

多層的な国際安全保障環境における
パートナーシップ平和活動—地域・準地域組織の
国際平和活動への関与についての一考察

**Partnership Peace Operations in Multi-layered International Security:
An Examination of the Involvement of Regional and Sub-regional
Organizations in International Peace Operations**

篠田 英朗
SHINODA Hideaki

東京外国語大学大学院総合国際学研究院
Institute of Global Studies, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies

Introduction

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【Summary】

This essay is intended to explore the implications of the recent phenomenon of “partnership peace operations”, the collaboration between the United Nations and regional and sub-regional organizations in the field of peace operations. After providing the overall picture of partnership peace operations in the contemporary world, the essay shows that the phenomenon is a reflection of recent trends of international peace operations. The essay also argues, however, that the



phenomenon is not a deviation from international order, but a development of the international security system envisaged in the Charter of the United Nations.

本稿は、「パートナーシップ平和活動」という国連と地域・準地域組織の間の国際平和活動における協力関係の高まりを意味する最近の現象が内包する性格を探求するものである。まず本稿は、現代世界におけるパートナーシップ平和活動の全体像を提示する。次にこの現象が国際平和活動の最近の傾向を反映したものであることを論じる。さらに本稿は、パートナーシップ平和活動が、既存の国際秩序から逸脱するものではなく、むしろ国連憲章が標榜する国際安全保障システムの発展の一形態だと考えるべきものであることを論じる。

Keywords: partnership peace operations, partnership peacekeeping, international peace operations, United Nations, AU, ECOWAS, NATO, EU

キーワード: パートナーシップ平和活動、パートナーシップ平和維持、国際平和活動、国連、アフリカ連合、西アフリカ諸国経済共同体、北大西洋条約機構、欧州連合

Introduction

This essay is intended to explore the implications of the recent phenomenon of “partnership peace operations”, the collaboration between the United Nations and regional and sub-regional organizations in the field of peace operations.¹⁾ After providing the overall picture of partnership peace operations in the contemporary world, the essay shows that the phenomenon is a reflection of recent trends of international peace operations. The essay also argues, however, that the phenomenon is not a deviation from international order, but a development of the international security system envisaged in the Charter of the United Nations.

UN peacekeeping operations continued to expand the budget and personnel scale in the first decade of the 21st century. In 2010 its annual budget was around US\$ 8 billion with about 120,000 personnel deployed to about 15 missions worldwide. However, in the second decade of this century, there has been a

noticeable downsize in UN peacekeeping operations. In the fiscal year 2018-19, the annual budget fell from \$ 7 billion to \$ 6.7 billion. Accordingly, the number of military and police personnel decreased to 89,409 in January 2019 from more than 100,000 at the beginning of 2017.²⁾ No new UN peacekeeping operation has been created since 2014.

But it is also true that there is no attempt to abandon peace operations. There are currently 13 UN peacekeeping missions. In addition, there are 21 special political missions (SPM). the wave of budget and personnel reductions has spread to all of UN peacekeeping missions, but it has not closed them. Unlike the pattern of reduction in the number of peacekeeping operations in the latter half of the 1990s, the number has not been significantly reduced in this decade. Unlike the time after many failures of UN peacekeeping operations in the early 1990s, the current period sees not so many criticisms about UN peacekeeping in the background of today's shrinkage. It is true that there is a great pressure to operate with greater efficiency imposed by countries including the United States under the Trump administration. But the pressure does not mean that the need for peace operations is lost.

At the 70th anniversary of the United Nations in 2015, the "High Level Independence Panel on Peace Operations" (hereinafter "HIPPO Report") was issued to clarify the framework of UN peace operations in the contemporary environment. Since 2015, a number of senior ministerial meetings on UN peacekeeping have been held.³⁾ Secretary General Antonio Guterres is also seeking the support of a wide range of member states for his "A4P: Action for Peace" to promote peacekeeping operations.⁴⁾ He introduced some institutional reforms to strengthen peace operations in January 2019 including the transformation of the "Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO)" to the "Department of Peace Operations [DPO]" and of the "Department of Political Affairs [DPA]" to the "Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA)".

The recognition of the importance of international peace operations may be even increasing. Nevertheless, the UN peacekeeping operations are scaled down. This certainly means that the current level of deployment cannot meet all the expectations for international peace operations in any case. Thus, if there are other entities than the United Nations that can perform peace operations, they must

be highly welcome. Non-UN entities would maintain the level of engagement of the entire community of peace operations, while the proportion of UN decreases. This trend has become evident as a result of the growing involvements of regional organizations in the field of international peace operations. One of the characteristics of contemporary international peace operations is the growing number of partnership style peace operations by UN and (sub-)regional organizations.⁵⁾

Then, there arise questions about such partnership peace operations. What is the framework of this phenomenon in contemporary international order? Should it be considered as a deviation from the desirable manner of international peace operations that should always be led by the United Nations?

The purpose of this paper is to explore the implications of the phenomenon of partnership peace operations. This paper argues that the transformation of UN peacekeeping is a result of the diversification of international peace actors and also a reflection of a structural shift of international security. But the paper also argues that the structural shift is in line with the overall structure of international order designed in the UN Charter and rather expected to reinforce the level of international security in our contemporary world.

1. The Age of Partnership Peace Operations

In order to see the changes in UN peacekeeping operations in the overall trend of international peace operations, it is essential to confirm the recent movement of “partnership peacekeeping”. “Partnership” is a concept used in various contexts within the UN system including development and humanitarian aid. Recently, however, “partnership” tends to be used to indicate a special type of peacekeeping operations. When a “partnership” is mentioned in discussions related to UN peacekeeping operations, the first assumption is the collaboration between the United Nations and (sub-)regional organizations.

The Secretary-General's report published in April 2015 “Partnering for Peace: Moving towards Partnership Peacekeeping” declared that “[w]e have thus entered an era of “partnership peacekeeping”, where close cooperation among multiple multilateral actors throughout every phase of a crisis is becoming the norm — and

an essential component of each organization. our age is the “era of partnership peacekeeping”.⁶⁾

Notable in this “Partnership Report” are the AU (African Union) and the EU (European Union). It should be noted that the phenomenon of partnership peacekeeping is by no means universally homogeneous. The “Partnership Report” has focused on partnerships with regional organizations that have become indispensable for UN peacekeeping operations, mainly including the AU in Africa (and sub-regional organizations in Africa) and the EU. And the EU is noted in the Report, because the EU is active in the African continent where the United Nations is involved in a large scale. This implies that partnership peacekeeping is occurring more or less on the African continent.

Later, the 2015 HIPPO Report emphasized that “a stronger and more comprehensive partnership for peace and security is needed for the future”.⁷⁾ The importance of “partnership” was also emphasized at the “Leaders’ Summit” where the senior leaders of member countries gathered that year.⁸⁾ “Partnership” is also noted as an important concept in the “A4P (Peace for Action)” currently promoted by Secretary General Guterres.⁹⁾ What is mentioned in the discussion is the improvement of cooperation between the UN Security Council and the AU Peace and Security Council. For UN, collaboration with (sub-)regional organizations is crucial to conduct effective peace operations in difficult political situations. This is one of the consequences of a trend that has been evolving since the middle of the 1990s.

The United Nations did not have a clear role in the process of peacebuilding in Bosnia and Herzegovina that began with the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement. This was because the United Nations lost credibility during the conflict in Bosnia because of its inability to respond to the crisis effectively. Through the Dayton Peace Agreement, regional organizations in Europe such as NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) and EU were given various important roles to implement the Agreement. Furthermore, a new international organization called OHR (Office of High Representative), mainly maintained by European countries, was established as a way to avoid UN-led peacebuilding. This trend continued in accordance with the progress of the

peacebuilding process led by regional organizations such as EULEX (EU Rule of Law Mission) in Kosovo after NATO's military intervention.

In the 21st century, European regional institutions continued to handle European conflict resolution. The EU, OSCE, and NATO have taken initiatives in running a number of missions from Europe to Central Asia.¹⁰⁾ For example, in the event of a crisis in Ukraine, there was no significant involvement of United Nations. When EU is not appropriate due to political considerations concerning its confrontation against Russia, OSCE plays a key role.

It should be noted that NATO took command authority of ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) in Afghanistan in 2003. It was active in being involved in the process of peace-building. In 2011, NATO conducted large air strikes over Libya leading to the collapse of the Gaddafi administration. The EU has also conducted numerous major military interventions and peace operations in such African countries as the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Mali. The pattern is that NATO's activities on the African continent can proceed based on cooperation with such regional organizations as the AU.

The new institutional collaboration of the UN and the AU with the innovative “hybrid mission” called UNAMID (African Union / United Nations Hybrid operation in Darfur) . There had been the case of the transformation of AMIB (African Union Mission in Burundi) created in 2003 to the United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB) in 2004.

Similar examples of institutional settings between UN and ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) were the transformations of ECOMOG (ECOWAS Monitoring Group) in Liberia and Sierra Leone to the UN peacekeeping missions (UNAMSIL [United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone] in 1999 and UNMIL [United Nations Mission in Liberia] in 2003). It should be noted that ECOWAS formed ECOMIB (ECOWAS Mission in Guinee-Bissau) to intervene in Guinea-Bissau in 2013. In 2017, ECOWAS intervened in Gambia and established ECOMIG (ECOWAS Mission in Gambia). In West Africa, ECOWAS has been actively engaged in peace operations in cooperation with the United Nations and AU.

MINUSMA (United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission

in Mali) was established in 2013 following the activities of AFISMA (African-led International Support Mission to Mali) organized by ECOWAS. MINUSCA (United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic) was established based on the function of MISCA (Mission internationale de soutien à la Centrafrique sous conduite africaine) organized by AU. While the United Nations peacekeeping operations have not been formed in Somalia since UN's withdrawal from the country in the 1990s, AU's AMISOM (African Union Mission in Somalia) has been active since 2007. UN has been taking a support role since 2009 with UNSOA (United Nations Support Office for AMISOM) and since 2015 with UNSOS (United Nations Support Office in Somalia) as well as UNSOM (United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia), a political mission established in 2013.

MONUSCO (UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo) initiated a special military function called FIB (Force Intervention Brigade) in 2013. The FIB was actually formed by the members of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), although it was part of MONUSCO in the formal institutional structure. It was a function initiated by the African sub-regional organization to take robust actions against hostile factions in the eastern part of DRC, while intentionally incorporated within the UN mission.

UNMISS (UN Mission in the Republic of South Sudan) has the function of MVM (Monitoring and Verification Mechanism) of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) within its structure, which constitutes another pattern of partnership between UN and (sub-)regional organizations. Furthermore, it should be noted that AU set up the Regional Co-operation Initiative for the Elimination of the Lord's Resistance Army (RCI-LRA) in the Great Lakes region to reinforce countermeasures against LRA. In a similar vein, MNJTF (Multinational Joint Task Force) was established for the purpose of countering Boko Haram.

There are no uniform standards among the various examples of these partnership operations. The current situation is that partnership cases have been created in ad-hoc manners, depending on the needs of each situation. As partnership styles arose out of practical needs, there is no uniform standards. At the same time, however, these examples show that there are great needs for flexible and creative

partnerships due to the different circumstances on the ground.

While there is no uniform standard, however, it may be possible to classify these cases into several patterns. It is possible to classify the above-mentioned cases into two major patterns of “sequential partnership” and “functional partnerships”.¹¹⁾ *Sequential partnership* is a pattern in which the UN takes over the activities of (sub-)regional organizations. Some of the recent examples like MINUSMA and MINUSCA are typical examples of this pattern. This pattern is observed, as (sub-)regional organizations are swifter than UN in deploying a mission to the field, but UN can mobilize more financial and political resources. *Functional partnership* is a pattern in which the UN and (sub-)regional organizations share the same organizational structure with different functions respectively. The division of labor is created in accordance with different capacities and different interests of multiple partners. For instance, the case of UNMISS shows that while UN provides a wider platform for comprehensive assistances for the peace process and humanitarian aid, IGAD takes the lead role in mediation for peace agreements. The “hybrid partnership” found at UNAMID is a very special case, and it is unlikely that the same pattern will be tried in the future.

2 . Regional Discrepancies of International Peace Operations

In this way, regional organizations are actively engaged in peace operations in Europe and Africa. The UN is not heavily involved in the case of Europe, but regional organizations tend to take lead roles. In the case of Africa, there are various types of partnership operations ranging from hybrid partnership to sequential and functional patterns of partnerships. The same troops engaged in the activities of the (sub-)regional organizations in Africa tend to remain in the UN mission with new blue helmets.

However, the progress of partnership peacekeeping is significant only in Africa. Currently, given that approximately 80% of UN peacekeeping operations are dispatched to the African continent, the importance of Africa is immeasurable for UN peacekeeping operations. Only in such an environment has partnership

peacekeeping developed; or because of such a partnership environment there are so many peacekeeping operations in Africa.

Regional disparities in international peace operations reflect regional disparities in the situation of armed conflict and also the geopolitical nature of contemporary international politics. If we look at the outside of Europe and Africa, things are very different. In the Middle East, there is no regional organization that is functionally engaged in peace operations. The air strikes in Yemen being carried out by the Gulf States led by Saudi Arabia are simply a case of military intervention conducted by a group of states derived from a regional organization. It is also apparent that despite the international attention toward the war in Syria, there is no regional organization working for a field operation and even mediation. The Middle East has become a vacuum zone for international peace operations. It can be safely assumed that the intensity of wars and the political complexity of relationships among regional actors and extra-regional powers have been preventing any operations from coming into existence.

South Asia has not yet seen any substantive development of partnership style peace operations. Afghanistan hosted a peacekeeping operation in the form of ISAF which originally consisted of NATO forces. But there was no regional engagement and now ISAF has gone. There is no element of partnership styles over Kashmir where the tension between India and Pakistan is so high. SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation) is still not capable of conducting a peace operation as its initiative. South Asia is also becoming a vacuum zone for international peace operations, along with the Middle East.

In Southeast Asia, ASEAN (Association of South-East Asian Nations) has a great record of diplomatic interactions to build trust among member countries. But the organization is not ready to conduct active peace operations. Levels of interests in peace operations among member countries drastically differ. In the first place the number of armed conflicts has declined in this region with the achievements of improvement in political stability and dramatic economic development. This is a region where the UN is starting to lose its need to intervene. With the exceptions of Cambodia as a case of resolution of a Cold-War-oriented conflict after the end of the Cold War and of Timor-Leste as a case of settlement of self-determination, there has

been no more international peace operation in Southeast Asia. This would mean that partnership peace operation is not yet ripe in the region, as it is an advanced version of peace operation.

After the peace agreement was achieved in Aceh, there was limited involvement of ASEAN, but support for the peace agreement process was basically promoted in the form of coordination of bilateral donor efforts. Mindanao's case also shows the tendency of Southeast Asia not to form a peace operation on the ground, but promote and rely on the coordination of bilateral donors.

In Northeast Asia, the war over the Korean Peninsula has not been resolved, and there is no indication of introduction of international peace operations with regional initiatives. In particular, as a region where the United States, one superpower, has huge military bases in Japan and South Korea, while China, the other superpower, can exercise enormous influence in the region. Given the superpowers' veto power in the UN Security Council, Northeast Asia has a structure that makes it difficult to organize an international peace operation. In the first place, Northeast Asia has no substantive regional organization. A regional dialogue mechanism called the "Six-Party Talks" was once formed over the issue of nuclear disarmament in North Korea.

In this way, the different circumstances of different regions led to very divergent development of peace operations. In Europe and Africa various types of partnership peace operations developed with the significant commitment of the UN. In other regions, international peace operations have been stagnated with no element of partnership peace operations. In the first place, there are large regional discrepancies in the spread of armed conflicts. From Asia to Africa where conflicts frequently occur, especially from South Asia though the Middle East to the Sahel in Africa, there are needs for peace operations despite the differences of international responses. But Europe and the Americas have relatively a few conflicts, and thus no great need for peace operations. In the 1990s after the end of the Cold War, the most intensive conflict zone was Sub-Saharan Africa. In the 21st century, the era of "Global War on Terror", the rise of the Islamic extremist forces is creating serious threats to many countries in the Sahel, the Middle East and South Asia.

The background that the United Nations places importance on "partnerships"

is the recognition that even in the era of the largest presence of UN peacekeeping operations in history, the United Nations alone is not able to meet the needs to respond to conflicts worldwide. The international community including international organizations like the United Nations and regional or sub-regional organizations must explore new ways of forming and operationalizing peace operations. In such a circumstance, partnership peace operations have conspicuously emerged in a certain part of the world.

3 . Impact of Doctrinal Shifts of International Peace Operations

Is it the case that partnership peace operations are the reflection of changes in international peace operations? It is possible to analyze the phenomenon of partnership peace operations from the perspective of doctrinal changes.

The United Nations has already clarified that the three principles of peacekeeping have been modified. For instance, the neutrality principle has been replaced with the principle of impartiality.¹²⁾ This could have affected the phenomenon of partnership peace operations. If we apply the principle of neutrality very rigidly, we might hesitate to call for peace operations by neighboring countries even in the form of (sub-)regional organization. The impartiality can be maintained by neighboring countries having political commitments in the country they operate, as long as they comply with principles and standards of international peace operations. The doctrinal shift from neutrality to impartiality apparently facilitated more participation of neighboring countries in international peace operations. Even within the formal structure of UN peacekeeping, many major troop contributing countries are African countries.¹³⁾ If we add the number of peacekeepers working under the command of (sub-)regional organizations, it is apparent that Africans are taking so much care of peace operations in Africa. They can work in Africa without being excluded as a result of fear of violation of neutrality.

The “robustness” of international peace operations as a result of the doctrinal shift of use of force may also be said to be relevant to the rise of partnership peace operations. According to the doctrine of non-use of force except self-defense and

defense of mandate, peacekeepers are now able to use force more often. However, this tends to create the atmosphere that some member countries become hesitant to participate in peace operations. Those countries which are more strongly committed to peace operations should be the neighboring countries which have interests in maintaining peace in their region. The creation of G-5 Sahel in addition to the cases of AMISOM and FIB reiterates this observation. Through partnership peace operations, neighboring countries tend to take roles which are more robust and dangerous than UN's.¹⁴⁾

The doctrinal shift in the principle of consent of parties may have affected international peace operations. The UN now cannot recognize terrorist organizations as official parties to peace agreements. The recent examples of UN peacekeeping operations like MINUSMA and MINUSCA did not require peace agreements between actual conflict parties. The government's consent is the basis of their deployment, while the governments are de fact conflict parties. As a result, UN peacekeepers are attacked more often in these critical peacekeeping missions.¹⁵⁾ Those who are not regarded as parties to possible peace agreements tend to be hostile to the UN, as UN more or less tends to take the side of the government. In a situation in which hostile elements are attacking UN personnel, those member states which are not politically committed to the host country would be more reluctant to deploy their troops to such volatile areas. Then, the UN must more heavily rely on neighboring countries including partnership of their (sub-)regional organizations.

4. UN Charter and the Relationship between UN and Regional Organizations

If the phenomenon of partnership peace operations is a reflection of changes in international peace operations, is it the case that the phenomenon is also a reflection of changes in overall international security?

This question entails subtle elements. It should be true that the phenomenon of partnership peace operations appeared in response to changing nature of international security. But this does not mean that the phenomenon is a deviation from the existing framework of international order.

As we have observed, the phenomenon of partnership peace operations is the consequence of the expansion and robustness of contemporary international peace operations. UN peacekeeping operations themselves have expanded and become more robust. But the expectations are so high that other entities like (sub-)regional organizations are mobilized to fill in the gap between the expectations and the reality of UN peacekeeping.

But that is not necessarily the case that this situation is a deviation from the international security system envisioned by the UN Charter. Rather, the Cold-War-period UN peacekeeping was something that the UN Charter did not initially envision. Due to the constraints of the Cold War confrontation between the Western bloc and the Eastern bloc, traditional UN peacekeeping was invented. For example, the “neutrality” principle was such an important principle in the context of the East-West confrontation during the Cold War period. The UN Charter did not advocate the principle of neutrality. Rather, it has a strong value set expressed in the form of goals and principles of the United Nations. For instance, in today’s UN peacekeeping, human rights norms constitute the foundation of values, which navigates the course of operations. Namely, if UN peacekeepers come across grave violations of human rights, they cannot be away from the circumstance by hiding themselves with excuses of neutrality.

The same can be said about partnership. Chapter VIII of the UN Charter consists of provisions for “Regional Arrangement”. Article 52 states that “Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations”. Rather, “The Members of the United Nations entering into such arrangements or constituting such agencies shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council.” “The Security Council shall encourage the development of pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies either on the initiative of the states concerned or by reference from the Security Council.”

According to Article 53, “The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority.” For this use, the Security Council’s permission is a condition, but the premise is that the Security Council must be always well-reported, that is, the Security Council and regional arrangements or regional organizations are closely linked.

Chapter VIII shows that since the establishment of the UN Charter, regional organizations have been assumed to play indispensable roles in the maintenance of international peace and security. It is assumed that the UN and regional organizations are not in conflict or divided in different areas, but rather work together to maintain a common goal of the maintenance of “international peace and security”.

The tendency to neglect the role of regional organizations was born in the East-West confrontation during the Cold War, when both of the Western and Eastern blocs created their own military alliance systems. In the Cold War period, the United States established its own security zone by creating the regional military alliance bloc with South American states and West European states, and the Soviet Union with East European states. Then, the cooperation with regional organizations could mean cooperation with only one of the two military alliance systems. UN peacekeeping was designed as a security measure to be neutral to such bipolar confrontation of the Cold War. Certainly, during the Cold War, it would have been catastrophic for the UN to rely on either NATO or the WTO (Warsaw Treaty Organization). But this Cold War situation was rather a departure from the UN Charter. The involvement of regional organizations for the maintenance of international peace and security is rather a return to the UN Charter.

5. International Security designed in the UN Charter

There is a view that UN must be superior to regional organizations. According to such a view, the phenomenon of partnership peace operations is not desirable; we should rather strengthen UN activities. According to this view, reservations would have to be attached to Chapter VIII and Article 51 of the UN Charter, because the most legitimate way to maintain international peace and security is collective

security by all the members of the United Nations. This view may be characterized as the position of the UN special entity theory. This view might entail romanticism about the United Nations or misunderstanding of the international legal order envisaged by the UN Charter.

For example, the collective right of self-defense as stipulated in Article 51 of the Charter is a typical provision against the UN special entity theory. Certainly, the concept of collective self-defense did not exist before the enactment of the UN Charter. At the time of drafting the Charter, Central and South American countries requested insertion of the right of collective self-defense in order to ensure the legality of OAS (Organization of American States) due to fear of malfunction of the Security Council. However, even the Covenant of the League of Nations of 1919 stipulated that “Nothing in this Covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity of international engagements, such as treaties of arbitration or regional understandings like the Monroe doctrine, for securing the maintenance of peace. the League will not affect regional measures like the Monroe Doctrine” (Article 21). The Covenant implicitly indicated what we now call collective self-defense. In this sense the proposal on collective self-defense eventually envisioned in Article 51 of the UN Charter cannot be said to be a sudden accidental event.

It must be explained that the right of individual and collective self-defense in Article 51 of the UN Charter was a consequence of general illegality of the use of force stipulated in Article 2(4). The use of force is legal, if it is an exercise of the right of self-defense stipulated in Article 51 or Chapter VII authority to exercise collective security. Both collective security and the right of individual and collective self-defense are intended to guarantee countermeasures to protect international order. If there are no such countermeasures, there is no way to deter, prevent, or contain aggressors violating the UN Charter. Collective security and the right of individual and collective self-defense are the measures to maintain international order against potential aggressors by reinforcing general illegality of use of force in international law.

It goes without saying that the right of self-defense in international law is different from the right of self-defense in domestic law. Under domestic law assuming that there is a centralized and unified public law enforcement agency,

there is a legal norm of legitimate self-defense in order to prevent illegality of private emergency evacuation. On the other hand, in international law, the highest law enforcement agencies are individual sovereign states, and the right of self-defense is itself the use of public power. The UN Security Council, which has special powers based on the UN Charter, is not necessarily a supreme authority against individual states. It is based upon the authority of member states of the UN. The Security Council cannot deny the special authority for maintaining public order that member states have as sovereign states. The Security Council's role is to recognize threats to international peace and security and introduce measures against the threats. The right of individual and collective self-defense is also intended to introduce measures against the threats. Both are intended to work against common threats.

Denying the right of self-defense of member states would lead to denying the basic character of the UN Charter. Denying the role of regional arrangements or regional organizations formed by member states leads to denying the basic character of the UN Charter. If so, partnership between the UN and (sub-)regional organizations should be a reflection of the structure of the UN Charter; it is by no means a deviation from it.

6. Multi-layered International Security

Unconsciously adopting “domestic analogy” and assuming inferiority of international law to domestic law is a dangerous attitude in analyzing international society. The assumption of the existence of a central government that “monopolizes legitimate violence” in domestic society is not applicable to international society. The security mechanism assumed by actual international law is not based on such “domestic analogy”. As already mentioned, even after the establishment of the UN Charter system, the highest power in international law lies with individual sovereign states. It is not surprising that this mechanism is different from the security mechanism of domestic society.

It can be said that one of the major differences between international society

and domestic society is the plural nature of the security system. Thus, partnership peace operations are not the deviation from international security order; it is in line with the UN Charter and the basic structure of international security. During the efforts of the three layers of security measures, namely, collective security of all the member states, collective self-defense of regional organizations, and individual self-defense of sovereign states. It is true that the patterns of combination of UN, regional organizations and sub-regional organizations are limitless, so it is not really correct to say “three layers”. It should be the case that multilayered international security measures coexist based upon the three layers of legal structure. The UN Charter planned the security arrangement as such from the beginning.

Conclusion

This paper has highlighted the remarkable trend of partnership peace operations. It has focused on the recent changes in UN peacekeeping operations and has attempted to explore the meaning and background of the trend. This paper has given an overview of the current status of partnership peace operations illustrated by the summary description of armed conflicts in the contemporary world. This paper has also argued that partnership peace operations have a very different character compared to the traditional UN peacekeeping. This paper has thus argued that partnership peace operations could be described as a move back to the mechanism that the United Nations Charter originally envisaged. Based on the basic structure of the international community and the structure of international law, a multi-layered security system is the standard, and partnership peace activities are in line with the basic structure of international security.

- ¹⁾ The argument was also provided in Japanese language as Hideaki Shinoda, “Multi-layered International Security and the Transformation of International Peace Operations”, *Kokuren Kenkyu* (United Nations Studies), vol. 20, 2019, pp. 29-51.
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- ⁹⁾ UN Website “Action for Peacekeeping (A4P)” “Thematic Consultations” <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/action-for-peacekeeping-a4p> (accessed 8 October 2019).
- ¹⁰⁾ EU “Ongoing Missions and Operations” <http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/index_en.htm>; NATO, “Operations and Missions: Past and Present” <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_52060.htm>; OSCE “Field Operations” <<http://www.osce.org/where>>.
- ¹¹⁾ See Hideaki Shinoda, “Peace-building and State-building from the Perspective of the Historical Development of International Society,” *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, Volume 18, Issue 1, 1 January 2018, Pages 25–43.

¹²⁾ United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines (Capstone Doctrine), United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, 2008, pp. 33-34.

¹³⁾ “United Nations Peacekeeping”, “Troop and police contributors” <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/troop-and-police-contributors> (accessed 8 October 2019) .

¹⁴⁾ See Paul D. Williams, *Fighting for Peace in Somalia: A History and Analysis of the African Union Mission (AMISOM), 2007 – 2017* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018).

¹⁵⁾ See “United Nations Peacekeeping”, “Fatalities” <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/fatalities> (accessed 8 October 2019)