government Machinery; c) Intelligence and Information; d) Separating the insurgents from his Support; e) Neutralising the Insurgent; f) Longer Term Post-insurgency planning.

It is noteworthy that this 287-page document has 5 pages devoted to Civilian Affairs at the very end. While admitting that the British Army approach to civil affairs is currently modest and that the doctrine is not fully developed, here interaction with civilians is projected as an operation encumbrance rather than a strategic imperative.

14.8 Chapter XIV Review

The US COIN doctrine as collated by David Patraeus in 2006 defined a sea change in the effort to address the strategic doctrinal deficiencies that were dogging US COIN interventions. It’s about State-building rather than firepower! It is population-centric. Drawing on Mao, Che and Lawrence, the manual attempts to address the ‘soft-power’ and cultural awareness elements so critical in ‘winning the people.’ The focus must be on supporting the development of legitimate governance... the rule of law. It is largely a political process that needs soldiers with multi-dimensional capacities and integrated approaches, both civil and military. The Canadian manual of 2008 takes this further emphasising the dangers of value relativism and cultural absolutism. Sepp looks at the US shortfall in COIN in Iraq post-‘shock & awe,’ in the failure to rapidly adapt to the reality of COIN. The culture of ‘firepower’ drawn from conventional warfare remained dominant. He highlights that modern global insurgency is more about ‘making people ungovernable’ than ‘winning the people’... which contributes to the

421 Ibid, Chapter 2, Section 1 p B-2-1
422 Ibid, p B-2-3
423 Ibid, p B-3-2
424 Ibid p B-12-3
complexity of COIN. Jones in Afghanistan takes the neo-conservative line that it is necessary to ‘go in heavier,’ in covering beyond the urban centers by bringing COIN into the rural areas. He considers that the national government may have been neglected to date, but like Galula, Nagl and Kilcullen before him, loses the sense of the danger created by foreign agency. He disagrees that the decisive element in COIN is “winning the people” and advocates directly defeating the insurgency and strengthening indigenous capacity for governance and rule of law. He accused coalition partners of “not playing by the rules” in the US COIN effort. McCrystal is an advocate and true believer in the COIN doctrine of Patraeus and strives to implement the ‘soft power’ elements together with the kinetics. He fails to bring the reticent military institution, his troops or the media with him, losing his job in the effort. The polemic within the US military institution for and against COIN continues. Prior to Afghanistan, British COIN was less based on doctrine than on past experience in the insurgencies associated with decolonisation and in Northern Ireland. It emphasised the liberal democracy approach to “winning the people” and drew particularly on the success in Malaya.
Chapter XV

COIN: The British Experience in Afghanistan

The British experience in COIN in Helmand Province, a difficult location, as junior partner to a US operation, is a traumatic one. Experienced-based practice does not work well in an integrated environment where the other actors don’t do it the same way; have different organisational culture and are resourced differently. This is a tough learning experience that forces the strengthening of doctrine and efforts to devise a functioning ‘comprehensive approach,’ in both winning the people and destroying the insurgents. The new British COIN manual 2009 reflects these lessons, particularly the need to focus on the perceptions of the people.

15.1 The British Experience in Helmand Province, Afghanistan

The British experience of COIN in Afghanistan has been, to say the least, challenging. Farrell and Gordon, professors at Kings College and Sandhurst respectively, carried out an evaluation in 2009 as the British prepared to handover the control of Helmand Province to US Forces.\textsuperscript{425} In their “Coin Machine: The British Military in Afghanistan,”\textsuperscript{426} they reviewed the mission in three key areas; strategy, military operations and the interagency “Comprehensive Approach.”\textsuperscript{427} Helmand is probably the most difficult place in Afghanistan to stabilise and secure as a foreign military mission, a task made exponentially more complex by the effort to implement a COIN strategy. They note that the British Military no longer have the reputation as efficient exponents of COIN, a reputation earned in the COIN experience of decolonisation, particularly the COIN operations in Malaya. The British failure to hold Basra in Iraq in 2008 undermined that reputation. The US COIN manual by Patraeus (FM3-24), based on US experience in Iraq, is now the definitive textbook on COIN doctrine the world over. While Britain supported the US strategy in Iraq, it had no strategy of its own and has thus always been following. Britain Forces in Iraq also suffer from wavering political will and progressively reducing resources. There is now concern that the same ‘dysfunctional dynamic’ is at play in Afghanistan. In light of limited political will, resources and a lack of commitment, they are considered to be overly dependent on airpower that undermines the integrated civil-military Comprehensive

\textsuperscript{425} Theo Farrell is Professor of War in the Modern World in the Department of War Studies at Kings College, London and Stuart Gordon is a Senior Lecturer in defence and International affairs at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst
\textsuperscript{426} Theo Farrell and Stuart Gordon, COIN Machine: The British Military in Afghanistan, Elsevier on behalf of Foreign Policy Research Institute, Fall, 2009, pp 665-683
\textsuperscript{427} ‘The Comprehensive Approach’, this is an integrated cross-government and civilian-military approach to delivering COIN, designed to maximise collaboration and develop synergies in an effort strengthen local government and ‘win the people’. The Comprehensive Approach is clearly a parallel with the UN focus, since the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, commonly called the Brahimi Report of 2000, on Integrated Programming.
Approach that was tentatively launched to maximise synergies of systemic collaboration in implementing a COIN strategy. The US, having committed to the surge in US troops, have little expectations of the British, or indeed of the European commitment to ISAF in general, believing that the US have been ‘carrying the can’ in Afghanistan. However, this reflects and underestimation of the complexity of British operations in Helmand Province. Farrell and Gordon say that the scale of international expectations for what might be achieved in Afghanistan is extraordinary; the intention to implement a ‘triple transition’ in the Afghan state and society; in the security, political and socio-economic sphere… “the equivalent of the Enlightenment and the Marshall Plan in the context of Europe’s one hundred years war.” This despite the absence of an “importing elite,” a contrary geography, limited infrastructure and a fragmented xenophobic society unused to central government and particularly resistant to a central government that lacks legitimacy, with a history of expelling foreigners from their land. This is the briar patch for insurgents. The economic disadvantages common to most Afghan provinces are accentuated in Helmand; criminality, corruption and the narcotics trade, limited education opportunities and a lack of the requisite human capital. Local leadership is more focused on consolidating their personal power bases and wealth than on any level of political stabilisation or social contract. Basically, the state is absent and the private sector is dormant. The support for Taliban in Helmand is also more consolidated than in other provinces. Further, in the east during 2007 and 2008, insurgent’s energies were more diverted to dealing with the Pakistani offensive than was the case in Helmand. The areas under control of the US forces are generally in a better condition. Therefore, comparisons are unfair.

The British entered Helmand in 2006 initially with a peacekeeping strategy and commenced to adjust to the reality over the following year. The British Cabinet Office established a coordinating body to lead inter-department collaboration ensuring civilian-military cooperation, (Post-conflict Reconstruction Unit, PCRU) developing a Joint Plan for Helmand. This plan was to be consistent with all relevant national and internationally agreed strategies and plans for stabilisation, development and narcotics control, and to offer coherence in collaboration between British Development Assistance (DfID), the Foreign Office, the Ministry of Defence and the British Afghan Drugs Interdepartmental Unit, with the view to ensuring synergies. The military tactical idea was for the British mixed teams combined with Afghan troops to implement an “ink spot” strategy similar to that used successfully in Malaya, offering small-scale socio-economic investment into the critical areas of the province from an initial fund of £36 million. However, the plan appears to have been desk drafted and the complexity
and the reality of the local political challenges in Helmand were underestimated, compounded by the redirection of Foreign Office focus and assets to Iraq. The ‘cross-governmental’ aspect of collaboration in the COIN strategy was unclear as regards the synergies between the implementation of COIN and the counter-narcotics approach. The top-down considerations associated with the post-Bonn approach to state building failed to address the sub-national reality and, in particular, the absence of a collaborative vision of local actors concerning state building.

From the outset, British military ‘ink-spot’ deployments met with stiff insurgent opposition, their platoon houses coming under unexpectedly fierce attack from the Taliban forcing them to depend on air support and ultimately to withdraw and rethink the strategy.  

The deteriorating security environment discouraged constructive civilian engagement in the “Comprehensive Approach” and rattled Foreign Office support for the strategy. The top-down approach and initial assumptions that failed to consider the reality of Helmand Province resulted in the dissipation of effort and a period of eighteen months ‘strategic drift’ as regards the British COIN strategy. With military reinforcements arriving in 2007, in a bottom-up initiative with a clear view of the realities, British commanders refocused attention on fixing the COIN strategy, specifically on aligning military and development activities. This resulted in the Helmand Road Map that restated adjusted security, counter-narcotics, development and governance objectives as collaborative frameworks taking on board the state-building objectives of the original top-down Joint Plan for Helmand. The Road Map stressed the cooperation with local government and communities and strengthening cross-governmental and civilian-military collaboration in encouraging local political dialogue to be led by Afghan local authorities, in addressing community aspirations and grievances in a traditional COIN process of ‘winning the people.’

In reviewing the evolution of the military campaign, Farrell and Gordon say that it launched in a less than successful initial phase operating counter-terrorism tactics centred on killing and capturing Taliban. This in an environment of shortage of necessary resources in which, despite a high ‘body count’, areas cleared of Taliban could not be held and were frequently re-infiltrated. In 2007 this moved to a phase focusing on ‘soft-effects’ and securing the civilian population, particularly “involving stabilisation operations to secure and develop urban centres,” through improved COIN tactics of ‘clear, hold and build,” the centre of gravity being the people rather than the Taliban… through the inclusion of effective non-kinetic activities, a population-centric strategy.

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428 “Ink-Spot deployments” refers to the placement of troops in locations dispersed as required to address specific security needs and perhaps without the capacity of mutual support.
From 2006 to 2009, the impact of British COIN operations in Helmand Province improved dramatically. Beyond the impact of the change in strategy resulting from the British relearning old tricks, other variables that contributed to this can be listed as a) diminishing Taliban capacity for attrition demonstrated by their shift from conventional to asymmetric tactics and their increased use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs); b) the strengthening of Afghan National Army capacity; c) an increase in support, resources and training based on the ground reality, available to the British Forces in Helmand Province in the latter stages of the period.

The level of air support required for British operations, frequently resulting in civilian deaths, alienating the population, continues to be a problem. The frequent rotation of unit commanders and staff officers, usually on six-month tours of duty is a problem for continuity of command.

The authors discuss the growing penchant of MoD in considering the potential contribution to the Comprehensive Approach of the advanced technology being tested to effect by the US in a drive to “transform the battlefield” in electronic kinetic, surveillance and communications through the concept of a Effects Based Approach to Operations (EBAO). With EBAO the enemy is re-conceptualised as a complex, adaptive system of systems. It identifies the critical nodes of that system and destroys them, breaking up the system. However, while they embraced the concept, the British gravitated towards ‘softer effects’ (diplomatic leverage, information and development actors) and the projection of a more ethical foreign policy towards the traditional COIN strategy of making development progress to consolidate military victories.

The ‘Comprehensive Approach’ has been difficult to coordinate, often giving rise to more tensions than complementarities. Farrell and Gordon highlight a phenomenon that has been discussed in relation to the evolution of the theory of DDR. It is the pervasive influence, in this case in the British Ministry of Defence (MoD), drawing on its experience particularly in Bosnia, Kosovo and Sierra Leone, of the “human security” agenda. Human security “shaped both its understanding of conflict causality and its (MoD) appetite for harnessing the capacity of other actors (IOs, UN humanitarian agencies and funds, NGOs, social scientists and local stakeholders) to address root causes...” factors deeply influencing the focus on the Comprehensive Approach. This attempt to develop a coherent combination of effort from broadly differently motivated organisations reconciling the often strongly held commitment to sometimes opposing overarching philosophies; security or human security; military or humanitarian, requires a massive coordination effort. The tensions between the civilian development actors and the military as a result of the differences of understanding as to what the
civilian role should be, are indeed pervasive. The difficulties for the civilians to work directly with the military seems to increase as concerns about using funds and reconstruction projects “as a weapon system” in “creating perverse incentives, undermining the state and reinforcing the war economy” arise. However, as with the US polemic on conventional or COIN strategies in the context of the military being at the sharp end of the war, their aspirations carry more weight at home… in an environment of “clashing institutional cultures.”

Despite all, the authors are optimistic that the improving implementation of the COIN strategy focusing on creating employment and a new conditionality on assistance to the Government of Afghanistan will deliver results. Perhaps these are already confounded expectations as we move into 2013. However they note that the US direction in 2009, concerned with ‘blood and treasure’, may be moving more back towards a counterterrorism, intelligence based ‘kill and capture’ strategy, than towards increasing the COIN effort.

15.1.1 The Evolution of British COIN Doctrine during Afghanistan

The Director of the UK Defense Academy, Lt Gen Kiszely emphasised the importance of the necessity for effective combined and integrated COIN operations in his presentation to the US Government conference on COIN in September 2006. Kiszely refers to evolving doctrine as reflected in Br COIN Ops 2001 and in subsequent COIN doctrinal guidance in a joint publication “Military Contribution to Peace Operations, 2004 and moving towards a doctrine called “Countering Irregular Activities”.

He acknowledges that things are changing in a dynamic environment. Beyond terrorism to insurgencies, the current challenge is that in addition to the objective of overthrowing specific governments, some of the insurgencies target the overthrow of the whole global political status quo, terrorism being a tool of these insurgencies. Such global movement is organised only in that it is governed by an overarching ideology and strategic intent. As such a ‘top-down structure is unnecessary as the initiative is ‘bottom-up’ with the structure being ‘flat’. It is a “Network Enabled Capability”... that spreads like a virus. It is trans-national without tangible front lines. In 2006, Kiszely considers where British COIN doctrine should be focusing for the near future. Firstly, he warns that the lessons of COIN seem to be easily

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431 Terrorism... “to coerce or intimidate governments or societies to achieve political, religious or ideological objectives”. Insurgency... “an organised movement aimed at the overthrow of a constitutional government through the use of subversion and armed conflict.” Kiszely, Op sit p 2
forgotten. Thompson’s lessons from Malaya and J.F. Kennedy’s concerns about US Army training deficiencies facing Viet Nam in 1962 are drowned in what Max Boot calls the “big-war culture”. We don’t study enough history and perhaps are deterred by the uniqueness of each insurgency context preventing cookie-cutter approach solutions. However, he insists that old principles remain valid.\footnote{Ibid, p 3} Insurgency is war... but it is not war. Because it is beyond Clausewitz’s definition of ‘a continuation of policy by other means’... it requires solutions that are far more complex than war-fighting. The ‘big-war culture’ will over-simplify the analysis of the conflict and result in responses that ultimately fail. Further, despite the trans-national nature of modern global insurgency, the network-enabled capacity, the virtual world that they occupy supported by internet based mass communications, the insurgency still depends on popular support. Mao’s analogy on the fishes and the water holds true and the ‘hearts and minds’ approach remains vital. In winning the people, it is not enough to hold the high moral ground. It is more critical to be legitimate in the perception of the people. Military, especially in expeditionary operations, are often ignorant of the local culture and underestimate the power of popular perception and fail to commit sufficient resources and time to ensuring that they hold the positive perception by the people. Finally, Kiszely advises that the COIN approach must be multi-disciplinary and comprehensive or it will fail. It must consist of all “the lines of operation – diplomatic, information, military, economic, political, social and legal, bound by leadership, a common objective and an agreed plan.”\footnote{Ibid, p 4} This approach is referred to as the “Comprehensive Approach.”

15.1.2 That Comprehensive Approach?
The focus on the Comprehensive Approach (CA) does not appear to have any easier a ride than the UN efforts to developed integrated approaches in improving UN civil-military inter-functionality or in developing integrated DDR programming. This is an approach that sees different UN agencies working in a formal collaboration to deliver their institutional strengths to DDR. Philipp Rotmann reviews this CA in 2010.\footnote{Philipp Rotmann, “Built on shaky ground: the Comprehensive Approach in Practice”, Research Paper No. 63, NATO Defence College, December 2010,} While the concept is well founded considering the necessity of optimising the capacity of all collaborating elements of the Alliance, in practice a CA is not working. CA in NATO, as with integrated programming in the UN, is about personalities getting along well together and overcoming institutional resistance by willing mutual achievement of objectives. It can’t be imposed in a top-down instruction. It requires a natural bottom-up harmony of personalities,
commitment and effort to make it work. Such a comprehensive integration is difficult to achieve within one institution. The difficulties of implementing a comprehensive integration in a multiplicity of institutions with many different national policies and interests and a mix of civilian and military institutions and individuals guided by different overarching philosophies sees an exponential multiplication of the complexity. The main obstacles to delivering CA as:

i. Institutional and political fragmentation of mandates at a national level;
ii. Conflicts between organisational and professional cultures;
iii. Differences about dealing with violence
iv. Unresolved political-strategic disagreements among contributing nations

Rotmann concedes that top-down efforts to make this work can only have limited impact. Conducive individual personalities in the right positions, good networks and pragmatism are key elements needed to allow CA function. It requires a decentralisation of decision-making authority to the lowest level. It needs an improved environment of civil/military mutual learning. Here he grudgingly refers to the lessons of the Brahimi Report suggesting the tools devised by the UN “merits a closer look even for a much more richly endowed organisation such as NATO.” Rotmann asserts that the problem of institutional fragmentation must be addressed at the national political level of each member state. Ultimately the potential for the effective functioning of CA may be a long shot. Rotmann mentions that NATO rates PRTs as its most successful example of CA implementation. We’ll question just how successful that is in the next section. Stapleton advises:

Given this extremely worrying context, the degree of international attention and debate over the utility of the civil-military relationship in Afghanistan can be compared to rearranging the deckchairs on the Titanic.

The shock of the Afghan experience, working as the junior partner in a US dominated theater and the collapse of British self-confidence as ‘the authority’ on COIN operations led to a significant adjustment of Br COIN Ops 2001 and major evolution in the doctrine that is reflected in the new British Army COIN manual in 2009.

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435 Ibid
15.2 The Evolution of British COIN After Afghanistan

The new British Army COIN Manual (Br COIN 2009) reflects the COIN lessons learned the hard way by the British Army as a junior partner in the ‘long war’ in Afghanistan; lessons painful enough to precipitate some dramatic changes in doctrine.438 It tells in the forward “doctrine is ‘what is thought’ and to be effective it must be read and understood. Pragmatism is needed, however, in its application.” That pragmatism is reflected in the bold adaptation to reality of dynamic global insurgency. In addition to the traditional sources of British COIN doctrine, Br COIN 2009 draws on the US experience in Iraq 2003-2008 and in particular the British experience in Helmand Province. COIN is certainly war, but a very complex type of warfare in addressing “hybrid threats.”

The six principles as listed in Br COIN 2001 (Political primacy and political aim; coordinated government machinery; intelligence and information; separating the insurgent from his support; neutralising the insurgent; longer term post-insurgency planning) have increased to ten differently expressed principles reflecting a significant ‘culture turn’ emphasizing a ‘hearts and minds approach.

a) Primacy of political purpose b) Unity of effort; c) Understanding the Human terrain; d) Secure the population; e) Neutralise the insurgent; f) gain and maintain popular support; g) operate in accordance with the law; h) integrate intelligence; j) prepare for the long term and k) learn to adapt. The new doctrine is increasingly population-centric stressing that the most important security element of a COIN strategy is the security of the population [as opposed to the priority of force protection reflected in US practice]. Security is ensured through ‘presence’ and ‘continuity’. Intelligence is critical and this is supported by constant intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance (ISTAR) coverage. In building local capacities, embedded training teams are essential. In ‘winning the people’ influence is critical to gain positive perceptions. Effective education of COIN practitioners is vital.

The overall campaign direction is based on the “Stabilisation Model.” This considers the impact of three prime variables within the environment: Insecurity; Weak Governance and Rule of Law, and Under-development, with the objective of achieving political settlements. The role of the military is to assist in delivering that settlement in a “semi-permissive environment” (permissiveness being the degree to which non-military personnel can operate in the area). Where security does not permit direct assistance, the military help in enabling political settlement. The three main areas of focus in bringing

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438 Ibid
about the settlement are to “build human and national security... foster host-government capacity and legitimacy... and to stimulate economic an infrastructural development.”

The framework for COIN adopted in this evolved doctrine is “a general model of Shape-Secure-Develop,” the weighting on each theme being dependent on the security environment.

Shape:
The ability to influence and inform perceptions, allegiances, attitudes and behaviors of all principal participants in the area of operations, and in the regional, international and domestic audiences as well.

Secure:
The objective of Security is to provide the population with the opportunity to go about their daily lives without fear of violence.

Develop:
Development operations generally involve long-term activities and build on the opportunity that security offers.

Approaching COIN from this conceptual framework of the three interlocking and interdependent themes, Shape, Secure and Develop, allows the weighting of emphasis in accordance with context, primarily the security context. In this dissertation our interest in the framework is particularly in Shape:

...the ability to influence and inform the perceptions, allegiances, attitudes, actions and behaviors of all principle actors in the area of operations, and in the regional, international and domestic audiences as well. Shaping operations influence the population, they are human activities and they require personal engagement. Shaping activities also increases the counterinsurgents understanding of the problems and the human terrain.

Our focus in considering ‘Shaping’ will be on the perceptions and attitudes of the population at a sub-national level and the degree to which Shape activities must consider human security, elements that represent convergence with the evolving theory of DDR

COIN operation require a commitment to the ‘Continuum of Operations’, i.e. an ability to operate at all times and places in the theatre of operations. British COIN operations occur in an environment

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439 Ibid, Figure 4-1, p 4-2
440 Ibid, Shape-secure-develop. p 4-3
441 Ibid, p 4-5
442 Ibid, p 4-7
443 Ibid, p 4-10
444 Ibid, p 4-5
where the relationship between security and stabilisation is strong... the three major sectors of stabilisation being security, governance and development. The level of emphasis on COIN over Stabilisation depends on the scale of the insurgency. Under the heading “operating in a sovereign nation”, in addition to British government policy, the issues of legitimacy and the complexity of working within a comprehensive framework are considered. The psychosocial dimensions focus on the narrative used in mobilising the population and the mechanisms to be utilised in shaping perceptions, which it termed as “influence activities.” The enduring characteristics of COIN are described as while “direct military action may be required; both sides have a political imperative; the population is central to the outcomes and the solution is multifaceted.”

In considering building host-nation capacity, it recognises the need to transition to host-nation primacy as soon as possible and suggests guidelines to overcome the difficulties of working with a weak host-government. These ideas are surprisingly blunt and point directly to the challenges of working with allies in COIN in Afghanistan:

“The interests of an ally should take second place to those of the host-nation; the host-nation must have a system to prosecute the campaign; allies should coordinate their efforts through a focal point; allies should be represented at every level and all organisations and institutions should have a common understanding of the problem.”

The manual outlines the evolution of the British COIN doctrine ranging from Charles Callwell’s *Small wars – Their Principles and Practice*, 1896, to the current day. This dissertation focuses on doctrine post-1969. A 1969 manual, “Counter Revolutionary Warfare” amended in 1977 did not reflect the experience of “Northern Ireland where troops were deployed in military assistance to the civil powers (MACP).” That experience was reflected in the training and practice at the level of the military unit and in ad hoc guidance but not in doctrinal evolution. The period from 1977 to the publication of the 2001 manual is considered one of doctrinal stagnation as regards British COIN. After 1989 and the demise of the Warsaw Pact with related global changes, particularly in Europe, Britain adopted a ‘manoeuvrist approach’ to military operations and engaged in international stabilisation and peacekeeping operations. The relationship between COIN and Stabilisation operations was well noted in the new doctrinal guidance... reemerging from that period of stagnation. The lessons of subsequent COIN operations with coalition partners in Iraq and Afghanistan have forced an even more

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445 *Ibid*
446 *Ibid*, p CS1-5
dramatic review of COIN doctrine, particularly in addressing the emerging global insurgency. The evolution of the Principles of COIN is reflected in a very useful matrix that is adapted and expanded upon later in the dissertation.\textsuperscript{447} In reviewing best practice in British COIN, the manual highlights the need for a human security approach, intelligence based operations and adherence to the rule of law, the application of population control measures and inclusion of the population in the political process.\textsuperscript{448}

\textbf{15.2 Chapter XV Review}

The British COIN experience in Helmand Province has been a painful one. As the junior partner in a US operation in what is billed as an integrated environment, the judicious experience-based ‘ad hocery’ of its past COIN approaches in multiple decolonizing environments were not working. Extraordinary local political and socio-economic complexity with broad Taliban infiltration and incoherent top-down planning results in strategic drift and a deteriorating security situation. This requires the development of a coherent road map that would allow the British effort to ‘win the people’ in Helmand through community protection and local socio-economic development applying a ‘comprehensive approach.’ From 2006 to 2009 this offers mixed results. In a complex security environment with conflicting organisational cultures, the tensions between security and human security motivation that meet in the ‘Comprehensive Approach’ are reflected between the military and development staff. In 2009 a new British COIN manual reflects the evolved doctrine in light of the new lessons learned ‘under fire.’ The doctrine reflects a strong ‘culture turn.’ Amongst other principles it includes the need to recognise the primacy of political purpose; the importance of ‘human terrain’; the necessity to maintain popular support; the requirement to protect the people; to operate within the law. This is based on a ‘stabilisation model’ guided by the doctrinal policy framework to ‘shape, secure and develop’ the COIN environment by focusing on ‘shaping’... influencing the perceptions of the population. The doctrine considers the dangers of foreign agency and commits to the interests of the host-government.

\textsuperscript{447} Ibid, Matrix, “Evolution of Counterinsurgency Principles,” p 3 - 1
\textsuperscript{448} Ibid, p 2 - 21/ 4 - 22
Chapter XVI

PRTs, The ‘Ethnographic Turn’ and local Solutions

PRT were to be the lead mechanism in ‘winning the people,’ to shift the COIN influence beyond urban centers into the rural populations in spreading the reach and legitimacy of the national government. However, in light of absence of coordinated approach and multiple components of the ‘partnership of the willing’ having differing objectives and benefits coopted by local elites, the value of PRTs is less than optimal. Whether as a contribution to force protection, local development or spreading the influence of the Karzai government in winning the people, PRTs remain a disputed mechanism of COIN. In a focus on foreign agency, the opportunities for local solutions to the conflict may have been tragically missed.

16.1 The Role and Impact of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs).

In considering the position of a COIN strategy in Iraq and Afghanistan, the outward manifestation of the ‘soft approach’ with civil and military integration in addressing political aims in the effort to ‘win the people’ is the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) concept. A review of the diverse literature available on PRTs offers a confusing and perhaps conflicting list of objectives that include force protection; projection of the reach of the central government, empower of local government and socio-economic reconstruction together with a diverse list of results achieved, depending on the writer’s perspective. It is necessary to be objective and pragmatic in reviewing the implementation of this complex concept that means so many different things to different sectors of the community; military, central government, local government, local populations and the humanitarian sector. PRTs are a concept that has manifestly different approaches in implementation within the different contingents of the ‘partnership of the willing’, the twenty or so countries actively engaged in ISAF/NATO, PRT supporting countries and the humanitarian agencies tentatively contributing to their understandings of the objectives. We’ll take a circuitous route through the relevant literature of PRTs to gain an understanding of the complexity of the concept and the tensions between theory and practice in their implementation.

16.1.1 An Authoritative and Damning View of PRTs

Early in 2008, Barbara Stapleton, an authority on the modern evolution of political events in Afghanistan observed from within Afghanistan and especially on the current international
interventions, offered a damning view of the impact and value of PRTs.\textsuperscript{449} She asserts that the initial mistake was through the US and its allies adopting a ‘light-footprint’ approach to its military intervention, immediately after the Bonn Conference when they should have ‘gone in heavy’ and reduced the international footprint as GoA legitimacy and capacity were extended. Afghan confidence was undermined from the outset. The US priority was on its ‘War on Terror’ and not on the human security needs of the Afghan people. Mirroring Jones’ concerns, she laments that the required SSR that would establish a capable indigenous rule of law sector, specifically a national police force operating effectively in the provinces, was neglected. It was expected in some poorly defined way that the PRT process would overcome some of these deficiencies and assist in improving security and expanding the legitimacy and reach of the GoA. In the fog of common wisdom, the international partners persisted in judging the success of the PRT concept based on their proliferation across the provinces rather than on any measure of their impact. Late in 2007, in a deteriorating security environment, this was deemed as negligible, demonstrating little improvement in the human security environment.

Stapleton suggests that PRT are addressing the needs of the international community rather than those of Afghanistan, offering a level of ‘positive spin’ for their domestic audiences in the intractable situations in which they find themselves. Primarily she attributes the failure of the PRT experiment to the ad hoc and disparate nature of approaches, unguided by an agreed mandate. The implementation of such a mandate would be very complex in an environment with an absence of unity of policy complicated by the “inability of NATO member states to subjugate national agendas...”\textsuperscript{450} She sounds alarm bells in concluding that PRTs are distracting attention from the failure of the intervention to improve governance at the provincial and district levels, while “the political constraints [...] on state building and stabilisation processes were either avoided or lost out to political accommodations based on decisions governed by realpolitik...” \textsuperscript{451}

16.1.2 Internal evaluation of PRTs

In May 2009, Adams in her consultant evaluation offers policy options in considering the future role of ISAF/NATO PRTs in Afghanistan in the light of a limited and deteriorating security environment.\textsuperscript{452} She states that the ISAF/NATO development role, as opposed to the security role, in PRTs, is to a)

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{449} Stapleton 2008, \textit{Op cit}, p 28
  \item \textsuperscript{450} Ibid, p 29
  \item \textsuperscript{451} Ibid, p 30
  \item \textsuperscript{452} Natasha T. Adams, \textit{Policy Options for State building in Afghanistan: the Role of NATO PRTs in Development in Afghanistan}, \url{http://www.sais-jhv.edu/academics/regionalstudies/southasia/pdf Role_NATO_PRTs_Afghanistan_Adems.pdf} (accessed April 1, 2012)
\end{itemize}
“support reconstruction and development projects and to secure areas for development work other national and international actors implement” and b) to implement those development projects when the security situation does not permit civilian implementation. Dealing with the security problem and correcting the “development coordination gap,” i.e. coordination between military, humanitarian and development actors, are the biggest challenges facing ISAF /NATO in PRT implementation. Given these problems, depending on policy decisions, PRTs can be enhanced, redefined or reduced. While hedging her bets, Adams primary recommendation is for the expansion of the role of ISAF/NATO PRTs in Afghanistan.

16.1.3 US military practitioners perspective on PRTs
Bebber reviews the operation of PRTs in the US managed Khost Province from a military perspective in 2010,\(^\text{453}\) stressing that the operation and format of PRTs is in flux in the context of a dynamic environment.\(^\text{454}\) He mentions that the method and objectives of US PRTs differed in Iraq and Afghanistan. In Iraq in 2009, PTRs were military dominated with only a few civilians in a team of between 50 and 250 personnel. However, the leader in Iraq in 2007 had been State Department with a military second in command. Occasionally PTRs were imbedded into Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) and were termed as Collocated PRTs (CPRT).

Afghanistan PRTs are led by a lieutenant colonel with a platoon of National Guardsmen for protection (60-100 persons) while US Government civilians and military officers form an executive committee of equals, there is no lead agency or department. In Khost in Afghanistan, efforts are being made to increase both the number of civilians in PRTs to increase capacity and scope of PRTs in the areas of the rule of Law, reconstruction, development, agriculture, governance and local governance capacity building… offering a ‘level of public diplomacy’. PRTs are seen by many as offering a livelihood alternative for the recruitment base of the insurgents. PRTs coordinate, develop and fund local projects with the aid of the government. While projects have to be approved by local government, they are seen by the military as a process that facilitated the locals to become familiar and to develop trust for the US COIN effort. The civilian affairs element (CA) of the PRTs tends to focus on popular local projects such as construction and rehabilitation of schools, medical facilities or local markets. CA reaches out to the population to attempt to isolate them from the ‘insurgent ideology.’ It is critical for CA to know

\(^{453}\) Bebber PhD is a young naval ensign who acted as Welfare Officer in the Khost PRT for nine months in 2008.
the people, places and culture of their sector of the Province. Bebber recommends that COIN in Afghanistan be about demonstrating long-term patience in maintaining local support for the US military through PRTs.

Moses Ruiz in his “Sharpening the Spear” offers a statistical and administrative overview of the US approach to PRTs in Afghanistan. The primary objectives of the US PRTs, as stated by the US military, are to improve security; extend the reach of the Government of Afghanistan, and to facilitate reconstruction. Ruiz outlines three sources of funding for PRTs: Quick Response Funds (QRFs); Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) which can offer up to $200,000 per project and the Commanders discretionary funds, Commanders Emergency Response Programs (CERP) to which the Government of Afghanistan must contribute 50% if the cost of the project is over $750,000. The first PTR launched in Afghanistan operated in an environment of insecurity in Gadez in Pakia Province and the implementation team included one civilian.

Training for operation of PRTs takes place in Camp Atterbury in Indiana with reconstruction of the Afghani environment and use of Internet conferencing in keeping abreast with developments in the field. By March 2010, ISAF /NATO had 27 PTRs in Afghanistan with the majority being operated by US, but also by Britain, Germany, Sweden, Finland, Belgium, Norway, Latvia, Hungary, Turkey, Italy, Albania, Spain, Lithuania, Estonia, Denmark New Zealand, Czech Republic, Poland and Republic of Korea with some other supporting countries such as Japan, involved in funding. One totally civilian PRT had been operating in Panjshir but was closed in light of security considerations in July 2011. Ruiz notes that in Iraq in 2008 there were 31 PRTs, with 13 of those embedded in the military.

16.1.4 Japan and PRTs

Chieho Imai of Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs worked on the implementation of the Lithuanian-led PRT in Ghor Province from May 2009 to October 2010, as one of four Japanese civilians. There was no Japanese Self Defence Force engagement in this PRT. The four staff rotated, two in Ghor province, one in the office in the Japanese Embassy in Kabul and one backstopping in MoFA in Tokyo with eight weeks in Afghanistan and three weeks in Japan in an eleven-week cycle. The Japanese engagement was driven by the funding scheme of the Grant Assistance for Grassroots

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456 Chihero Imai was a member of the Japanese MoFA team that was engaged with Professor Kenji Isezaki in the Afghan New Beginnings Programme (ANBP) that carried out DDR of the Northern Alliance from 2003 to 2006 and then was engaged for MoFA Japan with the management and funding of the Lithuanian-led PRT in Ghor Province. Interview with author June, 2012.
Project (GAGP), contributing to small-scale infrastructure projects such as schools, health centres, vocational training centres, etc. the procedure was that the Japanese office in Kabul would receive and screen GAGP project proposals from local NGOs. The screening was done in consultation with the Ghor provincial government to ensure the selection of high priority projects that really met local needs. Participation of the local community in monitoring the progress of the project and to contribute to the maintenance of the finished construction was encouraged. Once approved by the Tokyo office, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) would be signed between the office in the Embassy of Japan, Kabul and the selected NGO agreeing to the completion of the project within twelve months. The completion of the project in the required timeframe was a challenging requirement although most NGOs did good work.

After October 2010 the Japanese policy towards the PRT changed and the team engaged in cooperation with a broader range of PRTs in other provinces. Though staff is no longer continuously stationed in Ghor, Japan has continued its assistance to the Lithuanian-led provincial PRT, an approach appreciated by the other participating countries.

Imai says that the PRTs offer an opportunity for genuine ‘unity of effort’, or in quoting from the NATO manual, “a critical approach to a common objective between NATO forces and other military forces present in the area with a different chain of command and between military and civilian components of any operation”. Such unity of effort gives the PRT reach beyond the immediate protected area to access the grassroots community, in an unstable security environment when ‘community acceptance’ is not guaranteed. Further, the military logistics capacity and support is a programme multiplier. Imai admits that the connection with local and national government, even where it does reach and has implementation capacity in Afghanistan, is an inherent weakness in the operation of PRTs and as such they contribute little to local or national institutional capacity building. The impact of PRTs is therefore limited. However, the particular weaknesses within the national institutions would have been difficult to overcome; absence of transparency, nepotism and corruption. Imai suggests that rather than investing in internationally led PRTs, a greater focus in needed on capacity building in the national governance institutions and a transition to the national ownership of PRTs.

16.1.6 Missed local solutions in Afghanistan
Lucy Morgan Edwards offers us an emotional journey of her understanding of missed opportunities for a local solution to the entire Afghan conflict, from her perspective initially as a humanitarian worker with an International NGO and a UN Agency in the early nineties and subsequently as a political advisor to the EU Mission in Kabul. The focus of her book, *The Afghan Solution*, is on how Abdul Haq, an influential Mujahedeen and member of the Pashtun Arsala family of South West Afghanistan around Kandahar, believed that he had the pieces in place, through the application of the sacred Pashtun tradition of loyalties of kinship and blood to attract moderate and disenchanted Taliban leaders. His efforts were rejected by the Western powers, primarily the US (CIA) in favour of the Pakistani surrogate warlords, in responding to advice from a single source of intelligence, the Pakistani Inter-service Intelligence (ISI). Morgan Edwards decries particularly the international community’s, the US and the UN, willingness to “sell out Afghanistan” by sacrificing justice for peace in seeking narrow objectives focused on US needs rather than Afghan needs, a short-sighted policy motivated by the search for a ‘quick-fix in the aftermath of 9/11; a policy that guaranteed failure of the entire intervention.

Morgan Edwards is highly critical of the PRT process. She draws from her experience with UN HABITAT in developing the Community Forae (CF projects) Programme in Afghanistan in 1997. This programme, worked over:

...months and years to develop community partners in re-establishing local infrastructure and implementing public health awareness projects, contributing towards poverty eradication and community empowerment... to address humanitarian and development needs and build economic infrastructure in the context of the breakdown of all levels of government.

This process in latter years was adapted into the Government of Afghanistan led National Solidarity Project (NSP). However, the benefits were dissipated by poor direction and management due to the absence of any effective conditionality being imposed by the donors.

Morgan Edwards says that a major difficulty in attempting to apply a focus on the people in a COIN approach is the absence in foreign troops of any significant consciousness of Afghan and local area cultural norms. Efforts are being driven by the US to integrate the military, the UN, and International

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458 *Ibid*, Kindle of IPad, loc 5,416
459 *Ibid*, loc 4,965
NGOs (INGOs), and significant pressure is being brought to bare on development workers to “fall in line” in the delivery of the PRT concept in a “military dominated triangulation of diplomacy, development and defence, known as 3D.”\(^{460}\) This approach sees the military leading in reconstruction rather than developing local capacity as in the UNHABITAT CF approach. This offers a dramatic contrast in that the PRTs, modeled on the successful PAT concept in Vietnam, cost exponentially more to implement than CF, are ‘top-down’ and prioritise military objectives, primarily force protection. Further, PRTs being implemented across the various components of ISAF have no common mandate and the methods of implementation also vary. PRTs are being used by the military to buy the goodwill of local warlords. The military implementers have little humanitarian or development experience, use a ‘tick-box’ method of implementation and relegate civil society to a separate and subordinate forum. Basically the method of implementation demonstrates a classic case of the absence of the Do No Harm (DNH) approach to community based conflict management interventions.\(^{461}\)

In contrast, CFs had been based on a policy of ‘bottom-up’ implementation, transparent and accountable with community ownership; respected dignity and tradition; and was supported through a very light-foot and low visibility intervention by the agency.\(^{462}\) In PRTs, foreigners are trying to impose a western way, “a modern way” of democratically elected local management, Community Development Councils, through which PRTs would be implemented in contributing to reconstruction and local governance. They are ignoring the local traditional structures and existing ‘shura’ (local traditional councils/assemblies). This approach is ‘unconstructive in state building.’\(^{463}\) The objectives of the PRTs are beyond those of the local communities and focus on force protection.\(^{464}\) The focus required is clearly not on “military security, but on genuine people-centred governance and legitimacy.”\(^{465}\) However the overall focus of the intervention in Afghanistan remains on peace over justice, “contributing to the crisis of impunity…while failing to protect the interests of ordinary people.”\(^{466}\)

The ambivalence of the GoA towards PRTs can be judged to some degree by the public utterance of the President of Afghanistan as regards them. In Munich in mid-2011, Karzai stated that PRTs were

\(^{460}\) Ibid, loc 5,401

\(^{461}\) Do No Harm (DNH), Mary Anderson, Do No Harm Concept evolved from conflict reduction work in communities from 1999 to 2004. This concept outlines a socially conscious methodology for addressing community conflict. It is a critical concept that has gained global credence and is adapted by most responsible agencies intervening in situations of community conflict. Methodologies illustrated in the Do No Harm Handbook, http://www.cdatnc/publications/dnh. (accessed July 9, 2012)

\(^{462}\) Morgan Edwards, The Afghan Solution, Op cit, loc 5446 to 5460

\(^{463}\) Ibid, loc 5,643

\(^{464}\) Ibid, loc 5,733

\(^{465}\) Ibid, loc 6,701

\(^{466}\) Ibid, loc 6,750 to 6,769
“undermining the state institutions and have to go,” noting that “PRTs operate through structures parallel to GoA including through the use of private security companies.” Peter van Burgen, a former leader of two US PRTs takes a similar view of PRTs in Iraq in his 2011 article “We Meant well…”

16.2 The Failure to win the people in Afghanistan: a Destructive Dilemma

The appraisal of the impact of the decade long US and allies intervention in Afghanistan will rest on an assessment of the condition of the legitimacy and capacity of the GoA in offering a rule of law and stability in the aftermath of the US and allies withdrawal, already underway and scheduled for completion in 2014. The indications are not good. In March 2013, Rubin of NYT says that the Government of Afghanistan and Karzai in particular, face a potentially destructive dilemma. How can Karzai distance himself and the administration from the popularly perceived malevolence of being the stooges of a foreign oppressive invasion force while maintaining the investment of the nations providing that force post-withdrawal in propping up the limited capacity of GoA? Karzai, perhaps in reviewing the fate of his predecessors; all previous modern Afghan leaders were either ousted or executed, is progressively distancing himself from:

the widely held image as an American lackey by appealing to nationalist sentiments and invoking Afghanistan’s sovereignty...[and] rather than being the person who was installed by the Bonn process...he want to be remembered as the guy who kicked out the foreigners.

With less than twelve months left in his term, gambling that he will not drive-off continued US investment and support for the current administration in Afghanistan, he is endeavoring to change the narrative by railing against US interventions, limiting US military maneuverability and CIA activities, that he claims are undermining his government. This could be locally popular considering a US COIN campaign that has failed to win over Afghan grass-roots perceptions and attitudes in an environment where “Afghans at a more grass-roots level have little faith in either the Afghan government or the Americans.” The article suggests that he may be overestimating US patience and in particular the Obama administration’s need to remain engaged and unwillingness to abandon an uncooperative and turbulent erstwhile unquestioning ally. Between a rock and a hard place, the Afghan administration

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467 Peter van Burgen, We Meant well: How I Helped to Lose the battle for Iraq hearts and Minds, 2011, hpp://www.wemeantwell.com (accessed July 4, 2012)
469 Ibid
470 Ibid
471 Ibid
must face this ultimate security dilemma of how to survive after the departure of its protectors having failed to protect the people against either the Taliban or oppressive and corrupt warlords, or to improve human security in any way and thereby alienated the people, losing their positive perceptions and attitudes... the failure of a COIN campaign.

16.3 Chapter XVI Review

PRTs, mixed teams of COIN troops and civilian agencies in an integrated “All of Government” approach to local development were to be the ‘soft’ face of COIN through implementing local vital social infrastructural projects, extending the reach of both COIN and national government into the remote rural areas that were easy pickings for Taliban infiltration and influence. Each country of the ‘partnership of the willing’ found the concept attractive and made resources available. Some countries not present on the ground but wishing to be associated with the effort also contributed. However, in the absence of coordinated methods or objectives amongst a wide range of implementing countries, results were mixed. In some cases the conduit for PRTs was the local elites who used them to consolidate their powerbases. US commanders saw PRTs as a contribution to force protection rather than a mechanism of local development. From the military perspective they do have a role to play in contributing to force protection. Where local agency was used, accountability and transparency were nebulous. In most cases foreign agency was dominant in implementing PRTs. Everywhere in the civil/military cooperation (CIMIC) environment, the tensions between security and human security were evident.

In considering the dangers of foreign agency and the failure to ‘win the people,’ Morgan Edwards claims that opportunities for local solutions to the conflict were missed either purposefully or through ignorance as the invasion began. She advises that the agency, ignorant and insensitive approach to PRTs has failed to address perceptions and attitudes of the people. The Karzai government is in a bind as the foreign presence draws down approaching 2014 and its legitimacy has not been consolidated. It moves to assert its independence from the US led intervention. It may be too late. Perceptions and attitudes are not in their favour.
Chapter XVII
Consideration of Literary Review on COIN: The Evolving Doctrine

17.1 An Evolving Doctrine

In the past five hundred years, since the concept of the nation state emerged; an entity that has an equal status in law with its neighbors, its rulers being the legitimate representative of the people, established as the foundational principle of international law. The nation state, to thrive, has required a cultural and geographic integrity with legitimacy conferred on the rulers, if not by acclaim, at least by the acquiescence of the people, who identify themselves as citizens. The phenomenon of colonialism, rule by a foreign power, is broadly rejected as people cleave to their constructed identities and crave liberty to live that identity and to be governed by their own. Where such aspiration is obstructed, injustice is perceived and insurgency can erupt. The evolution and realisation of the concept of the social contract has confirmed that in addition to the citizen having responsibilities to the state; to comply with the rule or law, to pay taxes; the state has responsibilities to the citizen; to protect, to sustain, to provide basic services. Where the state has failed to deliver on this social contract, the ground is prepared for insurgency.

Insurgency is not a new phenomenon. It has been here as long as men have sought authority to control men, often through oppression, generating a desire for freedom or a reversal of the relationship. Without the people the insurgency is doomed. In winning the people, the insurgent feeds the constructed identity, emphasises the injustice against the people and claims the high moral ground. The insurgent has a cause with which the people can identify. So it was with T.E. Lawrence in supporting the Arab revolt.472

Prior to World War II, insurgencies were routinely dealt with by the prevailing power using an iron fist in a zero sum confrontation. WWII is seen as a cataclysmic event plumbing the depths of human depravity and inhumanity. In its aftermath, an enlightening (Western) world agreed that the existing international law has failed the world. Driven by the victors in the war, it embraced a new sense of collective responsibility for the care of humanity with the newly formed United Nations Organisation. It adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, together with detailed treaties and the strengthening of the position of the Geneva Conventions combined into the Bill of Rights that considered civil and political rights in addition to economic, social and cultural rights. This launched a new era of humanitarian morality that was to impact on international relations and intrastate relations.

472 Lawrence, The Seven Pillars, Op sit
in a new age. Concepts that gained importance in this new age, though not yet legally binding, are relevant to the morality of how states and international powers deal with insurgencies include the human security concept that arose in 1994 and R2P in 2005.\footnote{473} The expansionism of the warring powers that led to WWII and the subsequent Cold War gave impetus to Communist inspired insurgency in China and in many of the newly liberated states. Though insurgent strategies and tactics have been developing through the lessons learned over centuries of anti-colonial rebellions and protracted attrition, none so long as the 600 year Irish refusal of the colonial yoke, the mid-twentieth century experience-based writings of Mao Tse-tung and Che Guevara have laid the basis for modern insurgent strategies.\footnote{474} For them, the centre of gravity is the people. Without the people there is no insurgency. The insurgency must have legitimacy and the cause must be the people’s priority. In the insurgent’s narrative, the West, having won the war (WWII), is now deemed to be abandoning and in fact, exploiting the poor in the developing world. A new system, neither feudal nor semicolonial, but based on the people, is necessary. The rural population struggling for survival and with nothing to lose is ripe for revolution.

Mao in his “Guerrilla War” of 1936 projected a strategy to address an asymmetric fighting environment, in which the insurgents have the political advantage, the will and support of the people. The insurgents are the fish swimming in the sea of the people. He envisaged 3 phases of insurgency; organisation, consolidation and preservation, followed by progressive expansion leading to the final phase in which the politically empowered and militarily strengthened insurgents would destroy the conventional army in battle. An organised and planned insurgency that has the will of the people cannot lose. A conventional army that does not have the people cannot win. Che in his “Guerrilla Warfare” of 1961 is, for the most part, in tune with Mao. Insurgency is about liberation from oppression and imposed poverty and is for the people. Winning the people ensures success. His significant difference with Mao is that Che believes that it is not necessary to wait for the supporting conditions for revolution; they can be created through the ‘foco.’ The principles and tactics of Guerrilla Warfare outlined in the works of Mao and Che form the bases for the methodologies of most insurgencies of the twentieth century and therefore the basis of modern COIN planning and implementation. Into the nineteen seventies the Provisional IRA, without crediting the originators, follow the same logic.\footnote{475} It is about the people.


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COIN is a contested concept, particularly in the polarised institutions of the US military. The argument is between the use of firepower and mass together with technical advantage in applying military force to search and destroy, even in an asymmetric insurgency. This approach versus greater consideration of the political and socio-cultural aspects of the insurgency to be defeated in an effort to “win the people”, a battle for ‘hearts and minds; perceptions and attitudes. The conservative US military establishment clinging to its comfort zone with mass and power, together with the beneficiary military industrial complex support the former. This approach failed in Vietnam. Larry Cable spelled out the cause of this failure as being doctrinal back in 1986. Duffy in 1995 further highlighted the nature of the failure. However, the US military is not a learning institution and has been slow to take the lessons on board. Bumiller 2012 advises that the polemic continues today without resolution.

Galula drawing from the experience of a string of failed French COIN operations, Indochina and Algeria in particular, codified COIN theory and practice in 1965, clearly drawing from Mao in confirming the centre of gravity as the people. Winning the people in COIN must make the insurgents irrelevant. In 1975 Andy Mack reviewed the COIN being implemented in the US expeditionary campaign that was petering out in failure in Vietnam. In the context of broadening its military assistance programs (MAP) the US had recently been engaged in successful COIN operations in Latin America. In that context, the iron fist approach, covert operations, torture and terror tended to work. This approach was not working in Vietnam. The US was losing the people. Though the US had toyed with the idea of developing “soft power” approaches to COIN, utilising the social sciences. Such efforts had gone underground in light of resistance for professional ethical concerns from the social scientists and more practical concerns from the conservative ‘firepower and mass’ establishment. The latter were concerned about their professional comfort zones and perhaps under the influence of the military industrial complex. Mack contends that the failure to embrace “soft” approach to consider the political and socio-economic position of the people and to separate them from the insurgents using “soft power”, gaining the support of peoples opinion (perceptions and attitudes) over the worthless gratification of the ‘body count’ was the main contributor to failure in Vietnam.

476 Cable, 1986, Op sit
477 Duffy, 1995, Op sit
478 Bumiller, NYT, 2012, Op sit
479 Galula, 1965, Op sit
480 Mack, 1975, Op sit
Nagl focuses on the learning or non-learning culture in military institutions that dictates how they will adapt to COIN implementation.\footnote{Nagle, 2002, Op sit} The US in Vietnam was a non-learning institution that continued to apply ‘old tricks’ even as they were failing. They had poor, conservative and visionless leadership that knew how to apply firepower and mass and little else. Despite a few successful experiments, they resisted the implementation of a COIN approach. They alienated the people in Vietnam and lost their own domestic support base. They lost the war.

The British in Malaya learned quickly and adapted well to the insurgency context after initial painful lessons. In Templer they found a great COIN leader who could combine military knowhow with political astuteness supported by the domestic political establishment in London, to develop solutions that co-opted the insurgents cause. He won the people and left Malay re-establishing itself as an independent nation state.

Following this experience, Moyer attributes successful COIN to innately sound leadership characteristics.\footnote{Moyer, 2010, Op sit} These include qualities like judgment, empathy, charisma, sociability, and creativity, gained naturally and through nurturing at the mother’s knee rather than learned in military college.

David Kilcullen asserts that key to success in a COIN environment is respect for non-combatants with an understanding of local socio-cultural imperatives and a focus on the people and their aspirations; perceptions and attitudes; win the people!\footnote{Kilcullen, 2010, Op sit} Kilcullen believes that globalising it in a war on terror will not defeat the current Islamist insurgency. It must be ‘disaggregated’ and dealt with in its component parts, preferably within the context of better governance in the nation states where it is occurring.

According to Sitaraman, international law is in agreement that both conventional war and the war on terror are about killing and capturing insurgents while COIN is about winning the people.\footnote{Sitaraman, 2009, Op sit} Asymmetry is to the insurgents’ advantage. A conventional force failing to focus on the political and winning the people is at a decided disadvantage, particularly so if that COIN force is foreign and perceived as an occupying force, lacking legitimacy.

In dealing with the reality of the people, the preferred option for superpower interventions in the middle of the last century has been the use of firepower and mass, not only against the insurgents, but also in ‘destroying the social base’, destroying the people and so separating the fish from the water.
This strategy, in addition to alienating the people, lost the media wars and so failed as much for the Russians in Afghanistan and for the US in Vietnam.

While democracies have a record of losing COIN wars, it’s not because they are democracies, says Lyall.\(^485\) It is more associated with the fact that they tend to be expeditionary forces and have the habit of losing the support of their domestic social and political base.

Patraeus viewing the inappropriateness of the firepower and mass approach in both Iraq and Afghanistan attempted to overcome the institutional inertia or active resistance by launching his new COIN manual on the US military establishment in 2006.\(^486\) He advises the Forces that they must now be nation builders as well as warriors. They must contribute to the capacity building of national institutions, indigenous security forces and police, and rebuilding local infrastructure and basic services in addition to contributing to strengthening local governance and the rule of law. He draws on the masters and reminds that it is about the people; primarily a political matter. It requires an integrated civil and military approach focused on creating confidence and stability thereby winning the people; their perceptions and attitudes.

The Canadian Army Manual on COIN in 2008 looks philosophically at the COIN environment and the concepts relevant to addressing its complex nature such as the dangers of moral relativism and cultural absolutism.\(^487\) It draws on Mao and Che emphasising the political nature of the environment and the centre of gravity being the people. It concurs with Patraeus that an integrated civil military approach is critical. National ownership and rule of law are vital. Likewise, this manual firmly focuses Canadian COIN operations on winning the people.

Sepp, just a year after the publication of the Patraeus groundbreaking manual on COIN, reviews the US mistakes in approaching a COIN environment in Iraq.\(^488\) It started with “Shock and Awe” in March 2003 applying the ‘American way of war’, firepower and mass, and in a fluctuating security environment with frequently changing objectives, moved grudgingly towards COIN implementation. Agreeing with Kilcullen and Nagl, he notes that the US military has been slow to learn from its mistakes. While the State Department was calling for a COIN approach from an early stage, the systematic asymmetrical relationship between Defence and State spoke louder. Defense had an annual global budget of $300 billion and State had about $50 billion. The military institution being at the coalface of the conflict and spilling their blood had more influence to push their traditional penchant

\(^{485}\) Lyall, 2010, Op sit
\(^{486}\) Patraeus, 2006, Op sit
\(^{487}\) Canadian Army Manual, 2008, Op sit
\(^{488}\) Sepp, 2007, Op sit
for a conventional approach to the insurgency on Iraq. It had worked fine for the first few weeks of the initial invasion.

The insurgency in Iraq is not the same as those led by Mao and Che who were promoting systemic change. This new insurgency can be to make the people ungovernable and so the globalised insurgency may not feel as dependent on the people. Support for global terror comes from outside the people. US short memory and efforts to address it with firepower has retarded the identification of solutions. The Chaney/Rumsfeld regime saw a period of seeking ‘quick-fixes’ through the militarisation of US Foreign Policy, a direction that placed diplomacy on the back burner. Impatience with the efforts to develop the required integration with allies, military and civilian, led to increasing tensions. The US, more used to big wars, had difficulty with the concept of winning the people in Iraq. Sepp is not optimistic that the damage done can be resolved and the people won.

Seth Jones, another prolific scholarly writer on COIN in Afghanistan, usually from the conservative perspective, is asking what is working in COIN in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{489} He notes that the original objective was to ensure that it doesn’t become a haven for anti-US terrorists. He feels that the major weakness of US policy in Afghanistan has been the neglect of the capacity of the indigenous government and the strengthening of the police and indigenous security forces. Tommy Franks ‘light foot’ approach was a mistake and was never sufficient to stabilise a post-Taliban Afghanistan. Jones advocates improved resourcing, human and technical and the creation of more decentralised command structures allowing junior commanders on the ground to use their initiative. He recommends that increased integration with the peacebuilding efforts, SSR, DDR and justice, is critical. He says that PRTs have had limited success with their role more perceived as towards force protection than local reconstruction. Improved collaboration with allied forces, international organisations and NGOs is required if objectives are to be delivered. Jones does not see the priority as ‘winning the people’ and focuses on the agency of the US Forces.

McCrystal in 2009 embraces the approach of the Patraeus COIN manual to deliver in destroying al Qaeda through alienating them from the people, his stated objective, using a strategy of kinetics and non-kinetic activities.\textsuperscript{490} He is focusing on developing an integrated military and civilian effort to gain the support of the Afghan people. While in agreement with Jones that improved governance and capacity of indigenous security forces is vital, winning the people is more important. He is aware that this is a difficult task for troops trained in kinetics, but that applied effort to win the people can deliver

\textsuperscript{489} Jones, 2008, \textit{Op cit}

\textsuperscript{490} McCrystal, Commanders Assessment, 2009, \textit{Op cit}
the necessary results. Risks will need to be taken. He is also in line with Jones in highlighting the need for improved integration of effort with local forces and civilian agencies. He reiterates that the objective is to gain the will and support of the people; their perceptions and attitudes, thus raising the chagrin of the conservative right. McCrystal is ousted by his own naivety and brashness in exposing to a professional journalist the underbelly of his own internal administration, the uncertainty of the direction of the COIN strategy, the discomfort of his troops and his tense and ambivalent relations with the principals of the US administration. That journalist, Hastings, claims that the resources being expended in delivering soft power as an aspect of that COIN strategy are empowering the warlords without improving the lot of the people. This is further alienating the people. He is advising a reconsideration of how COIN is being implemented in this particular effort to win the people.

The British have had a difficult COIN experience in Helmand Province in Afghanistan. Their integration into the US master plan in a conflict not of their choice has been painful. Helmand is the toughest spot in Afghanistan and the expectation of what can be achieved enormous. They have attempted to create the institutional structures that allow for the full integration of effort between civilian agencies and the military. These efforts have met with considerable cultural and ethical resistance from within their own integrated teams, particularly between the advocates of human security over security; a resistance that contributed to very sluggish delivery. 2007 saw a reinvigorated attempt to move the COIN processes of non-kinetic activities seeking ‘soft-effects’, launching at a time when kinetics were having poor results. Optimism exits that a new direction focused on non-kinetic activities of creating education and employment opportunities for youth will contribute to improved outputs. Concern is expressed that their main sponsors, the US, may be moving more towards a kinetic counter-terrorism strategy of killing and capturing insurgents.

The British have invested significant energy into implementing a Comprehensive Approach that would derive the synergies of multiple agencies, military and civilian, bringing their particular institutional strengths in delivering their brand of COIN. However institutional integration is difficult, especially, as Rotmann 2010 points out, in a multinational fragmented organisation with stove-piped chains of commands and the conflicting overarching philosophies such as security and human security.

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491 Hastings, McCrystal, RollingStone 2009, Op sit
492 Nye, Soft power 2006, Op sit
493 Farrel and Gordon, 2009, Op sit
Kiszely acknowledges the changes necessary in British COIN doctrine to work collaboratively in addressing global terrorism/insurgency and its “network enabled capability.” It is clear that Mao’s fishes and water analogy still holds true. It’s the people, ‘stupid’… or at least their positive perception of the COIN. And… COIN must be addressed in a multi-disciplinary and ‘comprehensive approach’.

That painful British experience in Afghanistan as a junior partner, constrained by an absence of unity of command within the allied forces, a divergent cultural psyche and uncoordinated COIN doctrine, is addressed, reflecting something of a learning institution, in renouncing a habit of an over-confident ad hoc approach to COIN. Building on a sound foundation of its 2001 COIN manual, identified weaknesses are addressed in a revamped manual, Br COIN Ops 2009. This advocates an approach to COIN within a Shape-Secure-Develop framework in a major turn (return?) to winning the people, following population-centric principles in consideration of human security. This in an environment delicately and dynamically balanced between security and stabilization. It recognizes that the primary focus should be the interests of the host-nation rather than those of allies.

The following matrix offers a review of the evolution of British Principles of COIN in comparison with allies currently stated COIN principles. This is drawn from BR COIN Ops 2009 with the addition of those principles outlined in Canada, COIN B-GL-232, 2008.

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494 Sir John Kiszely, 2006, Op cit
495 Br COIN Ops, 2009 Op cit, p 48 adapted.
**Table 1.**

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legitimacy is the main Objective</td>
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<tr>
<td>Political Primacy</td>
<td>Recognition of the political nature of the problem and by Definition of the Solution</td>
<td>Political Primacy and Political Aim</td>
<td>Political factors are Primary</td>
<td>Effective Political primacy in pursuit of a strategic aim</td>
<td>Primacy of Political Purpose</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration</td>
<td>Civilian Dominated, Coordinated system of Command and Control</td>
<td>Coordinated Government Machinery</td>
<td>Unity of Effort is Essential</td>
<td>Promote unity of purpose to coordinate the actions of participating agencies</td>
<td>Unity of Effort</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information/ Intelligence</td>
<td>Information collated into usable intelligence</td>
<td>Intelligence and information</td>
<td>Intelligence drives Operations</td>
<td>Exploit intelligence and information</td>
<td>Integration of intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutralising Insurgents</td>
<td>Neutralisation (including selective destruction) of insurgents</td>
<td>Neutralising the Insurgent</td>
<td>Neutralise the insurgent</td>
<td>Secure the population Neutralise the insurgent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Fishes from the Water</td>
<td>Separate the insurgents from the people</td>
<td>Separating the Insurgent from his Support</td>
<td>Insurgents must be Isolated from their cause and support</td>
<td>Separate the insurgents from their physical and moral strength, including addressing their grievances, real and perceived</td>
<td>Gain and maintain popular support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rule of Law</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Security under the rule of law is essential</td>
<td>Operate in accordance with the law</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time frames</td>
<td>Development of long-term Government reforms to Prevent a Resurgence of Trouble</td>
<td>Longer term post-insurgency Planning</td>
<td>Counterinsurgents should prepare for a long-term commitment</td>
<td>Sustain commitment to expend political capital and resources over a long period</td>
<td>Prepare for the long-term</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adaptation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Counterinsurgency imperative: Learn and adapt</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Planning</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Conduct longer term post-insurgency planning</td>
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</table>

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Both Kilcullen and Jones looked somewhat askance on the impact of PRTs. They are the front of house presentation of the COIN strategy, the prime mechanism to win the people. Every participating nation of ISAF/ NATO and some who are not otherwise engaged, want to be part of this programme; the delivery of an integrated military civilian approach to reconstruction projects in order to increase the reach of the government and local government. A main difficulty is that different participants have different perspectives as to what is the purpose of the PRTs. The US military commanders on the ground, despite their people-centric doctrine, are clear that force protection is their priority in supporting PRTs. They are a means of offering resources to local influential leaders to win them over and to allow them to help to win the people who benefit from these projects, thereby reducing the number of potential enemies that the troops face in the community and enhancing human intelligence. The development-minded partners, civilian agencies and governments such as Japan take a human security related view. While the purpose is to increase the capacity of local government, it must be through improving the lot of the community. This conflict between security and human security results in what one consultant calls a ‘development coordination gap’ and the inability of the military to coordinate the activities of the civilian actors in delivering PRTs.496 Young social science minded civil affairs officers of the US military remain enamored with the concept that they feel overcomes some of the civilian reservations regarding kinetics and allows the Force to reach out to the people.497 Chihiro Imai, a Japanese representative on one PRT, agrees that the impact has been limited and that there is a need, after appropriate capacity building, to pass the operation of PRTs into national ownership. Lucy Morgan Edwards is angry.498 Already having sold out Afghanistan with peace before justice, how can ISAF/NATO apply a COIN strategy that focuses on the people when they remain ignorant of the local culture? PRTs are guided by the military prerogatives of diplomacy, development and defence, addressing the needs of the military but failing to address the genuine needs of the people. It is a top-down approach as opposed to the required bottom-up approach considering human security with ‘Do No Harm’ considerations to community-based conflict reduction. The PRTs, while varying wildly in form of implementation, in many cases are attempting to impose elements of western values in the mechanisms of implementation, in what the Canadian COIN Manual calls a demonstration of cultural relativism and moral absolutism, failing to recognise effective local traditions and practices. Van Burgen, who managed two PRTs in Iraq in 2009 and 2010 accompanies Morgan Edwards in her

496 Adams, 2009, Op sit
498 Morgan Edwards, 2011, Op sit
pessimism, conceded that the implementation of PRTs had contributed to the alienation of the population. Karzai said at the Munich meeting in mid-2011 that PRTs as they are currently operated are undermining his government and he wants the concept ended.

While success in the implementation of COIN doctrine remains illusive and clearly dependent on how COIN is implemented and in what context, the overarching principle of the doctrine has remained paramount since Mao first put pen to paper. As with insurgency, the current status of the doctrine of COIN is about winning the people. It is about perceptions and attitudes. This may be difficult to reconcile with practice.

\[\text{\textsuperscript{499}} \text{van Burgen, 2011, Op cit}\]
Part 3
The Convergence of COIN Doctrine and DDR Theory

Chapter XVIII The Elements of Theoretical Convergence: COIN and DDR

18.1 The Principal Sectors

In 1936 Mao specified the constituent parts of Insurgency (principal sectors) as military, political, economic, psychological and social, sectors that also reflect the principal sectors of society, of polity. It is natural that the principal sectors in COIN reflect this.

The review of the evolution of the doctrine of COIN in Section 2 indicates some deviation in approach between COIN doctrines of respective countries, reflecting some levels of doctrinal divergence or at least, varying nuance in approach. Patraeus in 2006 (US, FM 3-24) identifies the principal sectors covered by COIN as military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological and civic action. The Canadian manual (Canada B-GL-232, 2010) identifies political, social, economic, psychological, informational and military sectors. From our study of British COIN we have drawn the principle sectors of military, political, psychosocial, intelligence, Influence Activities, Social/Human terrain activities.

In reviewing the evolution of DDR theory, we find that the essential sectors are security, political, social and economic, communications and psychosocial. The first four sectors reflect the basic dimensions of human organisation within the modern state system. Communications and information are closely connected and while crosscutting, have proven of decisive importance in delivering DDR, sufficient to be taken as an additional sector. For this study we’ll call it Communications/Information. The Psychosocial sector relates to the higher-level qualitative environment of human security

Element of divergence in approaches to the principal sectors clearly exist between COIN doctrine and DDR theory. However we can also identify some important levels of convergence in the principal sectors and in the implied critical elements of practice that contribute to outcomes in both COIN and DDR.

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Table 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>“Constituent parts of Insurgency”</th>
<th>PRINCIPAL SECTORS of COIN /DDR</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mao “Yu Chi Chan” 1936</td>
<td>COIN US (FM 3-24) 2006</td>
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<td></td>
<td>COIN Canada (B-GL-323) 2010</td>
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<td></td>
<td>COIN Britain** (Br COIN 2009)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>DDR*** 2013</td>
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<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>Military</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paramilitary</td>
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<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>Political</td>
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<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>Economic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychological</td>
<td>Psychological</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic action</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>(mainstreamed)</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>Psychosocial</td>
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<tr>
<td>Psychological</td>
<td>Psychological</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>Informational</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>Influence</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>Activity</td>
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<td>Social</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>Human Terrain</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The shading of the rows reflects the assumed normative placement of the relevant principal sector in the context of “Green or Blue” (Juaregui, Kelly et al, 2010, Op cit), i.e. the Military predominance or Civil responsibility. Gray is added to reflect particularly debatable cases.

** The primary sectors are not directly stated as such in Br COIN 2009 but are implied and extracted from a review of the text.

*** The primary sectors in DDR are drawn from the review of the current status of DDR theory.
18.1.1 Divergence.

It is unsurprising that the constituent parts of insurgency (Mao 1936) also form the bulk of the Principal Sectors in COIN (collated from the US, British and Canadian definitive COIN military manuals) and DDR even in its current state of evolution of doctrine/theory in 2013. These constituent parts/principal sectors also are generally the constituent parts of polity, the structures of state. Stabilising society within those states through ‘winning the people’ remain the primary objectives of both insurgency and COIN and indeed the outcomes of DDR.

However there are some differences between respective COIN approaches and through a process of reviewing the language used in naming the principal sectors applying post-structural techniques we can identify an inference of substantial difference in the underlying philosophies directing the doctrine. Such techniques were described in Molloy E, 2011 as:

[Post-structuralism] focuses on the ways that languages and narratives construct reality. (Minkler and Wallerstein 2003:36.) It examines how “socially and culturally produced patterns of language, known as ‘discourses’ construct people and the power relationships amongst them in particular ways. (Banks 2007:55)

The differences between the listed US principal sectors and the Canadian principal sectors for COIN are telling, as are the differences between COIN and DDR. Let us consider these divergences:

Paramilitary; the US COIN lists the Paramilitary in addition to the Military Sector. This does not appear in the Canadian manual and perhaps reflects a particular US habit. It draws to mind the Phoenix Project in Viet Nam that saw the mobilization of local militia led by US advisors that identified and assassinated over 26,000 local officials and others suspected of supporting the North Vietnamese. The US sponsorship of the moderate Sunni tribal leaders and their militias represented by the National Council for the Awakening of Iraq from 2005 is attributed with having facilitated some short-term improvements in security for US interventions. After the US drawdown the Government of Iraq pays for this force. In light of festering grievance regarding the numbers to be absorbed into the Iraqi Security forces and growing sectarian friction the Sunni militias now pose a threat to the state. In Afghanistan numerous militias under various notorious warlords, considered useful to the US military objectives, were remobilized and rearmed concurrent with DDR activities. This practice from Vietnam

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501 Molloy E. 2011, Op Sit, p 6
to Afghanistan has proven largely counterproductive in contributing to outcomes as it usually further alienates the community and undermines the legitimacy of the host-government. Its inclusion in US COIN 2006 may represent to a great extent a post-facto justification and a stubborn denial of the blatant illegitimacy of the practice of mobilising and empowering, for their own immediate interests, often uncontrolled and brutal informal militias operating outside the rule of law of the host-nation.

The Psychological sector is common to both the US and Canadian manuals and reflects a traditional sector of COIN. The psychological sector refers to psychological operations (Psy Ops), used to manipulate or unnerve the insurgents or to reinforce the people’s attitude in favour of the COIN agents and against the insurgents. It can entail a range of ‘dirty tricks,’ including misinformation, provocation of outrages to shock the population, direct psychological attacks on insurgents using personal intimate information or intimidation (and worse) of loved ones. In light of the impact of the Metropolis Effect, the loss of support of the home populations of expeditionary COIN forces, Psy Ops is also frequently directed towards the home population. This is undertaken in attempting to retain popular political support for the COIN effort in managing the metropolis effect. Primarily a ‘security tool’, such operations would be anathema to the overarching Human Security agenda of DDR processes implemented by the international community. The activities of covert Psy Ops in COIN operations that become public knowledge will often “back-fire” on the counterinsurgents. Insurgents can gain considerable sympathy and positive local perception or the benefits of the Metropolis Effect by exposing these activities. Thus, their implementation poses considerable risk to counterinsurgents. In light of the necessity for the COIN actors to maintain legitimacy; adherence to rule of law etc., the insurgents, apparently not so constrained, appear to have more scope in applying Psy Ops including ‘dirty tricks.’

The US manual refers to Civic Action while the Canadian manual and DDR refer to the Social Sector. This is significant when reviewed in the context of post-structural analysis. Civic Action suggests the agency of the COIN actor in implementing civic action. This may be typical of the US approach to COIN. The omission of a Social Sector as a principal sector in the US manual is also telling. The Canadian manual use of the term ‘Social Sector’ implies a greater level of community conflict sensitivity, as is essential also in DDR. The Canadian doctrine as reflected in this 2008 manual is generally more sensitive to the modern shift from the orientalist attitudes of the superiority of western

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504 See Mack, 1975, Op cit
agency that is reflected in the US manual, an approach that views every US soldier as a ‘state builder,’ even in an environment that is incomprehensible to him.

It is further telling that the US principal sectors omit either ‘Communications’ or ‘Information’. Intelligence is certainly mainstreamed throughout all aspects of US COIN operations but the more passive sector of ‘information’ critical in managing the expectations of the population, is not considered as an independent sector. This perhaps reflects an over confidence in its own agency. Intelligence is the gathering and collation of relevant information to support operations. Intelligence is gathered from multiple sources and prioritised in accordance with its value and credibility. Specifically, good intelligence permits actions for self-protection and aides targeting, contributing to tactical and strategic military outcomes. In supporting the accurate targeting of insurgents it is expected to contribute to avoiding collateral damage, a euphemism for the killing or injuring of innocent people, damaging their property or offending their sensibilities, and thus retaining the positive perceptions and attitudes of the people towards the COIN actors.

Information and Communications is the process of ‘putting-out’ information usually directed towards the relevant actors and population in managing expectations and in garnering support through offering facts. The information/communications campaign requires detailed planning, tight integrated coordination to ensure that all COIN actors are ‘on message,’ and considerable resources and management. To offer misinformation in such a programme may have short-term benefit but will, in the longer-term, undermine the credibility and legitimacy of the COIN actors and the host-government that they support/represent. This is often a dilemma for COIN actors where occasional misinformation can prove useful, while insurgents, as in ‘dirty tricks’, have less need to consider their legitimacy in the context of rule of law and seem for the most part, to ‘get away’ with the practice of disseminating misinformation.

The dissemination of accurate information reflecting integrated messages and managing expectations is also a vital operation to support DDR. It requires good political will in an effective integrated environment between host-government and implementing agencies, between agencies and between agencies and donors. Sufficient attention and resources in planning and delivering an effective communications campaign has rarely been applied in DDR practice. This deficiency has been ineffectively addressed in practice through ad hoc communications campaigns resulting in frequent lapses in the management of expectations and the occasional prevalence of negative perceptions due to
misinformation, willful and accidental; an environment in which tensions can be raised and security threatened.

The British COIN emphasis on Influence Activities, winning hearts and minds, demonstrates, as later reflected in the Canadian manual, their consideration of the importance of perceptions and attitudes of the people, at which such activities are directed. The British emphasis on Human Terrain as a principal sector within their doctrine indicates a realisation of the critical importance of the tactical and ultimately strategic dimension of the people in the COIN theater beyond the physical geographical terrain. Human terrain represents the population of the AO; (the insurgents), the local leaders, the influence makers, the people of the villages... their security and protection; their cultural, religious and traditional sensitivities; their perceptions and attitudes.

While the US does nod in the direction of the Human Terrain with the provision of financial resources, the launching of the HTS and the deployment of Human Terrain Teams (HTTs) in support of Brigade COIN activities, we have seen how this is a limp attempt at mobilising the science of ethnography, particularly anthropology, in strengthening force protection and in targeting insurgents. The British COIN doctrine is perceived to take a higher moral approach to Human Terrain in considering the needs of the population.

In an interview for Small Wars Journal in 2011, Colonel Alexander Alderson, British Army, who was the lead author of the Br COIN 2009 manual, restates that COIN is an integrated strategy and not a “strategy of tactics”, as COIN critic Colonel Gian Gentile of West Point has claimed. It is an integrated strategy that must be ‘Whole of Government’ and be population-centric dealing with the broader root causes of the insurgency; it must bring government to the people; it must ‘win the people’. 505

18.2 In our definitions we have offered a broad interpretation of security dilemma contextualised beyond the ‘classic security dilemma’ to include those dilemmas that ultimately impact on the ‘success’ of a COIN operation and therefore on security. The contradiction inherent in each security dilemma is an apparent paradox. This dissertation asserts that awareness of and capacity to address the paradoxes/security dilemma are the key to success in both COIN and DDR and represent the deficit that has contributed to ambiguity as regards ‘success’ of both COIN campaigns and DDR processes to date. The evolving doctrine identifies only a limited number of the existing security

505 Octavian Manea, interview with Col Alexander Alderson, BA, “ Counterinsurgency as a whole of Government approach: notes on the British Army Field Manual,” Small Wars Journal, January 2011,
dilemmas. Our study expands on the list. The following sections will focus on the Paradoxes, identified as Security Dilemmas, in both COIN and DDR.

18.2.1 Security Dilemmas (Paradoxes) within modern COIN as identified in the Br COIN 2009 adapts from US COIN 3-24, (Patraeus’ COIN manual) offer an array of conundrums that often defy conservative military nature. While contexts differ and no ‘cookie-cutter’ approach exists, consideration of the paradoxes highlights the complexity of COIN environments and the need for very cerebral approaches.

18.2.1.1 The following nine (9) paradoxes are listed in the Br COIN 2009 Manual and we identify them as security dilemmas. These represent less than half of the security dilemmas that we identify in the study and are considered only in a cursory way, their impact grossly underestimated. We will look at each of these security dilemmas from the perspective of their impact on perceptions and attitudes, drawing from the study of the evolution of the doctrine, before considering other important security dilemmas.

1. The more you protect your force, the less secure you are.

The security of the population is the primary objective of a COIN operation and if a COIN commander is heavily engaged in force protection, concentrating on the safety of his own troops and is therefore risk averse, he is unlikely to be constantly present in the community, sharing the risk, developing confidence and securing the population.

The British Army learned in Northern Ireland that patrolling in full battle order, i.e. flack jackets and helmets together with protective movement in tactical formation through the community, projected a sense of hostility to and distance from the community. The community did not perceive them as being there to protect them and frequently felt threatened by their presence. The impact of a changed British policy that allowed commanders on the ground to use their initiative in permitting patrolling in Belfast and Derry city with troops in less defensive attire and less tactical movement formations, without flack jackets and helmets, when circumstance permitted, was notable. US policy tends to see troops in ‘full metal jacket’, in the most innocuous circumstance... ‘lest the worse happen’, and so contributing to alienation from the people.

506 Br COIN 2009, Op cit, pp 3-22
507 All initial nine paradoxes in 20.2.1.1 are drawn from Br COIN 2009, Op sit, pp 3-22/23
This phenomenon is also evident in the controversial prize winning documentary movie, “Armadillo” that tracks the six-month mission of a platoon of a Danish Army infantry company attached to a British Brigade in Helmand Province, Afghanistan in 2009, as part of the NATO mission. Without commentary, just raw footage of the events with uncensored sound, the viewers can draw their own conclusions. In the platoon’s patrols the viewers clearly see a physically and socially hostile environment with community apparently bemused by these ‘creatures from the moon’ temporarily passing through their lives, bringing nothing good. The community, knowing the reality of the Taliban presence and resilience, is cynical of the claims that “we are here to protect you.” It is clear that the platoon has difficulty in protecting itself, with members injured in firefights. When colleagues are killed, the ‘attitude’ of the platoon members hardens as the reality of the threat is felt. The local villagers are seen to flee. The movie draws to a conclusion with a fighting patrol made up by the platoon killing five Taliban in a firefight and, not seen but later implied, apparently finishing them off with ‘coup de grace’.

Ignorance of the culture, language and concerns of the community by the troops is evident. The preoccupation of the force with self-protection, conscious of the pervasive presence of the Taliban, prevents any useful connection with the community, thus preventing them in garnering any perception of legitimacy for their presence by the community and the associated passage of useful intelligence, while they are unable to offer any level of protection to the community. It is difficult to imagine how such an unnatural, uninformed and totally foreign presence in the community can in any way offer protection to the community. This environment offers a dramatic security dilemma.

**ii. The more force you use, the less effective you may be**

Greater use of force alienates the community, often targeting local heroes and increases the chances of mistakes and collateral damage. It can rapidly be used as anti-COIN propaganda and can degenerate into creating the perception of a ‘brutal force’ that often contributes to distance from the people.

As seen in ‘Armadillo,’ the increase of kinetic operations by the COIN force impacts on the lives of the community, either by its nature on through the countermeasures by the insurgents. As the

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social distance between the COIN force and the local community increases, so does the threat to COIN forces. Thus the increase in force is counterproductive. Restraint, on the other hand, while offering some immediate risk, can create a perception of strengthening the rule of law and a sense of legitimacy, contributing to a ‘normative system’ for the community, lessening the distance between the local community and COIN forces, increasing security.

**iii. The more successful a COIN is, the less force can be used and more risk must be accepted**

As the levels of violence reduce, a COIN force must address the objects of transiting the environment from ‘Green to Blue’, from a military security operation to a more civil policing approach in facilitating a return to rule of law. This is a sign of the development of a ‘normative system’, a primary objective of COIN operations. From the perspective of COIN force policy, this is likely to require requisite restraint reflected in restricted Rules of Engagement (RoEs). This implies the necessity for more open engagement and less projection of a ‘force protection’ posture, a level of ‘appearing’ to reduce ones guard; less defensive patrolling; engagement in the cultural and economic life of the community in offering local CBMs. These could include support for local social services and critical infrastructural projects in collaboration with local government and the community, e.g. education, health, market places and ceremonial, etc. Such operations contribute to the ‘normalisation’ and improve the perceptions of the community towards COIN forces and towards the supported government, local and national. However, the reduction in defensive demeanour and associated use of force can leave the COIN force open to increased risk, an increased risk that must be weighed carefully against the return on investment in terms of contribution to objectives.

**iv. Sometimes doing nothing is the best reaction**

Often insurgent goading is targeted at eliciting a response that will compromise COIN forces either physically on in the perception of the population. Restraint, even to the extent of not reacting can be the wisest action.

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509 Beatrice Juaregui, Green on Blue, Kelly et al, *Op cit*, pp39 ... 49
Further, COIN immediate reactions, usually kinetic reactions, often result from the influence of cultural relativism or moral absolutism, and the force not making any reaction to specific incitement, but thinking more strategically, can be more constructive than taking action.\textsuperscript{510} Often the absence of a response to goading activities can be extremely frustrating for troops that have the capacity to respond, forced to abide by a commander’s patience. This weighing of the benefits of doing nothing against the benefits of responding is the prerogative of a commander and a wise decision the sign of competence in command. It is from the perspective of command and ultimate responsibility that the wisdom and longer-term benefits of doing nothing can be seen to outweigh the immediate gratification and luxury of responding. Such is a frequent security dilemma in a COIN environment where response to attacks may offer immediate gratification to COIN forces but will contribute to an alienation of the community.

\textbf{v. The best weapons for COIN do not shoot.}

Progress is measured in the gaining of popular support and the strengthening of the legitimacy of the host-government, not in firepower. Negotiating skills; projection of a positive demeanour/posture and resolution of local problems without recourse to arms; cultural sensitivity, contribution to the development of a ‘normative system’ with priority to the rule of law... by ‘winning the people,’ can offer greater contribution to the achievement of COIN objectives than kinetic operations.

\textbf{vi. The host nation doing something tolerably well is sometimes better than us doing it well.}

Echoing T.E Lawrence, supporting the establishment of local legitimacy is more important than perfect operations. The concept of agency in the absence of allowing local capacity to develop, even at the expense of less than perfect operations is a major contributor to mitigating the challenges experienced by governments, national and local, in establishing legitimacy. This is a particular complaint by the GoA as regards the impact of PRTs that were supposed to extend the legitimacy of GoA, but in many cases were used as an aid to COIN force protection.

\textbf{vii. If a tactic works this week, it might not work next week; if it works here, it might not work there.}

\textsuperscript{510} Canada, B-GL-323, \textit{Op cit}
Insurgents who survive are fast learners and adapt quickly to address COIN tactics. Flexibility, dynamic evaluation and adjustment of COIN approaches must overcome complacency and address the dynamic environment. This is especially difficult in a changing COIN environment where military forces are not learning institutions, as we have seen the US military is generally deemed not to be, or where initiative at a field level is not encouraged. Mental agility is a survival tool in COIN for both the insurgent and the counterinsurgent. He who thinks faster and smarter survives. Repeating specific tactics temporally or replicating in different AOs in a world of fast learners and good communicators offers an advantage to the opposition.

viii. **Tactical success guarantees nothing**

Tactics must be clearly integrated to the strategic objective; an approach that requires a clearly articulated Joint Operational Plan, encompassing all COIN actors and ensuring integrated activity at all levels. This requires tactics to contribute to the overarching objective, the strategic outcome. E.g. the execution of insurgent leaders by the British in Ireland in 1916, a tactical victory, was an action that ‘lost the people’, the Irish majority that heretofore had not been prepared to condone violent insurgency in achieving liberation from 600 years of colonisation. This was the one tactical victory that launched the beginning of the British exit in 1922 from 26 counties of the Irish 32 counties.

ix. **Many important decisions are not made by generals**

Notwithstanding the previous dilemma that tactical success guarantees nothing, COIN operations, in particular where small unit operations are prevalent, means that tactical decisions made in local operations can have strategic implications. Therefore commanders must have confidence in their subordinates capacity, initiative and understanding of the commander’s intent. This is a product of training and institutional culture.

18.2.1.2 Additional Security Dilemmas in COIN

The following additional security dilemmas are distilled from this study and form a bulwark in responding to the research questions:
i. **COIN must prioritise space for human security.**

Kinetic operations cannot legitimately project a commitment to human security. The two are mutually exclusive. COIN can however, facilitate the environment for human security. A nod in the direction of human terrain with the half-hearted deployment of the Human Terrain System (HTS) or the uncoordinated funding and implementation of PRTs with a varying range of methodologies and objectives will not address the human security environment. The security dilemma is that military capacities focus on security and human security is beyond their ‘comfort zones.’ A military force opening space for human security implies taking risks. Further it creates confusion in the mind of a soldier regarding the scope of his authorization to apply his kinetic training. A French battalion commander on UN service in south Lebanon told the author that it took him two years to retrain his troops for effective kinetics after a six month rotation on UN service in peacekeeping. Such a dilemma is more accentuated in attempting to consider the human security aspects of COIN while addressing a highly kinetic security environment.

ii. **Grassroots Social media trumps COIN media campaign and censorship capacity.**

Grassroots social media capacity means that COIN forces cannot control the message either locally or in considering the broader metropolis effect. Perceptions will be created by their actions and behavior, not by message management. Social media can shape the perceptions of the people. Furthermore, these perceptions will influence how they use the social media at their disposal, in support of or against the COIN.

iii. **High Tech alienates people.**

Galula’s reservations regarding the potential counterproductive impact of modern technology that it cannot surpass human presence and judgment in COIN have come to pass. We are witnessing how targeted assassination using drones does not replace ‘boots on the ground’ and may undermine both local and international perceptions of the COIN effort due to collateral damage and issues of international law. This rapidly becomes a political issue, as currently demonstrated between

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511 That military ‘comfort zone,’ frequently referred to in Kelly et al (Op cit), is the sense of certainty regarding actions to be taken, immediate responses and the competencies for which soldiers are trained in executing kinetic operations. Outside of those ‘comfort zones’ is a nebulous world for professional soldiers; particularly those operating in foreign socio-cultural environments. It involves more complex considerations; thinking ‘outside the box,’ constraint or hesitation and the modification of reflexive responses.

512 Discussion between author and French battalion commander in UNIFIL HQ, Naquora, Lebanon, December 1982.
Pakistan and US COIN in Afghanistan, an issue that undermines the scope of collaboration of COIN forces with host and neighboring governments effected by high tech incursions. This undermines the legitimacy of the COIN campaign and loses the perception of the people.

iv. Coopt the cause to ‘win the people.’

General Templer in implementing the Biggs plan in Malaya demonstrated how the insurgents can be undermined and separated from the people if the primary aspirations of the people are being addressed by the COIN campaign. Understanding the ‘cause’ that has been mobilised by the insurgents as the basis of the peoples frustration, and turning it to COIN advantage is a political decision beyond the COIN force capacity. However, it is a necessity that can predetermine the potential for COIN success. The dilemma exists in how far this political decision will take the COIN force beyond its ‘comfort zone.’

v. Without legitimacy, COIN is lost

Legitimacy involves operating within the law. This remains true despite that fact that the violence perpetrated by the insurgents is conducted outside the law. The most convenient, effective and satisfying response to this is often in kind. However, COIN forces that operate outside the law risk losing their foundational legitimacy and the perceptions of the people. The security dilemma exists in that effective immediate responses or proactive prevention in applying military capacities may entail the COIN force acting outside the law (international and national), e.g. Illegal detention and hostage taking, disproportionality in use of force; preemptive targeted assassinations, etc.

vi. Integrated COIN trumps military capacity.

The ability to collaborate effectively with national and international civilian partners; ministries, development agencies, local government, the legislative and rule of law sectors, INGOs, NGOs and CBOs, in delivering a ‘whole of government’ (from host nation and COIN partners) approach to national capacity building, an objective well outside military ‘comfort zones’ that includes security and human security elements is a critical asset that has been underestimated in most comprehensive COIN operations to date. The security dilemma exists in the necessity to constrain

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the application of normal military capacities and accept short-term risks in addressing the broader insecurity while developing the broader collaboration, considering both security and human security.

vii. The metropolis effect can beat an expeditionary force

It is not enough to communicate internally within the working partners or even in country with the host-population. The message that is reaching the home population in liberal democracies through the formal media, which influences the political imprimatur for the COIN campaign, is equally important. The dilemma is often that in needing the formal media present to gain support for the campaign, the message cannot always be controlled or that the perception of the message from the perspective of the COIN force and the home populations, or an influential sector of that, is considerably different.

viii. COIN as foreign occupation is set-up to fail.

COIN is Iraq and Afghanistan in particular suffer from the broad perception that it is an invasion of western value-driven forces in the absence of sensitivity to local religious and cultural sensitivities. This perception that an expeditionary force cannot possibly understand the local context and becomes, over time, an occupying force that is seen to pursue its own interests is effectively coopted by insurgents and severely complicates the effort to ‘win the people.’ How long is the time when and expeditionary COIN force supporting the defeat of an insurgency that is threatening the state becomes perceived as occupation is debatable but probably beyond six months. An additional dilemma is that insurgents ‘have time’ while the expeditionary COIN forces do not, either from the perception of the metropolis effect or that of the host population. A COIN campaign that is time-bound from the outset is thus self-defeating.

ix. Extensive use of cash incentives in COIN is counterproductive.

Cash is a convenient and quick way to get compliance in a COIN environment, However, the prevalence in US expeditionary COIN of buying-off warlords, local commanders or even governments, has demonstrated how this practice contributes to a cycle of corruption, empowerment of malign power-structures, dependency and the undermining of the rule of law necessary to extend the reach of legitimate governance. It undermines the perception of the people
18.2.2 The Impact of Security Dilemmas in COIN on Perceptions and Attitudes

Of the nine primary security dilemmas/paradoxes listed in Br COIN 2009 and drawn also from US FM 3-24, (19.2.1.1) the first six (i, ii, iii, iv, v, and vi.), 66%, and all nine or 100% of the additional security dilemmas distilled from the review of the evolution of the doctrine of COIN (19.2.1.2), relate directly to the criticality of perceptions and attitudes of the local population towards the COIN actors including the host-government, or the home populations in managing the metropolis effect. While the existence of at least the first nine of these security dilemmas was recognised early in the Iraqi and Afghan campaigns, the pressure of the counter-COIN polemic both at home and among US forces; the negative perception of McCrystal’s COIN efforts and his subsequent dismissal; his efforts anyhow probably coming after the Afghan popular perception and attitudes ‘horse had bolted,’ resulted in the “Patraeus reversal” of his own COIN doctrine. This is evidenced in the scaling up to high tech unmanned targeted kinetics, specifically in increasing the use of drones and the apparent operation of an executive, extrajudicial preemptive kill list, with extraordinary undermining ‘collateral damage,’ both physical and political. The six critical security dilemmas that focus on perceptions are left largely unaddressed by US COIN forces; a decisive deficiency. Neither the extensive proliferation of uncoordinated PRTs with varying methodologies and objectives, nor the launch of the HTS addressed these deficiencies, but offered a half-hearted attempt to create the perception of addressing the people, ostensibly through demonstrating improved cultural, moral and national sensitivities to the local populations. More honestly both mechanisms were employed, particularly by US forces, as a device to improve both force protection and targeting through an ‘ethnographic turn.’ By association, in light of the continuing inability of COIN forces to either protect the people or to consider their substantial cultural, religious or national sensitivities, the British COIN effort, though apparently more committed to addressing the security dilemmas associated with perceptions and attitudes, has also foundered.

The deficiency in addressing security dilemmas in practice by all expeditionary COIN forces in Afghanistan has contributed to the failure to ‘win the people,’ to increased COIN force casualties and has had detrimental impact on the achievement of establishing central government legitimacy throughout the territory.
18.3 Security Dilemmas in modern DDR as identified in the theory.

18.3.1 Security Dilemmas in DDR

COIN is a realist response to a security threat to the state by insurgency albeit it needs to employ a political and socio-economic approach and strong consideration of human security in addition to the security approach. DDR implemented predominantly under the overarching philosophy of the human security agenda is undertaken in a constructivist environment that also operates in the political and socio-economic sphere. Though it involves high levels of security consideration from several dimensions, particularly so if implemented during conflict and/or as an element of SSR where both the operating security environment and the security institutions of the state are engaged together with political and socio-economic aspects, it requires significant levels of a ‘leap of faith’ by all actors. A level of idealism is an inherent element in DDR, even where DDR is implemented as an aspect of COIN. Whether contributing to defeating insurgents or stabilising a peace process, DDR funders, planners and implementers must believe that they can address people’s needs; ex-combatants and the community, by placing weapons beyond use and achieving peaceful absorption of ex-combatants into the community as constructive citizens with improved livelihood potential. DDR, to have acceptable outcomes requires, at minimum, the acquiescence of the people, the community. The greater the level of support by the people, the higher the likelihood of acceptable outcomes. Therefore, as in COIN, ‘winning the people’ is critical. Security dilemmas in DDR, badly addressed or unaddressed, militate against these acceptable outcomes.

However, a major difference between COIN and DDR is that in DDR we can no longer identify one side as the enemy. Even in the case of an outright military victory by one side, DDR cannot be successfully implemented in the absence of a degree of magnanimity by the victor. The charade being currently passed for reintegration of LTTE ex-combatants in Sri Lanka is indicative of this failure.\(^{514}\) DDR is no longer the state challenged by those who wish to defeat it. DDR is usually a voluntary process approached in the context of agreement and collaboration. Still, there are at least three broad groups in DDR with three different perspectives for whom security dilemmas are of vital importance; the international actors, the national actors (state and combatants), and the people. For simplicity as well as practicality, we will reduce the number of groups upon which those security dilemmas impact to two; one to represent those international actors, those funding, planning and supporting the implementation of DDR. The second group is the national actors, those representing the state and its

institutions and the armed groups that formerly opposed the state. The national population is ultimately the direct beneficiary group who will gain the ‘peace dividend’ offered by positive outcomes of a DDR process. They are also, in the context of ‘winning the people,’ on the critical path to those positive outcomes and are thus not included in the group of national actors experiencing the security dilemmas, even if they ultimately experience the results of the handling of the security dilemmas. Their perceptions and attitudes that result from the process of handling the security dilemmas impact on the political stability and sustainability post-implementation.

Practitioners and scholars in DDR frequently mention the many security dilemmas that contribute to the complexity, cost and effort of DDR implementation. Despite their critical importance, there has not been a systematic listing of security dilemmas in DDR or the consideration of their impact on programme levels of ‘success or failure.’ Distilling from our review of the evolving doctrine, we will list those principal security dilemmas identified from the perspective of the two aforementioned groups. In light of the existing multiple heterogeneous contexts and evolving new contexts for DDR, this list may not be exhaustive.

i. DDR is a leap of faith; a constructivist approach in a realist environment.

a) DDR demands a leap of faith, on the part of the donors and the international community engaged in funding and delivering DDR:

- That political will exists to deliver DDR. Such political will was absent either in the government or the Maoist leadership in the delivery of rehabilitation to verified minors and late recruits (VMLRs) in the context of the UNIRP in Nepal 2010-2012.

- That the contributions of the international community to DDR are not being exploited in a rent taking opportunity for national/regional actors. The “Prac” DDR process (2004-2007) and DDR process of 2009-2010 in CAR demonstrates how an international effort can be exploited by local elites.

- That in the enthusiasm to see belligerents enter the DDR process, expectations are not either purposefully (vested national interests) or mistakenly (international community) oversold, creating unrealistic expectations that will subsequently undermine confidence and trust in the process. Such was the case with the VMLRs in the UNIRP in Nepal when local Maoist commanders in their anxiety to see the smooth VMLR exit from the cantonments
suggested that decent jobs for life were part of the deal; an undeliverable promise in a depressed economy where 15% of youth have ‘decent’ (‘formal sector’) jobs and an unrealistic expectation. An effective integrated Communications Strategy by the programme may have prevented such manipulation.

b) DDR associated with peace processes also demands the leap of faith on the part of local governments, armed groups and (ex)-combatants that genuine good will for peace exists amongst all former belligerents.

- That they have not been entangled in a ‘prisoners dilemma’ and their former opposition is not using the lull in hostilities in regrouping for a counterattack, This was the case by both Savimbi’s UNITA in Angola and the RUF under Foday Sankoh in Phase I and II of DDR in Sierra Leone.
- That their vulnerability as soon as they disarm will not be exploited by their opposition
- That the promises associated with the DDR process as an element of a CPA or enticement to disengage from the armed group, will be delivered
- That their status as former fighters will be respected in the community.

VMLRs in Nepal’s UNIRP were constantly frustrated that their being termed as ‘unqualified’ which they claim, led to derision when they returned to their communities and undermined their dignity.

- That the ex-combatant will not face retributive justice rather than restorative justice either in the context of traditional justice mechanisms, the national justice system or the international system.

ii. **DDR walks a narrow line between security and human security.**

The British difficulties in implementing the comprehensive approach in COIN in Afghanistan demonstrate the particular incompatibilities between security approaches and human security approaches, even where there is institutional imperative to overcome them. Within DDR similar tensions exist as demonstrated between the military intelligence based, security driven JMAC in the UN Stabilisation Mission in Haiti in 2006-2007, and the UN Integrated DDR Section that was operating in an overarching philosophy of human security. The DDR programme though working directly with the leaders of the criminal gangs in Port au Prince
and Gonaives, could not, in light of their professional ethics, share all their information about those gang leaders; their movements, locations etc., with the JMAC that was preparing ‘locate and arrest’ information for the UN force. This led to serious conflict amongst UN staff, DDR and JMAC, and in fact precipitated significant covert coercive activity against one particular DDR staff member who was leading disarmament negotiations with gangs.

Despite significant political pressure, generally supporting security approaches, often coming from the dominant components of a UN mission; some senior management, Force and Police, DDR must retain levels of mutual trust with leaders of armed factions/gang leaders in the context of human security approaches if sustainable DDR results are to be achieved. Surprisingly, donor states and organisations that have deeply considered the implications of DDR tend to be supportive of the human security approach and often form the primary buffer protecting DDR managers from the pressure to accede to security approaches. However the security dilemma persists.

iii. The people’s perception has predominant impact.

 Scholars like Muggah frequently lament the failure of DDR practitioners to find the appropriate metrics to indicate the real achievement of a DDR programme. Popular quantitative metrics include numbers of ex-combatants entering the DDR process, numbers of guns and amount of ammunition collected, numbers of ex-combatants completing the reintegration process, percentage of graduates of reintegration with sustainable livelihoods etc. However, the level of relativity of these metrics to the stabilisation of the peace process and the direct relationship between participation in a DDR process and sustainable livelihoods as opposed to the impact of the general ‘peace dividend’ and improving socio-economic environment is difficult to attribute. Millett, Molloy and Shibuya suggest that the wrong questions have been asked. The most critical indicator of achievement in DDR is a qualitative one. It is the perception by the people that DDR has contributed to sustainable peace in their community, or at least to an environment of survivable predictability... a normative system. This security dilemma echoes the difficulties discussed between the security approach and the human security approach in DDR. The political search for ‘quick-fixes’ prefers concrete quantitative metrics to demonstrate progress, to the nebulous quality of ‘perception’. The security dilemma lies in the temptation to prioritise quantitative metrics over the qualitative ones, despite the fact that the qualitative
metrics, particularly the consideration of perceptions, offer greater sustainable stability and more successful reintegration of ex-combatants in the long-term.

iv. DDR cannot lead a political process, it is an aspect of political agreement.
The uninitiated frequently perceive DDR as a ‘quick-fix’ or a ‘magic bullet’ to an environment of violent conflict that will offer incentives to armed factions, insurgents, criminal gangs, in the absence of political solutions to underlying causes of violence or agreed peace processes. This was the case in Nigeria with President Yar’adua’s offer of amnesty and incentives to the ‘boys in the creeks,’ the oil bunkerers and guerrilla groups such as MEND in the Niger Delta in 2009... a ‘buy-off’ that consolidated the status quo and permitted elite and military beneficiaries, and indeed the ‘boys in the creeks’ themselves to continue criminal activity while offering the impression of taking action. This mistake is currently coming back to haunt the Nigerian government.

v. Credible deterrent must demonstrate proportionality.
High profile deterrent can indicate an absence of trust. Strengthening trust implies the acceptance of elements of risk. High visibility of force or police, and apparent high levels of ‘enforcement’ capacity rather than enhance security may damage public perception that the DDR process is based on agreement, a voluntary process. This offers particular difficulties in implementing DDR, a peacebuilding activity, in ongoing conflict; as in Afghanistan where there is not yet peace to build.

vi. DDR must prioritise ‘carrot’ over the ‘stick.’
DDR is a voluntary process that ex-combatants enter in free will (perhaps under directions of former commanders) to participate in a process of good will. Excessive use of force... as in president René Pravel’s public threat to criminal gangs in Port au Prince, “join the DDR or we will kill you” in mid-2006, probably set-up DDR efforts to fail. ‘Stick’ that is applied must be political rather than physical.

vii. **Ex-combatant-centric DDR can lose the community.**

The commitment to bottom-up DDR and the realisation that its implementation brings more sustainable results is not a new idea. World Bank literature in the mid-eighties was recommending community-based approaches to the reintegration of ex-combatants that demonstrate a more equitable share of the peace dividend to the broader community. However, the norm, in the context of constrained timeframes and budgets with extreme political pressure for ‘quick-fixes’ to address the concerns of volatile ex-combatant case-loads and a demanding donor base, has tended to see an implementation of DDR focusing resources exclusively on the ex-combatant caseload, with the broader community receiving ‘spin-off’ as an afterthought. It is not that practitioners didn't understand the benefits of community-based implementation that offer greater sustainability of reintegration. It is clear that this approach can contribute to the establishment of normative systems at the level of the community through conflict sensitive approaches that address real community needs. This can also contribute to the development of positive community perceptions and attitudes towards the DDR. Community security approaches, recently called ‘second generation’ approaches like CVR, require a commitment in resources; time, finance and human capacity, to facilitating community capacity and activities. Tangible results can be achieved more quickly, though less sustainably, if the focus is on the ex-combatant caseload. To focus on the immediate target caseload, the ex-combatants as opposed to implementing a community-based approach is a practitioner security dilemma associated with resources and time; one that weighs broader perception and more sustainable long-term reintegration against the achievement of short-term quantitative metrics usually to satisfy political interests.

viii. **Failure to engage the community in the planning and implementation may create societal cleavage rather than offer peace dividend.**

A community that is fully engaged in a reintegration process and that does not consider the return of ex-combatants and a threatening imposition is likely to have positive perceptions of the process and support, or at least not oppose, its implementation.
ix. **Building confidence in the DDR process implies accepting risk.**

An effective integrated communications strategy can go a long way to reducing misunderstanding and frustration, ensuring that beneficiaries understand the level of support deliverable and relevant timeframes, including any deviation from their legitimate expectations. However, formal and informal communications at a local level is critical in dealing with local issues and ensuring conflict sensitivity. This can be done through the nurturing and recognition by implementers of local advocacy, mediation and representation mechanisms such as veteran representation associations, through the development of a relationship of mutual respect. Often this requires the implementer initially to go more than 50% of the way in demonstrating that respect through humility and patience, in maintaining the commitment of a dedicated service-provider to beneficiaries. Despite threats and aggressive behavior, a light-foot security presence is necessary. Heads of international implementation agencies are often very risk-averse. The security dilemma is in that the establishment of such relations takes time, effort and exposure to risk, local knowledge and high levels of conflict sensitivity. Failure to build these relations can see apparent minor incidents or delays in delivery of services develop into serious security threats.

x. **Peace over justice risks losing the people.**

An amnesty as an aspect of a CPA is often instrumental in bringing rebels to the peace table and often a prerequisite to rebels agreeing to enter a DDR process. The rebels in their insurgency have taken on the legitimate state and may in the course of their insurgency have engaged in other serious crimes including war crimes and crimes against humanity. The UN draws the line in amnesties by requiring that ‘those most responsible for war crimes or crimes against humanity’ cannot be granted amnesty. However, the vast majority of foot soldiers do escape formal justice for their part in such crimes. Despite the welcome end of hostilities, this sends a mixed message to the people who have been the victims of the war. Their frustration can increase the more stabilised and distant from the initial cessation of violence the environment moves. Those who perpetrated such crimes are now not only exempt the retribution for those crimes but are also benefiting in being rehabilitated back into society. This can undermine the DDR process by turning popular perception against it.
Isezaki contends that such amnesty does not consist of ‘sacrificing ‘ justice but represents a “temporal void of justice that is necessary for peace, [a void that we] solemnly and silently conceive strategies to remedy.”

The issue has been overcome in some cases by requiring those accused of crimes to undergo local forms of community justice, traditional justice mechanisms such as the Cacaca system in Rwanda, and traditional cleansing ceremonies such as in Sierra Leone. However this might be addressed, sacrificing justice for peace at any level poses a security dilemma and can also undermine the achievements of acceptable outcomes. The operation of DDR through notorious warlords in Afghanistan spelled disaster for that DDR from the outset.

**xi. Sometimes doing ‘nothing’ is best.**

Ex-combatant caseloads are frequently a volatile group of people with which to work. Ceasefires can be broken or dissatisfied with the DDR process, they can revert to form in offering threats or indeed, violence. Precipitative security reaction is rarely constructive. Frequently, no immediate security reaction is wise, while mediation in all three tracks and political action is implemented immediately.

**xii. Host-government doing DDR tolerably well trumps International community doing it excellently.**

As with COIN, DDR processes are vital in contributing to the reestablishment of the legitimacy of government in an immediate post-conflict environment. Often the capacity of that post-conflict government or indeed government during a conflict, to implement DDR efficiently, effectively or with any level of accountability and transparency, is very limited. There can be a tendency for international implementation facilitators to take a position of agency in the delivery of the process. While this can contribute to effective delivery of the DDR process, it may not enhance the position of legitimacy of the host-government in the perception of the people. This will undermine the potential sustainability of outcomes, particularly once the international partner is no longer present. Being prepared to accept less than perfect delivery of DDR in projecting the host-government as the prime implementer and in accepting the fall-off in quality of delivery that may go with that is a significant security dilemma. However, the

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516 Isezaki in discussion with the author, May 2013
investment in building government capacity and legitimacy can far outweigh the risks in terms of sustainability of DDR outcomes and stability of governments. Such was the case in the delivery of the Sierra Leone DDR process from 2001 to 2004 where GoSL was clearly in the lead.

xiii. **Consistency is king!**
Despite the need for flexible management in the context of mainstreamed dynamic M&E in DDR, clear consistency on the delivery of benefits across the programme avoids misunderstanding between beneficiaries and programme and avoids the use of threatening power games to leverage benefits. Inconsistencies will be exploited by very savvy and organised caseloads. In an environment of social communications capacity, local solutions that contradict programme policy will be exploited. e.g. the extensive use of mobile phones and txt messaging by Maoist ex-combatants in UNIRP in Nepal. The dilemma arises in that in offering local solutions to specific contextual difficulties that address local problems, we may undermine programme policy and cause a ‘snowball effect’ of undeliverable demands amongst the broader caseload.

xiv. **Local solutions are best.**
Local solutions to difficulties in DDR that do not undermine programme policy or derail consistency in the delivery of the programme can usually address problems and improve goodwill. The dilemma is in the increased exposure to the risks elaborated on in xiii.

xv. **Decentralised DDR facilitates local solutions.**
DDR must demonstrate trust in regional and local managers, those who understand the local context and are ready to work with the local community in addressing local concerns, while maintaining consistent programme policy. The risk in offering subordinate authority for decision-making in a decentralised manner is that local managers are often exposed to local pressures; security, political and social. Such pressures may increase the risk of exposure to the dysfunctional phenomena mentioned in xiii.
xvi. **Reintegration walks a narrow line between time/resource constraint and disillusionment of the caseload, and the community.**

The delivery of reintegration supported by the appropriate communications strategy that reinforces the management of expectations is time and resource heavy. The dilemma is in securing the resources (time, treasure, political imprimatur) and committing them, supported by the appropriate integrated communications strategy. Time and resource constraints coupled with weak communications strategies have resulted in less than optimum outcomes deficiency in many DDR processes.

xvii. **Focus on cash incentives undermines sustainable results and may strengthen the power structures that DDR hopes to dismantle.**

The use of cash incentives in DDR is an attractive option for DDR implementers in many circumstances. It can simplify management and administrative procedures and reduce support costs. Indeed, cash is often a basic subsistence requirement of ex-combatants and their dependents after demobilisation. Cash may also be a vital component of a reintegration option especially such as entrepreneurial support where micro-finance start-up support is needed. The provision of cash support can contribute to beneficiary empowerment and offer greater choices to ex-combatants regarding their reintegration trajectory contributing to respect for their dignity. However, the exclusive provision of cash incentives to ex-combatants poses risks.

The introduction of cash into DDR environments can create the impression of a weapons ‘buy-back’ process that will inflate the value of arms and ammunition in the post-conflict environment and contribute to their trafficking. This can undermine the effort to place weapons ‘beyond use.’ Further, it creates opportunities for corruption and rent taking by both implementing partners and former armed faction commanders. In the community it can create negative perceptions where the perpetrators of the conflict are seen to benefit disproportionately materially by their violence, while the members of the community, the victims of the violence, continue to struggle seeing relatively little of the peace dividend. Further, local markets may experience inflation where an excess of financial resources are injected into a community. Returning ex-combatants may be in a position to exert excessive leverage as a result of their resources and upset the traditional or natural social structures of the community. Ex-combatants may be inexperienced in financial management and may quickly
spend their next-egg irresponsibly, becoming destitute without having invested in sustainable livelihoods. The security dilemma arises in weighing the attractiveness of cash benefits, both in easing implementation and in their acceptability by the beneficiaries against the inherent risks that their introduction can undermine the DDR process.

xviii. **Placing weapons beyond use is more important than collecting weapons.**
Collecting weapons does not necessarily offer sustainability in reducing armed violence. Still, it offers a metric that is very popular with donors and lead nations in funding and encouraging DDR. Even a successful DDR process is likely to collect less than 25% of the illicit arms in the theatre. Collected weapons can easily be replaced. Further, belligerents will often cash spare weapons, maybe their best weapons, in the bush pending their perception of the outcomes of the DDR. If the perception is that those weapons are no longer necessary, than the weapons will remain in the bush ‘beyond use’ and pose little threat to the DDR process or indeed, the peace process. This represents disarmament of the mind in placing weapons beyond use. That is more effective and more sustainable than physical disarmament. Prioritising the physical disarmament in seeking a ‘quick-fix’ to armed violence and in creating a perception of political progress is more attractive than investing in developing disarmed mindsets that may require discretion and magnanimity. Of course, focusing on physical disarmament may be an effort to address lead-nation national interest, as in Liberia, 2003. The security dilemma is in addressing the political and security perception that collecting arms resolves the security problems and in gaining support for the qualitative over the quantitative.

xix. **Bottom-up planning and implementation facilitates local solutions**
Top-down effort in reintegration tends to prioritise security objectives and is ex-combatant-centric. A bottom-up approach with broad community engagement is necessary to ensure that the human security needs of the population are receiving the required attention. This is recognised within the evolution of DDR theory in second-generation approaches, community security, CVR etc. Despite this recognition, the security dilemma remains in consideration of

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the additional resources, time, expertise and sensitivities required in facilitating or mobilising that bottom-up effort.

Further, empowering local civil capacity for violence reduction when local government may be under-resourced and have limited presence and capacity in an environment where it is striving to strengthen its legitimacy, as was the case during the launch of CVR in Haiti, can create insurmountable opposition to the programme.

**xx. DDR may be viewed as a foreign and western colonising idea.**

The destructive capacity of western moral relativism and value absolutism in expeditionary COIN campaigns are mentioned in the Canadian COIN manual. Butt has highlighted the difficulty in harnessing the expertise and experience of western institutions, the UN and WB in implementing DDR/SSR in Islamic countries, particularly the newly emerging Islamist led systems in Arab Spring countries. His implication is that while needing the donor support, western value and moral systems will be rejected in Islamist-led countries, that could lead to the danger of ‘throwing the baby out with the bathwater’ in rejecting a wealth of technical experience. He advises that all relevant institutions, including the emerging Islamist states, need to start thinking of the priorities of Islamist-led DDR/SSR and to find the required accommodation with the supporting global institutions that have the funds and the necessary technical expertise. The security dilemma appears in finding the common ground that agrees that the human security approach in a western value driven system is compatible with or adaptable to a human security approach in an Islamist value driven approach. Failure to reconcile these approaches can result in the rejection of support and the benefit of experience and in less than optimum outcomes in DDR/SSR in emerging Islamist-led states as regards the position of the national security forces and former combatants.

DDR must be contributing to the establishment of normative systems.

The Maoists in Nepal and MILF and MNLF in the Philippines, also reject the term DDR, seeing it as representing the ‘classic’ form of DDR. They view it as a specifically Western concept that was imposed on African post-conflict environments that implies a degree of defeat and surrender.  

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518 From the author’s experience in Nepal and discussions with representatives of both Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) in Manila in late May 2013.
18.3.2 The impact of Security Dilemmas in DDR

Of twenty security dilemmas identified and drawn from the review of the evolution of the theory of DDR as represented in 20.2.3, eleven or 55% of them relate directly to the perceptions and attitudes of the people. This is not an extraordinary finding as we consider the growing emphasis that has been reflected in the evolution of the theory from an ex-combatant-centric focus of DDR to a broader population-centric emphasis on facilitating the development of the capacity of the community to absorb and assimilate the ex-combatants as constructive contributing members in a conflict sensitive manner. This is evidenced through the emergence of ‘2nd Generation DDR’, Community Security/Safety, CVR, and DNH methodologies. What is extraordinary, given the evidence, is that despite the evolution of the theory, practice has been a slow and negligent follower. The reasons for this are similar to the reasons for the deficit in implementing a people-centric approach in COIN practice. Developing such an approach requires time, resources, ethnographic and local expertise; patience in building relationships, understanding local imperatives, culture, values and concerns... and more to the point, the understanding of local perceptions of what constitutes a normative system. Addressing the security dilemmas that contribute to a successful people-centric approach requires the understanding and agreement amongst actors that rapid material political gains, ‘quick-fixes’ are unlikely, and recognition that the perceptions of the people are the primary objective. The DDR programme must enter a series of locality specific engagement and facilitation processes, often offering ‘light footprint’ or ‘invisible footprint’ presence, as in South Central Somalia. This is expensive, time consuming and labour intensive, requiring high levels of local ethnographic expertise. The approach is neglected in favour of quick gains, and represents a deficit in addressing security dilemmas in practice.

18.4 The elements of convergence represented by the security dilemmas in the theory of DDR and doctrine of COIN.

Drawing from the reviews of the evolution of both COIN doctrine and DDR theory and from extensive experience in practice, we can identify that some of the security dilemmas experienced in COIN and DDR are mutually exclusive. However of the majority of the security dilemmas, seventeen from a total of 18 in COIN and 20 in DDR, are duplicated in significant ways in both COIN and DDR; Twelve (12) of which impact specifically on the perceptions and attitudes of the people. This represents a high
level of convergence in the evolution of the doctrine/theory. This convergence is demonstrated in the comparative relationship between security dilemmas in Table 3.
### Table 3. Security dilemmas (Paradoxes) in COIN and DDR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>DDR</th>
<th>COIN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>i.</td>
<td>DDR is a leap of faith; a constructivist approach in a realist environment.</td>
<td># COIN is implemented in addressing a realist approach to the threat to the state. Failure to consider relevant constructivism risks loosing the elements of perception and attitudes of the people.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ii.</td>
<td>DDR walks a narrow line between security and human security.</td>
<td>COIN must prioritise space for human security, despite security imperatives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iii.</td>
<td>The people’s perception has predominant impact.</td>
<td>Coopt the cause to ‘Win the people”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iv.</td>
<td>DDR cannot lead the political process, it is an aspect of the political process.</td>
<td># COIN is predominantly a political process in reestablishing the legitimacy of government through its monopoly in the legitimate use of force.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v.</td>
<td>Credible deterrent must demonstrate proportionality</td>
<td>The more you protect your force, the less secure you are. The more successful COIN is, the less force can be used and the more risk must be accepted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vi.</td>
<td>DDR must prioritise the ‘carrot’ over the ‘stick.’</td>
<td>The more force you use, the less effective you may be.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vii.</td>
<td>Ex-combatant-centric DDR can lose the community.</td>
<td>Protection of the people in contributing to a normative system is more important than force protection.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>viii.</td>
<td>Failure to engage the community in the planning and implementation of reintegration may create social cleavage rather than offer the peace dividend.</td>
<td>Coopt the insurgent cause to win the people.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ix.</td>
<td>Building confidence in DDR implies accepting risk.</td>
<td>The best weapons in COIN do not shoot. The more successful a COIN is, the less force can be used and more risk must be accepted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>x.</td>
<td>Peace over justice risks losing the people.</td>
<td>Without legitimacy, COIN is lost.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>xi.</td>
<td>Sometimes doing ‘nothing’ is best.</td>
<td>Sometimes, doing nothing is the best reaction.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CP</td>
<td>Host government doing DDR tolerably well trumps international community doing it excellently.</td>
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<tr>
<td>xiii.</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>Consistency is king!</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>xiv.</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>Local solutions are best.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>xv.</td>
<td>CP</td>
<td>Decentralised DDR facilitates local solutions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>xvi.</td>
<td>CP</td>
<td>Reintegration walks a narrow line between time/resource constraints and disillusionment of the caseload and the community. The integrated communications strategy is paramount.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>xvii.</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>Focus on cash incentives undermines sustainable results and may strengthen the power structures that DDR hopes to dismantle.</td>
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<tr>
<td>xiii.</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>Placing weapons beyond use is more important than collecting weapons.</td>
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<td>xix.</td>
<td>CP</td>
<td>bottom-up planning and implementation facilitates local solutions but risks undermining local government.</td>
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<tr>
<td>xx.</td>
<td>CP</td>
<td>DDR may be viewed as a foreign and western colonising idea.</td>
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<tr>
<td>xxi.</td>
<td>D</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

* “D” implies a security dilemma that appears mutually exclusive to COIN or DDR respectively.

** “CP” implies convergence in a security dilemma that specifically impacts negatively on the Perceptions and Attitudes of the people if not appropriately addressed (i.e. a deficiency)

*** “C” implies a convergence in security dilemmas, not specifically impacting on perceptions, in evolved COIN Doctrine and DDR Theory, majority of which represent a deficiency in practice.

# Explanatory comments entered in the COIN column demonstrating the comparative relationship with DDR but perhaps not referring to security dilemmas.
N.B. Some COIN security dilemmas are relevant to more than one DDR security dilemma or in some cases, several COIN security dilemmas are relevant to one DDR security dilemma.

(The shading is purely presentational. Numbering corresponds with the numbering of the Security Dilemmas in DDR, Section 18.3.1)

18.5. The Finding of the Thesis

We have traced the main aspects of the evolution of DDR theory and COIN doctrine. The evidence of the review of the evolution of the theory of DDR in Part 1 and the doctrine of COIN in Part 2 implies that perceptions and attitudes of the people have a dominant impact on outcomes in both practice areas. We have identified the primary security dilemmas in both the theory of DDR and the doctrine of COIN.

The main findings of this study as outlined in Section 3 are that the primary convergence between the evolving theory of DDR and the evolving doctrine of COIN are in the shared security dilemmas associated with addressing the perceptions and attitudes of the people, predominantly in sub-national communities. The failure to address the dilemmas and thereby neglecting the perceptions and attitudes of the “receiving” communities, the local populations, is the decisive common deficit element in most observed practice of DDR and of COIN. This direction in practice is contrary to the guidance of the theory and doctrine.

Noting the existence of this convergence, these findings offer opportunities to reconsider the application of the theory of DDR and the doctrine of COIN on practice with the objective of developing synergies in achieving desirable outcomes. It follows that management of the security dilemmas within the context of the evolving guiding theory and doctrine can impact on perceptions and attitudes and therefore on outcomes. Thus, through the management of security dilemmas, negative outcomes may be avoided. The position of perceptions and attitudes has not been omitted from attention in the evolving theory of DDR or the evolving doctrine of COIN.

These considerations emerged in COIN from the outset, evolving from the central position of the people in Mao’s doctrine of insurgency. The lessons of the failure in the implementation of COIN in Iraq and Afghanistan, the contemporary location where doctrine meets practice, is that the people-centric focus is addressed in the doctrine only, while bowing to military capacity and comfort zone and a dominant pro-insurgent-centric military industrial complex, an insurgent-centric focus is implemented in practice. The question of the prioritisation of the perceptions and attitudes of the
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people dominates most of the critical security dilemmas that permeate COIN, making it difficult and uncomfortable for COIN forces to address it. It is neglected, and represents the decisive deficiency in practice, leading to failure to achieve acceptable outcomes.

As a theory of DDR, debatably, gradually emerged, starting from the studies and evaluations of the early practitioner/scholars, mainly working for the World Bank or BICC, in post-Cold War security considerations in South and Central America and southern Africa; the need for people-centric implementation was emphasised. However, it is only in the search for appropriate metrics in judging the impact of DDR early in the new millennium, often where the quantitative metrics defy the common wisdom that DDR is effective, that the appropriateness of those metrics came under scrutiny. An emerging school of DDR scholar (Millett, Molloy, Shibuya et al) has realised that the most critical metrics are qualitative and point especially to the requirement for a sustained focus on addressing and evaluating the elements of the perceptions and attitudes of the people at a local, sub-national level.

The difficulties experienced by the earlier scholars in identifying appropriate quantitative metrics with which to effectively evaluate the outcomes of DDR programmes demonstrates how consideration of the most critical outcome represented by the qualitative indicator of perceptions and attitudes of the people has been neglected and represents a deficiency in practice.

Clearly, the focus on quantitative metrics in assessing the progress and achievement of both DDR Processes and COIN campaigns, metrics that impact on the planning of subsequent DDR processes and COIN campaigns, the most appropriate type of metrics for planning and evaluation of COIN and DDR have not been applied to contribute to the achievement of positive outcomes. The quantitative metrics represent the semblance of achievement; body count, ground covered, number of military sorties in COIN; numbers of combatants entering the process, number of weapons collected, number of ex-combatants completing a reintegration process in DDR. However, they have not equated with ‘successful’ outcomes. It is time to refocus on applying the guidance of doctrine and theory, to recommit in both practice areas to ‘winning the people;’ their perceptions and attitudes. Such a refocus requires an improved capacity to appropriately weight prioritisation in the application of political imprimatur, resources; human and treasure, and in time as opposed to seeking quick-fixes and early political progress, in addressing the security dilemmas. The failure to address such security dilemmas heretofore has impacted adversely on the perceptions and attitudes of local people in the AOs of COIN, and in the communities of resettlement in DDR. Approaching such security dilemmas with a prioritisation on gaining the positive perceptions and attitudes of the people will contribute to
improved outcomes; to lives saved, to the establishment of appropriate normative systems for the people in supporting COIN campaigns and stabilising post-conflict environments through effective DDR as an aspect of peacebuilding and to the enhancement of both security and human security.

18.6 **Recommended areas for further study.**

1. Each security dilemma identified in this study requires detailed analysis and recommendations on the operationalisation of mechanisms in addressing it that will offer optimum outcomes in both DDR and COIN.

2. How security dilemmas in both DDR and COIN can be addressed in practice in offering the national governments in Iraq and Afghanistan opportunities to strengthen the population’s perceptions and attitudes towards their legitimacy can contribute to a stabilisation in those countries in moving towards post-conflict environments.

3. Deeper consideration of areas of doctrinal/theoretic convergence between DDR and COIN may offer synergetic opportunity for improving outcomes in both practice areas.

4. The study of methods of operationalizing effective DDR in COIN or conflict environments can offer new options for stabilisation of normative systems in complex conflicts.
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